Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In July 2001, eight-year-old Jane Doe and thirteen-year-old Lisa Roe were playing unsupervised at the Presidential Hills Park, a public park built, operated, and maintained by the City of Jackson (the City). While playing in the park, the two children were approached by Andrew Lawson, a convicted sex offender, who fondled Lisa Roe and sexually battered Jane Doe. Lawson was convicted for his criminal acts against the girls. Two girls sued the City. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the motion. Because the City's operation of the park was a discretionary function, the Supreme Court granted the City's petition for interlocutory appeal and reversed the trial court and rendered judgment for the City.

In November 2008, P. Leslie Riley and an organization known as "Personhood Mississippi" filed an initiative, now known as Measure 26, with the Office of the Secretary of State. The initiative was qualified by the Secretary of the State to be placed on the general election ballot. Thereafter, Deborah Hughes and Cristen Hemmins ("Plaintiffs") filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in Hinds County Circuit Court against Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, challenging Measure 26 as a violation of Article 15, Section 273(5)(a) of the Mississippi Constitution. On August 10, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Secretary of State replied with a response to that motion. Then, on September 30, 2010, the trial court entered and approved an Agreed Order, allowing Riley and Personhood Mississippi to intervene. In that same order, all parties agreed that this case was "based on questions of law" and "should be resolved by way of judgment on the pleadings." Subsequently, after considering the motion and responses, having heard oral argument, and being otherwise fully advised in these matters, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that they had not carried their heavy burden in attempting to restrict the citizenry's right to amend the Constitution. Thereafter, the trial court entered an additional order, titled "Final Judgment." The trial court ruled that the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings disposed of the case. Additionally, the trial court ruled that "final judgment is hereby entered in favor of the" Secretary of State and the Intervenors. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Measure 26 was not ripe for review. Thus, the Court vacated the trial court's final judgment in favor of Intervenors and Secretary Hosemann. The Supreme Court finally dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice.

David Waide filed an Initiative with Mississippi Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, and Hosemann approved it for placement on the November, 2011 general election ballot. Plaintiff Leland Speed filed a complaint against Hosemann in the Hinds County Circuit Court, along with a Motion for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, asking the Supreme Court to declare Initiative 31 unconstitutional and to enjoin Hosemann from placing it on the ballot. Speed argued that Initiative 31 "violates Section 273(5)(a) because that section prohibits use of the initiative process for the proposal, modification or repeal' of any portion' of the Constitution's Bill of Rights." Speed argued that Initiative 31 was a "proposal, modification or repeal' of the Bill of Rights . . . and more specifically of its Section 17, which governs taking of private property for a public use." After Hosemann and Waide responded to Speed's pleadings, Speed filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, in which he argued that the case "involve[d] a pure issue of law with no material facts in dispute" and asked the court to enter judgment in his favor under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The trial judge both denied Speed's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ruled on the merits, finding that Speed's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and ordering that Hosemann be allowed to proceed in placing Initiative 31 on the ballot. On appeal, Speed asked the Supreme Court to reverse the trial judge, declare that Initiative 31 violates Section 273(5) of the Mississippi Constitution, and "keep Initiative 31 off the November ballot." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issue presented in this appeal (the constitutionality of proposed Initiative 31) was not ripe for adjudication by the Court, such that any opinion thereon would be improperly advisory. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's decision and dismissed the case.

Petitioners Mary Gray, Peggy Pettaway, Kimberly Clausell, Lillian Byrd, and Chris Clausell filed negligence lawsuits against the City of Jackson, City of Raymond and Alice Wilson. Before trial, Raymond settled with Petitioners leaving Jackson and Ms. Wilson as Defendants. A Raymond police officer pursued Ms. Wilson who was driving erratically on a Raymond highway. Jackson officers were notified that Raymond police were in pursuit of Ms. Wilson's vehicle and assisted in the pursuit. The chase ended with Ms. Wilson striking a vehicle containing the Clausells and Ms. Byrd. Ms. Wilson died from the injuries she sustained, and Kimberly Clausell and Lillian Byrd were both injured in the crash. The trial court found that Ms. Wilson was fifty percent at fault, Raymond was thirty percent at fault and Jackson was twenty percent at fault. Jackson appealed the final judgment of the circuit court arguing that the court's apportionment of fault was made in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of Petitioners and rendered judgment in favor of Jackson.

Minor Petitioners Latisha Head and Ashley McCoy through their mothers Shirley Russell and Shirley McCoy (collectively Petitioners) filed a complaint against the Jackson Public School District (JPS), the City of Jackson, the Jackson Police Department and several school officials because of a skirmish that occurred at Watkins Elementary School. Petitioners' complaint alleged assault and battery against a school official as a result of an altercation with Ms. Head. Four years would pass between Petitioners' initial complaint and the discovery phase of the case for various reasons by both parties' counsel. JPS moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. The circuit court denied the motion, and from this denial, JPS appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no inexcusable delay and that JPS suffered no actual prejudice. The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of JPS' motion, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Barry Gregg challenged a Workersâ Compensation Commission (Commission) holding that denied him permanent partial disability benefits. Petitioner was injured on the job for Respondent Natchez Trace Electric Power (Natchez) and was unable to satisfactorily return to his job nor earn on-call compensation. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed the Commissionâs decision to the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Commission erred in reaching its decision. In the decision adopted by the Commission, the administrative law judge observed that Petitioner made more money after his injury than before he was injured. The appellate court affirmed the Commissionâs decision on the basis of a presumption that because of that earning discrepancy, Petitioner failed to prove that he suffered a loss of âwage-earning capacity.â The Supreme Court found that the Commission erred by considering Petitionerâs higher wage post-injury as determinative of his earning capacity. The Court found that Petitioner had rebutted the presumption regarding his earning capacity. Subsequently, the Court reversed both the Commissionâs and the appellate courtâs holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellee Terrance Shanks filed a personal-injury action against Defendants-Appellants Kimball Glassco Residential Center and van driver Vera Richardson on behalf of his mother Lois Shanks. Ms. Shanks was injured when the van Ms. Richardson was driving went out of control. Ms. Richardson moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the action was barred by a one-year statute of limitations under state tort law. In its answer to the action, Kimball Glassco also raised the statute of limitations as a defense and argued that it was a state entity entitled to a level of immunity under the state tort law. The trial court denied Ms. Richardson's motion to dismiss and held that both Defendants had waived the statute of limitations defense earlier in the litigation. Furthermore, the court found that the state tort law did not give either Defendant immunity from liability. Upon consideration of the briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by finding that Defendants waived the statute of limitations as their defense. The Court found that Mr. Shanks filed his complaint one year after the expiration of the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order, and rendered judgment in favor of Defendants.

James Littletonâs employment as Greenwoodâs city attorney was terminated by the newly elected Mayor, Carolyn McAdams. Littleton announced to the Greenwood City Council that he was statutorily authorized to continue to serve as a holdover appointee until the council approved his replacement. The mayorâs first appointee was initially rejected by the council. The newly elected mayor sued to have the council terminate Littleton and confirm her choice as the new city attorney. The chancellor granted the Mayorâs petition for declaratory relief, and Littleton appealed the decision. The Supreme Court found Littleton had no legal authority to holdover when his term had ended, and that the chancellor properly granted the declaratory judgment.

The City of Jackson appealed a judgment made against the city for damages based on a police officerâs pursuit of a vehicle. The suspectâs vehicle collided with another vehicle owned by Eric and Kristina Law. The Jackson Police Department has a written pursuit policy which stipulates all police officers perform a balancing test when in pursuit of suspects. This means that police officers should weigh the immediate danger posed by their pursuit to that of allowing the suspect to remain at large. The trial court held that the officer acted recklessly when he pursued the suspect causing damage to the vehicle owned by Eric and Kristina Law. The court awarded each of the Laws $250,000. The Supreme Court found that the officer had violated the applicable pursuit policy by failing to weigh the potential harm to the public. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs ruling.