Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Hillyard suffered a head injury and was hospitalized for two weeks while serving in the U.S. Army. Hillyard filed a single claim for service connection for a mental condition, which he attributed to his in-service head injury. The Veterans Administration denied his claim and the Board affirmed and subsequently denied Hillyard’s request for revision. The Veterans Court affirmed. Hillyard later filed a second request for revision alleging clear and unmistakable error (CUE) by the Board in failing to consider and apply 38 U.S.C. 105(a) and 1111, a different CUE allegation from the one he made in his first request. The Board dismissed the second request for revision with prejudice, concluding 38 C.F.R. 20.1409(c) permitted only one request for revision to be filed. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The interpretation of Rule 1409(c) proffered by the VA is consistent with the language of the regulation and is in harmony with the VA’s description of the regulation in its notice of rule-making. View "Hillyard v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Conyers and Northover were indefinitely suspended and demoted, respectively, from their positions with the Department of Defense after they were found ineligible to occupy “noncritical sensitive” positions. The Department argued that, because the positions were designated “noncritical sensitive,” the Merit Systems Protection Board could not review the merits of the Department’s determinations under the precedent set forth in Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). The Board held that Egan limits review of an otherwise appealable adverse action only if that action is based upon eligibility for or a denial, revocation, or suspension of access to classified information. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. Egan prohibits Board review of agency determinations concerning eligibility of an employee to occupy a “sensitive” position, regardless of whether the position requires access to classified information. View "Berry v. Conyers" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Sean Theodore Brehm, a citizen of South Africa, pled guilty to a federal charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, on condition that he be allowed to challenge through appeal the jurisdictional basis of the indictment underlying his conviction. The grand jury accused Defendant of stabbing a British subject, "J.O.," during an altercation at Kandahar Airfield, while both men were employed with private contractors supporting the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. On appeal, Defendant argued that the indictment's reliance on the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was misplaced, in that the statute (which Defendant admitted was valid on its face) could not be applied to him in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Defendant also asserted that the government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between him and the United States to support the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, pointing out that, prior to his arrival in Virginia as an accused, neither he nor his victim had ever set foot in this country. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges to his conviction and affirmed the district court's judgment.

Reeves served as a heavy mortar crewman during combat offensives, 1942-1945, and was awarded three Bronze Stars. In 1981, Reeves filed a claim seeking service-connected disability benefits, with a medical opinion, stating that Reeves had bilateral, nerve-type hearing loss in 1962, attributable to noise exposure or to treatment with quinine for malaria. He also submitted records of an audiogram and statements from officers with whom he had served. The board denied the claim, stating that hearing loss documented in 1962 was too remote from active service. Reeves did not appeal. In 2004, the board granted an application to re-open, citing new evidence of treatment from 1946 to 1954, and awarded him service-connected disability benefits, effective 2002. In 2006, Reeves sought revision to an earlier effective date. The board denied the motion. The Veterans Court affirmed, rejecting an assertion that the evidence of record in 1983 was such that the board had no choice but to resolve in his favor that his hearing disability was incurred in service. Reeves died in 2011; the Federal Circuit substituted his widow and reversed. The Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 1154(b) in rejecting the clear and unmistakeable error claim.

After the Air Force announced it would conduct a reduction-in-force (RIF) at Luke Air Force Base, the Union made several proposals about how the RIF should be conducted and asked the Air Force to enter into negotiations. The Air Force claimed it had no duty to negotiate over three of the Union's proposals, prompting the Union to appeal the FLRA. The FLRA determined that the Air Force had an obligation to negotiate over two of the three disputed proposals and the Air Force subsequently petitioned for review of the unfavorable rulings. Because the Air Force's objections to the FLRA's rulings were either waived or unavailing, the petition for review was denied.

The Government appealed from the district court's judgment requiring the Government to disclose, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, information redacted from two memoranda prepared by the OLC. The Government contended that the redactions were justified under FOIA because the information pertained to a highly classified, active intelligence method. The court concluded that the Government could withhold this information under FOIA Exemption 1. Plaintiffs challenged the judgment insofar as it sustained the Government's withholding of certain records relating to the use of waterboarding and a photograph of a high-value detainee in custody. The court agreed with the district court that the materials at issue were exempt from disclosure. The district court erred, however, in requiring the Government to disclose the classified information redacted from the two memoranda.

After the September 11, 2011 attacks, the government detained plaintiff, an American citizen, as an enemy combatant. Plaintiff alleged that he was held incommunicado in military detention, subjected to coercive interrogation techniques and detained under harsh conditions of confinement, all in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff and his mother sued John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2001 to 2003, alleging that they suffered from plaintiff's unlawful detention. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court law, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the court was compelled to conclude that, regardless of the legality of plaintiff's detention and the wisdom of Yoo's judgments, at the time he acted the law was not "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [wa]s doing violated[d]" plaintiff's rights. Therefore, the court held that Yoo must be granted qualified immunity and accordingly reversed the decision of the district court.

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Robert Newton alleged Major John R. Teter and Lieutenant Colonel Wayne E. Lee of the Utah Air National Guard violated his due process rights when they suspended and subsequently withdrew his Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) certificate, and when they suspended his employment as an Air Traffic Control Supervisor at Hill Air Force Base in Utah. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the suspension of his employment. It denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the withdrawal of his ATCS certificate, holding this claim was not barred by qualified immunity or by intramilitary immunity under the "Feres" doctrine. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendants challenged the denial of qualified immunity and intramilitary immunity on Plaintiff's ATCS certificate claim. Plaintiff cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on his employment claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's ATCS certificate was not barred by the "Feres" doctrine, and that the Court had no jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity to defendants. The Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's cross-appeal.

More than 7,000 named plaintiffs brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, asserting injuries because of the U.S. Navy's alleged negligence in emitting pollutants during military exercises (which ended in 2003) at the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed. The limited abrogation of sovereign immunity in the FTCA does not extend to these claims because of the discretionary function exception, which precludes FTCA actions against government conduct which is both within the discretion of the relevant government party and susceptible to policy-related judgments. The court rejected arguments that the Navy acted beyond its discretion because it allegedly violated mandatory directives concerning water pollution issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1389; violated a pair of permits that purportedly forbid firing depleted uranium bullets on Vieques; violated unidentified internal regulations, policies, directives, and orders; and failed to comply with a purported duty to warn.

In 2009, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs sued Frank S. Smith, Jr. in the Jefferson Circuit Court, stating a claim of ejectment and sought possession of Mr. Smith's house in Bessemer. The mortgage to Mr. Smith's home was assigned to the Secretary, and the Secretary had sold the house at a foreclosure sale in 2007. The auctioneer who sold the house executed an auctioneer's deed conveying the house to the Secretary. The Secretary demanded that Mr. Smith vacate the house, but Mr. Smith failed to leave. The trial court granted summary judgment, asserting as a matter of law he was entitled to possession of the house. Mr. Smith opposed the summary-judgment motion by filing a pleading titled 'Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.' In his response, Mr. Smith argued, among other things, that the Secretary had failed to establish that he was entitled to possession of the house because, Frank said, the affidavit filed with the Secretary's motion did not comply with Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. Mr. Smith appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals which reversed the summary judgment and remanded the action for further proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Smith should have moved to strike the offending affidavit in the Secretary's summary judgment motion in his response: "an objection to the inadmissible evidence alone is not sufficient." The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the trial court's decision.