Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A mining company sought to develop an open pit gold mine in the Kuskokwim River watershed, on lands owned by Alaska Native Corporations. To operate the mine, the company needed state permits for a natural gas pipeline right-of-way across state lands and for water appropriations to dewater the mining pit and support operations. Local tribes objected, arguing that the mine and its associated infrastructure would have significant impacts on the watershed, which is culturally and economically important to them. The Department of Natural Resources approved the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits after considering the impacts of the permitted activities themselves, but not the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project.The tribes appealed the Department’s decisions to the Commissioner, arguing that both the Water Use Act and the Alaska Constitution required consideration of the cumulative impacts of the whole mining project. The Commissioner denied the appeals, finding that the Department was only required to consider the effects of the permitted activities themselves. The tribes then appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decisions, ruling that the agency was not required to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis of the entire mine project under either statute or the constitution.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the Department was required to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project when granting the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits. The court held that neither the Water Use Act nor the Right-of-Way Leasing Act required consideration of downstream effects of mining activity enabled by the permits. The court also held that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution did not require the Department to consider the costs and benefits of developing private resources on private lands when deciding whether to grant permits for the use of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgments. View "Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle" on Justia Law

A corporation owned by a federally recognized Indian tribe, along with several tribal officials, was alleged by the State of California to have violated state cigarette tax laws and regulations. The corporation manufactured and distributed cigarettes in California, including to non-tribal consumers, without collecting or remitting required state excise taxes or payments under the Master Settlement Agreement. California claimed that the corporation and its officials distributed contraband cigarettes not listed on the state’s approved directory and failed to comply with shipping, recordkeeping, and tax collection requirements under the federal Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act). Despite warnings and being placed on a federal non-compliance list, the corporation continued its operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the corporation, as an arm of the tribe, was shielded by tribal sovereign immunity and dismissed claims against it. However, the court allowed claims for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials in their official capacities to proceed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted such relief under the PACT Act. The court also denied the officials’ claims of qualified immunity for personal capacity claims, reasoning that qualified immunity did not apply to enforcement actions brought by a state under a federal statute.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the PACT Act does not preclude Ex parte Young actions for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials, as the Act does not limit who may be sued or the types of relief available, nor does it contain a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme to displace Ex parte Young. The court also held that qualified immunity does not shield tribal officials from California’s claims for civil penalties and money damages under the PACT Act. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. DEL ROSA" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the State of Hawai‘i Board of Land and Natural Resources’ (the Board) annual continuation of a revocable water permit issued to Kaua‘i Island Utility Cooperative (KIUC) for the diversion of water from state lands to power hydropower plants. The permit, first issued in 2003, was renewed yearly through 2022. In 2019, the diversion infrastructure was severely damaged, and KIUC ceased using the water for hydropower but continued to maintain the system. Petitioners, two organizations with members asserting native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights, requested contested case hearings in 2020 and 2021, arguing that the continued diversion and disrepair of the system harmed their rights and the environment. The Board denied these requests and continued the permit.Petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Environmental Court), challenging the denial of contested case hearings, the permit’s continuation, and alleging violations of the Board’s public trust duties. While the appeal was pending, the permit expired at the end of 2022. The Environmental Court found that Petitioners had protected property interests under the Hawai‘i Constitution, that their due process rights were violated by the denial of contested case hearings, and that the Board’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law prevented meaningful review. The court vacated and reversed the Board’s 2021 and 2022 permit continuations.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the Environmental Court’s decision, holding that Petitioners had standing under the right to a clean and healthful environment, but that the case was moot and no exceptions applied. The ICA also found no due process violation and concluded the Environmental Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing the merits of the permit continuations.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that exceptions to mootness applied, Petitioners had standing based on injury to traditional and customary rights, and that contested case hearings were required to protect their due process rights. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. View "Kia'i Wai o Wai'ale'ale v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

After the birth of a child who qualified as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) in Alaska took emergency custody due to the mother’s substance use during pregnancy. Initially, no relatives were available for placement, so the child was placed with a non-relative foster parent. Nearly two and a half years later, the mother requested that the child be placed with his great-grandmother. OCS denied this request, citing unsafe conditions in the great-grandmother’s home, including excessive clutter that posed safety risks. The great-grandmother made some improvements but did not sufficiently address the concerns. OCS also expressed doubts about her judgment and ability to protect the child, referencing past incidents involving other family members.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, held a placement review hearing after the great-grandmother requested judicial review of OCS’s denial. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that OCS did not abuse its discretion in denying the placement, determining that the great-grandmother’s home remained unsuitable and that her past actions raised concerns about her ability to prioritize the child’s needs. The court also concluded that OCS was not required to provide the great-grandmother with reasonable efforts to make her home suitable, as she was not the child’s parent or guardian.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether ICWA required OCS to demonstrate “active efforts” to assist the great-grandmother in overcoming obstacles to placement. The court held that ICWA’s active efforts requirement applies to preserving or reunifying the family unit with a parent or Indian custodian, not to extended family members seeking placement. Therefore, OCS was not required to provide active efforts to the great-grandmother in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding OCS’s denial of placement. View "Betsy F. v. State" on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Members of the Crow Tribe who own trust allotments on the Crow Reservation challenged the loss of their historic water rights following the ratification of the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact and the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act. The Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 2010, codified a negotiated agreement among the Crow Tribe, the state of Montana, and the United States, which defined tribal water rights and provided substantial federal funding for water infrastructure. In exchange, the Tribe and allottees agreed to waive all other water rights claims. The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a Statement of Findings certifying that certain conditions were met, which would trigger the waiver of prior water rights.After the Secretary published the Statement of Findings in June 2016—following a deadline extension agreed to by the Tribal Chairman and the Secretary—several allottees filed suit nearly six years later. They argued that the extension was invalid because, under the Crow Constitution, only the Tribal General Council or Legislature could authorize such an agreement. They also alleged that the Secretary’s action exceeded statutory authority, breached trust obligations, and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Secretary reasonably relied on the Tribal Chairman’s authority to extend the deadline. The court further held that the Settlement Act created specific trust duties, but the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any breach. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for takings, due process, and equal protection failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hill v. DOI" on Justia Law

A consumer lender, GreatPlains Finance, LLC, owned by the Fort Belknap Indian Community, a federally recognized tribe, was sued by Rashonna Ransom for allegedly violating New Jersey consumer-protection laws. Ransom had taken out two high-interest loans from GreatPlains and claimed the lender broke several laws. GreatPlains argued it was protected by tribal sovereign immunity, as it was created by the tribe to generate revenue and was managed by a tribally owned corporation, Island Mountain Development Group.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied GreatPlains' motion to dismiss, ruling that the lender was not an arm of the tribe and thus not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court based its decision partly on the control exerted by a non-tribal private-equity fund, Newport Funding, which had significant influence over GreatPlains' operations due to a loan agreement. GreatPlains' subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and applied a multi-factor test to determine whether GreatPlains was an arm of the tribe. The court considered factors such as the method of incorporation, the entity's purpose, tribal control, the tribe's intent to confer immunity, and the financial relationship between the tribe and the entity. The court found that while GreatPlains was created under tribal law and intended to benefit the tribe, the financial relationship was crucial. GreatPlains had not shown that a judgment against it would impact the tribe's finances, as it had not returned profits to the tribe. Consequently, the Third Circuit held that GreatPlains was not an arm of the tribe and lacked sovereign immunity, affirming the District Court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. View "Ransom v. GreatPlains Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

The Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, a federally recognized tribe, operates several substance-abuse health programs funded by the federal government. To support these programs, the Tribe built the Obaashiing Chemical Health Treatment Center, costing $5.8 million, financed through a $4.95 million loan from the Department of Agriculture and $850,000 of the Tribe's own funds. The Tribe sought compensation from the Indian Health Service (IHS) for both the facility's depreciation and the loan payments under a § 105(l) lease.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The Government had compensated the Tribe for depreciation in 2020 and 2021 and for loan payments in 2022 but refused to compensate for both costs each year, citing 25 C.F.R. § 900.70, which prohibits duplicative compensation. The district court upheld the Government's decision, agreeing that compensating for both depreciation and loan payments would be duplicative.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government correctly declined to compensate the Tribe for both depreciation and loan payments, as doing so would result in duplicative compensation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the 2022 decision but reversed the judgment for 2020 and 2021. The court instructed the district court to vacate the Government's decision for those years and remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings, allowing the Government to apply its anti-duplication rationale consistently across all years. View "Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. HHS" on Justia Law

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres, members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, believe that certain religious services must be conducted at a specific site within Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, Texas. The City of San Antonio planned improvements to the park, including tree removal and bird deterrence, which Perez and Torres argued would destroy their sacred worship space. They sued the City, claiming violations of their religious rights under the First Amendment, the Texas Constitution, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and a new clause in the Texas Constitution that prohibits limiting religious services.The federal district court granted limited relief, allowing the Church access for certain ceremonies but did not enjoin the City's improvement plans. Perez appealed, and the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the district court's decision but later withdrew its opinion and certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding the scope and force of the new Texas Religious Services Clause.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Texas Religious Services Clause imposes a categorical bar on governmental limitations of religious services, regardless of the government's interest in the limitation. However, the Court also concluded that the scope of the clause is not unlimited and does not extend to the government's preservation and management of publicly owned lands. The Court emphasized that the clause does not require the government to provide or maintain natural elements necessary for religious services on public property. The case was remanded to the federal courts for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "PEREZ v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law