Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Medical Marijuana Growers Association, Inc., Courier 1, Courier 2, Caregiver 1, Caregiver 2, and Caregiver 3 (collectively referred to as Plaintiffs) appealed an Order and Rationale on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Order), entered by the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County, Montana. The Order determined that caregivers, as providers of medical marijuana to qualifying patients under Montana’s 2009 Medical Marijuana Act, were not permitted to engage in marijuana transactions with or provide cultivation services to other caregivers or their agents or contractors. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the plain language of the statute clear and unambiguous: "A caregiver is authorized to provide marijuana to qualifying patients only. The 2009 MMA does not provide for the transfer of marijuana or paraphernalia from caregiver to caregiver or among their agents, nor is there a provision allowing for a caregiver to cultivate marijuana for other caregivers or for their agents or contractors." Therefore, the Court affirmed the determination of the District Court that the 2009 MMA does not permit the exchange of marijuana among caregivers, nor does it permit a caregiver to cultivate or manufacture marijuana for another caregiver.

The State Department of Labor and Industry appealed a district court's order that reversed the Department's decision regarding Petitioner Sheila Callahan & Friends, Inc. (SC&F). SC&F, a radio broadcasting company entered into a one-year contract with Joni Mielke. During the term of employment, SC&F evaluated Mielke as being an excellent radio personality and announcer but as underperforming other responsibilities because she either did not want to do them or preferred announcing-related duties. Mielke elected not to renew her contract with SC&F, and on an exit interview form, Mielke indicated her reason for leaving was that she "quit." After Mielke left her employment with SC&F, she was hired by another radio station. After a brief employment with this subsequent employer, she was laid off and filed for unemployment benefits in October 2009. The Department of Labor sent a Notice of Chargeability Determination to SC&F assessing a pro rata share of the costs of Mielke’s unemployment insurance benefits to SC&F’s experience rating account. The Department administratively determined that Mielke was employed for SC&F on a contract basis during her base period of employment and that SC&F’s account was chargeable for a portion of benefits drawn by Mielke. SC&F requested a redetermination, arguing that Mielke had voluntarily left her employment. The Department issued a Redetermination affirming the initial Determination. An administrative hearing was then conducted by telephone; the hearing officer determined that Mielke neither voluntarily quit nor was discharged for misconduct and affirmed the decision to charge SC&F’s account. On appeal, the Department argued the District Court improperly failed to defer to the Board’s findings of facts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the error of the Board was primarily premised upon application of legal standards, in the nature of a conclusion of law. Given the inapplicability of the imputation rules to the situation here, the District Court properly concluded that the evidence did not support the Board’s determination that Mielke’s work separation was involuntary.

I.M. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated his parental rights to his children A.J.M (daughter) and C.J.M. (son). The children's biological mother already had her parental rights to terminated. The Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) contacted the family and made recommendations, but the parents did not follow through. Father reported Mother to DPHHS in July of 2009 with concerns about her drinking and inability to care for the children. After Father’s call, the children were removed. Upon stipulations by both Mother and Father, the children were adjudicated Youths in Need of Care on August 14, 2009. The District Court found that: 1) termination was statutorily presumed to be in both A.J.M.’s and C.J.M.’s best interest due to the length of time each had been in foster care; 2) Father’s treatment plans were appropriate; 3) Father did not comply with the treatment plans; 4) the conditions rendering Father unfit or unable to parent would not likely change within a reasonable amount of time, and 5) the best interests of A.J.M. and C.J.M. would indeed be served by termination of Father’s parental rights. Father then appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Father's parental rights.

Petitioner Emily Blodgett petitioned the Supreme Court for a Writ of Supervisory Control alleging that the Missoula County Justice Court violated sections 3-10-231 through -234, MCA; Article VII Sections 1 and 5 of the Montana Constitution, and several of the Court's prior decisions when it allowed a retired district court judge to preside over her jury trial. Petitioner contended that the presiding justice of the peace improperly called the judge to preside over the case even though the justice was present in her court but otherwise involved with another case. Finding that though the retired judge was qualified by his training and experience to act as a substitute justice of the peace, he was not one at the time he presided over Petitioner's trial because the statutory procedures to vested him with the power to perform judicial functions as a substitute justice of the peace had not been followed. Consequently, any purported judicial acts performed by the judge in this case were void ab initio. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control and held that Petitioner's jury trial was void ab initio. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

At issue in this case was the Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation's (MBOGC) issuance of twenty-three gas well permits to Fidelity Exploration and Production Company in the area known as the Cedar Creek Anticline (CCA). The Montana Wildlife Federation and National Wildlife Federation (collectively, Federations) challenged the issuance of the permits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, MBOGC, Fidelity, and Montana Petroleum Association, holding that the Federations failed to rebut the presumption of validity in the MBOGC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) conducting its review under Mont. Code Ann. 82-11-144 and in considering evidence outside the administrative record; (2) determining that the environmental assessments prepared by MBOGC for gas development in the CCA were adequate under the Montana Environmental Policy Act; and (3) ruling that MBOGC did not have to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement for oil and gas development in the CCA.

Oliver Arlington was employed by Miller's Trucking as a log truck driver and loader operator pursuant to an oral employment agreement. For his work, Miller's paid Arlington twenty-five percent of the "load rate" as calculated by Miller's. Arlington, however, asserted that according to the parties' oral agreement, he should have been paid a salary in the form of annual wages. Arlington filed a wage claim, seeking the pay he alleged he was owed in regular and overtime wages. The Department of Labor and Industry's bureau dismissed Arlington's claim for lack of merit and lack of sufficient evidence. On appeal, a bureau hearing officer dismissed Arlington's claim. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to require Miller's to produce material requested by Arlington and in refusing to admit tendered evidence, prejudicing the substantial rights of Arlington, and the district court erred in affirming the hearing officer's judgment; and (2) the hearing officer and district court incorrectly determined that Arlington engaged in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of the operation of motor vehicles in interstate commerce and thus was exempt from overtime requirements. Remanded.

The Town filed an application with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) seeking approval for proposed changes to its municipal well water rights. The DNRC notified the Town that its application was deficient because it did not contain information on the Town's historical use of its rights. The Town did not provide the information, contending that the information was irrelevant to its application. The DNRC then determined that the Town's application was not correct and complete as required by Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-302 and informed the Town that its application was terminated. The district court upheld the DNRC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on established Montana law and the applicable regulations, the DNRC was within its lawful authority to request that the Town provide information on its historical use of water as part of its application for approval of its proposed changes.

Employee, a truck driver, resigned from his employment with Employer after he developed arthritis. Employee later filed an occupational disease claim, which the Montana State Fund (MSF) denied. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) concluded that Employee's job duties were the major contributing cause of his arthritic condition, and therefore, Employee was suffering from an occupational disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that Grande was suffering from a compensable occupational disease arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment, as the WCC's findings of fact were supported by substantial, credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct.

Appellants, a group of individuals, filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) against NorthWestern Energy (NWE) concerning NWE's provision of street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the four named complainants lacked standing under Mont. Code Ann. 69-3-321. Appellants then filed an amended complaint in which they named four additional complainants. The PSC concluded (1) Appellants were procedurally barred from amending their complaint, and (2) the court would not reconsider its earlier ruling on standing in any event. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the original complainants lacked standing to pursue their complaint in the PSC under section 69-3-321; but (2) the PSC's and district court's rationales for rejecting the amended complaint were incorrect as, in this case, there was not a categorical procedural bar to the filing of an amended complaint following an order of dismissal for lack of standing.

Randall Simms was injured during his employment. The Montana State Fund (MSF) provided workers compensation to Simms' employer, and later, paid continuing medical benefits for Simms. MSF subsequently utilized the services of a special investigative unit (SIU) to investigate Simms for fraud. The SIU took multiple videos of Simms in public places. The videos were deemed confidential criminal justice information (CCJI) by the district court. The court allowed them to be used in relation to Simms' workers' compensation claim in any manner consistent with the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure and workers' compensation court (WCC) procedures. Simms appealed, arguing that MSF did not having standing to file an action for dissemination under the Montana Criminal Justice Information Act of 1979, and that the district court inadequately balanced the demands of individual privacy against the merits of disclosure, did not follow established rules of statutory construction, and improperly identified and weighed the competing interests at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err when it authorized MSF to disseminate the CCJI under the Act, and the court correctly interpreted the statute and adequately engaged in the statutorily mandated balancing of competing concerns.