Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Berry and Co. petitioned the tax court for relief from the County's property tax assessment of its property for 2007 and 2008. At trial, Berry and the County each offered expert appraiser testimony as to the estimated market value of the property. Both appraisers used the market sales comparison approach to value the subject property. The tax county determined that the highest and best use for the subject property was redevelopment and agreed with the County's expert on the valuation, which was higher than the original assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court's determination that the highest and best use of the subject property was redevelopment was not erroneous, and (2) the tax court's valuation of the subject property was supported in the record and was not clearly erroneous.

Continental Retail sought certiorari review of the market value determinations by the Minnesota Tax Court for a Continental commercial building for the assessment dates of 2006, 2007, and 2008. Continental filed petitions challenging the county assessor's estimated market value for the three years, and at trial, the tax court increased the market value determinations for all three years. On appeal, Continental argued that the tax court's value determinations were excessive and not supported by the record over the assessed value of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court's value determinations were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous.

The Commission of Transportation requested a condemnation order for a portion of appellant Richard Lepak's land for the improvement and widening of a highway. After a condemnation hearing, the district court concluded that improving and widening the highway was a legitimate public purpose and that the state Department of Transportation had established a reasonable necessity. Therefore, the district court rejected the challenged to the proposed taking, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on review was whether the State had a valid public purpose for the taking because part of Lepak's land would be used to build a private road to mitigate damages to a neighboring parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purpose of the taking in this case met the definition of "public use" or "public purpose" as set forth in Minn. Stat. 117.025.

In 2008, Olmsted County changed the property tax classification of farmland owned by Frederick Farms from agricultural-homestead to agricultural-nonhomestead property. The tax court denied Frederick Farms' petition to change the classification of the property back to agricultural homestead for taxes payable in 2009 and later. Frederick Farms appealed, arguing that it was operating a joint family farm venture with its sole shareholder, James Frederick, and that the County must classify the property as agricultural homestead because it was used by the joint family farm venture. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court, concluding (1) that a joint family farm venture must own or lease, and not merely use, the property in order for a participant of the joint family farm venture to claim an agricultural-homestead classification; and (2) because the family farm corporation, not the joint family farm venture, owned the land in question, Frederick Farms was not entitled to claim an agricultural-homestead classification as a participant in a joint family farm venture.

George Frandsen was employed by Ford Motor Company when he was injured in the course and scope of his employment. Ford assumed responsibility for the injury and paid Frandsen temporary total disability (TTD) benefits pursuant to the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act. Later, the parties agreed to reclassify the TTD benefits Ford had previously paid to Frandsen as permanent total disability (PTD) benefit payments. After Frandsen turned sixty-seven years old, Ford petitioned the WCCA to discontinue payment of Frandsen's PTD benefits pursuant to Minn. Stat. 176.101, which states that permanent total disability shall cease at age sixty-seven because the employee is presumed retired from the labor market. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) denied Ford's petition, concluding that Ford had waived the retirement presumption by failing to expressly reserve the right to discontinue payment of Frandsen's PTD benefits in the settlement agreement. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the WCCA, holding (1) the retirement presumption applies unless the employee rebuts the presumption or proves knowing and intentional waiver by the employer, and (2) here the record lacked any evidence that Ford intended to continue paying PTD benefits to Frandsen after he turned sixty-seven. Remanded.

Employee was injured while working in Minnesota for Wisconsin-based Employer. Employee applied for Wisconsin and Minnesota workers' compensation benefits. Employer's insurance company, Travelers Insurance, covered the Wisconsin benefits but denied the claim for Minnesota benefits based on an exclusion of Minnesota coverage in Employee's policy. Employee then filed a claim for Minnesota benefits with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry. After settling the claim, the Department pursued a petition for reimbursement it had filed against Employer. A compensation judge found that Employer was not insured for Minnesota workers' compensation liability and ordered Employer to reimburse the Department. The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that Employer was entitled to coverage from Travelers under the reasonable expectations doctrine. On review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of a recent Court decision clarifying that the doctrine should not be used to provide coverage in contravention of unambiguous policy terms. On remand, the WCCA again reversed the compensation judge. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCCA had no authority to declare unambiguous language of an insurance contract to be invalid and unenforceable because the exclusion conflicted with Wisconsin statutory provisions and public policy.

In 2008, Marlow Timberland (MT) filed a tax petition challenging the taxes payable in 2008 on the belief that Lake County's property tax assessment of MT's recently purchased land was too high. MT then filed tax petitions challenging the taxes payable in 2009 and 2010, which were dismissed due to MT's failure to pay the taxes. MT moved to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions based on its contention that the properties were overassessed and that it was unable to pay the taxes due. The Minnesota Tax Court issued an order granting Lake County's motion to dismiss the 2008 petition and denying MT's motion to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions. On review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the tax court erred by not allowing MT to amend its 2008 petition because an amendment would not result in any prejudice to Lake County; and (2) the tax court properly denied MT's motion to reinstate its 2009 and 2010 tax petitions, and reinstatement of those petitions was not required on an equitable basis. Remanded.

William Eldredge, an honorably discharged veteran and a firefighter employed by the City of Saint Paul, was notified by the City that it intended to terminate his employment. Eldredge challenged the termination under the Veterans Preference Act (VPA), which provided that Eldredge may not be removed from his job except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing. The Saint Paul Civil Service Commission granted summary disposition in Eldredge's favor. The City sought judicial review by petitioning for and securing the issuance of a writ of certiorari from the district court. The court dismissed the writ after concluding that the City had missed the filing deadline for appeals under the VPA. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the district court erred when it concluded the writ was untimely, and (2) because the writ was timely, the district court had jurisdiction to consider the City's appeal. Remanded.

After respondent was granted a permit by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (âMPUCâ) for routing and construction of a pipeline to deliver natural gas to an energy center within appellantâs city limits, appellant commenced an action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to require respondent to obtain a franchise from appellant to operate the pipeline. The district court dismissed, concluding that appellant did not have franchise authority over respondentâs pipeline, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a municipality is authorized by Minn. Stat. 301B.01 to impose a franchise on a public utility that has constructed and operates a gas pipeline located on public property within the municipality, regardless of whether the pipeline itself supplies gas to the public; (2) a municipality is authorized by Minn. Stat. 216B.36 to impose a franchise on a public utility that serves customers within the municipality or that uses public property within the municipality to serve customers elsewhere; and (3) the issuance of a permit by the MPUC for the construction of a gas pipeline does not preempt pursuant to Minn. Stat. 216G.02 a municipal ordinance requiring a franchise for the operation of the pipeline after construction is complete.

Respondents Dr. Rajbir Sarpal and his wife Carol purchased a parcel of property in 2003 on which they built their home. The property was encumbered by two easements reserved by the City of North Oaks for a future trail. The Sarpals wanted a shed on their property, and in 2006, went to the City to obtain the necessary permits. A City employee gave Dr. Sarpal an "as-built" survey in order to obtain the necessary permits, but the survey was dated to a time before the Sarpals' home was built. Dr. Sarpal, acting as his own general contractor, drew up the plans, submitted them to the requisite authorities, and built the shed on his property. He would later find out that the shed encroached on the City's two easements. Dr. Sarpal petitioned the local zoning board for a variance in order to save the shed, but was denied. The City sued to have the shed removed. The court dismissed all of the City's claims, holding that because the Sarpals relied on the survey given to them by the City, the City was equitably estopped from suing for the easements now. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that when a government entity makes a "simple mistake" when providing a document to a party upon which the party relies to obtain building permits and the government approves that permit, the mistake is not wrongful conduct sufficient to support the conclusion that the government is equitably estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances.