Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

When Mary Stewart failed to pay real property taxes on her property, the Flathead County Treasurer held a tax lien sale for the delinquent taxes. The County was listed as the purchaser of the tax lien. In 2013, RN & DB, LLC paid the delinquent taxes, penalties, interests, and costs for the property and applied for a tax deed. The County issued a tax deed to RN & DB, after which RN & DB filed an action to quiet title in the property. The district court granted RN & DB’s motion for summary judgment and entered a decree quieting title in favor of RN & DB. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in not applying the statutory homestead exemption to the tax lien sale on Stewart’s property; (2) Stewart’s claim that the district court should have considered the tax assessor’s failure to investigate Stewart’s complaints regarding irregular tax assessments on Stewart’s property was barred; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment without holding a hearing. View "RN & DB, LLC v. Stewart" on Justia Law

After Jon Cruson resigned from his position with Missoula Electric Cooperative, Inc., he filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry’s Unemployment Insurance Division (Department). The Department ultimately granted Cruson unemployment insurance benefits beginning on the date of his resignation. The Hearings Bureau reversed, concluding that Cruson was disqualified from receiving benefits because the reason he offered for quitting did not constitute good cause attributable to his employment. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed. The district court denied Cruson’s appeal, determining that the Board correctly applied the law to the facts when it determined that Cruson did not voluntarily leave his employment with good cause attributable to his employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and its legal conclusion that “good cause attributable to the employer” had not been shown was correct. View "Cruson v. Missoula Elec. Coop." on Justia Law

Westmoreland Resources Inc. (WRI) mines coal owned by the Crow Tribe and pays coal severance and gross proceeds taxes to the Tribe. In 2005, WRI filed a tax return with the Department of Revenue for coal produced and sold at its Absaloka Mine, located on the Crow Reservation, during tax year 2004. The return deducted the coal severance and gross proceeds taxes it had paid to the Tribe. The Department disallowed WRI’s deduction. WRI filed a complaint with the State Tax Appeal Board. WRI and the Department later filed a joint petition for an interlocutory adjudication of a substantive question of law with the district court. At issue was whether WRI’s coal severance and gross proceeds deduction was proper. The district court held in favor of the Department, concluding that WRI may not deduct taxes paid to the Tribe as “taxes paid on production” from the “contract sales price” when calculating the Resource Indemnity Trust and Ground Water Assessment Tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the phrase “any tax paid to the federal, state, or local governments” within Mont. Code Ann. 15-35-102(11) does not include those taxes WRI pays to the Tribe. View "Westmoreland Res., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case arose from a restriction placed on a certain parcel of real property providing that the land would be used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Greg Hampton, a developer, requested the consent of Lewis and Clark County to revoke the agricultural covenant. The County approved the lifting of the covenant subject to thirteen conditions. Hampton then began working on developing his residence on the parcel. The County later filed a complaint requesting injunctive relief and an order requiring Hampton to complete the conditions. A jury determined that Hampton had notice of the thirteen conditions prior to building his home and that he failed to complete four conditions prior to development. The district court then entered final judgment, ordering Hampton to pay the proportionate share of the cost to upgrade Lodgepole Road to County road requirements, among other orders. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in ruling on summary judgment that the County consented to revocation of an agricultural covenant on Hampton’s property; (2) the district court erred in determining that Hampton was only proportionally responsible for the cost of upgrading Lodgepole Road; and (3) the district court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Lewis & Clark County v. Hampton" on Justia Law

In 1980, the Montana Board of Livestock (Board) adopted the 12-Day Rule, which prohibits the sale of milk in Montana more than twelve days after pasteurization. In 2008, Core-Mark International, Inc. filed a petition with the Board seeking to amend or repeal the 12-day Rule. The Board held an administrative proceeding regarding Core-Mark’s petition, part of which involved a formal evidentiary hearing conducted by an independent hearing examiner. The hearing examiner issued a proposed decision recommending that the Board consider repealing the 12-day Rule. However, the Board voted unanimously to retain the 12-day Rule without modification. The district court denied Core-Mark’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in concluding that the administrative proceeding was not a contested case proceeding and therefore not subject to judicial review; (2) by applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and in determining that the Board’s decision did not violate that standard; and (3) in concluding that the 12-day Rule is a valid exercise of the Board’s authority. View "Core-Mark Int'l, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Livestock" on Justia Law

Appellant was an officer with the Glacier County Sheriff’s Office (GCSO) from 1995 to 2010 and occasionally investigated the deaths of people he knew. In 2010, Appellant pled guilty to two misdemeanors and resigned from the GCSO. In 2011, Appellant applied for disability retirement benefits from the Sheriffs’ Retirement Systems, alleging that he was permanently disabled due the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) he developed while working at the GCSO. The Montana Public Employees’ Retirement Board (PERB) denied Appellant’s disability claim, concluding that Appellant’s PTSD was not permanently disabling. The district court affirmed PERB’s decision to deny benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not misapprehend the effect of the evidence presented and properly determined that the findings of PERB were not clearly erroneous. View "Fauque v. Mont. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Whitefish passed Resolution 10-46, which authorized the City to enter into an interlocal agreement with Flathead County concerning planning and zoning authority over a two-mile area surrounding the City. In 2011, voters in Whitehead passed a referendum repealing the Resolution. Plaintiffs, residents of the City and the County, filed the present lawsuit claiming that the citizens’ power of referendum and initiative did not extend to the Resolution. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by not dismissing the suit as untimely based upon the doctrine of laches; and (2) did not err by determining that the Resolution was not subject to the right of voter initiative and referendum because the Resolution was an administrative act by the City. View "Phillips v. City of Whitefish" on Justia Law

This matter comprised two joined cases, both involving claims to water diverted from the South Fork of Dupuyer Creek in Two Medicine River Basin, into Gansman Coulee, for irrigation in the Teton River Basin. Two sets of claimants (“Duncan” and “Skelton”) filed statements of claim for existing rights. A canal and reservoir company (“Pondera”) appeared in the adjudication of Duncan’s and Skelton’s claims. The Montana Water Court amended the Water Master’s Report and adopted it as amended. Duncan and Skelton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Chief Water Judge properly admitted historical documents prepared by Pondera in anticipation of litigation under the ancient document exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the Chief Water Judge correctly rejected the Master’s findings regarding certain variables used to determine the historical capacity of a flume on the Thomas ditch; (3) the Chief Water Judge correctly determined that portions of the claimants’ water rights had been abandoned or never perfected; and (4) the Chief Water Judge correctly adopted the Master’s conclusion that the claimants did not acquire any water rights by adverse possession. View "Skelton Ranch, Inc. v. Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the water rights to a well (“disputed well”). In 1982, Carl Kambich filed a statement of claim for existing water rights. In 1990, Kambich filed a notice of transfer of water right to Randall and Ila Mae Brooks. The current Water Court case involved the claim originally filed by Kambich and amended by the Brooks. Ernest Nelson objected to the claim, arguing that he was the owner of the disputed well. After a hearing, the Water Master found that the claim belonged to the Brooks and that, although Nelson had presented some valid questions regarding the history of the well, he had failed to overcome the prima facie proof in the statement of claim. The Water Court dismissed Nelson’s objections to the water rights claim by the Brooks. The Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court’s order, holding that the Brooks’ well claim was valid. View "Nelson v. Brooks" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation (MBOGC) adopted special statewide temporary spacing units for certain wells. Petitioners = filed a petition for judicial review of MBOGC’s order, stating that it was filed pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 82-11-144 and Mont. Code Ann. 2-4-702. The district court dismissed Petitioners’ proceeding, stating that the “sole remedy for a person aggrieved by an order of the MBOGC was a challenge under Montana Code Ann. 82-11-144.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the action, as Petitioners’ allegations, coupled with their express reliance upon section 82-11-144 as a legal basis for their petition, should have been sufficient to save their petition from dismissal on the ground that they had not pursued their “sole remedy” of proceeding under that statute. View "Ostby v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law