Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Michigan Supreme Court
In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond (Michigan v. Gaston)
The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court's failure to provide the appellant-surety notice within seven days of defendant's failure to appear barred forfeiture of the bail bond posted by the surety. Relying on "In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond (Michigan v Moore)" (740 NW2d 734 (2007)), the Court of Appeals held that a court’s failure to comply with the seven-day notice provision of MCL 765.28(1) did not bar forfeiture of a bail bond posted by a surety. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Moore was wrongly decided, it held that a court’s failure to comply with the seven-day notice provision of MCL 765.28(1) did bar forfeiture of a bail bond posted by a surety: "[w]hen a statute provides that a public officer 'shall' undertake some action within a specified period of time, and that period of time is provided to safeguard another’s rights or the public interest, as with the statute at issue here, it is mandatory that such action be undertaken within the specified period of time, and noncompliant public officers are prohibited from proceeding as if they had complied with the statute."
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In re Hon. Bruce Morrow
The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal complaint against Wayne Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, alleging 10 counts of judicial misconduct that arose out of criminal cases over which he had presided. After hearing argument on objections to the master’s report, a majority of the JTC concluded that the evidence established judicial misconduct in eight of the ten allegations and recommended that respondent be suspended for 90 days without pay. After review of the entire record and due consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court agreed with the JTC’s conclusion that respondent committed judicial misconduct, but the Court was not persuaded that the recommended sanction was appropriate in this case. Instead, the Court held that a 60-day suspension without pay was proportionate to the body of judicial misconduct established by the record.
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Andrie, Inc. v. Dept. of Tresasury
Andrie Inc. brought an action in the Court of Claims, seeking a refund of use taxes it had paid under protest for the years 1999 through 2006 after an audit by the Department of Treasury determined that Andrie had understated the taxes it owed for that period under the Use Tax Act (UTA). In order to be entitled to the exemption from the use tax, a taxpayer must show that the sales tax was both due and paid on the sale of that tangible personal property. Because Andrie did not submit any evidence that sales tax had been paid, Andrie was not entitled to the use tax exemption. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed to the extent it held that the use tax could never be levied on property if the purchase of that property was subject to sales tax.
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Michigan ex rel Gurganus v. CVS Caremark Corp.
Before the Supreme Court, three actions: two class actions and a qui tam action brought in the name of the state of Michigan involving allegations that multiple pharmacies systematically violated MCL 333.17755(2) by improperly retaining savings that should have been passed on to customers when dispensing generic drugs in the place of their brand-name equivalents. Furthermore, plaintiffs argued that violations of section 17755(2) necessarily resulted in violations of the Health Care False Claim Act (HCFCA) and the Medicaid False Claim Act (MFCA) when pharmacists submitted reimbursement claims to the state for Medicaid payments that they were not entitled to receive. "The inferences and assumptions required to implicate defendants [were] simply too tenuous for plaintiffs' claims to survive summary judgment. Moreover, plaintiffs' overbroad approach of identifying all transactions in which a generic drug was dispensed fail[ed] to hone in on the only relevant transactions - those in which a generic drug was dispensed in place of a brand-name drug." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ construction of MCL 333.17755(2) and its holding that plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient to survive summary judgment, vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment, and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.
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In re COH, ERH, JRG, KBH
In February 2008, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed COH, ERH, JRG, and KBH from their mother’s care. The children were initially placed in two separate foster homes; however, in October 2008, all of the children were placed with Holy Cross Children’s Services. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court concerned the interplay between MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c, and whether the preference for placement with relatives created by MCL 722.954a was relevant to a court’s consideration of a petition to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2). Because the Court concluded that the two statutes applied at different and distinct stages of child protective proceedings, the Court held that hold that there was no preference for placement with relatives as part of a guardianship determination under MCL 712A.19c(2). Accordingly, because the Court of Appeals in this case applied a preference in favor of creating a guardianship with a relative in support of its decision to reverse the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred.
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Leon v. City of Brighton
The issue in this case involved two landowners’ facial challenge to the constitutionality of 18-59 of the Brighton Code of Ordinances (BCO), which created a rebuttable presumption that an unsafe structure could be demolished as a public nuisance if it was determined that the cost to repair the structure would exceed 100 percent of the structure’s true cash value as reflected in assessment tax rolls before the structure became unsafe. Specifically, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether this unreasonable-to-repair presumption violated substantive and procedural due process protections by permitting demolition without affording the owner of the structure an option to repair as a matter of right. As a preliminary matter, the Court clarified that the landowners’ substantive due process and procedural due process claims implicated two separate constitutional rights, and that each claim must be analyzed under separate constitutional tests. The Court of Appeals erred by improperly conflating these analyses and subsequently determining that BCO 18-59 facially violated plaintiffs’ general due process rights. When each due process protection was separately examined pursuant to the proper test, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance did not violate either protection on its face.
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Wurtz v. Beecher Metropolitan District
The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) to a contract employee whose contract was not renewed ostensibly because of the employee’s whistleblowing activities. A contract employee whose term of employment has expired without being subject to a specific adverse employment action identified in the WPA and who sought reengagement for a new term of employment occupied the same legal position as a prospective employee. The WPA, by its express language, only applied to current employees; the statute offered no protection to prospective employees. Because the WPA did not apply when an employer decided not to hire a job applicant, it likewise had no application to a contract employee whom the employer declined to rehire for a new term of employment. "The plaintiff in this case has no recourse under the WPA because he alleges only that his former employer declined to renew his contract, not that the employer took some adverse action against him during his contractual term of employment."
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Henry v. Laborers Local 1191
Anthony Henry and Keith White filed suit against Laborers’ Local 1191, Michael Aaron (the union’s business manager), and Bruce Ruedisueli (the union’s president), alleging that their indefinite layoff from employment at the union was unlawful retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA). Henry and White had worked as business agents for the union until their terminations. They alleged that defendants asked several union members to repair the façade of the Trade Union Leadership Council building. The union recorded payments for the work as picket duty even though the members did not engage in picket duty on those days. Henry and White believed that Aaron was involved in criminal activity, including fraud, an illegal kickback scheme, and misappropriation of union funds. They also believed that the union had required members to work without proper safety precautions and without receiving union wages. Henry and White subsequently contacted the United States Department of Labor with their suspicions and informed the union of their decision to report the allegations. The Department of Labor investigated the allegations and referred the matter to an assistant United States attorney, who declined to intervene. Aaron later notified Henry and White that they had been indefinitely laid off from employment at the union. During the pendency of Henry and White’s action, Michael Dowdy and Glenn Ramsey (also business agents for the union) were terminated from their employment. Dowdy and Ramsey filed a separate WPA action against the union, Aaron, claiming that they had been terminated for their cooperation in the Department of Labor’s investigation and disclosing to investigators facts substantiating the allegations of criminal misconduct. Defendants moved for summary disposition in the Henry/White lawsuit and for partial summary disposition in the Dowdy/Ramsey lawsuit, alleging that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) preempted plaintiffs’ WPA claims and that, as a result, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear them. The court denied both motions, concluding that the WPA’s protection of an employee against an employer’s retaliatory employment actions did not contravene the LMRDA. Defendants appealed in each case, reasserting their claim of LMRDA preemption and raising the new defense that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) independently preempted the circuit court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that neither the NLRA nor the LMRDA preempted WPA claims premised on reporting suspected criminal misconduct. The NLRA did not cover the reporting of suspected criminal misconduct, while the LMRDA does not provide a union official with discretion to cover up suspected criminal misconduct by retaliating against employees who report their allegations. However, plaintiffs’ allegations of retaliation for their reporting of improper wages and an unsafe work environment cover conduct "arguably prohibited" by the NLRA and, as a result, must be litigated exclusively before the NLRB. As such, the Court affirmed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings.
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Addison Township v. Barnhart
Addison Township issued Jerry Barnhart a misdemeanor citation for operating a shooting range without a zoning compliance permit. The case proceeded to a bench trial. After the township presented its case, the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict dismissing the case, ruling that defendant's activities were protected under MCL 691.1542a(2). The Circuit Court affirmed. In an unpublished opinion the Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of the citation and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of the panel’s interpretation of the term "sport shooting range" and for a determination whether defendant was in compliance with "generally accepted operation practices" as required by the statute. On remand, the township moved to enforce the ordinance, and defendant moved for a declaratory judgment and dismissal. The district court granted defendant's motion, concluding that defendant was operating a sport shooting range in compliance with generally accepted operation practices. The circuit court remanded the case to the district court to examine the provisions of the sport shooting ranges act (SSRA) as a whole and to consider whether MCL 691.1542a(2) applied to all local ordinances or only those attempting to regulate shooting ranges. On remand, the district court again ruled in favor of defendant. The circuit court reversed, holding that defendant’s activities were not protected under MCL 691.1542a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that in order for MCL 691.1542a(2) to apply to a shooting range, it must: (1) be a sport shooting range that also existed as a sport shooting range as of July 5, 1994; and (2) the sport shooting range must operate in compliance with the generally accepted operation practices. The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting MCL 691.1541(d) when it held that a shooting range owner could not have a commercial purpose in operating a sport shooting range. Defendant's shooting range was entitled to protection under MCL 691.1542a(2). The case was once again remanded for dismissal. View "Addison Township v. Barnhart" on Justia Law
Fradco, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury
Fradco, Inc., contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury that disallowed a sales tax deduction following an audit. Through its resident agent, Fradco requested the department send all information regarding tax matters to the certified public accountant (CPA) that Fradco designated. The department mailed a copy of its preliminary decision and order of determination to Fradco's CPA. It sent the final assessment only to Fradco's place of business. Fradco's CPA inquired about the final assessment and was informed a month later that a final assessment had been issued, that no appeal had been taken, and that the matter was now subject to collection. The letter did not include a copy of the assessment. The department sought summary judgment in Fradco’s appeal, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal had not been filed within 35 days after the final assessment. The tribunal denied the motion, concluding that state law provided a parallel notice requirement whenever a taxpayer properly filed a request that notices be sent to a representative and that notice to Fradco alone had not been sufficient to start the 35-day period. Similarly, SMK, LLC, contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury. SMK had hired a CPA and designated him to represent it for purposes of the sales tax audit, giving him limited authorization to inspect or receive confidential information, represent SMK, and receive mail from the department. The department faxed the CPA a notice stating that the audit package had been submitted. It sent a final assessment to SMK via certified mail, although SMK claimed that it did not receive the final assessment. The CPA made several inquiries to the department and received no answers from the department. Five days after the appeal period had allegedly run, the department sent SMK's CPA the final assessment and a letter stating that the deadline for appeal had passed. The Supreme Court granted the department leave to appeal and ordered that the Fradco and SMK appeals be heard together. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that if a taxpayer has appointed a representative, the Department of Treasury must issue notice to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s official representative before the taxpayer’s 35-day appeal period under MCL 205.22(1) begins to run. View "Fradco, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law