Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Miramar Lodge Nursing Home (Miramar) was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Miramar at the time was located in Pass Christian, Harrison County, Mississippi. On January 5, 2010, Harrison County Properties, LLC, d/b/a Gulfport Care Center (GCC,) filed a certificate of need (CON) application with the Mississippi Department of Health (DOH). GCC requested the CON for the construction of a replacement facility and relocation of ninety nursing-home beds from Miramar to an area located in central Harrison County, approximately twenty miles from Pass Christian. Sixty of Miramar’s 180 beds were relocated in 2006 to Boyington Health Care Facility in Gulfport, Harrison County, Mississippi. The remaining thirty Miramar beds were the subject of a separate CON application, which proposed to relocate those thirty beds to Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Several nursing homes from Harrison County and Jackson County contested GCC’s CON application and requested a public hearing. On August 26, 2010, the State Health Officer (SHO), concurring with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the DOH staff and the hearing officer, granted GCC a CON for the construction of a ninety-bed replacement nursing home in Harrison County. The contestants appealed to the Hinds County Chancery Court, which affirmed the SHO’s decision. The contestants the appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that: 1) DOH failed to comply with Mississippi law in granting the CON to GCC, as "GCC did not act in sufficient time to re-open Miramar under CON law"; 2) no actual need was demonstrated for the project; 3) no economic viability was demonstrated for the project; and 4) DOH failed to follow its own rules and regulations in granting the CON. Having found that the SHO’s decision to grant GCC a CON for the construction of a ninety-bed replacement nursing home in Harrison County is supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Hinds County Chancery Court.

The Mississippi State Department of Health (MDH) entered a final order disapproving the certificate of need application of Dialysis Solutions, LLC. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 41-7-201, Dialysis Solutions filed a direct appeal of the MDH's final order with the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Court entered an order on its own motion, seeking briefing from the parties and the Attorney General regarding whether Section 41-7-201, as amended, was "constitutional under Mississippi Constitution article 6, section 146 and whether [the Supreme] Court [had] appellate jurisdiction over this direct appeal from a decision of the [MDH]." After due consideration, the Court concluded that Section 41-7-201, as amended, was unconstitutional under Article 6, Section 146 of the Mississippi Constitution. Accordingly, the Court refused to exercise appellate jurisdiction over Dialysis Solutions' direct appeal from the final order of the MDH.

This interlocutory appeal involved two consolidated actions in which the trial court denied competing summary judgment motions. The case arose from University of Mississippi Medical Center's (UMMC) intent to purchase a platform linear accelerator system and to make renovations to its basement to house the new accelerator. UMMC represented that the accelerator would be an important aspect to the planned radiation oncology residency program. UMMC applied for a Certificate of Need (CON) to get the project started. Jackson HMA (HMA) and St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital (St. Dominic) filed a request for a public hearing in response to UMMC's CON application. The Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) thereafter sought an official opinion from the Attorney General (AG) on the issue of the CON statutes' applicability to UMMC. The Attorney General issued an opinion opining that UMMC was not subject to CON laws, and that it did not have to file an application for a CON. The AG issued a second opinion opining that there was no express exemption for UMMC within the CON laws, but that it was within the MSDH's power to make determinations of reviewability under the CON laws which carve out exemptions for equipment and/or services deemed necessary by UMMC. HMA and St. Dominic's filed a complaint with the Chancery Court requesting declaratory relief over the issue of whether the CON statutes applied to UMMC, and that MSDH had no authority to exempt UMMC from obtaining a CON. UMMC countered with its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning (IHL) approved the project and had exclusive authority to" manage and control" UMMC, and was not subordinate to the MSDH. Finding genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the CON statutes applied to UMMC, the chancellor denied both motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the CON statues applied to UMMC and that MSDH does have authority to create a "teaching" exception regarding when UMMC is required to apply for a CON. Therefore, the Court did not reach the question of whether the application of the CON statutes to UMMC unconstitutionally infringed on IHL's constitutionally vested authority to "manage and control" UMMC.

Laura Shontelle Barnes was employed as an elementary school teacher with the Taylorsville Elementary School in the Smith County School District (District) for eleven years before she was terminated in 2009. Barnes was terminated for refusing to take a drug test, which was a violation of the District’s drug and alcohol policy. The Smith County School Board (Board) held a hearing and later affirmed the District’s Superintendent of Education’s decision to terminate Barnes’s employment. Aggrieved, Barnes appealed the Board’s decision to the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the Board’s decision and reinstated Barnes’s employment, finding that the Board’s decision was arbitrary or capricious and was not supported by substantial evidence. The Board appealed. In a six-four decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and rendered the chancery court’s holding, finding that the Board’s decision to affirm the superintendent’s termination of Barnes based on her refusal to submit to a drug test was not arbitrary or capricious. Barnes filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied. Barnes appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to properly consider all relevant evidence that would have precluded termination of Barnes. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Ernest and Bonnie Harland filed suit in the Chancery Court of Lafayette County seeking to have a "corrected" warranty deed set aside; to vacate three lots from the official plat of Long Meadow subdivision; or to validate the protective covenants included with their original deed. The chancellor set aside the "corrected" deed and validated the Harlands' original covenants. The Long Meadow Homeowners' Association appealed the chancellor's judgment, and the Supreme Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, found no error and affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. The Supreme Court granted Long Meadow’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Having reviewed the briefs and record in this appeal, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, and used the opportunity of this case to discuss precedent as it related to the Harlands' equitable-estoppel claim.

The daughter of Mark Fails and Laura Fails transferred from Jefferson Davis County School District to Lamar County School District, after obtaining consent from the school boards of both districts. Four years later, the School Board passed a resolution that Jefferson Davis County residents would no longer be permitted to transfer to other school districts. The following year, the Superintendent of Education for the School District published an announcement in the local newspaper informing parents of Jefferson Davis County School District students that all transfers had been revoked. Although three of the School Board members represented to Mark Fails that this did not affect his daughter's transfer status, an interim conservator, appointed by the governor to oversee Jefferson Davis County Schools, represented to Mark Fails that it was the intent of the School Board to revoke all previously granted transfer petitions. Mark Fails attended a School Board meeting to appeal the revocation of his daughter's petition for transfer. However, the conservator prohibited the School Board from voting on the child's petition for transfer. Prior to the School Board meeting, the Failses had obtained Lamar County residency, and the student had continued to attend Lamar County Schools legally, and without interruption. Despite this fact, the Failses appealed the School Board's decision to the Circuit Court of Jefferson Davis County. The circuit court and the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the School Board's decision. Given that the Failses have represented to the circuit court and the Supreme Court that they have since moved into the Lamar County School District, and that fact was not disputed the issue of revocation was considered moot.

A corporation settled its delinquent tax liability to the State of Mississippi by paying $100 million to the State, $4.2 million to a private charity, and $14 million to a private law firm hired by the Attorney General to pursue the claim. Mississippi's Auditor demanded that, because the $18.2 million paid to the private charity and the law firm constituted public funds, it must be turned over to the State. The charity complied; but the law firm refused, claiming the payment of its fees was not made with public funds and, in any case, the Auditor had waived the State’s claim. The Auditor filed suit and the trial court granted summary judgment to the law firm. The state Auditor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that when the Attorney General pays special assistants, Mississippi statutory law requires that they be paid from the Attorney General’s contingent fund or from other funds appropriated to the Attorney General's office by the Legislature. Furthermore, the Mississippi constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury." Neither of these requirements was met in this case. Neither the Attorney General nor the Langston Firm provided sufficient evidence to establish that the Auditor waived the State’s claim to the funds. The Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A corporation settled a lawsuit by agreeing to pay the State of Mississippi $50 million, $10 million of which it disbursed directly to outside counsel retained by Attorney General Hood to pursue the litigation. The chancery court held that the payment was proper. But because the law requires that outside counsel retained by the Attorney General to pursue litigation in "the state or federal courts" be paid from his contingent fund or from other funds the Legislature appropriates to his office, and because the Mississippi Constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury," the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Attorney General failed to use his contingent fund.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was an appeal by the City of Cleveland of a judgment by the DeSoto County Chancery Court which denied the City's motion for attorney fees. The chancery court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the City's appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that, after the Court of Appeals rendered the underlying case and the Supreme Court denied certiorari review, the case was at its end. The chancery court did not thereafter have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to address the specific question of whether the requirement to post a pretrial bond set out in Mississippi Code Sections 27-77-5 and 27-77-7 (Rev. 2005) was procedural or jurisdictional. If procedural, it would constitute an intrusion by the Legislature into the assigned powers of this Court and of the judicial branch of government, and a violation of Article 6, Sections 144 and 146 of the Mississippi Constitution. Having considered the issue, the Court found that it's precedent was clear: the requirement of a pretrial bond relates to appellate jurisdiction and is within the powers of the Legislature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and of the Chancery Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County.