Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450, authorizes self-determination (Title I) contracts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs reviews proposals for the Secretary of the Interior. A proposal not declined within 90 days is deemed approved. In October 2011, the Tribe wrote to the Bureau’s Office of Self Governance (OSG) requesting several million dollars for public safety, attaching a Resolution authorizing submission of a “Title I Compact Request.” OSG replied that it did not have authority to manage a Title I agreement, copying the Bureau’s Office of Justice Services (OJS), as the appropriate contact. OJS asked the Tribe to clarify whether it was seeking a Title I contract or funding under Title IV. The Tribe emailed OJS, regarding availability to meet "regarding the Title 1 request" and sent two follow-up emails, referencing its “Title 1 request.” On February 1, 2012 the Tribe wrote to OJS, stating that “the contract is deemed approved.” OJS responded that the intent of the October letter was unclear and did not meet self-determination contract proposal requirements. The Tribe again asserted deemed approval. A year later, OJS received a letter titled “Claim for performance of Title I justice services contract pursuant to Contract Disputes Act.” OJS again denied receiving a complete proposal. The Civilian Board of Contracting Appeals dismissed a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Tribe has not been awarded a contract, noting a parallel appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. View "Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Shinnecock Indian Nation filed suit to vindicate its rights to land in the Town of Southampton, claiming that 1859 New York legislation allowed thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be wrongfully conveyed to the town. The district court dismissed, holding that laches barred the claims. An appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending. In 2012, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000, alleging that the United States, “acting through the federal court system . . . denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for the unlawful taking of lands” in violation of trust obligations arising under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, and the “federal common law.” The Claims Court dismissed on alternative grounds: that the claims were not ripe because they were predicated upon the district court’s judgment in the prior suit, which was on appeal, or that, even if the claims were ripe, it had no jurisdiction because they did not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The court refused to allow amendment to allege a judicial takings claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the breach of trust claims are not ripe for review, vacated the jurisdiction ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice. View "Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit against the government seeking damages to cover the cost of providing safe drinking water on the northeastern Arizona Hopi Reservation. The reservation’s public water systems rely on groundwater drawn from subsurface layers of water-bearing rock. The Tribe alleges that the systems serving five communities on the eastern portion of the reservation contain unsafe levels of arsenic that exceed the federally allowed maximum. The Tribe alleges the United States funded and provided technical assistance for the construction of many of those wells. The Tribe owns and operates the public water systems serving four of the communities; the Bureau of Indian Affairs owns and operates the system serving the fifth. To invoke the court’s jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act, the Tribe must identify a statute or regulation imposing a specific obligation on the government to provide adequate drinking water that would give rise to a claim for money damages. The Court of Federal Claims concluded that the Tribe failed to do so. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The sources of law relied on by the Tribe do not establish a specific fiduciary obligation on the United States to ensure adequate water quality on the Reservation. View "Hopi Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

Since 1998, Crow Tribal Housing Authority (“Crow Housing”) has received Indian housing block grants made under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). In 2001, HUD discovered that it had overpaid Crow Housing and sought to recover the overpayments through deductions from future grants. The district court concluded that HUD acted under 25 U.S.C. 4161 and 4165 when it sought to recover the overage and that HUD violated the notice and hearing requirements under those sections because it did not provide Crow Housing with a hearing at which these deductions could be contested. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) HUD did not act under section 4161, but its actions did trigger the opportunity for a hearing under section 4165; and (2) because Crow Housing did not request a hearing, HUD did not violate its statutory obligation under section 4165 and did not improperly deprive Crow Housing of a hearing. View "Crow Tribal Housing Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for emergency protective services for seven-year-old H.T., alleging drug use by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend. The petition stated that H.T. “may be an Indian Child for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).” The district court granted the motion for emergency protective services. The district court subsequently held a hearing that adjudicated H.T. a youth in need of care. The Department then filed a petition for permanent legal custody and termination of parental rights. The district court held a termination hearing and adopted and approved the termination petition. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements for terminating parental rights to an Indian child. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Mother received fundamentally fair procedures prior to the termination of her parental rights; but (2) because the district court applied the wrong statutory standards in its final order, its judgment is vacated. Remanded for entry of a new order on the issue of whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their request for a declaratory judgment and other relief. Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against defendants-respondents the City of San Diego and the predecessors of Tecolote Investors, LLC. Members of the HOA are sublessees of mobile home park lots subject to a 1979 master lease between the City and Tecolote Investors. Appellant argued that the park site was located on and should have been properly characterized as "Pueblo Lands" within the meaning of the San Diego City Charter (section 219). Section 219 and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleged the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence, Appellant sought decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 did not apply, the face of the pleading failed to state its causes of action, and the Landlord Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis (akin to judgment on the pleadings),the Court of Appeal concluded the record fully supported the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City too. View "Linda Vista Village San Diego HOA v. Tecolote Investors" on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma filed suit against defendants, officials of the Kialegee Tribal Town claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately operate a class III gaming facility on non-Indian lands in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the district court denied the motion. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from constructing or operating the gaming facility on the property at issue. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the State failed to state a valid claim for relief.View "Oklahoma v. Hobia" on Justia Law

Mother and Father (“Parents”) were the parents of twin girls. Mother was a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Tribe”), Father was not a member of any tribe, and the children were either members of, or eligible to be members of, the Tribe. The Dinwiddie Department of Social Services (DDSS) filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (“J&DR court”) denied the petitions. The DDSS appealed. The Tribe and Parents sought to transfer the case to tribal court. The trial court held that good cause existed not to transfer the proceeding to tribal court and denied the motion to transfer. The court then terminated Parents’ parental rights. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the motion to transfer, vacated the award terminating Parents' parental rights, and remanded. In so doing, the court rejected the traditional “best interests of the child” test in favor of a more limited test involving a substantial risk of harm to a child arising from the transfer to a tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded in light of the standards articulated by the court of appeals in Thompson v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Family Servs.View "Dinwiddie Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Nunnally" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians owned and operated a resort and casino on its rancheria lands in Madera County. In 2005, another tribe, the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior asking the department to acquire approximately 305 acres of land in Madera County adjacent to State Route 99 so the North Fork Tribe could develop its own resort and casino there. The land on which the North Fork Tribe wanted to build was approximately 40 miles away from the North Fork Tribe's rancheria lands and approximately 30 miles away from the Picayune Tribe's casino. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, casino gaming on lands acquired for a tribe by the Secretary of the Interior after October 17, 1988, was generally prohibited, subject to certain exceptions. One of those exceptions was if "the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary's determination." The United States Department of the Interior conducted an environmental review of the project proposed by the North Fork Tribe under federal law and issued a final environmental impact statement in 2009. In September 2011, the Secretary of the Interior's delegate notified the Governor of California that the delegate had made the "'two-part determination'" that a gaming establishment on the newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the North Fork Tribe and its members and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, and asked Governor Brown to concur in that determination. Despite requests by the Picayune Tribe and others that he prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) before acting, Governor Brown issued his concurrence in the two-part determination without preparing or considering the preparation of an EIR. The following day, the Governor executed a tribal-state gaming compact with the North Fork Tribe. The Picayune Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief against the Governor and others, asserting that the Governor's concurrence in the two-part determination constituted an "'approval'" of a "'project'" under state law that "must be the subject of the CEQA environmental review process." All of the defendants and the real party in interest demurred. Among other things, the Governor and the real party in interest argued that as a matter of law the Governor is not a "public agency" for CEQA purposes and therefore his concurrence in the two-part determination was not subject to CEQA. The trial court agreed. Accordingly, the court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court was correct in concluding the Governor was not a public agency for CEQA purposes, and therefore did not err in sustaining the demurrers. View "Picayune Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit alleging that the Secretary, acting through the BIA, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702, 706, by determining that the Secretary was not authorized to approve the Tribe's assignments of land to certain of its members. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary. At issue are the interpretation of two federal statutes: 25 U.S.C. 81 and 25 U.S.C. 77. Section 177 acknowledges and guarantees the Indian tribes' right of possession and imposes on the federal government a fiduciary duty to protect the lands covered by the Indian Nonintercourse Act. Section 81 provides that Indian tribes enjoyed the right to possess and occupy lands but not alienate these lands without the federal government's approval. The court concluded that Congressional intent is clear. Section 177 prohibits the grant, lease, or conveyance of lands, or any title thereto from an Indian tribe unless approved by Congress. In this case, Congress has not approved the transactions at issue. Thus, the Secretary properly denied approval of the deeds under Section 81 where such conveyances would violate federal law. The court concluded that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards was not binding. The plain language of Section 81 does not support the Tribe's reading that the deeds may nevertheless be approved by the Secretary under Section 81. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Jewell" on Justia Law