Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After an administrative judge (AJ) ruled on a claimant's petition to controvert a workers' compensation claim, the claimant had twenty days to file a notice of appeal with the full Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether an AJ's order, handed down more than twenty days after the AJ's ruling and granting a claimant thirty additional days in which to prosecute her claim, should be given legal effect by the Commission so that the claimant's notice of appeal, filed within the additional thirty days, would be considered timely. Upon review, the Court found that, under the facts and circumstances presented, such an appeal was timely. View "Felter v. Floorserv, Inc." on Justia Law

In a case consolidating the competing annexation petitions of Biloxi and D’Iberville, the chancellor ultimately awarded each city a reduced area from that requested, determining that it was unreasonable for either city to annex the entire area requested, and then determining that it was reasonable to award each city a smaller, reduced area. Both cities appeaedl this decision, and Biloxi raised jurisdictional issues for the first time on appeal. Because Biloxi raised personal jurisdiction on behalf of third parties, and because Biloxi failed to raise this issue at the trial-court level, the Supreme Court found that Biloxi not only lacked standing to raise this issue, it also waived it. Further, because the chancellor’s decision awarding each city a reduced area was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the annexations as modified by the chancellor. View "In The Matter of the Enlarging, Extending and Defining the Corporate Limits and Boundaries of the City of Biloxi" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommended that Mendenhall municipal court judge Bruce B. Smith be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office for thirty days without pay, and pay costs for: (1) failing to properly adjudicate criminal matters assigned to him; (2) engaging in ticket-fixing; and, (3) dismissing criminal charges against multiple defendants in exchange for simultaneous payments to a "drug fund" established and maintained by the Mendenhall police chief. The Commission found that Judge Smith's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute under Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Specifically, the Commission found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Smith violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), 3B(2), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court concurred with the Commission’s findings and adopted its proposed discipline. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Smith" on Justia Law

KCC, Inc., d/b/a Vital Care of Meridian (Vital Care) filed a complaint against the Mississippi State and School Employees' Life and Health Plan ("the Plan") and the Plan’s pharmacy benefits manager, Catalyst Rx, alleging that the Plan and Catalyst had violated Mississippi Code Section 83-9-6 by designating Walgreens Pharmacy as the sole provider of specialty pharmacy services. Later, Vital Care moved for partial summary judgment on the question of whether Section 83-9-6 applied to the Plan. The Chancery Court granted Vital Care’s motion for partial summary judgment, and the Plan and Catalyst appealed. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court found that Section 83-9-6 applied to the Plan because it applies to "all health benefit plans providing pharmaceutical services benefits, including prescription drugs, to any resident of Mississippi" and was not ambiguous. View "Mississippi State & School Employees' Life and Health Plan v. KCC, Inc." on Justia Law

Three main issues were raised on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case: (1) whether a school district is liable for oil and gas severance taxes on its royalty interests derived from oil and gas production on sixteenth-section land (the chancellor ruled that it is not); (2) whether the statute of limitations restricts the time period in which a school district can seek a refund of severance taxes that it had paid erroneously (the chancellor ruled that a three-year statute of limitations applied to any refund claims); and (3) whether a school district is liable for administrative expense taxes on its royalty interests derived from oil and gas production on sixteenth-section land (the chancellor ruled that it is). Upon review of the applicable code and in consideration of the arguments of the parties to this case, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor's judgment should be affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) school districts are not liable for oil and gas severance taxes on sixteenth-section royalty interests: school districts, as political subdivisions of the state, are not included within the definition of "persons" made subject to these taxes; (2) pursuant to the Mississippi Constitution, statutes of limitation in civil causes do not run against the state or its subdivisions; and (3) school districts are liable for administrative expense taxes on sixteenth-section royalty interests: "[t]hese assessments are 'fees,' not 'taxes'; the Legislature has expressly made the state and its subdivisions subject to these fees; and no constitutional provision or other law is violated by requiring school districts to pay them." View "Jones County School District v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) filed a motion to appeal a final order entered by the Circuit Court. PERS supported the motion with an affidavit of an employee of the Attorney General’s office assigned to PERS who was responsible for tracking opinions and orders issued by the circuit court. The affiant stated that she regularly contacted the circuit clerk's office to ascertain the status of the case. The affiant swore that she was not told that a decision had been entered. The general docket itself revealed that the circuit clerk had failed to give notice of the entry of several other orders to the parties or their counsel. Barbara Dunn, Circuit Clerk of Hinds County, Mississippi, was directed to respond and show cause why sanctions should not have been imposed. Dunn and one of her employees admitted that clerical errors were made in this case. They denied that any docket entries were backdated, and further query revealed that Dunn's office erroneously had sent notice regarding the circuit court’s final decision to the address of a deceased lawyer who had never been involved with this case, mistyped attorney bar numbers (and had no mechanism to detect the error). PERS’s counsel of record was never added to the general docket. Finding that Dunn’s office has implemented a personnel training program which was being supervised by the Hinds County circuit judges, the Supreme Court concluded that, while mistakes were made in this case by Dunn’s staff, those oversights did not warrant harsh sanctions. Accordingly, Dunn was ordered to implement procedures for routine verification of the names and contact information of parties and their counsel, and ordered to pay the cost of the record from the evidentiary hearing in the amount of $947.75 from her personal funds, and not from public funds. View "In Re: Barbara Dunn, Hinds County Circuit Clerk" on Justia Law

In this Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erred in finding the City of Jackson (the City) liable for the death of Tawanda Sandifer. Tawanda Sandifer was a chronic runaway. Tawanda’s mother, Mildred Sandifer, testified at trial that Tawanda began running away from home for extended periods of time. Tawanda ran away approximately seventeen times before she ran away for the last time in April 2005. Mildred testified that she had filed a runaway petition for Tawanda every time she had run away, and that Jackson Police Department (JPD) had taken Tawanda into custody on a few occasions. In 2006, approximately nine months after running away, a then fifteen-year-old Tawanda died as a result of blunt-force trauma after being beaten by her boyfriend, Toice Wilson. Tawanda’s parents, on behalf of her wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed suit against the City of Jackson and several police officers, in their official and individual capacities, for, among other claims, the wrongful death of Tawanda. The Sandifers alleged that the City caused or contributed to Tawanda’s death by ignoring its own policies with regard to runaways; by failing to investigate Tawanda’s claims in 2004 that she was having sex with a JPD officer; by negligently failing to train, hire, supervise, instruct, monitor or control its employees; by failing to maintain an adequate system to hire, train, supervise, instruct, monitor, and/or control its employees; by allowing Tawanda to be subjected to assault, battery, physical, mental, and sexual abuse; and by failing to timely apprehend Tawanda and deliver her to her parents and other appropriate agencies despite knowledge of her status as a runaway. The circuit court ultimately concluded that the City’s failure to fully investigate Tawanda’s case “caused [Tawanda] to succumb to the brutal and fatal actions of Toice Wilson” and that Wilson and the City were jointly responsible for Tawanda’s death. The circuit court assessed damages in the amount of $1 million. The City then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the City was immune from liability for the alleged misconduct of its employees at issue in this case under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court. View "City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Sandifer, Jr." on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Hancock County Justice Court Judge Tommy Carver. It alleged that Judge Carver had ex parte communication with Steven K. Roche about his pending criminal case; failed to disclose such ex parte communication to the prosecutor; dismissed the charges against Roche without a hearing and without any motion to dismiss by the prosecutor; and falsified court records by noting on the file that two witnesses, Officers Bryce Gex and John Grimsley of the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources Marine Patrol, were absent when Roche's case was called for trial. A three-member committee appointed by the Commission recommended that Judge Carver be suspended thirty days from office without pay, publicly reprimanded, and assessed costs. The Commission adopted the committee's findings. After conducting an independent inquiry of the record and giving careful consideration to the findings of fact and recommendations of the Commission, the Supreme Court ordered that Judge Carver be publicly reprimanded and assessed costs. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Carver" on Justia Law

An incident occurred at West Lauderdale High School which led to the suspension and eventual expulsion of four male students. The principal notified the four students' parents and/or guardians of the immediate suspension. (The four male students were identified herein as C.D., E.F., G.H., and I.J.) The matter was pending before the school board, and if the board approved the recommendation, the students could request a hearing before the school board to continue the suspension until such hearing occurred. Three of the four students, E.F., C.D., and G.H., requested a hearing. Prior to the disciplinary hearing, parents of E.F. and C.D. applied for separate ex parte temporary restraining orders (TROs) in the Lauderdale County Youth Court. The ex parte temporary restraining orders were granted without notice ordering that E.F. and C.D. be allowed to return to school and enjoining the superintendent and school board from expelling them or assigning them to an alternative school. At the hearing for the TROs, the school district objected to reenrollment because the youth court lacked jurisdiction to order the students' return to school. Nonetheless, the court ordered the reenrollment. After a hearing, the school board expelled all four students for one calendar year on the basis that their presence in school was a safety concern for other students. C.D. and E.F., through counsel, moved the youth court for reenrollment. The youth court granted this motion and treated it as an appeal on the record of the expulsion and "not a matter de novo." The school board timely appealed the youth court's decision to the Supreme Court and moved the youth court to stay its judgment pending appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the youth court exceeded its statutory authority by reenrolling C.D. and E.F. in high school because the discretion in this situation lied with the school board. Accordingly, the Court reversed the youth court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lauderdale County School Bd. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Roundstone Development, LLC, sought to develop an affordable-housing subdivision in the City of Natchez. The land which it sought to develop had two different zoning classifications: O-L (Open-Land) and R-1 (Single-Family Residential). The City’s Planning Commission denied Roundstone's site plan, finding that the O-L area must be rezoned R-1 before the development could be approved. The Mayor and Board of Alderman then denied Roundstone's rezoning request. The Circuit Court of Adams County and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the City’s decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address: (1) whether the City erred in requiring that the O-L area be rezoned R-1 and (2) whether the City erred in failing to grant Roundstone's rezoning request. Upon review, the Court found that the City’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance to require rezoning from O-L to R-1 was not manifestly unreasonable and that it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the rezoning. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. View "Roundstone Development, LLC v. City of Natchez" on Justia Law