Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Augutis had reconstructive surgery on his foot at a VA hospital. Complications led to amputation of his leg. Augutis claims that the amputation was the result of negligent treatment and filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs. The VA denied the claim. Augutis timely requested reconsideration on March 21, 2011. On October 3, the VA informed him that it had not completed reconsideration, but that suit could be filed or additional time could be permitted to allow it to reach a decision. The letter noted that Federal Tort Claims Act claims are governed by both federal and state law and that some state laws may bar a claim or suit. Days later, the VA denied reconsideration. The letter explained that a claim could be presented to a district court within six months, but again noted that state laws might bar suit. Augutis filed suit on April 3, 2012, more than five years after the surgery, but within six months of the VA’s final dismissal. The district court dismissed under Illinois’s statute of repose, 735 ILCS 5/13‐212(a), which requires that a medical malpractice claim be brought within four years of the date of the alleged malpractice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the state limitations period was preempted by the FTCA period. View "Augutis v. Uniited States" on Justia Law

Before the invasion of Iraq, KBR entered into contracts with the U.S. Army for the provision of dining facility (DFAC) services in Iraq. The contract at issue was for DFAC services at Camp Anaconda, one of the largest U.S. bases in Iraq. KBR subcontracted with Tamimi to provide services in Anaconda. As troop levels increased, the Defense Contract Auditing Agency (DCAA) engaged in audits of DFAC subcontracts. With respect to Anaconda, the DCAA concluded that KBR had charged $41.1 million in unreasonable costs for services provided from July 2004 to December 2004 and declined to pay KBR that amount. KBR sued and the government brought counterclaims, including a claim under the Anti-Kickback Act. The Court of Federal Claims held that KBR was entitled to $11,460,940.31 in reasonable costs and dismissed the majority of the government’s counterclaims, but awarded $38,000.00 on the AKA claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed the determination of cost reasonableness and dismissal of the government’s Fraud and False Claims Act claims and common-law fraud claim. The court remanded in part, holding that the Claims Court improperly calculated KBR’s base fee and erred in determining that the actions of KBR’s employees should not be imputed to KBR for purposes of the AKA. . View "Kellogg Brown & Root Servs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2671-80, seeking compensatory damages for loss of property and personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence and malice of the VA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the VA's motion to dismiss where the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA), 38 U.S.C. 511, and in the alternative, the United States' sovereign immunity, barred the district court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. View "King v. US Dept. of Veterans Affairs, et al." on Justia Law

The Department of Veterans Affairs promulgated a rule that purported to eliminate certain procedural and appellate rights for veterans appearing before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates (NOVA) sought review. During the course of review it became clear that the new rule was invalid; the VA made assurances to NOVA and to the Federal Circuit about how the matter would be handled pending resolution. It later became clear that these assurances were not honored by the VA. The Federal Circuit ordered the VA to show cause why it should not be sanctioned. The VA, conceding error, provided a detailed remedial plan. After clarifications, NOVA indicated its satisfaction with, and agreement to, the plan, under which the VA agreed to notify relevant claimants before the Board, to vacate the affected Board decisions, and to provide affected claimants with a new hearing even if relevant deadlines would otherwise have expired. The Federal Circuit approved the plan and did not enter sanctions. View "Nat'l Org. of Veterans Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former members of the armed forces, brought suit against defendants, two former Secretaries of Defense, alleging that they were victims of rape and sexual misconduct by fellow servicemembers during their military careers. Plaintiffs sought money damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The court held that no Bivens action will lie where special factors counsel hesitation in creating an implied right of action and special factors clearly counsel hesitation in implying a cause of action for injuries arising out of military service. The court concluded that judicial abstention was the proper course in this case pursuant to Chappell v. Wallace, United States v. Stanley, and Feres v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Cioca v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed suit against the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights in an administrative decision which suspended him from practice before naval courts. The disciplinary proceedings stemmed from plaintiff's filing of an appellate brief containing statements he knew were false and misleading. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the Navy JAG had authority to discipline plaintiff; plaintiff received ample due process and his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated during the proceedings against him; and the record did not support plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, 701, and 706, claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims and denied his request for mandamus review. View "Partington v. Houck, et al." on Justia Law

Antonellis, a member of the Navy Reserve since 1986, is a member of boththe Selected Reserve, a paid unit, and the Individual Ready Reserve, which is unpaid. From 2009 through 2011, Antonellis submitted 69 applications, but he was not assigned to any Selected Reserve billet and was instead assigned to a Volunteer Training Unit in the Individual Ready Reserve. He performed those duties without pay. In 2011 Antonellis filed suit under the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. 206(a), asserting that, based on his outstanding service record and the standards described in the Commander’s guidance letter, he “has been clearly entitled to a pay billet” and that the decision not to assign him to a Selected Reserve pay billet was arbitrary. He sought more than $64,700 in back pay. The Claims Court dismissed the claim as nonjusticiable, because there were no standards by which it could review the Navy’s assignment decisions. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Antonellis v. United States" on Justia Law

Harkness, a reserve Commander in the Navy Chaplain Corps, was denied a promotion to the rank of Captain by an annual selection board. The Secretary of the Navy denied his request to convene a special selection board (SSB) to review that decision. Harkness filed suit, claiming that promotion policies and procedures for chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by 10 U.S.C. 14502(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-promoted officers must first petition the Secretary to convene an SSB. The Secretary must weigh certain factors, including whether an administrative error caused the original selection board not actually to consider the officer, or whether a material error caused the original board to mistakenly fail to recommend promotion. If the Secretary determines that an SSB is not warranted, the officer can seek review of that denial in federal court. The language of Harkness’s request apparently challenged only the composition of the board and fell short of giving the Secretary a meaningful opportunity to respond to Harkness’s constitutional contention. View "Harkness v. United States" on Justia Law

Kebodeaux was convicted by special court-martial of a federal sex offense. After serving his sentence and receiving a bad-conduct discharge from the Air Force, he moved to Texas where he registered with state authorities as a sex offender. Congress later enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which requires federal sex offenders to register in the states where they live, study, and work, 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). SORNA applies to offenders who, when SORNA became law, had completed their sentences. When Kebodeaux moved within Texas and failed to update his registration, the federal government prosecuted him and the district court convicted him under SORNA. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SORNA’s registration requirements, as applied to Kebodeaux, fall within the scope of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress did not apply SORNA to an individual who was, before its enactment, “unconditionally released,” but to an individual already subject to federal registration requirements. SORNA somewhat modified registration requirements to which Kebodeaux was already subject, to make more uniform "a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration requirements." At the time of his offense and conviction, Kebodeaux was subject to the Wetterling Act, which imposed similar registration requirements and was promulgated under the Military Regulation Clause (Art. I, s. 8, cl. 14), and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The same power that authorized Congress to promulgate the Uniform Code of Military Justice and punish Kebodeaux’s crime also authorized Congress to make the civil registration requirement at issue a consequence of conviction. Imposing a civil registration requirement that would apply upon the release of an offender like Kebodeaux is “eminently reasonable,” as is assignment of a special role to the federal government in ensuring compliance with federal sex offender registration requirements. View "United States v. Kebodeaux" on Justia Law

Federal employees who are members of the National Guard are entitled to up to 15 days of annual military leave “without loss in pay, time, or performance or efficiency rating,” 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). Before a 2000 amendment, the Office of Personnel Management interpreted the section as providing 15 calendar days of leave, rather than 15 workdays; federal employees who attended reserve training on non-work days were charged military leave. The Federal Circuit held that even before 2000, federal agencies were not entitled to charge employees military leave on non-workdays. Tierney worked at the DEA, 1974-2001, and was a member of the Air National Guard. He filed a Merit Systems Protection Board claim that the DEA charged him military leave for reserve duty on 44 non-workdays, so that he took annual leave or unpaid leave for military duty. An AJ ordered DEA to compensate Tierney for 17 days. The full Board reversed, finding that the Military Leave Summary and Tierney’s testimony were based solely on his military records and on speculation that DEA improperly charged military leave on intervening non-workdays and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that DEA charged him military leave on non-workdays or that he used annual leave for reserve duties. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tierney v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law