Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

801 Skinker Boulevard Corporation (801), a corporation operating as a residential cooperative, sought a refund for sales taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2, which indicates that utilities purchased for residential units for common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be for domestic use. The refund request concerned state sales tax charged and paid on electric and natural gas utilities purchased from 2006 through 2009. 801 filed for a refund of sales tax on its Union Electric (Ameren) and Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) bills. Ameren and Laclede also filed for refunds on behalf of 801. Ameren and Laclede's applications were denied. 801, Ameren, and Laclede (Taxpayers) subsequently filed a request for a refund of sales tax with the Administrative Hearing Commission, alleging that the utilities were purchased for domestic use by the individual owners and residents of 801 in accordance with section 144.030.2. The Commission denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a full refund of the sales tax paid, holding that Taxpayers were entitled to the exemption and refund of their sales taxes pursuant to section 144.190.2, as 801's utility purchases were deemed by statute to be for "domestic use" and, thus, were exempt from sales tax. View "801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant operated an herbicide and pesticide manufacturing plant. After a tax audit, the director of revenue issued Appellant use tax assessments on its chemical purchases for its Missouri plant that covered tax period July 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. Appellant appealed the assessments to the administrative hearing commission, claiming that it was entitled to tax exemptions available to a material recovery processing plant. The commission determined that Appellant's chemical plant did not qualify as a material recovery processing plant for purposes of applying the claimed tax exemptions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commission did not err in rejecting Appellant's claims that it was entitled to tax exemptions related to operation of a material recovery processing plant. View "BASF Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to the imposition of municipal taxes on SLAH, LLC, a business entity that owned a hotel located in the city of Woodson Terrace. The city appealed from the declaratory judgment entered against it on SLAH's claim that the city was prohibited by Mo. Rev. Stat. 94.270.3 from imposing a hotel license tax rate in excess of $13.50 per room, per year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the remedy afforded to SLAH under Mo. Rev. Stat. 139.031 was adequate under the circumstances, and accordingly, it was the exclusive remedy for challenging the legality of the city's hotel license tax rates; and (2) because a declaratory judgment action is improper when an adequate remedy exists at law, the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of SLAH. View "State ex rel. SLAH, LLC v. City of Woodson Terrace" on Justia Law

This workers' compensation appeal raised the question of whether the fifteen-percent statutory violation penalty under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.120.4 applies to an employee's (claimant) compensation award from the Second Injury Fund (SIF). The ALJ here refused to award the claimant additional benefits, determining that the fifteen-percent penalty under section 287.120.4 was not applicable to enhance the claimant's award. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission found that the fifteen-percent penalty applied to the compensation awards entered by the ALJ. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the section 287.120.4 penalty was inapplicable to the award that claimant received from the SIF.

Deborah Gervich appealed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying her workers' compensation benefits as a dependent of her deceased husband, Gary Gervich. The Commission found that Gary's right to permanent total disability benefits terminated at the time of his death because his wife's right to such benefits had not "vested" prior to the 2008 statutory amendments that eliminated dependents from the definition of "employee" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes in effect at the time of Gary's injury governed, and under those statutes, the dependents of an injured worker, who was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and who died of causes unrelated to the work injury, are included within the definition of "employee"; (2) therefore, such dependents are entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits; and (3) because an employee's dependents are determined at the time of the injury and include the spouse of an injured worker, the Commission was not authorized by law to deny such benefits to Deborah.

Arnaz Crawford was fired from his job in January 2009. Crawford subsequently applied for Social Security disability benefits (SSDI benefits) due to a mental condition, but the social security administration (Administration) denied the claim. Meanwhile, Crawford applied for state unemployment benefits. The division of employment security (Division) awarded unemployment benefits to Crawford until March 20, 2010. On March 2, 2010, the Administration determined Crawford had been disabled and eligible for SSDI benefits since January 29, 2009. The Division subsequently determined (1) Crawford was unable to work from December 20, 2009 to March 20, 2010 and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits; and (2) Crawford had received $3,080 in benefits that he was ineligible to receive. The labor and industrial relations commission (Commission) affirmed the determination that Crawford was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the Commission's decisions to the extent they authorized the Division to collect the overpayment from Crawford; but (2) otherwise affirmed the Commission's decision.

In 2008, St. Louis County (County) assumed control of solid waste collection in County's unincorporated areas. Prior to that, waste collection services had been provided by private entities, including respondent Haulers. Following a 2007 amendment to Mo. Rev. Stat. to 260.247, which extended hauler-protective business regulations to counties that wish to provide trash collection, Haulers sued County for a declaratory judgment that County must comply with section 260.247. Haulers also claimed they suffered money damages as a result of County's failure to comply with the statute. The circuit court found County liable to Haulers on the theory of implied in law contract and awarded Haulers $1.2 million in damages. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's calculation of damages, holding that the circuit court was incorrect to exclude discovery or evidence of Haulers' expenses or net profit; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Remanded.

The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied Appellant unemployment benefits after it found that Appellant engaged in willful misconduct by repeatedly and deliberately disregarding her supervisor's instructions. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in finding that she engaged in misconduct because although she may have acted negligently, she did not deliberately violate her supervisor's instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent and substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Appellant willfully failed to follow her supervisor's instructions, although able to do so, on eleven separate occasions after her supervisor warned her three times she needed to comply with the instructions.

Lonnie Lewis died when the tractor trailer in which he was a passenger overturned. The driver of the truck, Nathan Gilmore, was employed by Buddy Freeman, and Freeman operated the tractor trailer pursuant to a contract with DOT Transportation. Neither Freedman nor DOT carried workers' compensation insurance. Lewis' dependents filed a claim for workers' compensation against Freeman and DOT and a wrongful death action against Freeman and Gilmore. An ALJ entered an award in favor of Lewis' dependents. After the entry of the workers' compensation award, DOT intervened in the Lewises' wrongful death action. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gilmore and Freeman, finding the wrongful death action was barred because the Lewises had made an election of remedies when they obtained a workers' compensation award against DOT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Lewises' civil action against Freeman was not barred by their workers' compensation award from DOT, as Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.280 allowed the Lewises to proceed in a civil action against Freeman as a result of his failure to insure his liability under the Missouri workers' compensation laws even though the Lewises obtained a workers' compensation award against DOT.

Sandy Johme was employed by St. John's Mercy Healthcare as a billing representative, and her work involved typing charges at a computer in an office. After making a pot of coffee at an office kitchen at work, Johme fell and injured herself. Johme was "clocked-in" as an employee at the time of her fall. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarded workers' compensation benefits to Johme after applying Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.3(2). The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's decision, holding that Johme was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because she failed to show that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment as specified in section 287.020.3(2).