Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) recommended that the Supreme Court remove Respondent 12th District Court Judge James Justin from office for numerous instances of documented judicial misconduct. Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct evidenced that he failed to follow the law, "apparently believing that it simply did not apply to him." Among the instances cited, Respondent fixed traffic citations issued to himself and his spouse, dismissed cases without hearings, failed to follow plea agreements, and made false statements under oath during the JTC hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court ordered Respondent's removal from office, and that he pay costs, fees and expenses incurred by the JTC in prosecuting its complaint.

Plaintiff Beverly Duffy was injured while riding an off-road vehicle on a trail owned by the State and maintained by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Plaintiff sued both entities, and throughout the litigation brought various theories in an attempt to avoid the grant of governmental immunity to Defendants under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). In the lower courts, Plaintiff argued that Defendant ad a duty to keep the trail in reasonable repair under the "highway exception" to governmental immunity because the trial falls within the statutory definition of "highway." On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the Court should rule that the trail is either a "forest road" or "road" under the GTLA and that the trail falls under the "highway exception." The Court noted that the issue that belies this case is one of first impression. Upon review of state case law and the case record from the lower courts, the Supreme Court concluded that the trail is not a "highway" under Michigan law. Instead, the Court classified it as a "trailway": "all roads, forest roads, trails, trailways and highways in this case lead to the conclusion that Plaintiff's claim is barred by governmental immunity." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that dismissed Plaintiff's case.

At issue in this case is the scope of an employer's vicarious liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether Wayne County and its sheriff's department could be held vicariously liable for a civil rights claim under state law based on the criminal act of a deputy sheriff committed during working hours but plainly beyond the scope of his employment. In 2001, Plaintiff Tara Hamed was arrested for unpaid child support. Because she had outstanding warrants for probation violations in Wayne County, she was transferred to the Wayne County jail. When she arrived, the deputy sheriff subjected her to sexually charged comments and offers for better treatment in exchange for sexual favors. Plaintiff resisted these advances, but she was transferred into an area of the jail not subject to surveillance cameras where she was sexually assaulted. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's harassment claim on the basis that Defendants were not vicariously liable for the criminal acts of sheriff's department employees. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had established a viable quid pro quo harassment claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Defendants could not be held vicariously liable under the traditional principles of respondeat superior because Defendants had no prior knowledge of the deputy's sexually harassing conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court.

The Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA) prohibits a "public body" from using public resources to make a "contribution or expenditure" for political purposes. At issue in this case what whether a public school district's administration of a payroll deduction plan that collects and remits political contributions from its employees to the Michigan Education Association's political action committee violates the MCFA. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that through the administration of a payroll deduction plan that remits funds to a partisan political action committee, a school district makes both a "contribution" and âexpenditure" under the terms of the MCFA.

The dispute in this case stemmed from a disagreement between Plaintiff Florence Beach and Defendant Lima Township over property rights to an area of land that were shown as streets on the recorded township plat. The land was originally recorded in 1835, and through a series of conveyances, was acquired and held by the Beach family ever since. In 2004, the Township purchased several blocks to build a fire department substation and intended to use the platted streets. Plaintiff disputed the Township's right to use the streets and filed an action to quiet title to them based on adverse possession. The circuit court denied the Township's motion after an evidentiary hearing. The court found that 100-year-old trees were growing in the middle of the "streets," and that the Beach family had adversely possessed them by farming as well as maintaining private trials and fences. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Township argued that Plaintiff was required to file a claim under the state Land Division Act (LDA) instead of bringing a quiet title action when the property in dispute is on a recorded plat. The Court found that the LDA only applied to cases when a party's interest arose from the platting process. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's findings that Plaintiff had adversely possessed the platted streets.

The Supreme Court consolidated nine separate cases for review. In each, Plaintiffs own property that was subject to state property taxes. Each Plaintiff described the property as âmachinery and equipment.â For the 2008 tax year, the local assessors classified the property for tax-assessment purposes as âindustrial real propertyâ or âcommercial personal property.â Plaintiffs petitioned the relevant boards-of-review to reclassify the property as âindustrial personal property.â That reclassification would permit them to take advantage of recently enacted tax exemptions or credits. In each case, the board denied the request. Plaintiffs then petitioned the State Tax Commission (STC) to reclassify the property. In each case, the STC denied the requests. Plaintiffs then sought and obtained relief in various state circuit courts. The STC appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the court reversed each of the circuit court judgments. The appellate court held that state law barred an appeal of the STC classifications to any state court. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, to ask whether the circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals of STC classification decisions. The Supreme Court found the state legislature has not provided for other means for judicial review of STC classification decisions. Accordingly, the Court held that the circuit courts do have jurisdiction over appeals from the STC.

Former Governor Jennifer Granholm appointed Defendant Judge Hugh Clarke to the district court. The Attorney General claimed that Defendant was not entitled to hold office beyond January 1, 2011, and brought a quo warranto action to oust him. The Supreme Court found that Defendant is entitled under state law to hold the office of district judge until January 1, 2013. The Court dismissed the Attorney Generalâs quo warranto action.