Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court
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This case involves an appeal by the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and Tintina Montana Incorporated (Tintina) of a district court's order revoking a permit granted to Tintina to construct and operate the Black Butte Copper Mine. The district court revoked the permit on the grounds that the DEQ failed to adhere to two statutory schemes governing the state permitting process: Montana’s Metal Mine Reclamation Act (MMRA) and the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The Supreme Court of Montana found that DEQ demonstrated compliance with both laws and accordingly reversed the district court's order and reinstated Tintina's permit.The Supreme Court held that DEQ satisfied MMRA and MEPA in approving Tintina’s proposed cemented tailings facility. The court concluded that DEQ had evaluated the science and made a reasoned decision, supported by substantial evidence, that the surface tailings at the Black Butte Copper Mine would be stable and non-flowable.The court also held that DEQ satisfied MEPA by rationally evaluating the environmental impact of the mine’s total nitrogen discharges into Sheep Creek. After considering relevant data, DEQ articulated a reasoned explanation for its rationale, and its determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, random, or seemingly unmotivated based on the existing record.Furthermore, the court held that DEQ satisfied MEPA when it considered and dismissed alternatives to the proposed action. DEQ had appropriately had its independent consultant take a deeper look when Tintina’s working group emphasized cost considerations in dismissing the depyritization alternatives. ERM identified technical feasibility issues it suggested be considered more carefully, and DEQ’s final review shows that the agency considered those challenges and decided to accept the cemented paste tailings option (with modification) as the preferred action. MTU has not demonstrated that DEQ failed its responsibility under MEPA to consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.The case was remanded to the district court to reinstate DEQ’s decision to grant Tintina’s permit. View "Montana Trout Unlimited v. Tintina" on Justia Law

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This case was a negligence action brought by Dennis Vancos against the State of Montana, Department of Transportation, for injuries he sustained when struck by a car at an intersection. Vancos alleged that the traffic control device at the intersection was inadequately designed, installed, and maintained, leading to the accident. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana addressed three issues on appeal. The first was whether the District Court made an error in handling evidence of Vancos’s consumption of alcohol. The court found that the District Court did err by allowing evidence of Vancos's alcohol consumption but refusing to take judicial notice of his blood alcohol content (BAC), which was not deemed to be in evidence. The court held that a party need not introduce evidence of a fact judicially noticed, and therefore, the District Court's interpretation of the rule was incorrect, and it abused its discretion by refusing to take judicial notice of Vancos's BAC.The second issue was whether the District Court erred by not accepting Vancos’s proposed jury instruction on pedestrian rights-of-way. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Vancos’s proposed instruction and instead chose to instruct the jury on the entirety of the law.The third issue, which was not addressed due to the requirement for a new trial determined by the first issue, was whether the District Court erred by not striking a prospective juror for cause. Due to the error in handling evidence of Vancos's alcohol consumption, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for a new trial. View "Vancos v. Montana Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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In the state of Montana, William James Rupnow Jr., a licensed bail bondsman, was accused of criminal offenses after he tried to apprehend a client, Victorianne Dahl, who had violated her bail conditions. Dahl had consistently been late with payments and had violated other conditions of her release. Rupnow resorted to using pepper spray in his attempt to detain Dahl, leading to the State charging him with felony assault with a weapon and aggravated assault. Rupnow was ultimately acquitted on the aggravated assault charge, but the jury could not reach a verdict on the assault with a weapon charge. In response, Rupnow filed a lawsuit against the Montana State Auditor and Commissioner of Insurance, Mike Winsor, Jennifer Hudson, and XYZ government subdivision, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of his rights under the Montana Constitution. The defendants requested the case be dismissed based on prosecutorial immunity, a motion which the District Court granted. Rupnow appealed the decision, arguing that as a bail bondsman, he had the authority to arrest Dahl without a warrant.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Rupnow's case. The Court found that Montana's statutory scheme for pre-trial release, or bail, did not provide bail bondsmen with an unfettered right to remit a bail bond client to jail without an outstanding warrant. The Court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to grant bail bondsmen arrest authority that far exceeded that of law enforcement officers. Therefore, Rupnow did not have the authority to arrest Dahl without a warrant, meaning there was probable cause to charge Rupnow with the crimes he was accused of. The Court concluded that Rupnow's claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process failed as a matter of law. View "Rupnow v. State Auditor" on Justia Law

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In the State of Montana, a group of parents and the non-profit organization Stand Up Montana sued several school districts in Missoula County over the implementation of mask mandates in schools during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs argued that the mask mandates violated their substantive due process rights. The Fourth Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts, finding the mask mandates did not violate the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court reiterated that the mask mandates did not implicate any fundamental rights under Article II of the Montana Constitution, and therefore, the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review. Under the rational basis test, the court found that the mask mandates were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of stemming the spread of COVID-19, as the school districts had considered information and recommendations from reputable public and private health care providers and agencies, including the CDC, which all recommended universal masking. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to grant a motion in limine to exclude testimony from the plaintiffs' hybrid witnesses, as the proffered testimony was not relevant to whether the mask policies were rationally related to stemming the spread of COVID-19. View "Stand Up Montana v. Msla Co. Schools" on Justia Law

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In the case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Caryn Miske, the plaintiff and appellant, was appealing a district court decision that granted the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) summary judgment on all of her claims that arose from her termination by the DNRC from the Flathead Basin Commission.The primary facts of the case involve Miske's employment as the Executive Director of the Flathead Basin Commission, a body established by the 1983 Legislature to protect the environment of Flathead Lake and its tributaries. The Commission is administratively attached to the DNRC, a relationship that Miske argued allowed the Commission independent authority over staffing decisions. However, the DNRC contended that the Commission and DNRC share concurrent authority over staffing decisions.The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the DNRC on all of Miske's claims. It held that, based on the plain language and structure of the relevant statutes, the DNRC and the Commission have concurrent authority over staffing decisions, and therefore, Miske was a DNRC employee.The court also ruled that the DNRC didn't commit intentional interference with contractual relations as it wasn't a stranger to Miske's relationship with the Commission. Additionally, the court found that Miske's lobbying efforts on behalf of the Commission were made in her capacity as a DNRC employee and thus were not protected political speech. Lastly, the court held that the DNRC had good cause to terminate Miske due to her repeated failures to provide the DNRC with state-issued credit card statements, which constituted a legitimate business reason for her termination. View "Miske v. DNRC" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "Watson v. FWP" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of the Montana Environmental Information Center and Sierra Club (collectively, Conservation Groups) and vacating the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) permit for Westmoreland Rosebud Mining, LLC's proposed coal mine expansion, holding that the Board of Environmental Review (Board) made several errors when it upheld DEQ's findings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that reversal of the burden of proof was prejudicial error; (2) the Board committed reversible error in limiting the Conservation Groups' evidence and argument; (3) the district court erred in determining that it was reversible error to admit certain testimony as proper rebuttal; (4) the Board erred when it concluded that no water quality standard violation could occur; (5) the Board properly considered cumulative impact of mining activity in its analysis; (6) the Board properly relied on evidence regarding aquatic life; (7) the attorney fee award was improper; and (8) the district court erred in ruling that the Board was properly included as a party on judicial review. View "Mont. Environmental Information Center v. Westmoreland Rosebud Mining" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Whitefish and affirming the Whitefish City Council's decisions to deny a conditional use permit (CUP) and grant Resolution 21-43, which denied the permit, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Whitefish 57 Commercial, LLC and Rimrock Companies, LLC (collectively, Appellants) applied for a CUP to develop a hotel on a lot of their subdivision. After a public hearing on the development project the Council adopted Resolution 21-43 that denied the permit. Appellants appealed, claiming that the Council abused its discretion in denying their CUP. The district court granted summary judgment against Appellants. View "Whitefish 57 Commercial, LLC v. City of Whitefish" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court in this tax appeal, holding that the district court erred by concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2119, the NOL statute, operates as a dollar-for-dollar offset provision that indirectly taxes out-of-state income.At issue was the decision of the Department of Revenue to deny nonresident taxpayers Franklin and Janet Tiegs a carryover net operating loss (NOL) deduction on their 2014 and 2015 Montana income tax returns. The Montana Tax Appeal Board upheld the Department's decision, but the district court reversed, concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2119 was unconstitutional because it authorized taxation of non-Montana income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred by holding that the general use of out-of-state income within the Montana income tax framework violated Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2102 and federal constitutional principles; and (2) erred by concluding that section 15-30-2119 constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside of Montana's jurisdictional reach. View "Tiegs v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Hamilton Southside Historic Preservation Association's (HSHPA) petition for a writ of certiorari challenging four decisions of the Hamilton Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in determining that the ZBA did not abuse its discretion when it (1) issued a conditional use permit to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Helena to construct and use a new church structure after demolition of the St. Francis Catholic Church; (2) approved a rear-yard setback variance; (3) approved a steeple height variance; and (4) upheld the zoning administrator's approval of a joint use parking agreement for the new structure. View "Hamilton Historic Preservation Ass'n v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law