Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

John Ter Beek filed an action against the City of Wyoming, seeking to have a city zoning ordinance declared void and an injunction entered prohibiting its enforcement. Ter Beek was a qualifying patient and held a registry identification card under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). He wanted to grow and use marijuana for medical purposes in his home and argued that section 4(a) of the MMMA, MCL 333.26424(a), preempted the ordinance. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Ter Beek argued that because the federal controlled substances act (CSA) prohibited the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana, the ordinance likewise prohibited the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana for medical use and therefore conflicted with and was preempted by the MMMA. The city argued instead that the CSA preempted the MMMA. The court granted the City's motion, agreeing that the CSA preempted the MMMA. Ter Beek appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the ordinance conflicted with sec. 4(a) of the MMMA and that the CSA did not preempt 4(a) because it was possible to comply with both statutes simultaneously and the state-law immunity for certain medical marijuana patients under 4(a) did not stand as an obstacle to the federal regulation of marijuana use. The City appealed. The Supreme Court concluded section 4(a) of the MMMA was not preempted by the federal controlled substances act, but 4(a) preempted the ordinance because the ordinance directly conflicted with the MMMA. View "Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the execution of a lease of tangible personal property constitutes "use" for purposes of the Use Tax Act (UTA). Petitioner purchased an aircraft from one company and immediately executed a five-year lease to another company that already had possession of the aircraft. The Department of Treasury assessed a use tax against petitioner based on the lease transaction, and the Michigan Tax Tribunal ultimately upheld the assessment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioner did not “use” the aircraft because it ceded total control of the aircraft to the lessee by virtue of the lease and the lessee had uninterrupted possession of the aircraft before and during the lease. The Supreme Court concluded that because the right to allow others to use one’s personal property is a right incident to ownership, and a lease is an instrument by which an owner exercises that right, it follows that the execution of a lease is an exercise of a right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership of the property. Therefore, that constitutes "use" for purposes of the UTA. Accordingly, petitioner "used" the aircraft in question for purposes of the UTA when it executed a lease of the aircraft in Michigan, regardless of whether it ever had actual possession of the aircraft. View "NACG Leasing v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Nancy Mick, as personal representative of the estate of Stephen Bradley, sought to have the Kent County Sheriff's Department held in contempt of court. She obtained an order from the probate court to take Stephen Bradley into custody for a psychiatric evaluation. The sheriff's department did not arrive, and Mr. Bradley shot and killed himself. Mick originally filed a wrongful-death action against the sheriff's department, but the department was granted governmental immunity from suit. Mick then filed her contempt action, arguing the estate of Mr. Bradley suffered damages as a result of the sheriff department's failure to show. The department again moved for dismissal on immunity grounds, but the probate court denied that motion. The department then appealed the probate court's decision at circuit court, which reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that the governmental tort liability act (GTLA) did not apply in this case. The department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court the department was entitled to dismissal on an immunity basis, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Bradley Estate" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hurticene Hardaway sued Wayne County in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment, and claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel in relation to the denial of certain lifetime benefits granted to certain former County employees. Plaintiff worked in the County's office of corporation counsel. The trial court concluded that due to language in the Wayne County Commission Resolution 94-903, plaintiff did not qualify for the benefits. The trial court ultimately granted the County's motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the language in question was ambiguous. In its review of the resolution in question, the Supreme Court concluded its language was not ambiguous, therefore affirming the trial court's interpretation and judgment. View "Hardaway v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court combined several taxpayers' appeals for the purpose of this opinion. In each, taxpayers owned two (or more) separate S-corporations, and attributed profits and losses from each businesses to their Michigan tax returns, arguing that the multiple businesses were unitary corporations. In each case, plaintiffs owned a Michigan company and a foreign company, but combined the profits and losses from both for credits on their Michigan returns. The Department of the Treasury disallowed the unitary classification. The Supreme Court held that under Michigan tax law, individual taxpayers may combine the profits and losses from unitary flow-through businesses and then apportion that income on the basis of those businesses’ combined apportionment factors. View "Malpass v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Thomas Petipren sued the police chief of Port Sanilac Rodney Jaskowski and the Village itself alleging Jaskowski assaulted and wrongfully arrested him for resisting, obstructing and disorderly conduct. Jaskowski filed a separate suit against Petipren alleging assault and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Petipren's band had been scheduled to perform at a fundraiser hosted by the Village. Attendees complained about the before Petipren's took the stage. A decision was made to stop the music; Petipren, claimed he was unaware of the decision to stop the performances, and was warming up on his drum set when Jaskowski approached him. Jaskowski arrested Petipren. The parties' respective versions of the facts surrounding the arrest were completely different. Petipren alleged that he did not resist arrest, but that Jaskowski barged through the drum set and then pushed him off his seat and into a pole before pushing him off the stage and onto the grass where he was handcuffed. Jaskowski alleged that Petipren refused to stop playing, swore at him, struck him in the jaw, and then resisted arrest. Jaskowski moved for summary judgment on Petipren's claims on the grounds of governmental immunity. The trial court denied that motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Jaskowski. View "Petipren v. Jaskowski" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Smitter applied for workers' compensation benefits after being injured on the job working as a firefighter for Thornapple Township. At the time of his injury, Petitioner also worked for General Motors. He earned eleven percent of his income from the township and 89 from GM. The township did not reduce its workers’ compensation obligation by coordinating Petitioner's benefits with his disability benefits under MCL 418.354(1)(b). The township sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund under the dual-employment provisions for the entirety of Petitioner's wage-loss benefits. The fund agreed to pay the amount it would have owed if the township had coordinated Petitioner's benefits. The township filed an application for a hearing with the Worker’s Compensation Board of Magistrates, seeking reimbursement from the fund for the uncoordinated amount. The magistrate ordered the fund to reimburse the township for 89 percent of Petitioner's uncoordinated benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied the fund’s application for leave to appeal. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that when the injury employment provided less than 80 percent of the employee’s wages, the fund is required to reimburse its portion of the coordinated amount of benefits. Because the Township did not coordinate in this case, the appellate court erred in its analysis. Accordingly the appellate court was reversed and the case remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings. View "Smitter v. Thornapple Township" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) issued a formal complaint against Judge Deborah Adams of the Third Circuit Court for misconduct (misrepresentations under oath, forgery and the filing of forged and unauthorized pleadings, and misrepresentations to the commission). The JTC found two of the three counts against Judge Adams were established by a preponderance of the evidence, and recommended that she be suspended without pay for 180 days and ordered to pay costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the JTC's findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the Court rejected the JTC's recommendation of suspension and instead removed her from office. View "In re Adams" on Justia Law

Several union groups filed unfair labor practice complaints against Macomb County and the Macomb County Road Commission over a change in the method for calculating pension benefits. The groups argued the County lowered benefits without bargaining on the issue as required by Michigan labor law. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that disputes over terms or conditions of employment covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) are subject to arbitration through a grievance process. When the CBA grants the retirement commission discretion to use actuarial tables to establish pension benefits, the decision to change a long-standing method of calculating those benefits does not (by itself) constitute the clear and unmistakable evidence needed to overcome the CBA's coverage, nor does it create a new condition of employment that would trigger the need to bargain. As a result, none of the unfair labor practices alleged in this case could be sustained, and the remedy for this dispute should have gone through the grievance process called for in the CBA. View "Macomb County v. AFSCME Council 25 Locals 411 & 893 " on Justia Law

Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS) filed an action against Hillsdale County, seeking mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to fund HCSS. The Hillsdale County voters approved the proposition in 2008 to raise funds for the provision of services to older persons by HCSS. Defendant entered into a contract with HCSS from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010, but did not levy and spend the full, voter-approved, 0.5 mill. The circuit court granted plaintiffs' writ for mandamus and ordered defendant to levy the entire 0.5 mill for the length of time approved by the voters. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the order, concluding that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the Tax Tribunal had exclusive and original jurisdiction over the matter. HCSS appealed, and the Supreme Court, after its review, agreed that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Hillsdale County Senior Services Center v. Hillsdale County" on Justia Law