Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, doing business as Spencer Brook Strings (SBS), rented string instruments to students in the Concord-Carlisle Regional School District. In 2011, the school district invited vendors of string instruments to bid to rent instruments to the parents of children in the school district and selected Music and Arts (M&A) as the winning bid. The school district then published on school Web sites a letter advising parents that M&A was the music rental company for Concord public schools. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that, by providing M&A with their "endorsement" and by failing to advertise SBS as a participating music rental company, Defendants had used their official positions to secure for M&A unwarranted privileges not available to similarly situated individuals in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, 23(b)(2)(ii). The judge denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a finding of a violation of chapter 268A, 23(b)(2)(ii) by the State Ethics Commission after an adjudicatory proceeding and a request for rescission by the municipal agency were prerequisites to the filing of a complaint seeking rescission under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, 23(a); and (2) neither prerequisite was met in this case. View "Leder v. Superintendent of Schs." on Justia Law

The Fall River zoning board of appeals (Board) granted the C.B.L. Realty Trust (Trust) a variance for certain real property owned by it. The Fall River building inspector subsequently issued a notice of violation, ordering the trust to cease and desist from violating a Fall River zoning ordinance that concerned execution of the ordinance. The Board reversed the building inspector's order. Plaintiff, E & J Properties, LLC, commenced this action in the Land Court challenging the Board's decision. The Land Court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly considered whether the city ordinance had been violated, as alleged in the notice of violation, on account of the Trust's failure to comply with the Board's variance decision within some specified "reasonable time"; and (2) the Board's decision that the variance did not require demolition within a particular time period was both legally tenable and reasonable. View "E & J Props., LLC v. Medas" on Justia Law

This action arose from the Department of Environmental Protection's (Department) issuance of a waterways license under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 91 (chapter 91 license) to the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) to redevelop a section of land owned by the BRA on the seaward end of Long Wharf (project site). Plaintiffs, ten residents of Boston's North End neighborhood, appealed the issuance of the chapter 91 license, claiming the Department acted unconstitutionally and beyond its statutory authority when it issued the license without obtaining two-thirds vote of the Legislature as required by article 97 of the amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. After the a Department's office of appeals affirmed the issuance of the license, the superior court ordered declaratory relief and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Department to enforce article 97. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that article 97 did not apply to the project site, and therefore, a two-thirds vote of the Legislature was not required to approve the planned development. Remanded. View "Mahajan v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiff received housing assistance through the Massachusetts rental voucher program. Plaintiff rented an apartment in Chelsea and received her voucher through the Chelsea Housing Authority. In 2009, Plaintiff received notice from the Authority that it was terminating her voucher because she did not report changes in family composition and in the family's income within thirty days of the change as required by the conditions of her voucher. After a hearing, the Authority's grievance panel upheld the termination. The Board of Commissioners affirmed, as did the superior court and appeals court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was unlawful for the Authority to proceed to the grievance panel hearing without first offering Plaintiff the opportunity to engage in settlement negotiations; (2) the regulations Plaintiff was found to have violated were impermissibly vague; and (3) the grievance panel's factual findings were insufficient. Remanded. View "Rivas v. Chelsea Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

An LLC filed an application for a comprehensive permit with the zoning board of appeals to build five three-story buildings with 150 rental apartments. The board denied the application. On appeal, the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) vacated the board's decision and directed the board to issue a comprehensive permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HAC did not err in calculating the regional need for low and moderate income housing; (2) substantial evidence supported the HAC's determination that the fire safety concern outweighed the regional need for low and moderate income housing; (3) the HAC did not err in concluding that the town need not acquire a ladder fire truck if the project were built and that other claims of adverse fiscal impact arising from the project may not be considered in evaluating whether the denial of project approval is consistent with local needs; (4) substantial evidence supported the HAC's determination that the development would not adequately protect wetlands; and (5) the HAC did not err in ordering the board to refund the fee it assessed the LLC to pay for the service's of the board's legal counsel. View "Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sunderland v. Sugarbush Meadow, LLC" on Justia Law

Hollis Hills, LLC filed an application for a comprehensive permit with the zoning board of appeals of Lunenberg to build condominium units in townhouses. The board denied the application. The Massachusetts housing appeals committee (HAC) set aside the board's decision and directed the board to issue a comprehensive permit. The superior court affirmed the HAC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the HAC's finding that the existing subsidized housing in the region did not adequately address the regional need for housing; (2) substantial evidence supported the HAC's conclusion that the proposed project was not inconsistent with the town's master planning and would not undermine those plans; (3) the HAC did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the balance of interests under the circumstances favored the regional need for affordable housing rather than the local concern of a zoning noncomformity; and (4) the HAC did not err in not staying the proceedings until the Governor had appointed a fifth member to the HAC. View "Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lunenburg v. Housing Appeals Comm." on Justia Law

After allegations of professional misconduct, the Board of Registration of Social Workers suspended Sandra Clark's license to practice as a licensed independent clinical social worker for five years. A single justice of the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's order. The Supreme Court affirmed the single justice's judgment, holding that the decision of the justice correctly rejected Clark's claims of error, as (1) Clark failed to demonstrate that the Board's decision to suspend her license was not supported by substantial evidence, or that it was arbitrary or capricious or based on any error of law; and (2) the Board's proceedings did not violate Clark's due process rights. View "Clark v. Bd. of Registration of Social Workers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought employment as a police officer with the Boston police department. On three occasions, the department extended conditional offers of appointment to Plaintiff, each of which was contingent upon her successful completion of a psychological screening process. On each occasion, department psychiatrists found Plaintiff psychologically unqualified for the job and bypassed her for appointment as a police officer. The civil service commission concluded that the department failed to meet its burden of establishing a reasonable justification for bypassing Plaintiff and ordered that her name be restored to the department's list of individuals certified for appointment. The superior court vacated the commission's order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the superior court correctly found that the commission erred in the manner in which it considered expert testimony from another proceeding; but (2) because the commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence independent of this extraneous evidence, the error did not prejudice the department. View "Boston Police Dep't v. Kavaleski" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on Plaintiff's application for direct appellate review of a decision of the superior court affirming a decision of the contributory retirement appeal board. The case required the Court to decide whether the $200 fixed annual compensation threshold set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 3(2)(d) applies to elected officials who are otherwise eligible to become members of the contributory retirement system for public employees and whether health insurance contributions and professional association dues paid on behalf of such an official are to be considered as fixed annual compensation for the purposes of this subsection. The Court affirmed the superior court, holding (1) the $200 threshold applies to "any person," including an elected official, otherwise eligible for membership under chapter 32; and (2) the value of health insurance contributions and association dues does not qualify as fixed annual compensation. View "Rotondi v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

This appeal, filed by brothers Gary and Dennis Baasch (Appellants), concerned disputed land located in Howard County. After a bench trial, the district court for Howard County denied Gary Baasch's counterclaim for quiet title. The court found that husband and wife Paul and Betty Lou Obermiller (Appellees) owned all the land they claimed to own, that the fence constructed by Appellants was on Appellees' land, and that Gary Baasch did not own any of the disputed land. The court also found that Appellants had trespassed, ordered them to remove the fence, and enjoined them from blocking access to the land owned by Appellees. The Supreme Court vacated the board's decision, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) Appellees were the rightful owners of the disputed land; (2) because Appellees owned the land, Appellants' intentional installation of a fence on the land constituted a continuous trespass; and (3) Appellees were entitled to an injunction. Remanded. View "Schoeller v. Bd. of Registration of Funeral Dirs. & Embalmers" on Justia Law