Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kevin Steele, a Marine veteran, filed an original claim in 1991 for a head injury sustained during service, which he attributed to a 1980 training incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) examiner noted that Steele experienced occasional headaches as a residual of the head injury but deemed them non-disabling. The VA Regional Office (RO) granted service connection for the scar on Steele's scalp but did not explicitly address the headaches in its decision. Steele did not appeal this decision.In 2013, Steele filed a new claim for various conditions, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), and was awarded a 50% disability rating effective from March 6, 2013. In 2016, he filed a claim for service connection for headaches, which the RO granted with an effective date of October 14, 2015. The Board of Veterans Appeals later adjusted the effective date to March 6, 2013. Steele appealed, arguing that his 1991 claim for headaches remained open and should entitle him to an earlier effective date.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, holding that Steele's 1991 claim for headaches was implicitly denied and thus finally adjudicated in 1991. The court applied the implicit denial rule, which provides that a claim can be deemed denied if the VA's decision provides sufficient notice that the claim was considered and rejected. The court found that the 1991 RO decision and notice letter provided Steele with reasonable notice that his claim for headaches was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, agreeing that the Board and the Veterans Court did not legally err in their application of the implicit denial rule. The court held that the reasons provided for the explicit denial of Steele's head injury claim in 1991 were sufficient to implicitly deny the related claim for headaches, thus closing off the earlier filing date. View "STEELE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller with the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve petty officer, was called to active duty in July 2012 under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d). He served until February 2017, primarily escorting vessels to and from harbor. Despite his active-duty service, Feliciano did not receive differential pay, which compensates federal civilian employees for the pay gap between their civilian and military salaries when called to active duty during a national emergency.Feliciano sought relief from the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming he was unlawfully denied differential pay. The Board rejected his claim, and Feliciano appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He argued that under 5 U.S.C. §5538(a) and 10 U.S.C. §101(a)(13)(B), he was entitled to differential pay because he was called to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency. The Federal Circuit, referencing its decision in Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, held that Feliciano needed to show a substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency, which he failed to do.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision. The Court held that a federal civilian employee called to active duty under "any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency" is entitled to differential pay if the reservist's service coincides temporally with a declared national emergency. The Court determined that no substantive connection between the service and the national emergency is required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Feliciano v. Department Of Transportation" on Justia Law

George Roseberry, a U.S. Army veteran, sustained a lower back injury during his service from 1977 to 1989. In March 1994, he filed a claim for service connection related to degenerative disc disease, which was denied three months later. Between 1998 and 2005, he made several unsuccessful attempts to reopen his claim. On July 20, 2021, the Veterans Court remanded his case to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, concluding his appeal on October 12, 2021. On November 13, 2021, Roseberry filed an application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which was one day late.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. The court found that the application was due on November 12, 2021, 30 days after the effective date of the mandate, October 12, 2021. Roseberry’s counsel had mistakenly relied on the date the mandate was entered on the docket, October 15, 2021, leading to the late filing. The court determined that equitable tolling was not warranted as there were no “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the delay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit agreed that the correct standard for equitable tolling is “extraordinary circumstances,” as established by precedent. Roseberry’s late filing was due to ordinary neglect, which does not meet the threshold for equitable tolling. Consequently, the Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal of Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. View "ROSEBERRY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Larry Williams served in the U.S. Navy from August 1972 to March 1974 and filed a claim for compensation for schizophrenia in April 1978. The VA's Regional Office (RO) denied the claim in July 1978. Williams filed a Notice of Disagreement in January 1979, and the VA received additional evidence, including a hospital report diagnosing chronic schizophrenia. In June 1979, the RO confirmed the denial of service connection for schizophrenia but did not send this decision to Williams. Instead, the RO issued a Statement of the Case, which included the new evidence and confirmed the denial.Williams did not perfect his appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. In 2009, he submitted a claim to reopen his previously denied claim and was eventually granted a 100 percent disability rating effective June 4, 2009. Williams sought an earlier effective date, but the Board denied this request. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, finding that the VA had complied with 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) in the 1979 Statement of the Case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the VA met the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) by issuing the 1979 Statement of the Case, which included the new evidence and confirmed the denial of service connection. The court found that the Statement of the Case provided sufficient indication that the VA considered the new evidence in connection with the pending claim, thus satisfying the regulatory requirements. View "WILLIAMS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Ryan Bussey, a former Army soldier, received a Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD) after being found guilty of wrongful sexual contact. He sought to upgrade his discharge to Honorable, arguing that his combat-induced Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) contributed to his conduct. The Army Board for Correction of Military Records acknowledged Bussey's PTSD but concluded it was not a mitigating factor for his crime of conviction.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Army, upholding the Board's decision. Bussey appealed this decision, seeking review under the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Board erred in its decision. The court held that the Board failed to consider all the circumstances resulting in Bussey's discharge, focusing too narrowly on whether PTSD caused the legal elements of the crime. The court emphasized that the Board should have analyzed whether PTSD potentially contributed to the facts, events, and conditions leading to Bussey's wrongful sexual contact.Additionally, the court found that the Board did not give liberal consideration to Bussey's PTSD-based claim, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B). The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the Board to reconsider Bussey's upgrade request under the appropriate standard, instructing the Board to resolve doubts and inferences in favor of Bussey. If the Board finds that PTSD contributed to the circumstances resulting in Bussey's discharge, it may grant the requested relief. View "Bussey v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed a petition for review challenging the validity of two provisions in a Final Rule issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The provisions in question are 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2), which requires users of VA’s Information Technology (IT) systems to potentially pass a background suitability investigation, and 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), which permits the VA to inspect the computer hardware and software used to access VA IT systems and their location at any time without notice.The VA issued the Final Rule on June 24, 2022, after a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and consideration of public comments, including those from MVA. MVA argued that the regulations violated the pro-veteran canon of construction, due process, and were arbitrary and capricious. The VA addressed some of these comments in the Final Rule but maintained the provisions as proposed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the VA has the authority to promulgate the Background Check Provision under 38 U.S.C. §§ 501, 5721–28, which allows the VA to establish and maintain information security programs. The court found that the Background Check Provision was reasonable and based on risk assessments, thus within the VA’s statutory authority.However, the court found that the Inspection Provision exceeded the VA’s statutory authority. The provision allowed the VA to inspect the location where the hardware and software are used, which could include private areas such as a user’s home. The court determined that this provision was not based on a risk assessment and was overly broad, thus not the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted MVA’s petition in part, setting aside 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), and denied the petition in part, upholding 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2). View "MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

Petitioners, veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton, applied for service-connected PTSD disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Bufkin's claim was denied due to insufficient evidence linking his PTSD to his military service. Thornton, who already received benefits, sought an increased disability rating, which the VA denied. Both cases were reviewed de novo by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the VA's decisions. Bufkin and Thornton then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the evidence was in "approximate balance" and they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding no clear error in the approximate-balance determinations. Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Veterans Court's interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §7261(b)(1). They argued that the Veterans Court should review the entire record de novo to determine if the evidence was in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the Veterans Court's decisions.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the VA's determination of whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is predominantly a factual determination, subject to clear-error review. The Court clarified that the Veterans Court must review the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule using the same standards as other determinations: de novo for legal issues and clear error for factual issues. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was affirmed. View "Bufkin v. Collins" on Justia Law

Captain Gardenia Dorado-Ocasio, an Army officer, challenged a decision by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) regarding an adverse performance evaluation she received. The evaluation was based on her failure to comply with her superior's orders and alleged retaliation against a subordinate. Dorado-Ocasio claimed the evaluation was biased and factually inaccurate. The ABCMR upheld the evaluation, finding no substantive errors or evidence of bias.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Acting Secretary of the Army. The district court found that the ABCMR had adequately explained its decision and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the ABCMR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board had provided a discernible path for its determination. The court emphasized the special deference given to military judgments and found that the ABCMR had met the required standard of review. The court concluded that the ABCMR's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. View "Dorado-Ocasio v. Averill" on Justia Law

A veteran of the United States Air Force, Clinton Siples, was granted service connection for bilateral shoulder subluxation by a Regional Office (RO) of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). After the decision became final, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) decided Burton v. Shinseki, which interpreted 38 C.F.R. § 4.59 as not limited to cases of arthritis. Mr. Siples then filed a motion alleging clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the RO’s rating decision, arguing that the newly interpreted § 4.59 would have required the VA to assign him a higher rating for his shoulder disability, which was not based on arthritis.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (Board) denial of Mr. Siples’s CUE motion, stating that at the time of his rating decision, § 4.59 was not undebatably understood to apply to cases other than arthritis, and thus there was no error of the type required for CUE. The Veterans Court applied the standard that CUE must be analyzed based on the law as it was understood at the time of the original decision and cannot arise from a subsequent change in the law or interpretation thereof.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that CUE must be based on the law at the time of the decision, and at the time of the RO’s decision in Mr. Siples’s case, § 4.59 was not undebatably understood as applying to cases other than arthritis. The court concluded that the regulation’s plain language did not clearly apply to non-arthritis claims, and the understanding of § 4.59 in July 2004 did not undebatably require the RO to assign a higher rating to Mr. Siples’s non-arthritic shoulder disability. View "SIPLES v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Thomas Rodenhizer, a U.S. Army veteran, sought an earlier effective date for his veteran benefits, which the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. During the appeal, Mr. Rodenhizer passed away, and his mother, Deborah Rodenhizer, moved to be substituted in his place. The Veterans Court denied her motion, vacated the Board’s decision, and dismissed the appeal, stating that Ms. Rodenhizer had not established her right to the benefits.The Veterans Court’s decision was based on the fact that Ms. Rodenhizer had not provided evidence that she requested a determination of accrued-benefits eligibility from the VA within one year of her son’s death, as required by 38 U.S.C. § 5121(c). Additionally, the VA had not made a determination about her eligibility to receive accrued benefits. The Veterans Court concluded that it could not make the factual determination of her eligibility in the first instance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Veterans Court erred in denying the motion to substitute and dismissing the appeal before a final decision was made in the parallel VA proceeding regarding Ms. Rodenhizer’s eligibility as an accrued-benefits claimant. The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to hold the appeal and motion to substitute in abeyance pending the outcome of the VA’s determination of Ms. Rodenhizer’s eligibility. The court emphasized that this approach would prevent unnecessary reworking of the same claim and save families from facing unnecessary administrative hurdles. View "RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law