Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

When Father and Mother divorced, the district court ordered Father to pay child support. After Father failed to make child support payments, the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) of the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) placed a support lien on all of his property. After Father and Mother's divorce, Mother married Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Mother subsequently divorced pursuant to a final decree of dissolution in which Mother assigned to Plaintiff her interest in the child support lien. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a proceeding against Father seeking to foreclose on the CSED support lien. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ordering that Plaintiff could foreclose on the child support lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded from obtaining an enforceable interest in the support lien, as, under Montana law, the Department alone held the rights to and was authorized to foreclose on the child support lien. Remanded. View "LeCount v. Davis" on Justia Law

Paula Ehrmantraut-Kiosee sought tax deductions for educational expenses incurred in pursuit of a doctoral degree in psychology. The Montana Department of Revenue disallowed the deductions sought by Paula individually in 2007, and jointly with Randy Myrup in 2008 and 2009. The Office of Dispute Resolution affirmed the disallowance, and the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) upheld the disallowance. The district court denied Taxpayers' petition for judicial review. After noting that educational expenses will be deemed nondeductible as qualification for a new trade or business if the education is a step towards obtaining a certification that, once obtained, would qualify the taxpayer to perform tasks significantly different from those the taxpayer performed before receiving the education, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the findings of STAB and the district court that Paula pursued her education in an effort to become a clinical psychologist, rather than simply to improve her skills as a counselor, were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) therefore, Taxpayers failed to demonstrate that the educational expenses were deductible under either 26 C.F.R. 1.162-5(a)(1) or (2). View "Myrup v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff asked the district court for a declaratory judgment that the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) used improper or illegal methods of assessing Plaintiff's Montana properties for property tax purposes in 2009 and 2010. The court granted summary judgment in favor of DOR on Plaintiff's claims, ruling that Plaintiff's substantive arguments could not be brought directly in a Montana district court without first appealing to the administrative tax appeals boards. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's challenges to the methods and procedures of assessment used by DOR to assess Plaintiff's property must be raised through the administrative tax appeal process; (2) Plaintiff's claim that DOR failed to equalize its valuation of Plaintiff's property is the type of challenge that must be pursued administratively; and (3) the district court did not err when it granted DOR summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that the 2009 assessment of its property was illegal or improper because the assessment was made too late. View "CHS, Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who operated a cattle ranch, owned a truck that had been modified with the attachment of a feedbox, hoist and tailgate. Plaintiff was cited for violating Mont. Code Ann. 15-70-330 after a Montana Department of Transportation (MDOT) officer discovered that the fuel in the tank of Plaintiff's vehicle was dyed and in excess of the legal concentration allowed to be in a fuel tank in a non-exempt vehicle being driven on a public highway. Plaintiff requested a review of his citation, arguing that the modifications made to his vehicle rendered its primary use off-road and off-highway, and therefore, he was entitled to a special exemption from the prohibition against dyed fuel on public roadways. After a hearing, MDOT determined Plaintiff was not entitled to any exemption. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) affirmed. The district court affirmed, determining that Plaintiff's vehicle's alterations simply enhanced its capability to transport property, whether on a public highway or on a ranch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by affirming STAB's determination that Plaintiff violated section 15-70-330 and that his truck was not entitled to a special exemption under Mont. Admin. R. 18.10.110(1) and (2). View "Coleman v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Bostwick Properties (Bostwick) sought a water use permit from the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), which was denied. The district court (1) agreed with DNRC that Bostwick failed to prove no net depletion of surface water and lack of adverse effect, and therefore Bostwick was required to mitigate its water usage in order to receive a water use permit; (2) determined that Bostwick had submitted an adequate mitigation proposal, and therefore, ruled that DNRC improperly had denied Bostwick's permit application; and (3) determined that DNRC exhibited bias toward BNRC, but any bias did not prejudice Bostwick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DNRC and the district court properly required Bostwick to mitigate its water usage; (2) the district court properly determined Bostwick's mitigation proposal was adequate as a matter of law; and (3) DNRC bias did not substantially prejudice Bostwick. View "Bostwick Props., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC), alleging that Northwestern Energy had been overcharging consumes for its street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded with instructions to remand the case to the PSC for a redetermination of whether to allow the filing of an amended complaint. On remand to the district court, Petitioners filed a motion seeking $1,137 in costs incurred while responding to objections before the PSC and courts. Petitioners also renewed a motion asking the district court to initiate an immediate rate reduction pending the PSC's final decision. The district court denied both of the Petitioners' requests and remanded to the PSC. The Supreme Court affirmed that order, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Petitioners their costs for the initial proceedings in district court and first appeal to the Supreme Court, and (2) denying Petitioners' request for a temporary rate decrease, pending the PSC's decision on remand. View "Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

An underground mine with surface facilities located in Musselshell County (Musselshell) extended underground into Yellowstone County (Yellowstone) and produced coal mined from both Musselshell and Yellowstone. Based upon a report of the counties from which the coal was mined, the Department of Revenue allocated approximately two-thirds of the mine's taxable coal gross proceeds to Musselshell, for a tax of $328,617, and the remainder to Yellowstone, for a tax of $126,909. Musselshell sued Yellowstone and the Department seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department wrongfully allocated a portion of the tax to Yellowstone. The district court upheld the Department's apportionment of the tax between the two counties, holding that Montana law contemplates taxation of the gross proceeds of coal in the county where the coal is mined and that the Department was not required to adopt administrative rules prior to apportioning the tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department correctly apportioned the coal gross proceeds tax from the mine between Musselshell and Yellowstone and was not required by law to create an administrative rule before making that apportionment. View "Musselshell County v. Yellowstone County" on Justia Law

This appeal pertained to the location of a partially-constructed horse barn in a planned unit development (PUD). Plaintiffs were the owner of the barn, the owner's contractor, and FPR Properties. After it was notified that the barn did not comply with the regulations and covenants and must be removed, FPR submitted an application to modify the conditional use permit of the PUD development to bring the location of the barn into compliance. The planning and zoning commission affirmed the code compliance specialist's determination that the barn violated zoning regulations and applicable covenants. The commission also denied FPR's request to modify the conditional use permit for the PUD. On appeal, the district affirmed the commission's rulings and dismissed FDR's takings claim without conducting a trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) affirming the commission's determination that the partially-constructed barn violated applicable zoning regulations and covenants and must be removed; (2) affirming the commission's denial of FPR's application to modify the PUD's conditional use permit; and (3) dismissing FPR's constitutional takings claim. View "Botz v. Bridger Canyon Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in anticipation of Revett Silver Company and RC Resources, Inc. (collectively, "Revett") seeking approval for mine-related construction under a general permit, filed this action against the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) seeking a declaratory judgment that use of general permits to approve stormwater runoff from the Rock Creek Mine would violate Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.1341(4)(e) because Rock Creek is an area of "unique ecological significance" based on considerations of impacts on fishery resource and local conditions at proposed discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and declared the general permit void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEQ's approval of the use of the general permit to allow storm water discharges was arbitrary and capricious because DEQ failed to consider the relevant factors set forth in the law prior to its decision, and as a result, committed a clear error of judgment. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application for a 119-lot subdivision, which the Board of Missoula County Commissioners denied. Plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of the Board's action and alternatively claimed that the Board's actions constituted a regulatory taking that entitled him to just compensation. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all of Richard's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Plaintiff to conduct further discovery before ruling on the summary judgment motion; (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment to the County on the Board's decision to deny the subdivision; and (3) the County was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's regulatory taking claim. View "Richards v. County of Missoula" on Justia Law