Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court had the right, authority, and power to declare itself superior to and above both the other two branches of government in all matters of constitutional compliance. Attorney General Jim Hood asked the judicial branch of government to void several pardons, alleging that the applicants failed to publish notice as required by Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution. After the Court received this appeal, Governor Barbour (who issued the pardons) submitted an amicus curiae brief, and the Court allowed his counsel to participate in oral argument. At oral argument, the Court asked Attorney General Hood to point out any pardon that was not facially valid, and he could not. The Court noted that the parties and Governor Barbour presented numerous issues for consideration, including: whether those who did not apply for a pardon were required to publish notice; whether the governor(and not the convicted felons) applied for some of the pardons; whether some of the pardons had any applicant at all; whether the publication provision requires four or five weekly publications; whether the governor, the attorney general, or the pardonees have the burden of proof; and whether the attorney general is estopped from objecting to the pardons. "No judicial duty is more central to the proper operation of our system of government than is [the Court's] duty to decide this issue correctly. . . . [the Court was] compelled to hold that – in each of the cases before us – it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the Constitution’s publication requirement was met."

Defendant Sylvia Montgomery filed suit against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (Commission) in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County after she was injured when her car struck a pothole in the northbound lane of Interstate 55 near Vaughan. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it was exempt from liability under several provisions of the Mississippi Torts Claim Act (MTCA). The court denied the Commission's motion. A three-justice panel of the Supreme Court granted the Commission's petition for interlocutory appeal. Upon review of the parties' briefs and the record, the Court found the trial court erred by not determining whether the duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the highway is a discretionary duty under the "public-function" test. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's denial of the Commission's motion for summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal arose from a dispute between the Third Circuit Drug Court and the Lafayette County Board of Supervisors regarding Lafayette County's alleged duty to administer the drug court’s funding and the drug court's having required that county to place a drug court employee on its payroll. Because Union County replaced Lafayette County as the lead county for the Third Circuit Drug Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot.

Pursuant to 42 United States Code Sections 2000e-5 and 1983, Appellee Shirley Johnson brought suit against Defendants the City of Belzoni, Police Chief Mickey Foxworth, and Officer David James. Appellee claimed she was sexually harassed at work by James for approximately a year. She reported the harassment to her supervisor Foxworth, but claimed insufficient action was taken to remedy the situation. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a unanimous verdict of $150,000–$50,000 against each Defendant, in favor of Appellee. Aggrieved, Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. The motion was denied and the defendants appealed. Finding that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA), and in denying a cross-motion for summary judgment for nursing homes and nursing-home residents. The circuit court found that MIGA was entitled to a credit, which would reduce the amount MIGA must pay to indemnify nursing-home owners and operators for damage claims of two nursing-home residents that were allegedly caused by a series of negligent acts and omissions over the course of many years. Upon review, the Court found "the factual and legal predicates necessary to formulate an opinion on coverage issues are lacking, which would preclude any court from rendering a valid ruling on coverage." The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment that granted MIGA's motion for summary judgment and that denied the cross-motions for summary judgment.

In July 2006, Respondent Paul Cook's workers' compensation claim was dismissed for failure to file a properly completed prehearing statement. In December 2006, his "Motion for an Order Re-Instating Claim" was denied for failing to "attach a properly completed prehearing statement . . . ." In August 2008, Respondent's "Amended Motion to Reinstate" was dismissed as barred under a one-year statute of limitations. The full Commission affirmed the dismissal, as did the circuit court and a unanimous Mississippi Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted Respondent's petition for certiorari and affirmed: "Cook's claim was properly dismissed. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the Commission's rules and rulings of their statutorily intended effect, since '[a] rule which is not enforced is no rule at all.'"

The Secretary of State of Mississippi (State) and the City of Ocean Springs (Ocean Springs) appealed a chancery court's decision that enjoined the construction of a sidewalk. The sidewalk would have run along a beach adjacent to the seawall on property claimed by Respondents Clyde Gunn, III and Neil Harris in Ocean Springs. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the chancellor erred in granting the permanent injunction. The State and Ocean Springs asserted that the chancellor erred in issuing the permanent injunction because: her finding of irreparable injury was not supported by substantial evidence; an adequate remedy at law was available; and she failed to rule on the merits of the underlying dispute regarding ownership of the land where the proposed sidewalk was to be located. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the chancellorâs earlier determination that irreparable injury would result if she did not grant an injunction and that no adequate remedy at law was available. The Court concluded that the chancellorâs order and opinion was in fact a preliminary injunction, incorrectly styled as a permanent injunction: "[i[t is clear from its language that the chancellor sought to protect the interests of all parties until ownership of the property could be determined. We therefore remand this case to the Hinds County Chancery Court, vacate the permanent injunction, and leave the earlier-issued preliminary injunction in place."

Petitioner Sylvia Montgomery filed suit against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (Commission) after she was injured when her car struck a pothole in the northbound lane of Interstate 55 near Vaughan. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it was exempt from liability under several provisions of the Mississippi Torts Claim Act (MTCA). The circuit court denied the Commissionâs motion. A three-justice panel of the Supreme Court granted the Commissionâs petition for interlocutory appeal. Upon review of the partiesâ briefs and the record, the Court found the trial court erred by not determining whether the duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the highway is a discretionary duty under the "public-function test." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial courtâs denial of the Commissionâs motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Mississippi Tax Commission (Commission) assessed a contractorâs tax against Walter Akins, d/b/a Akins Construction Company. Akins challenged the assessment administratively. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Akins appealed to the Chancery Court. The chancellor dismissed his complaint for failure to comply with Mississippi Code Section 27-77-7 (Rev. 2005), which required a taxpayer seeking judicial review to pay the amount ordered before filing the petition or attach a security bond, for double the amount in controversy, with the petition to appeal. Akins appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that he was deprived of his right to due process because the appeal provisions codified in Section 27-77-7 are unconstitutional. Finding that the statute does meet constitutional standards and that Akins failed to pay the tax or post a bond in order to grant jurisdiction to the chancery court, the Court affirmed the chancellor's decision.

This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to sever and transfer venue. Plaintiffs Hattie Douglas, Kevin Hamlin, and the victimâs five siblings (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a complaint in circuit court against Sunshine Medical Clinic; Dr. Vibha Vig, in her official and personal capacities and Lisa Hoehn, nurse practitioner, in her official and personal capacities (collectively Defendants). The Plaintiffs alleged a medical-negligence and negligent-hiring cause of action against Defendants concerning the treatment and care of their minor son and brother, Kaddarius Douglas (Kaddarius) received before he died. Plaintiffs, in the same complaint, also brought claims against the Mississippi Crime Laboratory; Mississippi State Medical Examiners; Dr. Steven Hayne, in his official and personal capacities; Expertox, Inc.; and MedScreens, Inc. (Wrongful Incarceration Defendants) asserting that their acts and omissions in performing a postmortem examination and toxicological tests on Kaddarius's body, as well as in storing and handling blood and urine samples, caused the wrongful incarceration of Hattie Douglas for the murder of Kaddarius. All Defendants moved to have the trial court sever the claims and to transfer the claims against the Wrongful-Incarceration Defendants and to transfer the claims against the medical-negligence Defendants to another county court. The trial court denied the motion. All Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal to severe the two claims and transfer venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in not severing and transferring the claims to their proper venues. The Court the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for severance and transfer.