Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Michigan Supreme Court
Price v. Kosmalski
This case involved the issue of the priority of competing liens between a court-appointed receiver and the holder of a first-recorded mortgage on real property located in DeWitt, Michigan. The receiver, Thomas Woods, sought to recover receivership expenses before the holder of the first-recorded mortgage, Dart Bank, satisfied its mortgage interest. In affirming the circuit court's order placing a first-priority lien on the property in the amount of the receiver's expenses, the Court of Appeals relied, in part, on the Supreme Court's decisions in "Bailey v Bailey" and "Fisk v Fisk" and its own decision in "Attica Hydraulic Exchange v Seslar," to hold that because Dart did not object to and benefited from the receivership, it "may be held responsible for the receivership expenses." The Supreme Court granted Dart's application for leave to appeal to determine whether the common-law rule that receivership expenses are entitled to first priority is controlling, notwithstanding that the holder of a prior recorded mortgage is statutorily entitled to priority under MCL 600.3236, and whether a mortgagee must explicitly consent to the receivership before the mortgagee may be required to pay the associated costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court declined to extend the common-law rule to the facts of this case. Rather, the Court held that MCL 600.3236 controlled and, by its plain language, requires that any liens preexisting the mortgage that is the subject of the foreclosure remain in the same order of priority as they existed at the time of the mortgage's execution. The Court also held that a mortgagee that forecloses consistently with MCL 600.3236 may waive its statutory right of priority and, if that occurs, the receiver may be entitled to compensation before the mortgagee, but only if the mortgagee's waiver is explicitly and unequivocally given. Because the Court of Appeals in this case failed to recognize the applicability of MCL 600.3236 and erroneously extended the holdings in "Bailey" and "Fisk" to support its conclusion that even in the absence of affirmative consent, Dart could nevertheless be required to pay the receiver's costs and fees, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of an order releasing the escrow funds in favor of Dart.
Toll Northville Limited Partnership v. Township of Northville
The issue in these consolidated cases involved interpretation of the General Property Tax Act. For this case, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Tax Tribunal has the authority to reduce an unconstitutional increase in the taxable value of property when the erroneous taxable value was not challenged in the year of the increase. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Tax Tribunal does have the authority to reduce an unconstitutional previous increase in taxable value for purposes of adjusting a taxable value that was timely challenged in a subsequent year. "The Tax Tribunal Act sets forth the Tax Tribunal's jurisdiction[;] once [. . .] properly invoked, the Tax Tribunal possesses the same powers and duties as those assigned to a March board of review under the GPTA, including the duty to adjust erroneous taxable values to bring the current tax rolls into compliance with the GPTA." Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held that the Tax Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review taxable values in years not under appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to that Court to consider Northville Township's remaining issues on appeal regarding the Tax Tribunal's valuation of the properties.
Michigan Properties, LLC v. Meridian Twp
The issue in these consolidated cases involved interpretation of the General Property Tax Act. For this case, the Supreme Court addressed whether the tax assessor's failure to adjust the taxable value of a parcel of real property in the year immediately following its transfer precluded a March board of review from adjusting the taxable value in a later year. Upon review, the Court held that the failure to adjust the taxable value in the year immediately following the transfer produced an erroneous taxable value because the taxable value was not in compliance with the GPTA. Further, the GPTA did not preclude a March board of review from correcting an erroneous taxable value that resulted from the failure of an assessor to adjust a property's taxable value in the year immediately following its transfer. Accordingly, the Court also held that a March board of review may adjust the erroneous taxable value in a subsequent year in order to bring the current taxable value into compliance with the GPTA. The Court of Appeals held that the error in this case could not be remedied and, therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Michigan Tax Tribunal's decision affirming the March board of review's correction of the tax rolls to reflect the properly adjusted taxable values.
Dept. of Env. Quality v. Worth Twnsp.
At issue in this case was whether a municipality such as a township could be held responsible under MCL 324.3109(2) of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA)1 for raw sewage discharged into state waters by private citizens within the township's borders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under NREPA, a municipality can be held responsible for, and required to prevent, the discharge when the raw sewage originates within its borders, even when the raw sewage is discharged by a private party and not directly discharged by the municipality itself. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it interpreted MCL 324.3109(2) in a manner that precluded a municipality from being held responsible for such a discharge. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address remaining arguments made on appeal.
In re J.L. Gordon, Minor
In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.
In re Honorable James Justin
The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) recommended that the Supreme Court remove Respondent 12th District Court Judge James Justin from office for numerous instances of documented judicial misconduct. Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct evidenced that he failed to follow the law, "apparently believing that it simply did not apply to him." Among the instances cited, Respondent fixed traffic citations issued to himself and his spouse, dismissed cases without hearings, failed to follow plea agreements, and made false statements under oath during the JTC hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court ordered Respondent's removal from office, and that he pay costs, fees and expenses incurred by the JTC in prosecuting its complaint.
Duffy v. Dept. of Natural Resources
Plaintiff Beverly Duffy was injured while riding an off-road vehicle on a trail owned by the State and maintained by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Plaintiff sued both entities, and throughout the litigation brought various theories in an attempt to avoid the grant of governmental immunity to Defendants under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). In the lower courts, Plaintiff argued that Defendant ad a duty to keep the trail in reasonable repair under the "highway exception" to governmental immunity because the trial falls within the statutory definition of "highway." On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the Court should rule that the trail is either a "forest road" or "road" under the GTLA and that the trail falls under the "highway exception." The Court noted that the issue that belies this case is one of first impression. Upon review of state case law and the case record from the lower courts, the Supreme Court concluded that the trail is not a "highway" under Michigan law. Instead, the Court classified it as a "trailway": "all roads, forest roads, trails, trailways and highways in this case lead to the conclusion that Plaintiff's claim is barred by governmental immunity." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that dismissed Plaintiff's case.
Hamed v. Wayne County
At issue in this case is the scope of an employer's vicarious liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether Wayne County and its sheriff's department could be held vicariously liable for a civil rights claim under state law based on the criminal act of a deputy sheriff committed during working hours but plainly beyond the scope of his employment. In 2001, Plaintiff Tara Hamed was arrested for unpaid child support. Because she had outstanding warrants for probation violations in Wayne County, she was transferred to the Wayne County jail. When she arrived, the deputy sheriff subjected her to sexually charged comments and offers for better treatment in exchange for sexual favors. Plaintiff resisted these advances, but she was transferred into an area of the jail not subject to surveillance cameras where she was sexually assaulted. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's harassment claim on the basis that Defendants were not vicariously liable for the criminal acts of sheriff's department employees. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had established a viable quid pro quo harassment claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Defendants could not be held vicariously liable under the traditional principles of respondeat superior because Defendants had no prior knowledge of the deputy's sexually harassing conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court.
Michigan Edu. Ass’n v. Michigan Sec’y of State
The Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA) prohibits a "public body" from using public resources to make a "contribution or expenditure" for political purposes. At issue in this case what whether a public school district's administration of a payroll deduction plan that collects and remits political contributions from its employees to the Michigan Education Association's political action committee violates the MCFA. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that through the administration of a payroll deduction plan that remits funds to a partisan political action committee, a school district makes both a "contribution" and âexpenditure" under the terms of the MCFA.
Beach v. Township of Lima
The dispute in this case stemmed from a disagreement between Plaintiff Florence Beach and Defendant Lima Township over property rights to an area of land that were shown as streets on the recorded township plat. The land was originally recorded in 1835, and through a series of conveyances, was acquired and held by the Beach family ever since. In 2004, the Township purchased several blocks to build a fire department substation and intended to use the platted streets. Plaintiff disputed the Township's right to use the streets and filed an action to quiet title to them based on adverse possession. The circuit court denied the Township's motion after an evidentiary hearing. The court found that 100-year-old trees were growing in the middle of the "streets," and that the Beach family had adversely possessed them by farming as well as maintaining private trials and fences. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Township argued that Plaintiff was required to file a claim under the state Land Division Act (LDA) instead of bringing a quiet title action when the property in dispute is on a recorded plat. The Court found that the LDA only applied to cases when a party's interest arose from the platting process. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's findings that Plaintiff had adversely possessed the platted streets.