Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of East Lansing entered into an agreement with the Lansing Board of Water and Light (LBWL) in 2016, which included a franchise fee to be charged to LBWL consumers residing within the City. The fee was collected by LBWL and remitted to the City. Plaintiff James Heos, representing a class of LBWL consumers, filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the franchise fee was an illegal tax under the Michigan Constitution's Headlee Amendment and other state laws.The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the plaintiff on most counts, ruling that the franchise fee was an illegal tax. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed this decision, directing the trial court to grant summary disposition in favor of the City, concluding that the plaintiff was not a taxpayer and thus his claim was time-barred.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the franchise fee was indeed a tax because it was used for general revenue-raising purposes, was not proportionate to any costs incurred by the City, and was not voluntary. The Court further held that the plaintiff was a taxpayer because the legal incidence of the fee fell on the LBWL consumers, not LBWL itself. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff to pursue his Headlee Amendment claim. View "Heos v. City Of East Lansing" on Justia Law

The case involves two groups of plaintiffs challenging several provisions in a 2022 manual issued by the Secretary of State, which provided instructions for election challengers and poll watchers. The plaintiffs argued that the provisions conflicted with the Michigan Election Law or required formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court of Claims consolidated the cases and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on several points, finding that certain provisions of the manual were invalid under Michigan law.The Court of Claims found that the manual's requirements for election-challenger credentials, the communication restrictions between challengers and election inspectors, the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible, and the prohibition of electronic devices in absent voter ballot processing facilities violated the Michigan Election Law. The court ordered the Secretary of State to either rescind or revise the manual to comply with its opinion. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and issued a mixed ruling. The court held that the Secretary of State has the authority to require a uniform form for election-challenger credentials and that this requirement does not conflict with the Michigan Election Law. The court also upheld the manual's communication restrictions, except for the requirement that challengers at absent voter ballot processing facilities must raise issues to a challenger liaison who is not an election inspector. The court found that the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible was generally lawful but invalidated the provision allowing a challenger liaison to deem a challenge impermissible based on their assessment of its validity. The court declared the challenge to the prohibition of electronic devices moot due to subsequent statutory amendments and vacated the lower court's opinions on that issue. View "O'Halloran v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the issuance of medical marijuana dispensary licenses in the city of Warren. In 2019, the Warren City Council adopted an ordinance to regulate these licenses, which involved a Review Committee scoring and ranking applications. The Review Committee held 16 closed meetings to review 65 applications and made recommendations to the city council, which then approved the top 15 applicants without further discussion. Plaintiffs, who were denied licenses, sued, alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) and due process.The Macomb Circuit Court found that the Review Committee violated the OMA and invalidated the licenses issued by the city council. The court held that the Review Committee was a public body subject to the OMA and that the city council's approval process was flawed. Defendants and intervening defendants appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Review Committee was not a public body under the OMA because it only had an advisory role, and the city council retained final decision-making authority. The appellate court also upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' due process claims.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the Review Committee was a public body subject to the OMA because it effectively decided which applicants would receive licenses by scoring and ranking them, and the city council merely adopted these recommendations without independent consideration. The court emphasized that the actual operation of the Review Committee, rather than just the language of the ordinance, determined its status as a public body. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the open meetings held by the Review Committee cured the OMA violations and to address other preserved issues. View "Pinebrook Warren LLC v. City Of Warren" on Justia Law

In 2018, Michigan's Legislature received initiative petitions proposing the Improved Workforce Opportunity Wage Act and the Earned Sick Time Act. The Legislature adopted these initiatives without changes, preventing them from appearing on the ballot. However, during the lame duck session after the election, the Legislature significantly amended both laws, effectively nullifying their original intent.The plaintiffs challenged these amendments in the Court of Claims, arguing they were unconstitutional under Article 2, § 9 of the Michigan Constitution. The Court of Claims agreed, ruling that the Legislature could not adopt and then amend an initiative in the same session. The court declared the amendments void and reinstated the original initiatives. The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the Legislature could amend an initiative in the same session since the Constitution did not explicitly prohibit it.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Article 2, § 9 provides the Legislature with only three options upon receiving a valid initiative petition: adopt it without change, reject it, or propose an alternative to be voted on alongside the original. The Court ruled that adopting and then amending an initiative in the same session violated the people's right to propose and enact laws through the initiative process. Consequently, the amendments were declared unconstitutional. The Court ordered that the original initiatives would go into effect 205 days after the opinion's publication, with adjustments for inflation and a revised schedule for minimum wage increases. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed. View "Mothering Justice v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves the Michigan Farm Bureau and other agricultural entities challenging new conditions imposed by the Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) in a 2020 general permit for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs). The new conditions included stricter limits on phosphorus application, setback requirements, and a presumptive ban on waste application during certain months. The plaintiffs argued that these conditions exceeded EGLE’s statutory authority, were contrary to state and federal law, lacked factual justification, were arbitrary and capricious, unconstitutional, and invalid due to procedural failures under the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act (APA).Initially, the plaintiffs sought a contested-case hearing to challenge the permit but then filed for declaratory judgment in the Court of Claims. EGLE moved for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies. The Court of Claims agreed, dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision but held that the plaintiffs could seek a declaratory judgment under MCL 24.264, provided they first requested a declaratory ruling from EGLE, which they had not done.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 2020 general permit and its discretionary conditions were not "rules" under the APA because EGLE lacked the statutory authority to issue rules related to NPDES permits for CAFOs. Consequently, the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 24.264. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals but vacated its holding that the discretionary conditions were rules. The Court emphasized that EGLE must genuinely evaluate the necessity of discretionary conditions in individual cases and that these conditions do not have the force and effect of law. View "Michigan Farm Bureau v. Dept. Of Environment Great Lakes And Energy" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, current or retired public school superintendents and administrators, filed a lawsuit against the Office of Retirement Services (ORS) alleging that ORS violated the Public School Employees Retirement Act by using salary schedules it created to determine their retirement allowances. The plaintiffs, who worked under personal employment contracts rather than collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), argued that the Retirement Act did not authorize ORS to create these normal salary increase (NSI) schedules and apply them to their pension calculations.The Court of Claims granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants on all claims except for a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). After cross-motions for summary disposition, the Court of Claims also ruled in favor of the defendants on the APA claim. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ORS lacked statutory authority to create NSI schedules and that MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) did not apply to employees under personal employment contracts. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the lack of authority for ORS to create NSI schedules but reversed the Court of Appeals' interpretation of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), remanding the case for further proceedings.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the term "normal salary schedule" is a written document established by statute or approved by a reporting unit’s governing body, indicating the time and sequence of compensation, and applying to a generally applicable job classification rather than a specific employee. The Court clarified that this term is not limited to CBAs and applies to public school employees regardless of their employment contract type. The case was remanded to the Court of Claims to determine whether the plaintiffs were subject to a normal salary schedule as defined. View "Batista v. Office Of Retirement Services" on Justia Law

Cleveland Stegall was employed at an FCA vehicle assembly plant through a staffing agency, Brightwing. In late 2015, FCA announced plans to eliminate Stegall’s shift by summer 2016. In April 2016, Stegall raised concerns about asbestos in the workplace to his FCA supervisors, who promised air quality tests but did not provide results. Stegall continued to request the results and threatened to file complaints with OSHA and Michigan OSHA. He was terminated on June 17, 2016, and subsequently filed a discrimination complaint with Michigan OSHA, alleging retaliation for his asbestos concerns.The Oakland Circuit Court granted summary disposition for both defendants, ruling that Stegall’s public-policy claim was preempted by the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) and that internal complaints could not support a public-policy claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the public-policy claim was preempted and could not be based on internal reporting. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that internal reporting could support a public-policy claim and remanded for further consideration of whether the claim was preempted by other laws.On remand, the Court of Appeals concluded that Stegall’s public-policy claim was preempted by OSHA and MiOSHA, as these statutes provided exclusive remedies for retaliation. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the remedies under OSHA and MiOSHA were inadequate and thus not exclusive. Therefore, Stegall’s public-policy claim was not preempted. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Stegall’s claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Stegall V Resource Technology Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves Daniel L. Renner, a groundskeeper for Saginaw County, Michigan, who was part of a bargaining unit represented by the Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Association of Michigan (the Union). Renner opted out of dues-paying membership with the Union in 2017. In 2018, Renner filed a complaint with his employer, alleging that a coworker smoked around him, which was injurious to his health. When Renner attempted to commence a formal grievance procedure, he was informed that only the Union could pursue the grievance procedure. The Union, however, required Renner to pay a fee for its assistance with the grievance under its pay-for-service policy for nonmembers. Renner refused to pay the fee, the Union did not provide assistance, and the deadline for pursuing the grievance expired.Renner filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) against the Union, alleging that the Union violated its duty of fair representation by refusing to represent him in a grievance with his employer unless Renner paid a fee for direct representation services. An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of Renner, concluding that the direct service fee was not permitted under the public employment relations act (PERA) or the collective bargaining agreement and that it constituted an unfair labor practice. MERC adopted the decision of the ALJ, and the Union appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed MERC’s decision.The Union sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted the Union’s application in part. The Supreme Court held that under the 2014 version of PERA, a public sector union that is the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit violates the union’s duty of fair representation by requiring an employee in that bargaining unit who is not a member of the union to pay a fee for the union’s representative services when the union’s pay-for-service policy denies the nonmember employee access to the grievance administration process under the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the decision of MERC. View "Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Assn v. Renner" on Justia Law

Vectren Infrastructure Services Corporation, the successor in interest to Minnesota Limited, Inc. (ML), sued the Department of Treasury (the Department) in the Michigan Court of Claims, alleging that the Department had improperly assessed a tax deficiency against ML after auditing ML’s Michigan Business Tax returns for 2010 and part of 2011. Following an audit, the Department determined that ML had improperly included its gain from a sale of its assets in the sales-factor denominator, resulting in an overstatement of its total sales and the reduction of its Michigan tax liability. The auditor excluded ML’s sale of assets from the sales factor and included it in ML’s preapportioned tax base, which increased ML’s sales factor from 14.9860% to 69.9761% and consequently increased its tax liability. ML asked the Department for an alternative apportionment for the period in 2011 before the sale, January 1, 2011 to March 31, 2011 (the short year), but the Department denied ML’s request and determined that ML had not overcome the presumption that the statutory apportionment fairly represented ML’s business activity in Michigan for the short year. The Court of Appeals ultimately held the Court of Claims had correctly analyzed the relevant statutes and applied the apportionment formula; however, the Court of Appeals concluded that Vectren was entitled to an alternative apportionment because applying the formula extended Michigan’s taxing powers beyond their acceptable scope, and ordered the parties to work together to determine an alternative method of apportionment. The Michigan Supreme Court held: (1) the income from the asset sale was properly attributable under the MBTA; and (2) the MBTA formula, as applied, did not impermissibly tax income outside the scope of Michigan’s taxing powers. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Vectren Infrastructure Services Corp v. Department Of Treasury" on Justia Law

Two freelance journalists, Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, brought separate actions at the Michigan Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC), arguing that the MDOC wrongfully denied their requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs sought video and audio recordings of a prisoner altercation that resulted in the death of inmate Dustin Szot. The MDOC denied their FOIA requests, claiming the records were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs and the MDOC both moved for summary judgment. The Court of Claims ordered the MDOC to disclose the audio recording to plaintiffs and to produce the videos for an in camera review. The trial court permitted the MDOC to submit the videos in a format that obscured the faces of the employees and prisoners in the videos to protect those individuals. However, the MDOC provided the unredacted videos for in camera review. The Court of Claims ultimately ordered the MDOC to disclose the unredacted videos to plaintiffs. The MDOC moved for reconsideration, arguing that it did not need to disclose the videos or, alternatively, that it should have been allowed to redact the videos by blurring the faces of the individuals in the videos. The Court of Claims denied the motion but nevertheless permitted the MDOC to make the requested redactions and permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to view both the redacted and unredacted videos. Plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s reduced amount of attorney fees and the denial of punitive damages. The MDOC cross-appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs prevailed in full and thus were entitled to attorney fees under FOIA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined plaintiffs prevailed under MCL 15.240(6) because the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records and because plaintiffs obtained everything they initially sought; accordingly, the court was required to award reasonable attorney fees. Furthermore, pro bono representation was not an appropriate factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees; accordingly, the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing the attorney-fee award to plaintiffs' law firm on the basis of the firm's pro bono representation of plaintiffs. View "Woodman v. Department Of Corrections" on Justia Law