Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners brought an original proceeding to the Supreme Court to challenge the validity of Initiative 166. They requested the Court rule that the Attorney General and Secretary of State did not comply with their responsibilities under law when they failed to bar I-166 from appearing on the general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General and Secretary of State acted in compliance with their duties under law, and that the initiative met all statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition.

Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Fellows appealed a district court's order that dismissed his complaint. Plaintiff owned a water right in Spring Creek. He claimed that the flow of the creek was for many years recharged by water seeping from the natural channel of the Teton River. He claimed that the practice of diverting water from the natural channel of the Teton implemented by the district court's water commissioner on the Teton adversely affected the water available to satisfy his water right in Spring Creek. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action as a dissatisfied water user unless he could prove a hydrological connection between Spring Creek and the Teton River. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's factual allegations and his request for a declaratory ruling were sufficient to invoke the district court's power to issue a ruling on the issue of connectivity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Sherman Anderson and other concerned residents of the City of Deer Lodge (Anderson) appealed a district court order that denied their petition for a writ of mandamus. The issue in this case arose from the revocation of Zoo Mountain Natural Care, Inc.'s business license. Zoo Mountain contacted the City in 2010 regarding a business license. Zoo Mountain had purchased property in the City limits for the purpose of lawfully growing and selling medical marijuana. The City was not issuing business licenses at that time, however, due to a change from a calendar-year licensing system to a fiscal year licensing system. The City previously had determined that it would waive the business license requirement for new applicants during this transition period. The City accordingly allowed Zoo Mountain to operate lawfully without a business license until July 2010. The City Council convened shortly after Zoo Mountain’s move to Deer Lodge. Anderson expressed concern over Zoo Mountain’s location at this meeting. He specifically disliked the fact that Zoo Mountain was located in a residential neighborhood, and that Zoo Mountain was located near the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Anderson believed that the City’s decision to issue the business license violated Ordinances 130 and 136. Anderson further believed that the City violated the 2009 version of the Medical Marijuana Act when it issued the business license to a corporation, rather than to an individual. Anderson sought a writ of mandamus from the District Court to require the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The court declined to issue the writ. It concluded that the MMA provided no clear legal duty for the City to revoke the business license. It similarly concluded that the City Code, particularly Ordinances 130 and 136, contained no clear legal duty to revoke the business license. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Anderson has failed to establish any clear legal duty that requires the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The District Court acted accordingly in denying the writ.

The district court entered judgment for the City of Cut Bank on Petitioner Arthur F. Rooney's complaint that he was wrongfully terminated from employment as a City police officer. Petitioner appealed the court's decision that his termination did not violate Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA). The City cross-appealed the district court's earlier interlocutory order which denied the City's motion to dismiss the WDEA claim. Because the Supreme Court reversed the interlocutory ruling, it did not reach the issues raised by Petitioner. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the City on this alternative ground.

In July 2009, Charles Albert’s Billings, Montana home caught fire. Despite response by the City of Billings Fire Department, the house burned to the ground. Albert sued the City for negligence of the Billings Fire Department, discrimination based upon age and disability, slander, and violation of his constitutional and statutory right to know and obtain documents held by the City. The District Court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on all issues. Albert appealed. Finding no error in the district court's consideration of Albert's case, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision.

Plaintiff Arthur Rooney appealed a district court's order in favor of Defendant City of Cut Bank in his wrongful termination suit. Plaintiff appealed the court's decision that his termination did not violate Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA). The City cross-appealed the District Court's earlier interlocutory order denying the City's motion to dismiss the WDEA claim. The Supreme Court reversed an interlocutory ruling, and did not reach the issues raised by Plaintiff. The Court affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor of the City on this alternative ground. The Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff was afforded "full and fair adjudication of his claims in the proceedings before the Police Commission." When the City moved for relief from the District Court's order ruling that the WDEA claim was distinct from the appeal of the Police Commission decision, it was correct that issue preclusion applied.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Dilley appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee City of Missoula. The district court concluded the City acted within its legal authority when it purchased the Missoula Civic Stadium with tax increment financing (TIF) funds designated for urban renewal. The stadium was originally planned and developed by Play Ball Missoula, Inc. (Play Ball), a volunteer, non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of bringing a minor league baseball team to Missoula. In 2000, Play Ball and the City entered a development agreement that permitted Play Ball to finance and construct a stadium on blighted City property and later convey the facility to the City. Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed suit prior to the City's acquisition of the stadium, alleging the planned purchase using TIF funds was an "illegal payoff of private enterprise debt." On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erroneously failed to specify which provision under Title 7, Chapter 15, Part 42 of the Montana Code that permitted the "payoff." He also argued that the City could not make such an expenditure of TIF funds simply because the practice was not prohibited by statute. Finding that the City's use of TIF money to acquire the stadium was a proper exercise of its urban renewal posers, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the City's favor.

Petitioner Dustin Robison appealed a district court order which reversed the findings of the State Tax Appeals Board (STAB) and reinstated the findings of the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR). This case concerned whether Petitioner was allowed to claim a deduction on his Montana income taxes for certain mileage as a business travel expense. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department of Revenue's decision.

Petitioner Billie L. Redding asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, and to conclude it was error for the District Court to grant partial summary judgment to Defendants Timothy Janiak; Anderson ZurMuehlen & Co., P.C.; Ray E. Petersen; and Rick Ahmann. Petitioner's case arose from a series of real estate transactions by which she sold her property to Defendants for which she would receive payments from them which would serve as her monthly income. The scheme by which Defendants paid Petitioner and their other real estate clients collapsed in 2008 (as a Ponzi scheme), and they filed for bankruptcy. Petitioner sued, alleging: (1) unlawful sale of securities; (2) negligence; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) breach of contract; and (6) tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Petitioner sought damages in the amount of $4,635,485.51, plus additional amounts for punitive damages, emotional distress, loss of established course of life, and consequential damages. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on several issues, the only issue before the Court was whether the "investments" Petitioner made with Defendants qualified as "securities" under the state Securities Act. The district court found that Petitioner "did not engage in a common enterprise," an essential element of an investment contract (i.e. a security), because she "did not share the risks of the investment with other investors because she agreed upon a contractually set return on her investment." Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that supervisory control was appropriate in this case and that the real estate transactions in question here were indeed securities. Accordingly the Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control.

Respondent-Appellant Chad Cringle appealed a district court order that remanded his case to the Montana Human Rights Commission for further proceedings in his discrimination complaint against Petitioner-Appellee BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). The issue on appeal was whether BNSF demonstrated sufficient grounds to excuse its noncompliance with a fourteen-day filing deadline. In 2008, Respondent filed a complaint with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry charging that BNSF had illegally discriminated against him in employment. Following proceedings on the issues of damages and affirmative relief, the hearing officer issued a final decision in Respondent's favor. That same day, the hearing officer issued notice of his decision by mail to the parties. BNSF received the decision the next day. A legal secretary discovered the decision under papers on her desk nineteen days after it was received. By that time, the decision had become final and "not appealable." BNSF filed a notice of appeal, asking for an extension of time in which to file its notice of appeal. Respondent objected to the request. The Commission denied BNSF's appeal. BNSF sought judicial review; The Commission and Respondent filed separate motions to dismiss BNSF's petition. BNSF then appealed the district court's dismissal of its petition, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the fourteen-day filing deadline as "jurisdictional" and asked the Supreme Court to hold that the Commission had authority to extend the deadline to file the appeal. The case came before the Supreme Court a second time, the last issue to decide was whether BNSF had shown good cause for its untimely filing. Upon review, the Court concluded BNSF failed to justify relief from the deadline.