Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In four cases, each involving a ballot proposal to amend the Michigan Constitution, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the groups proposing the amendments properly exercised their right to petition for constitutional amendments in compliance with the constitutional and statutory safeguards. Upon review of the cases, the Court reaffirmed prior caselaw holding that an existing provision is only altered when the amendment actually adds to, deletes from, or changes the wording of the provision. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that an amendment only abrogates an existing provision when it renders that provision wholly inoperative. Applying the meanings of "alter" and "abrogate" to the cases at issue, the Court concluded that none of the ballot proposals altered an existing provision of the Constitution because none of them actually "add to, delete from, or change the existing wording of the provision . . . ." View "Protect Our Jobs v. Bd. of State Canvassers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger on a bus operated by the Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) when the bus was involved in an accident. Plaintiff filed an application for no-fault benefits with SMART's insurer soon thereafter, but waited more than seven months to notify SMART that she might pursue liability in tort. SMART moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the notice provision of the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act required notice of plaintiff’s tort claims within 60 days of the accident as a condition precedent to maintaining those claims. The circuit court granted SMART partial summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review of the applicable statute and Plaintiff's appeal brief, the Supreme Court concluded that notice of plaintiff’s application for no-fault insurance benefits, even when supplemented with SMART’s presumed "institutional knowledge" of the underlying facts of the injury, did not constitute written notice of a third-party tort claim against SMART sufficient to comply with MCL 124.419. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "Atkins v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transp." on Justia Law

Christina McCahan was injured in an automobile accident on the campus of the University of Michigan in 2007. The other driver, Samuel K. Brennan, was driving a car owned by the university and was on university business at the time. In 2008, McCahan’s counsel sent a letter to the university indicating that counsel intended to represent McCahan in a lawsuit concerning the accident. After McCahan brought the action against Brennan and the University of Michigan Regents in the Court of Claims, the university moved for summary judgment on the basis that the notice of intent had not been filed within the six-month period provided in MCL 600.6431(3). The court agreed with the university and granted summary judgment in its favor. McCahan appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly determined that when the Legislature conditions the ability to pursue a claim against the state on a plaintiff’s having filed specific statutory notice, the courts may not require an "actual prejudice" component onto the statute as a precondition to enforcing the legislative prohibition: "such statutory notice requirements must be interpreted and enforced as plainly written and that no judicially created saving construction is permitted to avoid a clear statutory mandate." View "McCahan v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stand Up for Democracy petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of State Canvassers to certify its referendum petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot. Intervening defendant Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility, challenged the certification of plaintiff’s referendum petition, alleging that it failed to comply with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) and that the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby technical deficiencies are resolved in favor of certification, did not apply. The Court of Appeals agreed with both assertions, but concluded it was required to follow its decision in "Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk" and conclude that the petition substantially complied with MCL 168.482(2) and that certification was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, overturning "Bloomfield Charter" and dismissed the case: "because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory term 'shall' and does not, by its plain terms, permit certification of deficient petitions with regard to form or content, a majority of [the] Court [held] that the doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for certification."

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) recommended that the Supreme Court remove Respondent 22nd District Court Judge Sylvia A. James from office for judicial misconduct. Judge James filed a petition asking the Court to reject that recommendation. The evidence established that respondent misappropriated public funds, some of which were intended for victims of crime in the city of Inkster. She inappropriately spent much of this money on self-promoting advertisements and travel expenses for herself and various other court employees. She treated these funds, as the master phrased it, as her own "publicly funded private foundation." In addition, she: (1) denied people access to the court by instituting and enforcing an improper business-attire policy; (2) employed a family member in violation of court policy; and (3) made numerous misrepresentations of fact under oath during the investigation and hearing of this matter. The Court concluded that cumulative effect of respondent's misconduct, coupled with its duration, nature, and pervasiveness meant that respondent was unfit for judicial office. "Although some of her misconduct, considered in isolation, does not justify such a severe sanction, taken as a whole her misconduct rises to a level that requires her removal from office." Therefore, the Court adopted the recommendations of the JTC, except with respect to costs respondent will be ordered to pay, as would be detailed later.

This case involved the issue of the priority of competing liens between a court-appointed receiver and the holder of a first-recorded mortgage on real property located in DeWitt, Michigan. The receiver, Thomas Woods, sought to recover receivership expenses before the holder of the first-recorded mortgage, Dart Bank, satisfied its mortgage interest. In affirming the circuit court's order placing a first-priority lien on the property in the amount of the receiver's expenses, the Court of Appeals relied, in part, on the Supreme Court's decisions in "Bailey v Bailey" and "Fisk v Fisk" and its own decision in "Attica Hydraulic Exchange v Seslar," to hold that because Dart did not object to and benefited from the receivership, it "may be held responsible for the receivership expenses." The Supreme Court granted Dart's application for leave to appeal to determine whether the common-law rule that receivership expenses are entitled to first priority is controlling, notwithstanding that the holder of a prior recorded mortgage is statutorily entitled to priority under MCL 600.3236, and whether a mortgagee must explicitly consent to the receivership before the mortgagee may be required to pay the associated costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court declined to extend the common-law rule to the facts of this case. Rather, the Court held that MCL 600.3236 controlled and, by its plain language, requires that any liens preexisting the mortgage that is the subject of the foreclosure remain in the same order of priority as they existed at the time of the mortgage's execution. The Court also held that a mortgagee that forecloses consistently with MCL 600.3236 may waive its statutory right of priority and, if that occurs, the receiver may be entitled to compensation before the mortgagee, but only if the mortgagee's waiver is explicitly and unequivocally given. Because the Court of Appeals in this case failed to recognize the applicability of MCL 600.3236 and erroneously extended the holdings in "Bailey" and "Fisk" to support its conclusion that even in the absence of affirmative consent, Dart could nevertheless be required to pay the receiver's costs and fees, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of an order releasing the escrow funds in favor of Dart.

The issue in these consolidated cases involved interpretation of the General Property Tax Act. For this case, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Tax Tribunal has the authority to reduce an unconstitutional increase in the taxable value of property when the erroneous taxable value was not challenged in the year of the increase. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Tax Tribunal does have the authority to reduce an unconstitutional previous increase in taxable value for purposes of adjusting a taxable value that was timely challenged in a subsequent year. "The Tax Tribunal Act sets forth the Tax Tribunal's jurisdiction[;] once [. . .] properly invoked, the Tax Tribunal possesses the same powers and duties as those assigned to a March board of review under the GPTA, including the duty to adjust erroneous taxable values to bring the current tax rolls into compliance with the GPTA." Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held that the Tax Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review taxable values in years not under appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to that Court to consider Northville Township's remaining issues on appeal regarding the Tax Tribunal's valuation of the properties.

The issue in these consolidated cases involved interpretation of the General Property Tax Act. For this case, the Supreme Court addressed whether the tax assessor's failure to adjust the taxable value of a parcel of real property in the year immediately following its transfer precluded a March board of review from adjusting the taxable value in a later year. Upon review, the Court held that the failure to adjust the taxable value in the year immediately following the transfer produced an erroneous taxable value because the taxable value was not in compliance with the GPTA. Further, the GPTA did not preclude a March board of review from correcting an erroneous taxable value that resulted from the failure of an assessor to adjust a property's taxable value in the year immediately following its transfer. Accordingly, the Court also held that a March board of review may adjust the erroneous taxable value in a subsequent year in order to bring the current taxable value into compliance with the GPTA. The Court of Appeals held that the error in this case could not be remedied and, therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Michigan Tax Tribunal's decision affirming the March board of review's correction of the tax rolls to reflect the properly adjusted taxable values.

At issue in this case was whether a municipality such as a township could be held responsible under MCL 324.3109(2) of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA)1 for raw sewage discharged into state waters by private citizens within the township's borders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under NREPA, a municipality can be held responsible for, and required to prevent, the discharge when the raw sewage originates within its borders, even when the raw sewage is discharged by a private party and not directly discharged by the municipality itself. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it interpreted MCL 324.3109(2) in a manner that precluded a municipality from being held responsible for such a discharge. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address remaining arguments made on appeal.

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.