Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed a petition for review challenging the validity of two provisions in a Final Rule issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The provisions in question are 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2), which requires users of VA’s Information Technology (IT) systems to potentially pass a background suitability investigation, and 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), which permits the VA to inspect the computer hardware and software used to access VA IT systems and their location at any time without notice.The VA issued the Final Rule on June 24, 2022, after a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and consideration of public comments, including those from MVA. MVA argued that the regulations violated the pro-veteran canon of construction, due process, and were arbitrary and capricious. The VA addressed some of these comments in the Final Rule but maintained the provisions as proposed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the VA has the authority to promulgate the Background Check Provision under 38 U.S.C. §§ 501, 5721–28, which allows the VA to establish and maintain information security programs. The court found that the Background Check Provision was reasonable and based on risk assessments, thus within the VA’s statutory authority.However, the court found that the Inspection Provision exceeded the VA’s statutory authority. The provision allowed the VA to inspect the location where the hardware and software are used, which could include private areas such as a user’s home. The court determined that this provision was not based on a risk assessment and was overly broad, thus not the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted MVA’s petition in part, setting aside 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), and denied the petition in part, upholding 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2). View "MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

Petitioners, veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton, applied for service-connected PTSD disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Bufkin's claim was denied due to insufficient evidence linking his PTSD to his military service. Thornton, who already received benefits, sought an increased disability rating, which the VA denied. Both cases were reviewed de novo by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the VA's decisions. Bufkin and Thornton then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the evidence was in "approximate balance" and they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding no clear error in the approximate-balance determinations. Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Veterans Court's interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §7261(b)(1). They argued that the Veterans Court should review the entire record de novo to determine if the evidence was in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the Veterans Court's decisions.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the VA's determination of whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is predominantly a factual determination, subject to clear-error review. The Court clarified that the Veterans Court must review the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule using the same standards as other determinations: de novo for legal issues and clear error for factual issues. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was affirmed. View "Bufkin v. Collins" on Justia Law

Captain Gardenia Dorado-Ocasio, an Army officer, challenged a decision by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) regarding an adverse performance evaluation she received. The evaluation was based on her failure to comply with her superior's orders and alleged retaliation against a subordinate. Dorado-Ocasio claimed the evaluation was biased and factually inaccurate. The ABCMR upheld the evaluation, finding no substantive errors or evidence of bias.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Acting Secretary of the Army. The district court found that the ABCMR had adequately explained its decision and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the ABCMR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board had provided a discernible path for its determination. The court emphasized the special deference given to military judgments and found that the ABCMR had met the required standard of review. The court concluded that the ABCMR's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. View "Dorado-Ocasio v. Averill" on Justia Law

A veteran of the United States Air Force, Clinton Siples, was granted service connection for bilateral shoulder subluxation by a Regional Office (RO) of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). After the decision became final, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) decided Burton v. Shinseki, which interpreted 38 C.F.R. § 4.59 as not limited to cases of arthritis. Mr. Siples then filed a motion alleging clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the RO’s rating decision, arguing that the newly interpreted § 4.59 would have required the VA to assign him a higher rating for his shoulder disability, which was not based on arthritis.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (Board) denial of Mr. Siples’s CUE motion, stating that at the time of his rating decision, § 4.59 was not undebatably understood to apply to cases other than arthritis, and thus there was no error of the type required for CUE. The Veterans Court applied the standard that CUE must be analyzed based on the law as it was understood at the time of the original decision and cannot arise from a subsequent change in the law or interpretation thereof.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that CUE must be based on the law at the time of the decision, and at the time of the RO’s decision in Mr. Siples’s case, § 4.59 was not undebatably understood as applying to cases other than arthritis. The court concluded that the regulation’s plain language did not clearly apply to non-arthritis claims, and the understanding of § 4.59 in July 2004 did not undebatably require the RO to assign a higher rating to Mr. Siples’s non-arthritic shoulder disability. View "SIPLES v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Thomas Rodenhizer, a U.S. Army veteran, sought an earlier effective date for his veteran benefits, which the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. During the appeal, Mr. Rodenhizer passed away, and his mother, Deborah Rodenhizer, moved to be substituted in his place. The Veterans Court denied her motion, vacated the Board’s decision, and dismissed the appeal, stating that Ms. Rodenhizer had not established her right to the benefits.The Veterans Court’s decision was based on the fact that Ms. Rodenhizer had not provided evidence that she requested a determination of accrued-benefits eligibility from the VA within one year of her son’s death, as required by 38 U.S.C. § 5121(c). Additionally, the VA had not made a determination about her eligibility to receive accrued benefits. The Veterans Court concluded that it could not make the factual determination of her eligibility in the first instance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Veterans Court erred in denying the motion to substitute and dismissing the appeal before a final decision was made in the parallel VA proceeding regarding Ms. Rodenhizer’s eligibility as an accrued-benefits claimant. The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to hold the appeal and motion to substitute in abeyance pending the outcome of the VA’s determination of Ms. Rodenhizer’s eligibility. The court emphasized that this approach would prevent unnecessary reworking of the same claim and save families from facing unnecessary administrative hurdles. View "RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Andrew J. Winterbottom, a veteran, was awarded a 30% disability rating for his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was later increased to 50%. He appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals seeking a higher rating. During a Board hearing in June 2021, the judge questioned Winterbottom about specific violent episodes, which he later claimed demonstrated judicial bias. In May 2022, the Board denied a higher rating, concluding that his violent behavior was not unprovoked.Winterbottom appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision and exhibited bias. The Veterans Court partially agreed, remanding the case because the Board did not adequately explain why it gave less weight to a private counselor's opinion. However, the court found no bias warranting reassignment, stating the judge's questions aimed to determine if the violent conduct was provoked.Winterbottom then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final orders from the Veterans Court. The court noted that exceptions to the finality requirement, as outlined in Williams v. Principi, did not apply to Winterbottom's case. The court also declined to create a new exception for judicial bias claims, suggesting that such claims should be raised through a mandamus petition or after a final judgment. Thus, the appeal was dismissed. View "WINTERBOTTOM v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Malcolm Pipes, a former reservist in the United States Air Force, sought disability-retirement pay and benefits after suffering a stroke while participating in the Air Force’s Self-paced Fitness Improvement Program (SFIP). Pipes argued that he was in inactive-duty training (IDT) status at the time of his injury, which would entitle him to the benefits under 10 U.S.C. § 1204. The Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) and the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) previously denied his claim, leading to this appeal.In the first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, holding that Pipes was in a duty status when ordered to participate in the SFIP. However, the court did not address whether Pipes was in IDT status when performing the SFIP. On remand, the AFBCMR and the Claims Court again denied relief, concluding that Pipes did not have the necessary advance authorization for IDT status as required by Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 36-8001.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Claims Court's decision. The court found that the AFMAN applies to all IDT and requires advance authorization for such status. Pipes failed to provide evidence of receiving this authorization. The court also rejected Pipes's argument that the lawful order to participate in the SFIP automatically placed him in IDT status. The court noted that the Department of Veterans Affairs' grant of service connection for Pipes's stroke did not impact the determination of his duty status under the AFMAN.The court affirmed the Claims Court's judgment, concluding that the AFBCMR's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "PIPES v. US " on Justia Law

Julien P. Champagne, a veteran who served from December 1953 to December 1956, filed a claim in September 1987 for benefits related to his cerebellar degenerative disorder (CDD) using VA Form 21-526. The VA regional office (RO) interpreted this as a pension claim and awarded a disability pension in December 1987. In 1999, Champagne sought service connection compensation for malaria and any residual illnesses, including CDD. The RO granted service connection for malaria at 0% in 2002 but did not grant compensation for CDD. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement in 2003, and after multiple proceedings, he was granted compensation for CDD at 100%, effective February 3, 2005. This effective date was later changed to July 14, 2003, but Champagne sought an earlier date, arguing it should be from 1987.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an earlier effective date in October 2020, finding no indication in the 1987 application that Champagne intended to claim service connection compensation. Champagne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision in July 2022. The Veterans Court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the VA may consider a pension claim as a compensation claim but is not required to do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) is permissive, allowing but not requiring the VA to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim. The court also found no merit in Champagne’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding, as the court had merely determined that any findings by the RO would not bind the Board. View "Champagne v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Thomas Smith, a veteran, sought specially adapted housing (SAH) benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to build a home spa for his service-connected low back disability. Before receiving a response, he constructed the spa. His initial request was denied, and he did not appeal. Later, he sought reimbursement for the spa's construction costs, which was also denied by the VA and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Smith appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims but died before the case was decided. His daughter, Karen Hicks, sought to substitute herself in the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denied Hicks's motion for substitution, stating she was not entitled to pursue her father's claim. The court found that Hicks had not obtained a determination from the VA that she was an eligible accrued-benefits claimant, a prerequisite for substitution under the court's precedent in Breedlove v. Shinseki.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Hicks argued that the Veterans Court should have made the determination of her eligibility for substitution without requiring a VA determination. She also contended that she should be allowed to pursue the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4406, which governs SAH benefits, and under the equitable doctrine of nunc pro tunc. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, holding that the court did not err in requiring a VA determination for substitution eligibility and that Hicks did not meet the regulatory requirements for reimbursement. The court also upheld the application of the nunc pro tunc doctrine, which did not apply as Smith died before the case was submitted for decision. View "SMITH v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Kenneth Dojaquez, an attorney, appealed a decision regarding his entitlement to additional attorney's fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3). Dojaquez represented a veteran, Billy Wayne Slaughter, who was awarded an increased disability rating by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. The agency assigned an effective date of August 1, 2012, for the increased rating in a decision dated March 2, 2019, but did not notify Slaughter of this decision until April 26, 2019. Dojaquez argued that his attorney's fees should be calculated up to the notification date, not the decision date.The Board of Veterans' Appeals concluded that Dojaquez was only entitled to attorney's fees through March 2, 2019, the date of the agency's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed this decision, relying on the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) and established case law, specifically Snyder v. Nicholson, which defined the end date for calculating past-due benefits as the date of the award decision, not the notification date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the "date of the final decision" under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3) refers to the date of the agency's decision assigning an effective date, not the date the veteran was notified of the decision. This interpretation ensures that attorney's fees are calculated based on past-due benefits up to the date of the award decision, consistent with the statutory language and previous case law. The court rejected Dojaquez's argument that the notification date should be used, as it would conflict with the statutory scheme and potentially allow attorneys to receive more than 20% of the claimant's past-due benefits. View "DOJAQUEZ v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law