Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The federally recognized Indian Tribe is a successor to an 1864 Treaty between the United States and the Chippewa Indians, including an agreement by the United States to set aside property in Isabella County, Michigan as a reservation. The Treaty did not mention application of federal regulations to members of the Tribe or to the Tribe itself. The property reserved for the “exclusive use, ownership, and occupancy” of the Tribe became the Isabella Reservation. The Tribe has over 3,000 members, and is governed by an elected council. In 1993, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Tribe and the state entered a compact, approved by the United States, allowing the Tribe to conduct gaming on the Isabella reservation. The Tribe opened the Casino; enacted a gaming code with licensing criteria for employees; and created a regulatory body. The council hires all Casino management-level employees, approves contracts, and decides how to distribute revenue. Of the Casino’s 3,000 employees, 7% are Tribe members, as are 30% of management-level employees. The Casino generates $250 million in gross annual revenues and attracts 20,000 customers per year, many of whom are not Tribe members. The Tribe discharged Lewis for violating an employee handbook policy that prohibited solicitation by employees, including solicitation related to union activities, on Casino property. The NLRB found that the policy violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and enforced the order, finding that the NLRB has jurisdiction over the Casino’s employment practices. View "Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Pueblo of Jemez brought suit against the United States under the federal common law and the Quiet Title Act (QTA), seeking to quiet its allegedly unextinguished and continuing aboriginal title to the lands of what was known as Valles Caldera National Preserve. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law and dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). It reasoned that sovereign immunity barred the action based on its conclusion that the Jemez Pueblo’s title claim against the United States accrued in 1860 when the United States granted the lands in question to the heirs of Luis Maria Cabeza de Baca (the Baca heirs). The claim thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA), which waived sovereign immunity and provided a cause of action to all Indian claims against the government that accrued before 1946 so long as they were filed within a five year statute of limitations period. Because the claim was not so filed, it became barred by sovereign immunity. The Pueblo appealed, arguing that its aboriginal title was not extinguished by the 1860 grant to the Baca heirs and that its claim for interference with its Indian title did not accrue until 2000, after the United States acquired an interest in the Valles Caldera and began interfering with the Jemez Pueblo’s access to the land. Upon careful consideration of the arguments made on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings: "This appeal is not about whether the Jemez Pueblo holds aboriginal title. On remand, the Jemez Pueblo will have to prove that it had, and still has, aboriginal title to the land at issue in the case. This appeal concerns whether the 1860 Baca grant extinguished the Jemez Pueblo’s alleged aboriginal title to the lands which are the subject of this action. We hold it did not and the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, the 1860 Baca grant itself provided a pre-1946 claim against the United States the Jemez Pueblo could have brought under the ICCA." View "Pueblo of Jemez v. United States" on Justia Law

Nearly forty years ago the Ute Tribe filed a lawsuit alleging that Utah and several local governments were unlawfully trying to displace tribal authority on tribal lands. After a decade of proceedings at the district court and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc. In the decision that followed, "Ute III," the court ruled for the Tribe and rejected Utah's claim that congressional action had diminished three constituent parts of Ute tribal lands (the Uncompahgre Reservation, the Uintah Valley Reservation, and certain national forest areas. When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, that "should have been the end of the matter." State officials chose "to disregard the binding effect of the Tenth Circuit decision in order to attempt to relitigate the boundary dispute in a friendlier forum" by continuing to prosecute tribal members in state court for conduct within the boundaries recognized by Ute III. Utah argued to the Utah Supreme Court that Ute III did not diminish tribal territory did diminish at least a part of the Uintah Valley Reservation. The Court agreed, as did the U.S. Supreme Court (despite having denied certiorari to "Ute III"). The issue of what to do with the mandate of "Ute III" remained: keeping it in place could leave the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hagen to control only cases arising from Utah state courts and not federal district courts. In "Ute V," the Tenth Circuit elected to recall and modify Ute III's mandate. On appeal, Utah sought to diminish parts of the national forest and Uncompahgre lands. "Ute V" rejected this request. The Tribe filed suit in federal court, seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the State and its counties from pursuing criminal prosecutions of Indians in state court for offenses arising in areas declared by Ute III and V to be Indian country, and prohibiting the State and its subdivisions from otherwise relitigating matters settled by those decisions. Before the Tenth Circuit in this matter were three interlocutory (but immediately appealable) collateral orders this latest litigation has spawned: (1) the Tribe's request for a preliminary injunction; (2) the Tribe's claim of immunity from the counterclaims; and (3) Uintah County's claim of immunity from the Tribe's suit. In all three decisions the district court denied the requested relief. But the Tenth Circuit found Tribe's arguments on all three points as "well taken." The district court should have issued a preliminary injunction; the Tribe was shielded by sovereign immunity; and Uintah County was not. View "Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah" on Justia Law

Shields and Wilson are Indians with interests on the Bakken Oil Shale Formation in the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota, allotted to them under the Dawes Act of 1887. Such land is held in trust by the government, but may be leased by allottees. Shields and Wilson leased oil and gas mining rights on their allotments to companies and affiliated individuals who won a sealed bid auction conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs in 2007. After the auction, the women agreed to terms with the winning bidders, the BIA approved the leases, and the winning bidders sold them for a large profit. Shields and Wilson filed a putative class action, claiming that the government had breached its fiduciary duty by approving the leases for the oil and gas mining rights, and that the bidders aided, abetted, and induced the government to breach that duty. The district court concluded that the United States was a required party which could not be joined, but without which the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience, and dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity for the claims and can decide itself when and where it wants to intervene. View "Two Shields v. Wilkinson." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Benedict Cosentino appealed an order that dismissed his claims against defendants-respondents Stella Fuller, John R. Magee, Jason P. Maldonado, William R. Ramos, and Robert B. Vargas based on the sovereign immunity afforded to Indian tribes and their officials. Cosentino was a table games dealer at an Indian tribal casino and Defendants were the five members of the tribe’s gaming commission responsible for licensing individuals involved in the tribe’s gaming activities and overseeing those activities. Shortly after he began working at the casino, Cosentino observed ongoing criminal activity on the casino floor. Based on his observations, Cosentino became a informant for the California Department of Justice and the information he provided lead to several criminal convictions. Defendants later sought to learn what information Cosentino provided the Department of Justice, but he followed the Department’s instructions and declined to divulge the information. Defendants thereafter revoked his gaming license and the casino terminated his employment because he could not work at the casino without a valid license. Cosentino filed suit claiming Defendants revoked his gaming license without cause and in retaliation for acting as an informant. Defendants specially appeared to make a motion to quash and dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction because Cosentino based all of his claims on Defendants’ official actions as members of the tribe’s gaming commission. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed: "[a]n official’s actions that exceed the scope of his or her authority are not protected. [. . .]Cosentino, however, presented evidence supporting his claim Defendants exceeded the scope of their authority by revoking his license without cause in retaliation against him. Sovereign immunity prevents us from inquiring into the reliability of information Defendants may have relied upon in revoking Cosentino’s license or any other errors they may have made, but it does not prevent inquiry into whether Defendants exceeded their authority by using their official position to intentionally harm Cosentino." View "Cosentino v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Officer Glen Gutierrez, on duty as a full-time salaried police officer of the Pueblo of Pojoaque and also commissioned as a Santa Fe County deputy sheriff, was patrolling a portion of U.S. Highway 84/285 located within the exterior boundary of the Pojoaque Pueblo. Officer Gutierrez observed Jose Loya making a dangerous lane change and pulled Loya over. Once stopped, Officer Gutierrez asked Loya to step out of his vehicle and informed Loya that he was under arrest for reckless driving in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-113 (1987), a state law. Officer Gutierrez placed Loya in the back of his patrol vehicle and transported Loya to the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department for processing. Loya, a non-Indian, was not subject to prosecution for violation of tribal law, so he was transported from the Pueblo to the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center where he was incarcerated. Ultimately, Officer Gutierrez prosecuted Loya for reckless driving in Santa Fe County Magistrate Court. The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on a a county’s legal obligation when a non-Indian, arrested by a tribal officer and prosecuted in state court for state traffic offenses, sues the arresting tribal officer for federal civil rights violations. Specifically, the issue the Court identified in this case was when the county has an obligation under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, to provide that tribal police officer with a legal defense in the federal civil rights action. The district court as well as the Court of Appeals found no such legal duty, in part because it concluded that the tribal officer was not a state public employee as defined in the NMTCA. The Supreme Court held the opposite, finding clear evidence in the text and purpose of the NMTCA requiring the county to defend the tribal officer, duly commissioned to act as a deputy county sheriff, under these circumstances. View "Loya v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450, authorizes self-determination (Title I) contracts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs reviews proposals for the Secretary of the Interior. A proposal not declined within 90 days is deemed approved. In October 2011, the Tribe wrote to the Bureau’s Office of Self Governance (OSG) requesting several million dollars for public safety, attaching a Resolution authorizing submission of a “Title I Compact Request.” OSG replied that it did not have authority to manage a Title I agreement, copying the Bureau’s Office of Justice Services (OJS), as the appropriate contact. OJS asked the Tribe to clarify whether it was seeking a Title I contract or funding under Title IV. The Tribe emailed OJS, regarding availability to meet "regarding the Title 1 request" and sent two follow-up emails, referencing its “Title 1 request.” On February 1, 2012 the Tribe wrote to OJS, stating that “the contract is deemed approved.” OJS responded that the intent of the October letter was unclear and did not meet self-determination contract proposal requirements. The Tribe again asserted deemed approval. A year later, OJS received a letter titled “Claim for performance of Title I justice services contract pursuant to Contract Disputes Act.” OJS again denied receiving a complete proposal. The Civilian Board of Contracting Appeals dismissed a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Tribe has not been awarded a contract, noting a parallel appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. View "Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Shinnecock Indian Nation filed suit to vindicate its rights to land in the Town of Southampton, claiming that 1859 New York legislation allowed thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be wrongfully conveyed to the town. The district court dismissed, holding that laches barred the claims. An appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending. In 2012, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000, alleging that the United States, “acting through the federal court system . . . denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for the unlawful taking of lands” in violation of trust obligations arising under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, and the “federal common law.” The Claims Court dismissed on alternative grounds: that the claims were not ripe because they were predicated upon the district court’s judgment in the prior suit, which was on appeal, or that, even if the claims were ripe, it had no jurisdiction because they did not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The court refused to allow amendment to allege a judicial takings claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the breach of trust claims are not ripe for review, vacated the jurisdiction ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice. View "Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit against the government seeking damages to cover the cost of providing safe drinking water on the northeastern Arizona Hopi Reservation. The reservation’s public water systems rely on groundwater drawn from subsurface layers of water-bearing rock. The Tribe alleges that the systems serving five communities on the eastern portion of the reservation contain unsafe levels of arsenic that exceed the federally allowed maximum. The Tribe alleges the United States funded and provided technical assistance for the construction of many of those wells. The Tribe owns and operates the public water systems serving four of the communities; the Bureau of Indian Affairs owns and operates the system serving the fifth. To invoke the court’s jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act, the Tribe must identify a statute or regulation imposing a specific obligation on the government to provide adequate drinking water that would give rise to a claim for money damages. The Court of Federal Claims concluded that the Tribe failed to do so. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The sources of law relied on by the Tribe do not establish a specific fiduciary obligation on the United States to ensure adequate water quality on the Reservation. View "Hopi Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

Since 1998, Crow Tribal Housing Authority (“Crow Housing”) has received Indian housing block grants made under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). In 2001, HUD discovered that it had overpaid Crow Housing and sought to recover the overpayments through deductions from future grants. The district court concluded that HUD acted under 25 U.S.C. 4161 and 4165 when it sought to recover the overage and that HUD violated the notice and hearing requirements under those sections because it did not provide Crow Housing with a hearing at which these deductions could be contested. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) HUD did not act under section 4161, but its actions did trigger the opportunity for a hearing under section 4165; and (2) because Crow Housing did not request a hearing, HUD did not violate its statutory obligation under section 4165 and did not improperly deprive Crow Housing of a hearing. View "Crow Tribal Housing Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law