Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Shelby operates a municipal water system in Toole County, Montana, supplying water to several service areas. In 2017, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) approved changes allowing Shelby to temporarily service these areas. In 2019, Shelby applied to expand its service area and increase groundwater production. DNRC issued preliminary approvals for these applications in 2020, which the Town of Kevin objected to, leading to a hearing examiner's review.The hearing examiner denied Kevin's motion for summary judgment and later approved Shelby's applications, concluding that Shelby met the statutory criteria based on service agreements with communities in its service area. Kevin then petitioned the Montana Water Court for judicial review, arguing that DNRC misinterpreted the law and that Shelby's applications did not meet statutory requirements. The Water Court denied Kevin's petition, affirming DNRC's decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, focusing on whether DNRC erred in approving Shelby's permit and change of use applications. The court found that DNRC's interpretation of the law, which allowed service agreements to satisfy the statutory requirement for written consent, was reasonable. However, the court noted that the record lacked evidence of a service agreement with Galata, one of the proposed new service areas. Consequently, the court affirmed DNRC's decision in part but reversed it regarding the inclusion of Galata.The court remanded the case to DNRC to determine whether all required service agreements exist and to issue an order consistent with this opinion. The main holding was that DNRC's interpretation of the statutory criteria was correct, except for the missing service agreement with Galata. View "Town of Kevin v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Montana Legislature amended the Opencut Mining Act to create "dryland" permits for mining projects that do not affect water sources and are located away from populated areas. LHC, Inc. applied for such a permit for a project near the Clearwater River. The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) approved the permit after LHC addressed initial deficiencies. Protect the Clearwater, an environmental group, challenged the permit, arguing it did not meet statutory requirements and that DEQ's environmental assessment was inadequate.The Fourth Judicial District Court granted a preliminary injunction to Protect the Clearwater, halting LHC's mining activities. The court found that Protect the Clearwater was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that DEQ erred in issuing the dryland permit. The court also determined that Protect the Clearwater would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities favored the injunction, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court's decision was based on Montana's general preliminary injunction statute, rather than the specific provisions of the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that the District Court improperly applied the general preliminary injunction statute. The Supreme Court held that Protect the Clearwater should have sought relief under MEPA's exclusive remedy provisions, given that the permit was issued under Title 75 and Title 82. The Supreme Court vacated the District Court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the application for the injunction. View "Protect the Clearwater v Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Judge Kerry L. Burman, the Glendive City Judge, and Mayor Deb Dion of Glendive, Montana. Judge Burman petitioned for a writ of mandamus to reinstate Mary York to her position as Clerk of Glendive City Court after Mayor Dion terminated York's employment. The termination occurred following a disagreement over the justification for York's attendance at a training conference. York was terminated without notice and escorted out of the court, leaving unfinished work and causing operational disruptions.The District Court initially ordered York's interim reinstatement pending further review. Judge Burman argued that Mayor Dion's actions violated state statute, the court's holding in Carlson v. City of Bozeman, and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Respondents contended that Mayor Dion had the statutory authority to terminate York, who was still in her probationary period, and that the court's operations were not significantly impaired.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court determined that the matter was more appropriately characterized as an application for a writ of prohibition rather than mandamus. The court found that Mayor Dion's actions disrupted the court's operations and violated § 3-1-111, MCA, which grants courts the authority to control their ministerial officers. The court held that the executive's authority to hire or fire employees must be exercised in a manner that does not impair the court's ability to conduct its business.The Supreme Court of Montana granted the petition for a writ of prohibition, arresting Mayor Dion's action of terminating York's employment. The court emphasized the need for coordination between branches of government to avoid such disruptions. View "Burman v. City of Glendive" on Justia Law

The North Central Montana Regional Water Authority (the Authority) was created in 2000 through an interlocal agreement among several municipalities and county water and sewer districts. The Town of Kevin, a small municipality with fewer than 175 residents, did not sign the original agreement but signed several later documents attempting to join the Authority. The Town later sought to sever ties with the Authority, which resisted these attempts. On May 29, 2020, the Town sued the Authority, seeking a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) that it was not, and never had been, a member of the Authority, and also sought attorney fees.The Twelfth Judicial District Court held a bench trial and issued an order on November 10, 2022, declaring that the Town was not a member of the Authority and granting other relief. Subsequently, the Town filed a motion for attorney fees under the UDJA. On March 30, 2023, the District Court found that equitable factors supported awarding attorney fees to the Town, noting the significant disparity in resources between the Town and the Authority. The Authority appealed this order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the UDJA provides a legal basis for awarding attorney fees between governmental entities when appropriate. The court found that the parties were not similarly situated, as the Town had significantly fewer resources compared to the Authority. The court also applied the "tangible parameters test" and concluded that the Authority possessed what the Town sought, it was necessary for the Town to seek a declaration, and the declaratory relief was necessary to change the status quo. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the Town. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney fees to the Town. View "Town of Kevin v. North Central Montana Regional Water Authority" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Brian McElroy, who was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, a felony. The charge stemmed from a traffic stop initiated by Trooper Adams for speeding. During the stop, Trooper Adams noticed the smell of marijuana from the vehicle and observed signs of "hard travel." After verifying the driver's information and concluding that the driver was not under the influence, Trooper Adams questioned the occupants about the smell of marijuana. When they denied consent to search the vehicle, Trooper Adams deployed a canine for a sniff test, which led to the discovery of drugs and other items. McElroy filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended without sufficient particularized suspicion.The District Court denied McElroy's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that Trooper Adams had sufficient particularized suspicion to conduct the canine sniff based on the smell of marijuana, signs of hard travel, the occupants' nervousness, and their somewhat differing backstories. McElroy then entered a plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that Trooper Adams did not have sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug possession investigation. The court held that factors such as signs of hard travel, traveling from a known drug center in a third-party vehicle, and nervous demeanor, even when considered together, do not constitute particularized suspicion. The court also noted that the smell of marijuana itself does not constitute particularized suspicion sufficient to conclude there could be drugs in the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded that Trooper Adams's further questioning about the marijuana smell and subsequent use of the canine sniff were unlawful. The court reversed the District Court's order denying McElroy's motion to suppress evidence and the resulting judgment of conviction and sentence. View "State v. McElroy" on Justia Law

The case involves the Gardiner-Park County Water and Sewer District (District) and the Knight family (Knights). The Knights own a property in Gardiner, Montana, under which the District has a prescriptive easement for a sewer line. In 2016, a survey revealed that part of the Knights' house and porch was built within the easement and over the sewer line. The District requested the Knights to remedy the easement violation, but the parties failed to reach an agreement. Consequently, the District filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Knights violated the District’s easements and caused damage to a retaining wall. The Knights counterclaimed, alleging that the District's Board Members had not taken and filed an oath of office, thus rendering any action they took invalid.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County, granted a declaratory judgment in favor of the District and summary judgment in favor of the individual Board Members. The court held that the District’s Board Members were not legally required to file oaths of office and were immune from personal liability for any actions taken related to the Knights. The court also held a joint hearing on the District’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment and the individual Board Members’ Motion for Summary Judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that there was no requirement for board members of a local water and sewer district to take and file an oath of office as they were not public officers of the state, nor members of the legislature or executive. The court also held that the Board Members were immune from suit in an action against the governmental entity for the same subject matter, even when oppression, fraud, or malice had been alleged. The court found no violation of the Knights' due process rights when the District Court entertained oral argument on a summary judgment motion and a declaratory judgment action at the same hearing. The case was remanded for the District Court to consider an award of attorney fees, if any, under the Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Gardiner-Park v. Knight" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the City of Great Falls and the Board of Commissioners of Cascade County, Montana, over the interpretation of a 1975 interlocal agreement that established a consolidated City-County Health Board. The disagreement arose after the Montana Legislature enacted new laws in 2021 that changed the governance of local health boards. The County argued that the new laws required the County Commission to be the governing body of the Health Board, while the City maintained that the 1975 agreement allowed the City mayor to be a full voting member of the Health Board.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District ruled in favor of the City, finding that the 1975 agreement allowed the City mayor to be a full voting member of the Health Board and that the Health Board was the "local governing body" referenced in the new laws. The County appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. It held that the District Court did not adjudicate a non-justiciable political question and correctly interpreted the 1975 agreement and the new laws. The Supreme Court found that the 1975 agreement allowed the City mayor to be a full voting member of the Health Board and that the Health Board was the "local governing body" referenced in the new laws. The Court also held that the new laws did not moot the issues at stake in the case. View "City of Great Falls v. Cascade County Commissioners" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a child, R.N., who was removed from his mother's care and placed in foster care with Ben and Charissa Wagner. The Wagners had previously adopted two of the mother's other children. The Department of Public Health and Human Services was granted temporary legal custody of R.N. and ordered the mother to complete a treatment plan. The Department later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights due to her failure to complete the treatment plan and alleged abandonment of R.N. However, the mother began to engage with the Department and made positive changes, leading to the Department's shift from termination to reunification.The Wagners, unhappy with the Department's change of stance, filed a motion to intervene, asserting that it was appropriate under M. R. Civ. P. 24 and § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA. The District Court granted the Wagners' intervention motion, despite objections from the mother, the Department, and the guardian ad litem. The Wagners then filed a motion seeking an order for R.N. to be immediately placed in their care and for the Department to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights. The District Court did not set a hearing or issue a determination on the Wagners' motion. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the District Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had misinterpreted the law when it allowed the Wagners to intervene. The court also ruled that the Wagners did not have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of R.N. because the mother's rights had not been terminated. Furthermore, the court held that neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to order or compel the Department to refile and prosecute its petition for termination. View "In re R.N." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Missoula County and the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) over the reimbursement rate for housing DOC inmates in county detention centers. The County and the DOC had entered into a contract in 2015, setting a reimbursement rate of $88.73 per day for each inmate. However, in 2015, the Montana Legislature capped the reimbursement rate at $69 per day. The County filed a lawsuit in 2020, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.The District Court granted summary judgment to the DOC, concluding that the County's contract claims were time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations. It also found that the County's tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith was not supported by a special relationship and that the County could not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment.The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. It held that the one-year statute of limitations applied to the County's contract claims, rejecting the County's argument that an eight-year limitation period should apply. The court also agreed with the lower court that the County's tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith was not supported by a special relationship. Finally, the court concluded that the County could not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment, as the County had not demonstrated that the DOC had reaped an inequitable gain. View "Missoula County v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC, an oil and gas mineral rights investment firm, acquired mineral interests on two sections of real property in Richland County, Montana. The previous owner, Katherine Solis, had been approached multiple times by Kraken Oil and Gas LLC, an energy production company, to secure a lease of the mineral interests or to participate in drilling wells. Solis consistently refused to engage with Kraken. After Phoenix acquired the mineral interests, it expressed a desire to participate in the oil and gas production from the wells being drilled by Kraken. However, Kraken responded that the mineral interests had been deemed “non-consent” due to Solis’s lack of participation, and it was authorized to recover risk penalties.The Board of Oil and Gas Conservation of the State of Montana held a hearing and determined that Kraken had made unsuccessful, good faith attempts to acquire voluntary pooling in the spacing unit, and that Phoenix, as a successor in interest, was bound to Solis’s decision not to participate. The Board therefore determined that the mineral interests owned by Phoenix would be subject to forced pooling and that Kraken could recover risk penalties from Phoenix. Phoenix requested a rehearing from the Board, but that request was denied. Phoenix then filed a Complaint seeking injunctive relief from the Board decision in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. The District Court issued an Order granting Kraken and the Board’s motions for summary judgment, and dismissing Phoenix’s Complaint.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Phoenix appealed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Board correctly interpreted the statutory force-pooling requirements, and that its decision to force pool Phoenix’s mineral interests was reasonable. The court also held that Kraken’s letters to Solis constituted written demands that gave Solis the option to either participate or face assessment of risk penalties. The court concluded that risk penalties were imposed, not pursuant to the presumption in § 82-11-202(3), MCA (2021), but under § 82-11-202(2), MCA, which requires an owner pay risk penalties when “after written demand, [the owner] has failed or refused to pay the owner’s share of the costs of development or other operations . . . .” View "Phoenix Capital v. Board of Oil & Gas" on Justia Law