Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A developer formed a company in 2006 and purchased property in the Town of West Yellowstone, Montana, intending to construct a 48-unit condominium project. The developer obtained a building permit and a “Will Serve Letter” from the Town, confirming that water, sewer, and storm drainage services would be provided. Construction began in 2007 but ceased in 2011, after which the building permit expired due to inactivity. The developer did not reapply for a permit, nor did it renew related approvals. In 2019, the Town adopted a resolution limiting new wastewater connections due to capacity concerns. In 2020, the developer attempted to sell the property, contingent on confirmation that service connections would still be honored. The Town responded that hookups would be permitted when capacity allowed but did not guarantee immediate service.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the Town’s argument that the developer’s claims were time-barred under statutory limitations, ruling that the claims accrued only when the Town refused to guarantee connections in 2020. However, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Town on the merits, finding that the Will Serve Letter did not create an enforceable contract or vested right to service after years of inactivity and expired permits, and that the Town did not owe a special duty under the public duty doctrine.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that the developer’s claims were timely but that, even assuming a contract existed, any right to service under the Will Serve Letter expired after a prolonged period of project inactivity and lapsed permits. The Court further held that the Town owed no special duty to the developer beyond its general obligations to the public, and summary judgment for the Town was appropriate. View "West Development, LLC v. Town of W. Yellowstone" on Justia Law

A state employee was involved in a fatal car accident while driving a state-owned vehicle in the course of employment, resulting in the deaths of both himself and another driver, Haley Wilson. Haley was survived by her minor daughter, for whom Thomas Wilson acted as both personal representative of Haley’s estate and as conservator. After the accident, Thomas submitted claims to the state on behalf of the estate and the minor for wrongful death, survivorship, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The state offered to settle all claims for $750,000, referencing a statutory damages cap, but Thomas declined.Following the rejected settlement and before any lawsuit was filed by Thomas, the State of Montana filed a petition in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, seeking to interplead the $750,000 and obtain a release from further liability. The state’s petition did not specifically invoke Montana’s interpleader rule or the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the state, authorized the deposit of $750,000 into the court registry, discharged the state and the state employee from further liability, and dismissed the state from the interpleader action with prejudice. Thomas appealed, challenging both the use of interpleader and the constitutionality of the statutory damages cap.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred in permitting the state to proceed via interpleader, because the state was the alleged tortfeasor and not a disinterested stakeholder, and the claims asserted were not adverse in the manner required for interpleader. The court further held that any discussion of the constitutionality of the damages cap would be speculative and advisory given the absence of a filed lawsuit, a determination of liability, or a verdict exceeding the statutory limit. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the state’s petition. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute regarding the proper method for appraising three commercial condominium units in Kalispell, Montana, owned by the estate of Maxine O’Brien and the Hash Family Trust. The central issue was whether the Montana Department of Revenue (MDOR) should use the income approach or the cost approach to value the units for the 2023/24 tax cycle. O’Brien provided detailed income information from the subject property and a nearly identical adjacent property, contending this information was sufficient to mandate the income approach under Montana law. MDOR instead used the cost approach, arguing that the available data was insufficient for an income-based valuation, particularly due to limitations in its mass-appraisal data pool.After O’Brien condominiumized the property in 2021, MDOR switched from the income approach to the cost approach for the 2023/24 appraisal. CTAB accepted O’Brien’s income-based valuation and found that the basements of the units were not separately rentable and their value was reflected in the overall rents. MDOR appealed CTAB’s ruling to the Montana Tax Appeal Board (MTAB), which reversed CTAB, concluding that MDOR lacked sufficient income information and was justified in using the cost approach. O’Brien then sought judicial review in the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, which affirmed MTAB’s decision.The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and held that MTAB erred by misinterpreting the statutory standard for sufficient, relevant income information. The Court found that O’Brien had provided adequate income information, triggering the requirement for MDOR to use the income approach. The Court reversed MTAB’s February 2025 merits decisions and reinstated CTAB’s April 2024 decisions, ordering MDOR to appraise the units using O’Brien’s income-approach valuations. View "O'Brien v. MT Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

A cosmetology school in Great Falls, Montana, was subject to disciplinary action by the Montana Board of Barbers and Cosmetologists after receiving student complaints between 2014 and 2016 about inappropriate conduct by a massage therapy instructor. The school investigated the incidents, issued a final written warning to the instructor, and ultimately terminated his employment following further complaints. The Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) later alleged that the school failed to meet generally accepted standards of practice in handling the complaints, specifically criticizing its investigation and adherence to internal policies.The case proceeded to a contested hearing before a Hearing Officer in the Office of Administrative Hearings, who concluded that, although the school's investigation could have been better, DLI had not proven the school committed “unprofessional conduct” as defined by statute. The Hearing Officer recommended dismissal of the case. The Montana Board of Barbers and Cosmetologists rejected that recommendation, found the school had committed unprofessional conduct by not following its own policies, and imposed sanctions including a fine and probation. The school sought judicial review in the First Judicial District Court, which upheld the Board’s actions, finding the Board’s interpretation and imposition of discipline were not arbitrary or capricious.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. It held that the Board’s decision to discipline the school, based solely on a failure to follow internal policies rather than a clear, generally accepted standard of practice, was arbitrary. The Supreme Court found the statutory language too vague to support the Board’s action in this case and ruled that the school had been prejudiced by the Board’s arbitrary application of unwritten standards. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s decision and instructed it to remand to the Board with instructions to adopt the Hearing Officer’s recommended dismissal. View "MAS v. Board of Barbers" on Justia Law

Victory Insurance Company, a Montana insurer, served as managing general agent for Clear Spring Property and Casualty Company’s workers’ compensation policies. When Clear Spring terminated their agreement, a dispute arose, leading to federal litigation. In 2021, Clear Spring notified the Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance that Victory had refused to provide required data related to its agency work. The Commissioner demanded Victory turn over all relevant records in a format usable to the agency, specifically requesting comma-separated value (.csv) files unless the native format was not conducive. Victory instead provided PDF documents and links to sample data, stating it did not use .csv formatting and that Clear Spring already possessed the requested information.The Commissioner initiated administrative proceedings, alleging violations of the Montana Insurance Code, including failure to provide records in a usable form. After a contested hearing, the agency’s Hearing Examiner granted summary judgment for the Commissioner, finding Victory violated the statute by not providing the records in the specified format. The Special Deputy Insurance Commissioner affirmed this decision and imposed a $25,000 fine for each violation. Victory sought judicial review in the Montana First Judicial District Court, arguing the agency misinterpreted the law and acted arbitrarily in imposing the maximum fine. The District Court affirmed the agency’s decision and the penalties.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that the statute requires managing general agents to provide access to records in a form usable to the Commissioner as specified at the time of request, and the Commissioner was not required to prove incapacity to use other formats. The Court affirmed summary judgment against Victory, finding no genuine dispute of material fact. It also ruled that the $25,000-per-violation fine was authorized by statute and was not arbitrary or capricious, affirming the District Court's decision in full. View "Victory Insurance Co. v. State Auditor" on Justia Law

A Montana ballot initiative, known as BI-9, sought to amend the state constitution by creating a new section that would define and limit the powers of “artificial persons,” such as corporations and other entities, by prohibiting them from spending money or anything of value to influence electoral outcomes. The initiative arose after a previous attempt (BI-4) by the same proponents was rejected for violating the state’s constitutional separate-vote requirement. The Montana Attorney General again found BI-9 legally insufficient, determining that it combined multiple unrelated constitutional changes in a single proposal and therefore violated Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution.After the Attorney General’s finding, the proponents petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for declaratory judgment, challenging the Attorney General’s assessment. The Attorney General argued that BI-9 not only added new material to the constitution but also limited the powers of artificial persons, affected a wide range of entities beyond corporations, and implicitly amended other constitutional provisions, all of which, in his view, required separate votes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the initiative and disagreed with the Attorney General’s conclusions. The Court held that BI-9 constituted a single constitutional amendment under Article XIV, Section 11, because the proposal’s various components were closely related and did not amount to “logrolling” or voter deception. The Court distinguished the current proposal from prior rejected initiatives and found that the specification of affected entities and the consequences of political spending restrictions did not require separate votes. The Court reversed the Attorney General’s rejection of BI-9 and ordered him to prepare and forward a ballot statement to the Secretary of State. View "Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

A driver was stopped by a county deputy after allegedly committing traffic violations that led the officer to suspect impaired driving. The officer noted possible signs of intoxication and requested that the driver submit to alcohol testing, which the driver refused. Under Montana’s implied-consent law, the officer seized the driver’s license and issued a notice of automatic six-month suspension. The next day, the driver petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the officer lacked sufficient suspicion for the stop and the test requests.The Eighth Judicial District Court set an evidentiary hearing, but delays resulted from a combination of the petitioner’s request for a continuance due to jury duty and procedural orders requiring both parties to file briefs before a hearing could be held. The petitioner filed a brief, but the State did not, leaving the hearing vacated. Before the court ruled, the six-month suspension expired and the license was reinstated. When the petitioner moved to reset the hearing, the State moved to dismiss the case as moot, arguing that the only relief available was the return of the license, which had already occurred. The District Court agreed and dismissed the petition as moot.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the expiration of the suspension and reinstatement of the license rendered the case moot. The court held that the case was not moot because the petitioner’s timely challenge could still result in relief, such as removal of the suspension from his driving record and potential reimbursement of reinstatement fees. The court found that the statute contemplates judicial review even after the suspension period if the challenge was timely filed and pursued. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kalafat v. State" on Justia Law

A county board created a port authority in 2003 to encourage economic development, administering a business park on contaminated land formerly operated by a lumber company. In 2022, the port authority entered into agreements with a private company to clean up and potentially develop the property, culminating in the sale of 105 acres for $1.6 million, with a credit for cleanup costs. The plaintiff alleged that between May 2022 and April 2025, the port authority failed to provide adequate public notice of its meetings or opportunities for public participation regarding the land transactions, in violation of Montana’s open meeting and right to participate laws.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, reviewed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to halt any actions pursuant to the port authority’s decisions during the contested period and to void the land sale and related contracts. The District Court denied the injunction, reasoning that the relief sought would not merely enforce open meeting laws but would invalidate completed transactions and disrupt the property’s new ownership and development. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, particularly given the significant passage of time and changes to the property. The court did not resolve contested factual issues about notice or participation, nor did it make any final rulings on the underlying claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff failed to establish all required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court had not decided the merits of the open meeting law claims and left those questions for future proceedings. View "Torgison v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Two individuals who are transgender women, one living in Montana and the other in Alaska, challenged recent Montana laws and administrative policies that restrict the ability to amend the sex designation on birth certificates and driver's licenses. These state actions, enacted in response to legislative changes, allow amendments to these documents only in limited circumstances such as clerical errors, not to reflect a person’s gender identity. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions forced them to carry identification that does not match their gender identity, resulting in concrete harms such as disclosure of their transgender status during routine activities and difficulties in verifying their identity.The case was filed in the First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of equal protection, right to privacy, and prohibition against compelled speech under the Montana Constitution, as well as violations of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court found that the plaintiffs had standing, demonstrated concrete and particularized injuries, and satisfied all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the policies likely violated Montana’s Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against transgender individuals on the basis of sex, and that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief. The District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the challenged state policies as applied to amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. It held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the state policies likely constitute unconstitutional sex discrimination under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, warranting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Kalarchik v. State" on Justia Law

The Montana legislature enacted a law, HB 937, and associated administrative rules that imposed new licensure and regulatory requirements specifically on abortion clinics, which were defined as facilities providing abortion-inducing drugs or performing surgical abortions to at least five patients per year. These requirements did not apply to clinics that provided identical medications and procedures exclusively for miscarriage management. Plaintiffs, including two clinics and a nurse practitioner, challenged the law and rules, arguing that they violated the equal protection and privacy rights guaranteed by the Montana Constitution. They asserted that these new requirements could force them to cease providing abortion care, thereby restricting their patients’ access to such services.After the plaintiffs filed their complaint, the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, initially granted a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of HB 937 and the associated rules. The District Court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their equal protection claim, that irreparable harm was likely absent an injunction, that the balance of equities favored the plaintiffs, and that an injunction was in the public interest. The court determined that the law treated similarly situated providers—those giving identical care for either miscarriage or abortion—differently solely based on the purpose of the treatment. The court applied strict scrutiny, finding that the state had not demonstrated a compelling interest or that the law was narrowly tailored.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court held that HB 937 and the rules likely violate the Montana Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection by subjecting abortion providers to unique, burdensome licensing requirements not imposed on providers of identical miscarriage care, thus likely infringing on the fundamental right to privacy. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs met all four elements required for a preliminary injunction and affirmed the lower court’s order in its entirety. View "All Families v. State" on Justia Law