Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

On November 7 2006, Courtney George was elected prosecuting attorney for Phelps County. George did not receive any salary increases during her term in office despite a report issued by the Missouri Citizens' Commission on Compensation for Elected Officials on December 1, 2006 increasing the salary for associate circuit judges in 2007 and 2008. In 2010, George filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the elected members of the county commission and others (Respondents), requesting a preliminary order compelling Respondents to approve increased compensation rates and to issue her underpayment of her salary for the duration of her term in office. The circuit court issued a preliminary order in mandamus but later quashed the order. At issue on appeal was whether a midterm increase in compensation for a full-time prosecuting attorney violates the provision of the Missouri Constitution prohibiting the compensation of government officers from being increased during the term of office. The Supreme Court made permanent the preliminary writ of mandamus, holding that because the midterm increase in compensation in this case resulted from the application of a statutory formula for calculating compensation in place before George took office, the increase did not violate the Constitution.

MoGas Pipeline operated an interstate natural gas pipeline delivering natural gas to customers in Missouri. MoGas submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) two proposals for approval. In both instances, the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) intervened as a party in the related FERC proceedings and to protest MoGas' proposals. MoGas subsequently filed a petition with the PSC alleging that the PSC did not have authority to intervene in matters before the FERC and requesting that the PSC terminate its intervention in FERC cases concerning MoGas' operations. The PSC denied MoGas' petition. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the PSC's order was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the PSC has no authority to intervene in matters pending before the FERC, and accordingly, the PSC erred in denying MoGas' request that it terminate its intervention in FERC proceedings.

St. John's Mercy Health System challenged the validity of the Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee (MHFRC) rule that exempted new hospitals costing less than $1 million from the statutory requirement of obtaining a certificate of need. St. John's further sought to enjoin the MHFRC from applying the rule and granting Patients First Community Hospital an exemption from the certificate of need requirement. The trial court held that the case was not justiciable and dismissed the action without prejudice but proceeded to address the merits of St. John's claim, finding that the MHFRC had not exceeded its authority in promulgating the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding (1) the case was ripe for judicial review; and (2) the new hospital rule was valid, and the MHFRC was within its authority to promulgate the rule.

Herschel Young was sworn in as presiding commissioner of Cass County in 2011. Teresa Hensley, the prosecuting attorney for the county, subsequently filed a quo warranto action in reliance upon Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.350, alleging that Young usurped the office of presiding commissioner because he was not qualified to be a candidate for elective public office due to a 1995 felony conviction. The circuit court granted Hensley's petition and ordered Young's ouster from office. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 115.350, as applied to Young, did not operate retrospectively in violation of the state constitution; (2) quo warranto was the appropriate remedy, and the petition was based on applicable law; and (3) section 115.350 does not violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution because it had a rational basis under the law.

In 2007, the General Assembly enacted a series of statutes regulating the private investigator profession. Appellant subsequently applied for licensure as a private investigator. The Board of Private Investigator Examiners initially denied Appellant's application, but later the Administrative Hearing Commission ordered the board to grant Appellant a license. After Appellant was awarded a license, he continued to pursue a lawsuit he had filed against the board and its members, arguing that the statutory scheme violated the free speech clauses of the state and federal constitutions and that his procedural due process rights were violated when the board denied his application before giving him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The circuit court (1) dismissed Appellant's procedural due process claim as moot, and (2) dismissed Appellant's free-speech claims after concluding that the statutes were not unconstitutional on their face. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment.

Casey's Marketing Company was a convenience store engaged in the retail sale of gas, grocery items, nonfood items, and prepared foods. Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corporation was a utility that sold electricity to Casey's. Casey's filed a refund claim with the director of revenue for one month's tax paid for a portion of electricity Aquila sold to two Casey's locations. The director denied the claim. At Casey's request, Aquila challenged the director's final decision. The administrative hearing commission reversed, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, which provides a tax exemption for the "processing" of products," exempted Casey's food preparation operations. The Supreme Court reversed the commission, holding (1) the preparation of food for retail consumption is not "processing" within the meaning of section 144.054.2; and (2) therefore, Casey was not entitled to a sales and use tax exemption on electricity it purchased to power its food preparation operations.

Craig Street requested a refund of the local sales taxes the Missouri Director of Revenue required him to pay to license the boat, outboard motor, and trailer he purchased from a dealer in Maryland. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) denied Street's request. Street appealed, claiming that the AHC erred because its interpretation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.069 and 32.087.12(2) to permit the County's assessment and collection of local sales tax on his out-of-state purchase was clearly contrary to the reasonable expectations of the General Assembly in enacting the local sales tax statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the plain and ordinary meaning of the Sales Tax Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.010 to 144.525, authorizes a county to impose sales taxes only on sales occurring within Missouri, the decision of the AHC upholding the Director's collection of a local sales tax on Street's out-of-state purchases was unauthorized by law. Remanded.

Custom Hardware Engineering (CHE) appealed an Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) decision determining that CHE was liable for use tax plus interest and additions to tax on its purchases of parts for use in fulfilling maintenance contracts. CHE asserted that is was not liable for any use tax because it did not use the parts and, instead, retained them for "temporary storage" as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.605(13). The Supreme Court affirmed the AHC decision, holding (1) the record demonstrated that CHE used the parts for testing and certification on behalf of its customers; and (2) therefore, CHE was liable for use tax as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.610.

Wehrenberg, Inc. operated a restaurant-style concession offering hotdogs, pizza, and similar items at four of its movie theaters. Wehrenberg charged its customers the four percent state sales tax imposed by Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.202. Wehrenberg then filed a sales tax refund claim with the Director of Revenue, asserting that the concession items should have been taxed at the one percent rate set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014. The Director and the AHC denied the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the food for sale at Wehrenberg's concession stands was not intended for home consumption, the one percent state sales tax rate set forth in section 144.014 did not apply to Wehrenberg's food sales.

Catherine Stone was employed as a nurse at a nursing facility when she physically restrained a patient in an attempt to force-feed the patient medication. The Department of Health and Senior Services placed Stone on the employee disqualification list for eighteen months after finding that Stone knowingly abused a patient. Stone sought review of the Department's decision, arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the decision because expert testimony was required to prove that she knowingly abused a patient with dementia and mental disabilities, and (2) the Department deprived her of due process of law by allegedly failing to provide notice of her violations. The circuit court reversed the decision of the Department. The Department appealed, and after opinion by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the Department's lay witnesses' testimony was substantial and competent evidence that Stone knowingly abused a patient; (2) the Department provided her with notice of her violations, and therefore, Stone's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the decision of the Department was authorized by law and supported by substantial and competent evidence.