Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between two federally recognized Indian tribes, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, over the excavation and development of a burial site known as Hickory Ground in Wetumpka, Alabama. The Muscogee Nation claims that the site is sacred and historically significant, containing graves and ceremonial grounds. The Poarch Band, which purchased the site in 1980 and later had it held in trust by the United States, excavated the site with Auburn University and announced plans to develop a hotel and casino on it. The Muscogee Nation sued to stop the development and restore the site.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama dismissed the Muscogee Nation's complaint, ruling that the Poarch Band and its officials enjoyed sovereign immunity. The court also found that the Poarch officials were immune under an exception to Ex parte Young for claims that are the functional equivalent of a quiet title action and implicate special sovereignty interests. The district court did not analyze the claims individually but dismissed them collectively, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by not analyzing the Poarch officials' sovereign immunity on a claim-by-claim basis. The appellate court emphasized that each claim must be considered separately to determine whether it is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action and whether it implicates special sovereignty interests. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to allow the Muscogee Nation to amend its complaint and to analyze the claims individually. The appellate court also rejected the argument that the Supreme Court had abrogated the Coeur d’Alene exception to Ex parte Young, affirming that it remains a narrow but valid exception. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Rollin" on Justia Law

In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted David DeQuattro, an architect, and Cedric Cromwell, Chairman of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council and President of the Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority. They were charged with various federal offenses, including bribery and extortion, related to Cromwell allegedly soliciting and DeQuattro allegedly providing checks and other items of value to protect a contract between DeQuattro's firm and the Gaming Authority for building a casino on tribal land.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a jury trial where DeQuattro was convicted of one count of federal-program bribery, and Cromwell was convicted of two counts of federal-program bribery and multiple counts of Hobbs Act extortion. However, the District Court later entered a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act-related counts, determining that the Hobbs Act did not clearly abrogate tribal immunity. Both defendants appealed their § 666 convictions, and the government cross-appealed the judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed both the § 666 convictions and the judgment of acquittal. The court found that the evidence did not suffice to show that the RGB contract was "business" of the Tribe, as required under § 666, because the Gaming Authority, which entered the contract, was a separate legal entity from the Tribe and received almost all its funding from a third party. The court also reversed the District Court's judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act convictions, holding that tribal officials do not enjoy immunity from federal criminal prosecution and that the evidence was sufficient to show Cromwell's intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Dequattro" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of an incarcerated father, Anton K., to his two daughters, Allie and Melissa, who are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the children from their parents' home due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Anton was later incarcerated on charges of physical and sexual assault against the children's mother, Keri K., and remained in custody throughout the proceedings.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially found probable cause to believe the children were in need of aid and that OCS had made active efforts to avoid removing them. OCS developed case plans for both parents and facilitated some initial visitation. However, after Anton's incarceration, OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide rehabilitative services were limited, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions and miscommunications with the Department of Corrections (DOC). OCS continued to work with Keri and the children's Tribe, eventually placing the children with maternal relatives after efforts to place them with paternal relatives failed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order terminating Anton's parental rights. The court held that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, considering the entirety of its efforts, including those directed at Keri and the children's extended family. The court acknowledged the significant gaps in OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide services to Anton while incarcerated but concluded that the overall efforts, including those to reunify the children with Keri and place them with relatives, were sufficient under ICWA. View "Anton K. v. State" on Justia Law

Two tribal companies, Rock River Manufacturing, Inc. and HCI Distribution, Inc., challenged Nebraska's enforcement of its escrow and bond requirements for cigarette sales. These requirements stem from a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that mandates tobacco manufacturers either join the MSA or place money in escrow based on cigarette sales. The companies argued that the Indian Commerce Clause prevents Nebraska from enforcing these requirements on cigarettes sold within Indian country.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted partial summary judgment, enjoining Nebraska from enforcing the escrow and bond requirements for cigarettes sold on the Winnebago Tribe's reservation but not for those sold on the Omaha Tribe's reservation. Nebraska appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Nebraska's escrow and bond requirements could be enforced for cigarette sales to nonmembers on the Winnebago Reservation but not for sales to tribal members. The court reasoned that the state's interest in public health and fiscal soundness outweighed the tribal and federal interests for sales to nonmembers. However, for sales to tribal members, the tribe's sovereignty and self-governance interests prevailed. The court reversed the district court's decision in part and remanded with instructions to tailor the injunction, enjoining Nebraska from enforcing the escrow and bond requirements for cigarettes sold on the Winnebago Reservation to tribal members. View "HCI Distribution, Inc. v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

The case involves the San Carlos Apache Tribe's challenge to the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality's (ADEQ) issuance of a 2017 Permit Renewal to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC (Resolution) for the discharge of water from a copper mine. The Tribe argued that the construction of a new mine shaft (Shaft 10) and other new features at the mine constituted a "new source" under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which would subject the mine to more stringent regulations.Previously, an administrative law judge (ALJ) had determined that ADEQ should have analyzed whether Shaft 10 and the other new features were a "new source" under the CWA before issuing the permit. The Arizona Water Quality Appeals Board remanded the matter to ADEQ, which concluded that Shaft 10 and the new features were "existing sources" under the CWA. The Board affirmed ADEQ's issuance of the 2017 Permit Renewal. The Tribe appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board's decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Shaft 10 was a "new source" under the CWA.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona disagreed with the court of appeals. The court applied a three-step test to determine whether a construction is a "new source" under the CWA. The court found that Shaft 10 was not a "new source" under the CWA because it was integrated with existing infrastructure at the mine and engaged in the same general type of activity as the existing source. The court also found that Shaft 10 did not have a new source performance standard "independently applicable" to it. Therefore, the court concluded that ADEQ acted within its discretion by issuing the 2017 Permit Renewal to Resolution. The court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE v STATE" on Justia Law

This case, decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, involved a dispute between the Governor of Oklahoma and the state's legislative leaders. The Governor sought a declaration that the legislative leaders did not have the authority to pass two bills related to Tribal compacts on behalf of the state.The case has its roots in previous US Supreme Court decisions that allowed Oklahoma to tax tobacco products sold on Indian lands to non-tribal members and to enter into agreements with tribal nations regarding these taxes. Following these decisions, Oklahoma's governor negotiated and entered into compacts with tribal nations regarding excise taxes on tobacco products and motor vehicle licensing and registration fees.The current dispute revolves around compacts negotiated in 2013. The Governor argued that the legislature lacked the authority to pass two bills extending the expiration of these compacts, alleging that the bills were the product of an unlawful concurrent special legislative session, that they violated the separation of powers by exercising powers that belong to the Executive branch, and that they contradicted his exclusive authority to negotiate state-tribal compacts.The court held that the legislature had the constitutional authority to consider the bills during a concurrent special session, and that the legislation did not exceed the call of the special session. The court also held that the Governor's authority to negotiate state-tribal compacts is statutory, not constitutional, and that the passage of the bills was not an infringement on the Governor's statutory authority to negotiate and enter into state-tribal compacts. Therefore, the court denied the Governor's request for declaratory relief. View "Stitt v. Treat" on Justia Law

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation (MHA), an Indian nation of three affiliated tribes, appealed the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approval of eight applications for oil drilling by the Slawson Exploration Company, Inc. next to Lake Sakakawea, MHA's sole source of drinking water. MHA challenged the approvals under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that BLM's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious due to an insufficient record and by precluding MHA from further developing the record about the threat the project posed to MHA's health and welfare.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to BLM and Slawson, dismissing the case with prejudice. The court found that BLM had engaged in reasoned decision-making and had evaluated all relevant factors. It noted that the agency placed the responsibility on Slawson to comply with tribal law without impeding MHA's ability as a sovereign to enforce its laws. The court also found that BLM's decision not to evaluate tribal law did not impact tribal sovereignty. The court concluded that MHA's jurisdiction over Slawson's project was not a relevant factor to the approvals and therefore further development of the record was not required.Furthermore, the court found that MHA was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as there was no dispute of material fact and MHA had adequate opportunities to submit evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that MHA had received all process required by the Constitution, laws, and agency regulation. View "Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara Nation v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

In the juvenile dependency case involving P.H., Jr., the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. This case revolved around the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and whether the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) and the juvenile court were obligated to formally notify certain tribes of the proceedings.The minor, P.H., Jr., lived with his parents, P.H. (Father) and A.R. (Mother), when the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging that the minor was at substantial risk due to physical abuse by the mother, the father's failure to protect the minor, and unsanitary living conditions. The parents filed ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status forms indicating possible affiliation with federally recognized Indian tribes.The appellate court held that no formal ICWA notice was required in this case because none of the statements by the minor’s parents or other family members provided a reason to know he was an Indian child for purposes of the relevant statutes. The ICWA and related California law define an "Indian child" as a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. The court found that at most, the statements by the parents and other family members suggested that the minor might have some Indian ancestry, but tribal ancestry alone is not sufficient to trigger the formal notice requirement. The court affirmed the lower court's jurisdiction and disposition orders. View "In re P.H." on Justia Law

In this case, the Sitka Tribe of Alaska challenged the State of Alaska's management of a commercial fishery, arguing that it harmed a subsistence fishery. The tribe argued that the state violated the subsistence priority statute and the common use and sustained yield clauses in the Alaska Constitution. The tribe also claimed that the state was misinterpreting a regulation controlling the fishery and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from managing the fishery according to that interpretation during the upcoming season. The superior court denied the preliminary injunction.The tribe eventually won on its statutory and regulatory claim, but the superior court denied its constitutional claim and its request for attorney’s fees. The tribe appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decisions. It held that the hard look doctrine, requiring agencies to consider all relevant information, already existed and there was no need to create a constitutional requirement not in the plain language of Article VIII, Section 4 of the Alaska Constitution. The court also declined to review the tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction under the public interest exception, as the issue was moot and did not justify application of the public interest exception. Lastly, the court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award attorney’s fees as the tribe had not shown that the superior court's decision was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or stemmed from an improper motive. View "Sitka Tribe of Alaska v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska dealt with an appeal against the termination of parental rights of two parents, Elena F. and Ronan F., by the State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had removed the two Indian children from their parents' home due to reported domestic violence and later terminated both parents' rights after two years. The parents appealed, arguing that OCS failed to make active efforts to reunify the family.The court found that the OCS made active efforts to reunify Elena with her children even in light of her serious mental illness, substance abuse, and her increasingly violent threats and behavior. As such, the court affirmed the termination of Elena's parental rights.However, the court found that the OCS did not make active efforts to reunify Ronan with his children. The court noted that there was no evidence that two out of three caseworkers assigned to Ronan made any efforts toward his reunification with his children. Therefore, the court reversed the termination of Ronan's parental rights. View "Ronan F. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law