Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent suffered a work-related back injury. Respondent and her employer entered into a “full, final, and complete” settlement of Respondent’s claims for workers’ compensation benefits related to that injury. Respondent later filed a claim petition seeking additional benefits for the back injury, alleging a lumbar spine injury with consequential depression and anxiety. The employer moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that Respondent was first required to bring a motion to vacate the existing settlement agreement before bringing a new claim. The workers’ compensation judge denied the motion, concluding that the settlement agreement did not foreclose a later claim for consequential psychological injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the settlement agreement did not foreclose claims from the same incident that were not mentioned in the agreement without evidence that those claims were contemplated by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the settlement agreement was sufficient settle conditions and complications that arise out of, and are a consequence of, Respondent’s workers’ compensation injury. View "Ryan v. Potlatch Corp." on Justia Law

When Daniel Berglund refused to file Minnesota income tax returns for tax years 2008, 2009, and 2010, the Minnesota Department of Revenue prepared and filed returns for Berglund and mailed him Notices of Commissioner Filed Returns for the relevant tax years. In total, the Commissioner of Revenue assessed $668,840 in unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest for the three-year period. Berglund appealed, arguing that because the returns did not contain the Commissioner’s signature they were invalid and unenforceable. The tax court granted the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the lack of a “manual signature” was of no consequence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relevant statutes do not require that the Commissioner sign commissioner-filed returns in order for those returns to be valid. View "Berglund v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Kelly Dennis was allegedly injured in the course of his employment with The Salvation Army. Dennis filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, but The Salvation Army and its insurer (collectively, Relators) denied liability. The compensation judge awarded Dennis benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed. Within thirty days, Relators filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the clerk of the appellate courts. Relators, however, failed to serve a cost bond on the WCCA as required by Minn. Stat. 176.471. Relators subsequently served an untimely cost bond on the WCCA. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether timely service of the cost bond was mandatory to have the WCCA order reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari. The Supreme Court discharged the writ of certiorari and dismissed the appeal, holding that Relators’ failure to file the cost bond within the thirty-day period to appeal was fatal to their appeal. View "Dennis v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while participating in an annual employee-recognition event sponsored by Employer. Employee petitioned for workers’ compensation benefits, but Employer denied liability, arguing that Employee’s injury was excluded from coverage under Minn. Stat. 176.021(9), which exempts from workers’ compensation coverage injuries incurred during “voluntary recreational programs.” A compensation judge concluded that the employee-recognition event was not a “voluntary” program because it occurred during Employee’s shift, and he was required to attend in order to obtain his wage without sacrificing his vacation time. The Workers’ Compensation Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an employer-sponsored recreational program is not “voluntary” when it takes place during work hours and employees must either attend the event or risk forfeiting pay or benefits; and (2) the relevant inquiry when applying section 176.021(9) is whether the program is voluntary, not whether individual recreational activities within the program are voluntary. View "Shire v. Rosemount, Inc." on Justia Law

When Respondents filed their Minnesota tax return for tax year 2007, they claimed they were part-year residents of the state. After an audit, the Commissioner of Revenue determined that Respondents were full-year residents of Minnesota for that year and assessed additional income tax, penalties, and interest. On appeal, the tax court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding that Respondents were not “residents” under Minn. Stat. 290.01. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute is ambiguous; and (2) the tax court’s interpretation of the statute was erroneous. Remanded to the tax court for a recalculation of Respondents’ tax debt in accordance with this opinion. View "Curtis G. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant was stopped by police officers while driving in a 2003 Chevy Tahoe on suspicion that he did not have a valid driver’s license. Appellant was subsequently issued a traffic citation. The officers proceeded to conduct an inventory search of the Tahoe and found 225 grams of methamphetamine. The officers then searched Appellant and found $611 in cash. Appellant was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance. The vehicle and cash were seized, and Appellant was served with notice and intent to forfeit the seized property. Appellant filed a civil complaint demanding a judicial determination of forfeiture, arguing that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture actions and that the evidence supporting forfeiture was illegally obtained and must be suppressed. The district court granted summary judgment for the County. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to civil forfeiture actions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the exclusionary rule is applicable to civil forfeiture actions brought under Minn. Stat. 609.531-.5319; and (2) Appellant had standing to challenge the forfeiture of the vehicle and cash. Remanded. View "Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe" on Justia Law

Relator was injured while working for Employer. Relator began receiving workers’ compensation benefits in 2010. In 2012, Relator began receiving a retirement annuity from the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA). At some point, Relator began receiving federal social security retirement benefits. While Employer was entitled under Minn. Stat. 176.101(4) to offset Relator’s permanent total disability benefits by the amount of her social security retirement benefits, the parties disagreed as to whether Employer was entitled to apply the offset to Relator’s PERA retirement benefits. A compensation judge granted Employer the offset. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, concluding that Relator’s PERA retirement annuity was an “old age and survivor insurance benefit.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the reasoning in Ekdahl v. Independent School District #213, also decided today, section 176.101(4) does not permit permanent total disability benefits to be offset by public employee pension benefits. Remanded. View "Hartwig v. Traverse Care Ctr." on Justia Law

Employee was injured in a work-related accident. Employee obtained approval for surgery from a union-sponsored benefit plan (the Fund) and proceeded with the surgery at a Hospital. After a hearing, a workers’ compensation judge concluded that the surgery was not reasonable and necessary and ordered Employer to reimburse the Fund for the medical bills but also concluded that Employer could seek reimbursement of the expenses from the medical providers. The Hospital was not given notice of that hearing. Before a second hearing on Employer’s request for reimbursement, the Hospital intervened. The compensation judge ordered the Hospital to reimburse Employer. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that the automatic-reimbursement rule announced in Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc. should be extended to the Hospital because it was not given notice of the first hearing. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to extend its decision in Brooks and require automatic payment of a medical provider’s treatment expenses when an employer fails to give the medical provider notice of its right to intervene in a workers’ compensation proceeding to determine responsibility for those expenses, holding that the Hospital was not entitled to automatic payment of its medical bills for Employee’s treatment. Remanded. View "Gamble v. Twin Cities Concrete Prods." on Justia Law

Relator was injured while working for a School District. Relator eventually sought and was awarded permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. Relying on Minn. Stat. 176.101(4) and claiming that the statute authorizes an offset for “any old age and survivor insurance benefits,” the School District sought to offset its PTD benefit payment by the amount of government-service pension benefits Relator was receiving. A compensation judge concluded that the School District was not entitled to the offset. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that government-service pension benefits are included in the phrase “old age and survivor insurance benefits” and therefore can be offset from the School District’s disability-benefit payment. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA and reinstated the decision of the compensation judge, holding that the phrase “old age and survivor benefits” refers only to federal social security benefits, and therefore, the WCCA erred when it applied section 176.101(4) to Relator’s retirement annuity. View "Ekdahl v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #213" on Justia Law

The Chief Deputy of the Steele County Sheriff’s Office evaluated the performance of Respondent, a sergeant, and gave him a negative review. Respondent appealed the Sheriff’s decision with the Minnesota Department of Administration by submitting a statement explaining why he disagreed with portions of the performance evaluation. The Department summarily dismissed the administrative appeal. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for informal resolution or a contested-case proceeding under the Data Practices Act (Act). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department wrongly concluded that Respondent’s appeal categorically fell outside the scope of the Act; (2) there was no support for the Department’s argument that dismissal was proper because the appeal raised new challenges and relied on new evidence; and (3) the Department does not have unqualified and unreviewable authority to dismiss any appeal brought under the Act. View "Schwanke v. Minn. Dep't of Admin." on Justia Law