Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Anthony Stuart, a Navy veteran, appealed a decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that denied him credit for his military service in computing his civilian retirement annuity. Stuart served in the Navy during three periods between 1974 and 1991 and was placed on the Permanent Disability Retirement List in 1994 with a 60% disability rating. He later entered federal civilian service and retired in 2015. Stuart did not waive his military retired pay to receive credit for his military service toward his Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) annuity.The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) initially decided that Stuart’s military service was not creditable toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay. OPM explained that by statute, Stuart could not receive both military retired pay and FERS credit for his military service unless his military retired pay was awarded for specific reasons, which did not apply to him. Stuart sought reconsideration, but OPM affirmed its decision. Stuart then appealed to the MSPB, where an administrative judge upheld OPM’s decision, and the full Board affirmed, modifying the initial decision to clarify the analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that under 5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(2), Stuart’s military service could not be credited toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay and did not meet any statutory exceptions. The court rejected Stuart’s argument that his military retired pay, calculated based on his disability percentage, was not “based on” his military service. The court found that the statute clearly barred double crediting of military service for both military retired pay and a civilian retirement annuity. View "STUART v. OPM " on Justia Law

Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran, served from 2000 to 2006 and was medically retired due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2016, Soto applied for combat-related special compensation (CRSC) and was approved, but his retroactive compensation was limited to six years due to the Barring Act's limitations period. Soto filed a class-action lawsuit arguing that the CRSC statute should displace the Barring Act's limitations period.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Soto and the class, holding that the CRSC statute provides its own settlement mechanism, thus displacing the Barring Act. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this decision, stating that the CRSC statute does not explicitly grant settlement authority and therefore cannot displace the Barring Act.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the CRSC statute does confer authority to settle CRSC claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act’s settlement procedures and limitations period. The Court reasoned that the CRSC statute authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due, creating a comprehensive compensation scheme. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Soto v. United States" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

Larry B. Herrington, a veteran who served in the U.S. Air Force, filed a claim in September 2009 for service connection for several gastrointestinal conditions, including Barrett’s disease, chronic gastritis, reflux disease, and hiatal hernia. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office awarded service connection for gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) with a non-compensable evaluation. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) later awarded a 30% evaluation for GERD by analogy to the diagnostic code for hiatal hernia, Diagnostic Code (DC) 7346, but denied an evaluation in excess of 30%.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the Board’s selection of DC 7346 was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Mr. Herrington appealed this decision, arguing that the Veterans Court should have applied a de novo standard of review rather than the deferential standard set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the selection of an analogous diagnostic code for rating unlisted conditions involves questions of fact or the application of law to facts, which requires a deferential standard of review. The court concluded that the Veterans Court applied the correct standard of review and affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s selection of DC 7346 for rating Mr. Herrington’s GERD was appropriate and supported by the evidence. View "HERRINGTON v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Michael Poffenbarger, a First Lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve, filed a lawsuit challenging the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, claiming it violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment. He sought a religious exemption, which was denied, and subsequently refused the vaccine. As a result, he received a letter of reprimand and was placed on inactive status, losing pay and retirement points. Poffenbarger sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including restoration of lost pay and points.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Air Force from taking further punitive action against Poffenbarger. In a related case, Doster v. Kendall, the same court certified a class of affected service members and issued similar injunctions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed these injunctions, but the Supreme Court later vacated the decision on mootness grounds after Congress directed the rescission of the vaccine mandate. The district court then dismissed Poffenbarger's case as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Poffenbarger’s claim for lost drill pay and retirement points was barred by federal sovereign immunity. The court explained that RFRA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not unequivocally include claims for money damages against the federal government. Since Poffenbarger’s claim sought retrospective compensation for a previous legal wrong, it constituted money damages, which are not covered by RFRA’s waiver. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Poffenbarger v. Kendall" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

Kevin Steele, a Marine veteran, filed an original claim in 1991 for a head injury sustained during service, which he attributed to a 1980 training incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) examiner noted that Steele experienced occasional headaches as a residual of the head injury but deemed them non-disabling. The VA Regional Office (RO) granted service connection for the scar on Steele's scalp but did not explicitly address the headaches in its decision. Steele did not appeal this decision.In 2013, Steele filed a new claim for various conditions, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), and was awarded a 50% disability rating effective from March 6, 2013. In 2016, he filed a claim for service connection for headaches, which the RO granted with an effective date of October 14, 2015. The Board of Veterans Appeals later adjusted the effective date to March 6, 2013. Steele appealed, arguing that his 1991 claim for headaches remained open and should entitle him to an earlier effective date.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, holding that Steele's 1991 claim for headaches was implicitly denied and thus finally adjudicated in 1991. The court applied the implicit denial rule, which provides that a claim can be deemed denied if the VA's decision provides sufficient notice that the claim was considered and rejected. The court found that the 1991 RO decision and notice letter provided Steele with reasonable notice that his claim for headaches was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, agreeing that the Board and the Veterans Court did not legally err in their application of the implicit denial rule. The court held that the reasons provided for the explicit denial of Steele's head injury claim in 1991 were sufficient to implicitly deny the related claim for headaches, thus closing off the earlier filing date. View "STEELE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller with the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve petty officer, was called to active duty in July 2012 under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d). He served until February 2017, primarily escorting vessels to and from harbor. Despite his active-duty service, Feliciano did not receive differential pay, which compensates federal civilian employees for the pay gap between their civilian and military salaries when called to active duty during a national emergency.Feliciano sought relief from the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming he was unlawfully denied differential pay. The Board rejected his claim, and Feliciano appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He argued that under 5 U.S.C. §5538(a) and 10 U.S.C. §101(a)(13)(B), he was entitled to differential pay because he was called to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency. The Federal Circuit, referencing its decision in Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, held that Feliciano needed to show a substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency, which he failed to do.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision. The Court held that a federal civilian employee called to active duty under "any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency" is entitled to differential pay if the reservist's service coincides temporally with a declared national emergency. The Court determined that no substantive connection between the service and the national emergency is required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Feliciano v. Department Of Transportation" on Justia Law

George Roseberry, a U.S. Army veteran, sustained a lower back injury during his service from 1977 to 1989. In March 1994, he filed a claim for service connection related to degenerative disc disease, which was denied three months later. Between 1998 and 2005, he made several unsuccessful attempts to reopen his claim. On July 20, 2021, the Veterans Court remanded his case to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, concluding his appeal on October 12, 2021. On November 13, 2021, Roseberry filed an application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which was one day late.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. The court found that the application was due on November 12, 2021, 30 days after the effective date of the mandate, October 12, 2021. Roseberry’s counsel had mistakenly relied on the date the mandate was entered on the docket, October 15, 2021, leading to the late filing. The court determined that equitable tolling was not warranted as there were no “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the delay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit agreed that the correct standard for equitable tolling is “extraordinary circumstances,” as established by precedent. Roseberry’s late filing was due to ordinary neglect, which does not meet the threshold for equitable tolling. Consequently, the Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal of Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. View "ROSEBERRY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Larry Williams served in the U.S. Navy from August 1972 to March 1974 and filed a claim for compensation for schizophrenia in April 1978. The VA's Regional Office (RO) denied the claim in July 1978. Williams filed a Notice of Disagreement in January 1979, and the VA received additional evidence, including a hospital report diagnosing chronic schizophrenia. In June 1979, the RO confirmed the denial of service connection for schizophrenia but did not send this decision to Williams. Instead, the RO issued a Statement of the Case, which included the new evidence and confirmed the denial.Williams did not perfect his appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. In 2009, he submitted a claim to reopen his previously denied claim and was eventually granted a 100 percent disability rating effective June 4, 2009. Williams sought an earlier effective date, but the Board denied this request. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, finding that the VA had complied with 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) in the 1979 Statement of the Case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the VA met the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) by issuing the 1979 Statement of the Case, which included the new evidence and confirmed the denial of service connection. The court found that the Statement of the Case provided sufficient indication that the VA considered the new evidence in connection with the pending claim, thus satisfying the regulatory requirements. View "WILLIAMS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law