Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs (collectively, the Officers) worked as police officers for the City of Hoover, Alabama. They also served as military reservists. Over a two-decade span, the Officers were summoned to active-duty service a combined thirteen times. While away, Hoover did not provide the Officers the same holiday pay and accrued benefits that it gave employees on paid administrative leave. This disparate treatment prompted the Officers to sue Hoover under USERRA. And it led the district court to grant summary judgment for the Officers. On appeal, Hoover argued that the Officers are not similar to employees placed on paid administrative leave. Second, Hoover asserted that military leave is not comparable to paid administrative leave.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Hoover violated Section 4316(b)(1)(B) by not providing the Officers the same benefits on military leave that it afforded similar employees on paid administrative leave. The court concluded that the DOL’s interpretation of Section 4316(b)(1)(B) deserves deference. Thus, to the extent Congress spoke to the meaning of “status” and “pay,” the legislative history suggests that it did so in a way that defeats Hoover’s interpretation. Further, the court reasoned that had the Officers been placed on paid administrative leave instead of military leave, they would have received holiday pay and accrued benefits for each period of service, including those shorter than sixteen months. So, the district court should have found the two forms of leave comparable in duration. However, the court affirmed because the district court reached the correct conclusion. View "Thaddaeus Myrick, et al v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked at Huntington Ingalls Incorporated as a sheet-metal mechanic. After leaving the company, Plaintiff complained of hearing loss. Plaintiff selected and met with an audiologist. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiff’s Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board. The Board reversed its initial decision on whether Plaintiff could choose his own audiologist. The Company timely petitioned for review. The question is whether audiologists are “physicians” under Section 907(b) of LHWCA.   The Fifth Circuit denied the Company’s petition for review. The court reasoned that based on the education they receive and the role that they play in identifying and treating hearing disorders, audiologists can fairly be described as “skilled in the art of healing.” However, audiologists are not themselves medical doctors. Their work complements that of a medical doctor. But, the court wrote, Optometrists, despite lacking a medical degree, are able to administer and interpret vision tests. And based on the results of those tests, optometrists can prescribe the appropriate corrective lenses that someone with impaired vision can use to bolster his or her ability to see. Audiologists are similarly able to administer hearing tests, evaluate the resulting audiograms, and then use that information to fit a patient with hearing aids that are appropriately calibrated to the individual’s level of auditory impairment. Because the plain meaning of the regulation includes audiologists, and because that regulation is entitled to Chevron deference, audiologists are included in Section 907(b) of the LHWCA’s use of the word “physician.” View "Huntington Ingalls v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Kelly served as a Navy diver from 2008-2013 and received numerous accolades but suffered multiple injuries. Following a 2012 dive mission, Kelly received hyperbaric chamber treatment. Kelly then experienced emotional and behavioral changes. He was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder, depressed mood, and anxiety. In 2013, Kelly was cited for criminal incidents. The Navy removed Kelly’s diver classification. Kelly was discharged “Under Honorable Conditions (general).” The narrative recited “misconduct” for the commission of a “serious offense.” Based on the “liberal consideration” policy, the Discharge Review Board removed the reason for separation.Kelly subsequently requested that the Record Correction Board correct his military records to reflect disability retirement under 10 U.S.C. 1201. A Senior Medical Officer advisor opined that Kelly was fit to perform his duties at the time of his separation and that his misconduct did not result from “a legal[ly] exculpating level of psychological impairment incident to a potentially compensable psychiatric condition.” The Board denied Kelly’s request.The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board failed to evaluate all relevant criteria under Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1850.4E 3304 (common military tasks, physical readiness/fitness tests, deployability, special qualifications); failure to evaluate the effect the upgrade change in Kelly’s record had on his eligibility for retirement disability pay was arbitrary. The Board must determine whether Kelly’s medical condition affected his deployability or special qualifications. Section 1201 military disability retirement benefits are nondiscretionary and statutorily mandated; they confer a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. View "Kelly v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) provides for collective bargaining between federal agencies and their employees’ unions and establishes the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to investigate and adjudicate labor disputes, 5 U.S.C. 7101. The Union represents federal civil-service employees (dual-status technicians) who work for the Ohio National Guard. After their prior collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) expired, the Guard, the Ohio Adjutant General, and the Ohio Adjutant General’s Department (petitioners) asserted that they were not bound by the FSLMRS. The Union filed a complaint with the FLRA. An ALJ concluded that the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard; the dual-status technicians had collective bargaining rights under the FSLMRS; and repudiating the CBA violated the FSLMRS. The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision.The Supreme Court affirmed. A State National Guard acts as a federal agency for purposes of the FSLMRS when it hires and supervises dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. When the Guard employs dual-status technicians, it exercises the authority of the Department of Defense, an agency covered by the FSLMRS. The statutory authority permitting the Ohio Adjutant General to employ dual-status technicians as civilian employees in the federal civil service is found in 5 U.S.C. 2105(a)(1)(F). Dual-status technicians are ultimately employees of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and the petitioners are the Secretaries’ designees for purposes of dual-status technician employment. View "Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

Nordby served as an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration. He was also a First Lieutenant in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the Army Reserve. From January-May 2017, Nordby was activated under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) to perform military service in the Army Reserve; he conducted basic training for new Judge Advocates in Georgia and Virginia. Federal employees who are absent from civilian positions due to military responsibilities and who meet the requirements listed in 5 U.S.C. 5538(a) are entitled to differential pay to account for the difference between their military and civilian compensation.The agency denied Nordby’s request for differential pay, reasoning that those called to voluntary active duty under section 12301(d) are not entitled to differential pay. The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected Nordby's argument that he was called to duty under section 101(a)(13)(B)— “any [] provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress” and that his activation was “during a national emergency” because the U.S. has been in a continuous state of national emergency since September 11, 2001. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Nordby failed to allege any connection between the training and the ongoing national emergency that resulted from the September 11 attack. View "Nordby v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was on active duty with the United States Army. He bought a car from Select Cars of Thornburg in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and financed his purchase with a loan from United Auto Credit Corporation. The loan financed not only the car’s cost but also the cost of Guaranteed Asset Protection. Guaranteed Asset Protection is like extra insurance, covering any amount still due on the car loan after auto insurance is paid out if the car is totaled or stolen. Plaintiff’s claims arise from this single loan. This loan, Plaintiff alleged, violated the Military Lending Act because the loan agreement mandated arbitration and failed to disclose certain information. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the loan was not covered by the Act at all.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a statutory provision must be given the ordinary meaning it had when it was enacted. Relevant dictionaries, carefully considered, sometimes shed light on that ordinary meaning. Yet here, dueling dictionaries provide more than one linguistically permissible meaning.  But by examining the relevant phrase in its statutory context. This context shows that while “the express purpose” can be used in different senses, it is best read in Section 987(i)(6) to mean the specific purpose. This loan was offered for the specific purpose of financing Plaintiff’s car purchase. And that satisfies Section 987(i)(6)’s relevant condition and the Act is inapplicable. View "Jerry Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in this case, are a group of Mississippi municipalities and associations harmed and threatened by this turn of events. They sued the Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Section 706(1) for the Corps’ refusal to prepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as assertedly required by NEPA and accompanying regulations. Invoking the federal government’s sovereign immunity, the Corps moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties agreed on the legal question at issue—namely, whether NEPA and related regulations impose on the Corps a discrete duty to act that a federal court can compel it to honor under APA Section 706(1)—but disagreed on the answer to the question.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the Corps. The court explained that because the Corps has no duty to prepare the supplemental EIS the plaintiffs seek, Plaintiffs have no APA claim for unlawful agency inaction, and the Corps is immune from their suit claiming otherwise. For better or worse, Congress and the Corps have authority to act on Plaintiffs’ dire environmental concerns. The federal courts do not. View "Harrison County, MS v. U.S. Army Corps" on Justia Law

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed suit under 38 U.S.C. 502, seeking review and revision of certain instructions and practices set forth in the Veterans Affairs Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1 Manual), which provides guidance and instructions to the administrators of veterans’ benefits and claims, by interpreting and coordinating the application of statutes, regulations, policies, and judicial decisions. The M21-1 Manual “limits VA staff discretion, and, as a practical matter, impacts veteran benefits eligibility for an entire class of veterans.”The Federal Circuit dismissed challenges to presumptions and procedures concerning Vietnam-era exposure to the Agent Orange defoliant. MVA waived its challenge to the “Thailand Rules.” The VA’s interpretation of the “Blue Water Navy Rule” of 2019 did not unduly narrow the presumption of exposure and service connection as applied to shipboard service. MVA’s challenge to the “Airspace Rule” is barred by the six-year limit provided in section 2401(a) because the rule has been in full force and effect since 1993. Even if the time bar did not apply, Congress has consistently preserved the high-altitude exception to the presumption of exposure since its adoption in 1993. View "Military-Veterans Advocacy Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Kluge, an Army Reserve commissioned officer and a civilian employee of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was ordered under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) to report to active duty in support of a contingency operation, Operation Enduring Freedom. He was absent from his DHS job from January 15 to July 30, 2011. For the first few weeks, Kluge was on paid military leave; from February 27 until July 30, DHS did not pay him except for the July 4 holiday. Kluge sought to recover differential pay under 5 U.S.C. 5538 for himself and similarly situated service members employed by the federal government, naming the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as the respondent.An administrative judge denied class certification and substituted DHS for OPM. DHS and Kluge stipulated that he was eligible for differential pay. The AJ determined that DHS owed Kluge $274.37 plus interest. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The court upheld a finding that putative class members lack commonality or that identifying class members and adjudicating their claims as a class would not be fairer or more efficient. There was no legal error or abuse of discretion in the substitution of DHS for OPM. Kluge failed to show any error in calculating the differential pay. View "Kluge v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

This case arises from major flooding events in the Houston area in 2016 and 2017. Local political subdivisions sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers, seeking compliance with alleged regulatory obligations. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The fundamental issue in the case is whether the Corps has violated any enforceable, legal obligation in the management of the relevant dams and reservoirs. A potential source for obligations imposed on the Corps is the 2012 Water Control Manual (“WCM”) adopted by the Corps for flood control in the relevant watershed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Section 702 of the APA has been satisfied in that the complaint alleges Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by agency action, that the suit is not one for money damages, and that the injury arises from an officer or employee who has acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of law. Further, the court held that the Tucker Act does not provide an “adequate remedy” to the County’s claims within the meaning of Section 704. Further, the court wrote that since the regulation does not specify when such conditions require the Corps to update a WCM, the Corps must exercise discretion in deciding when updating a WCM is necessary. Such discretion is antithetical to a mandatory duty. Thus the court concluded there is no discrete, mandatory duty to revise. View "Ft Bend Cty v. US Army Corps" on Justia Law