Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law

Philip Sanders filed a petition in the District Court for Creek County, alleging that Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC caused the wrongful death of his wife, Brenda Jean Sanders, during her confinement in the Creek County Jail. Brenda Sanders was booked into the jail on October 17, 2016, and her health deteriorated over four weeks. She was transported to a hospital on November 20, 2016, diagnosed with severe sepsis and other conditions, and died the next day.The District Court granted Turn Key's motion to dismiss Sanders' petition, citing immunity under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, and allowed Sanders thirty days to amend his petition. Sanders did not amend and appealed the dismissal. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the District Court's order, but Turn Key filed a petition for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that Sanders' appeal was premature as it challenged an interlocutory order, and appellate jurisdiction was absent. The Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and withdrew it from publication. The Court recast Sanders' petition in error as an application to assume original jurisdiction and a petition for prohibition. The Court concluded that the Governmental Tort Claims Act makes licensed medical professionals "employees" of the state when under contract with city, county, or state entities and providing medical care to inmates or detainees. The Court assumed original jurisdiction and denied the petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Sanders v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC" on Justia Law

Shanta Webster filed a complaint in the Grenada County Circuit Court against the University of Mississippi Medical Center-Grenada (UMMC-Grenada) and Drs. Aimee Watts and Kimberly Farmer, alleging medical negligence in the performance of a hysterectomy and post-operative care. Webster served the complaint to Dr. Watts, Dr. Farmer, and Dodie McElmurry, the CEO of UMMC-Grenada. The defendants requested an extension to answer the complaint and later claimed immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Webster argued that service of process was proper under Rule 4(d)(8) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.The Grenada County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that service of process was improper because it was not made to the Attorney General as required by Rule 4(d)(5) for state institutions. Webster appealed the dismissal, maintaining that UMMC-Grenada is a community hospital and that service on the CEO was sufficient.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and upheld the trial court's decision. The court found that UMMC-Grenada is not a separate entity but a part of UMMC, a state institution. Therefore, service of process should have been made to the Attorney General under Rule 4(d)(5). Webster failed to serve the Attorney General within the 120-day period required by Rule 4(h), rendering the service invalid. Additionally, the court noted that Drs. Watts and Farmer, acting within the scope of their employment, were immune from personal liability under the MTCA.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal, concluding that proper service of process was not effected, and the individual defendants were immune from liability. View "Webster v. University of Mississippi Medical Center Grenada" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Norene Rodríguez and Iris Rodríguez, sued Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of San Juan, Inc. and Dr. José Báez Córdova for medical malpractice related to the treatment of their mother, Gloria Rodríguez González, who died after being treated for COVID-19. They alleged negligence in her care, particularly in failing to provide timely prophylactic medication for deep vein thrombosis, which they claimed led to her death.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any genuine issue of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court also found that Dr. Báez was immune from suit under Puerto Rico law, as he was acting within his duties as a faculty member of the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) at the time of the alleged malpractice. Consequently, Encompass could not be held vicariously liable for his actions. The plaintiffs' remaining claims were deemed waived for lack of development.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Dr. Báez was immune from suit under Puerto Rico law, as he was acting in his capacity as a UPR faculty member supervising medical residents. The court also upheld the district court's application of the local anti-ferret rule, which disregarded certain facts not adequately supported by specific citations to the record. The plaintiffs' argument that Encompass was vicariously liable for the actions of other non-immune personnel was deemed waived, as it was not raised in the lower court. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing. View "Rodriguez v. Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of San Juan, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death lawsuit filed by the executors and an independent administrator of the estates of deceased residents of a nursing home, Geneva Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, doing business as Bria Health Services of Geneva. The plaintiffs allege that Bria negligently and willfully failed to control the spread of COVID-19, leading to the deaths of the decedents between March and May 2020. The complaints assert that Bria's failure to quarantine symptomatic staff and residents and to implement effective hygiene and equipment procedures caused the decedents to contract COVID-19 and die from related complications.The Kane County Circuit Court denied Bria's motions to dismiss the negligence claims but allowed Bria to file a motion to certify a question for interlocutory appeal. The certified question was whether Executive Order 2020-19 provided blanket immunity for ordinary negligence to healthcare facilities that rendered assistance to the State during the COVID-19 pandemic. The appellate court modified the question to clarify that the immunity in question derived from section 21(c) of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act and answered the modified question affirmatively, stating that Bria would have immunity from negligence claims if it could show it was rendering assistance to the State during the pandemic.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the appellate court's modification of the certified question. The court held that Executive Order 2020-19, which triggered the immunity provided in section 21(c) of the Act, grants immunity for ordinary negligence claims to healthcare facilities that rendered assistance to the State during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court affirmed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether Bria was indeed rendering such assistance. View "James v. Geneva Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Mark Glen Spencer died from sepsis two days after a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Lana Nelson at Norman Regional Medical Authority. Spencer's brother, Jimmy Wayne Spencer, acting as the Special Administrator of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against the hospital and Dr. Nelson, alleging negligent and grossly negligent treatment. The hospital delayed providing complete medical records, which were essential for evaluating the claim.The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the potential claim before the statutory deadline and that Dr. Nelson, as a hospital employee, was immune from individual liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the discovery rule did not apply to wrongful death claims under the GTCA and that Dr. Nelson could not be individually sued for actions within the scope of her employment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions arising from medical negligence under the GTCA. It also ruled that governmental employees have no immunity under the GTCA for gross negligence or acts outside the scope of employment. The court found that the trial court erred in making factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and that it should have taken the plaintiff's allegations as true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "SPENCER v. NELSON" on Justia Law

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY" on Justia Law

Bruce Kelley and his spouse, Nancy Kelley, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Vermont state court after Bruce Kelley was paralyzed from the waist down while residing at Franklin County Rehabilitation Center (FCRC). They alleged that Dr. Teig Marco, employed by Richford Health Center, Inc. (RHC), negligently treated Kelley, leading to his paralysis. RHC is a federally funded community health center deemed a member of the Public Health Service under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA).The United States intervened and removed the case to federal district court, asserting that RHC and Dr. Marco were covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) due to their deemed status. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the FSHCAA did not apply to Dr. Marco’s treatment of Kelley because Kelley was not a patient of RHC, and the treatment did not fall under the specified statutory criteria for nonpatients. Consequently, the District Court remanded the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Kelley was not a patient of RHC and that Dr. Marco’s treatment did not meet the criteria for FTCA coverage for nonpatients under the FSHCAA. The court concluded that the treatment did not qualify as after-hours coverage or emergency treatment and that RHC had not sought a particularized determination of coverage from the Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore, the remand to state court was appropriate, and the District Court's order was affirmed. View "Kelley v. Richford Health Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Arasely Soto, a public school teacher, was injured during a routine medical procedure and had to retire. She sued her medical providers for malpractice and also sought disability retirement benefits from the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). She and her husband, Raul Soto, settled with several of the medical malpractice defendants. CalSTRS brought an action against the Sotos, seeking to enforce its right to subrogation or reimbursement from the Sotos' settlement with the malpractice defendants.The trial court granted CalSTRS’s motion for summary adjudication on its declaratory relief cause of action and denied the Sotos’ motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that CalSTRS was entitled to seek reimbursement from the Sotos and rejected the Sotos’ defense that Civil Code section 3333.1 bars any subrogation claim that CalSTRS would have asserted against the malpractice defendants. The Sotos filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two to vacate the trial court’s orders.The appellate court agreed with CalSTRS’s argument that it has a statutory reimbursement claim against the Sotos, and the evidence in this case does not support application of section 3333.1 to bar CalSTRS’s claim. The court denied the Sotos' petition for writ of mandate. View "Soto v. Superior Court" on Justia Law