Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Members of the Crow Tribe who own trust allotments on the Crow Reservation challenged the loss of their historic water rights following the ratification of the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact and the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act. The Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 2010, codified a negotiated agreement among the Crow Tribe, the state of Montana, and the United States, which defined tribal water rights and provided substantial federal funding for water infrastructure. In exchange, the Tribe and allottees agreed to waive all other water rights claims. The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a Statement of Findings certifying that certain conditions were met, which would trigger the waiver of prior water rights.After the Secretary published the Statement of Findings in June 2016—following a deadline extension agreed to by the Tribal Chairman and the Secretary—several allottees filed suit nearly six years later. They argued that the extension was invalid because, under the Crow Constitution, only the Tribal General Council or Legislature could authorize such an agreement. They also alleged that the Secretary’s action exceeded statutory authority, breached trust obligations, and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Secretary reasonably relied on the Tribal Chairman’s authority to extend the deadline. The court further held that the Settlement Act created specific trust duties, but the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any breach. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for takings, due process, and equal protection failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hill v. DOI" on Justia Law

A consumer lender, GreatPlains Finance, LLC, owned by the Fort Belknap Indian Community, a federally recognized tribe, was sued by Rashonna Ransom for allegedly violating New Jersey consumer-protection laws. Ransom had taken out two high-interest loans from GreatPlains and claimed the lender broke several laws. GreatPlains argued it was protected by tribal sovereign immunity, as it was created by the tribe to generate revenue and was managed by a tribally owned corporation, Island Mountain Development Group.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied GreatPlains' motion to dismiss, ruling that the lender was not an arm of the tribe and thus not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court based its decision partly on the control exerted by a non-tribal private-equity fund, Newport Funding, which had significant influence over GreatPlains' operations due to a loan agreement. GreatPlains' subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and applied a multi-factor test to determine whether GreatPlains was an arm of the tribe. The court considered factors such as the method of incorporation, the entity's purpose, tribal control, the tribe's intent to confer immunity, and the financial relationship between the tribe and the entity. The court found that while GreatPlains was created under tribal law and intended to benefit the tribe, the financial relationship was crucial. GreatPlains had not shown that a judgment against it would impact the tribe's finances, as it had not returned profits to the tribe. Consequently, the Third Circuit held that GreatPlains was not an arm of the tribe and lacked sovereign immunity, affirming the District Court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. View "Ransom v. GreatPlains Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

The Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, a federally recognized tribe, operates several substance-abuse health programs funded by the federal government. To support these programs, the Tribe built the Obaashiing Chemical Health Treatment Center, costing $5.8 million, financed through a $4.95 million loan from the Department of Agriculture and $850,000 of the Tribe's own funds. The Tribe sought compensation from the Indian Health Service (IHS) for both the facility's depreciation and the loan payments under a § 105(l) lease.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The Government had compensated the Tribe for depreciation in 2020 and 2021 and for loan payments in 2022 but refused to compensate for both costs each year, citing 25 C.F.R. § 900.70, which prohibits duplicative compensation. The district court upheld the Government's decision, agreeing that compensating for both depreciation and loan payments would be duplicative.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government correctly declined to compensate the Tribe for both depreciation and loan payments, as doing so would result in duplicative compensation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the 2022 decision but reversed the judgment for 2020 and 2021. The court instructed the district court to vacate the Government's decision for those years and remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings, allowing the Government to apply its anti-duplication rationale consistently across all years. View "Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. HHS" on Justia Law

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres, members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, believe that certain religious services must be conducted at a specific site within Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, Texas. The City of San Antonio planned improvements to the park, including tree removal and bird deterrence, which Perez and Torres argued would destroy their sacred worship space. They sued the City, claiming violations of their religious rights under the First Amendment, the Texas Constitution, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and a new clause in the Texas Constitution that prohibits limiting religious services.The federal district court granted limited relief, allowing the Church access for certain ceremonies but did not enjoin the City's improvement plans. Perez appealed, and the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the district court's decision but later withdrew its opinion and certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding the scope and force of the new Texas Religious Services Clause.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Texas Religious Services Clause imposes a categorical bar on governmental limitations of religious services, regardless of the government's interest in the limitation. However, the Court also concluded that the scope of the clause is not unlimited and does not extend to the government's preservation and management of publicly owned lands. The Court emphasized that the clause does not require the government to provide or maintain natural elements necessary for religious services on public property. The case was remanded to the federal courts for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "PEREZ v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law

Citizens for a Better Eureka (CBE) filed a petition challenging the City of Eureka's decision to redevelop a city-owned parking lot into affordable housing, claiming the project was improperly exempted from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City Council had adopted a resolution authorizing the reduction or removal of public parking to facilitate the development, citing a Class 12 CEQA exemption for surplus government property sales. CBE argued that the project was unlawfully piecemealed and that the entire redevelopment should be considered under CEQA.The Humboldt County Superior Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the Wiyot Tribe's motion that the Tribe, selected as the developer for the project, was a necessary and indispensable party to the proceedings. The court found that the Tribe could not be joined due to its sovereign immunity, and thus, the case could not proceed without it.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Tribe was indeed a necessary and indispensable party. The court reasoned that the Tribe had significant interests in the project, having invested time and resources into its development. The court also found that any judgment in favor of CBE would prejudice the Tribe by hindering its ability to proceed with the project. Additionally, the court noted that CBE failed to join the Tribe within the statutory period, further justifying the dismissal. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. View "Citizens for a Better Eureka v. City of Eureka" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game (Alaska) challenging the Federal Subsistence Board's (Board) authorization of an emergency subsistence hunt for the Organized Village of Kake (the Tribe) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board allowed the hunt due to significant food supply chain disruptions, permitting the Tribe to harvest two moose and five deer on federal public lands in Alaska. The hunt was conducted by hunters selected by the Tribe, and the yield was distributed to both tribal and non-tribal residents of Kake.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska initially dismissed Alaska's claims related to the Kake hunt as moot. Alaska appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's claim that the Board lacked authority to authorize the hunt, remanding that specific claim for further proceedings. On remand, the district court ruled that the Board's approval of the hunt did not violate the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) and denied Alaska's request for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment that the Board had the authority under ANILCA to authorize the emergency subsistence hunt. The court held that Section 811(a) of ANILCA provided the Board with the authority to ensure rural residents have reasonable access to subsistence resources on federal lands, which includes the power to authorize emergency hunts. The court also vacated the district court's judgment on Alaska's improper delegation claim, ruling that the district court exceeded its mandate by addressing this claim, and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME V. FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE BOARD" on Justia Law

The case involves the Tohono O’odham Nation, the San Carlos Apache Tribe, Archaeology Southwest, and the Center for Biological Diversity (collectively, "Plaintiffs") who filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management (collectively, "Department"). The Plaintiffs allege that the Department violated the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by issuing two limited notices to proceed (LNTPs) for the construction of a transmission line by SunZia Transmission, LLC, before fulfilling its NHPA obligations. The Plaintiffs claim that the San Pedro Valley, through which the transmission line runs, is a historic property protected under the NHPA.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona allowed SunZia to intervene as a defendant. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and subsequently granted the Department's and SunZia's motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court also denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, deeming it futile. The Plaintiffs then appealed the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order dismissing the action. The Ninth Circuit held that the LNTPs constituted final agency actions because they represented the Department's final decision that the requirements for a Programmatic Agreement (PA) had been satisfied, allowing SunZia to begin construction. The court found that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the Department violated the PA by failing to consult with the Plaintiffs on a historic property treatment plan that would evaluate whether the San Pedro Valley should be designated as a historic property. The court inferred that proper consultation would have likely resulted in the Valley being designated as such. Consequently, the Plaintiffs also plausibly alleged that the Department violated the PA by authorizing construction before properly identifying all historic properties affected by the project and ensuring that any adverse effects would be avoided, minimized, or mitigated. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" on Justia Law

Johnnie Fuson, a registered member of the Navajo Tribe, was forced to relocate from his family’s home following the partition of the Joint Use Area (JUA) under the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act. Fuson applied for relocation assistance benefits, but his application was denied by the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR). On appeal, the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) also deemed Fuson ineligible for benefits, citing adverse credibility findings and determining that Fuson was not a resident of the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) on the relevant date.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IHO’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor of ONHIR and denying Fuson’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the IHO’s adverse credibility findings and that the IHO’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the IHO’s adverse credibility findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The IHO had found every witness not credible due to inconsistencies with other witnesses, creating a circular reasoning that guaranteed adverse credibility findings for all witnesses. The Ninth Circuit also found that the IHO’s finding that Fuson was not a resident of the HPL homesite was arbitrary and capricious. The IHO relied almost exclusively on the Bureau of Indian Affairs enumeration roster without adequately considering contrary testimony about the roster’s reliability.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FUSON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

In 2015, bipartisan legislation repealed the U.S. ban on crude oil exports, leading to expanded efforts to export U.S. crude oil. This case involves an administrative challenge to a construction permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for expanding operations at the Moda Ingleside Crude Export Terminal in Texas. The expansion includes constructing new docks and a turning basin, requiring dredging and discharging material into U.S. waters. The Corps conducted an Environmental Assessment (EA) and approved the permit. Plaintiffs, including Native American tribes and an environmental association, sued to invalidate the permit, claiming violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied summary judgment for the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment for the Corps, concluding that the Corps had adequately studied the environmental impacts of the proposed expansion. The court found that plaintiffs had associational standing but had waived certain claims by not raising them in summary judgment briefing. The court also found that plaintiffs forfeited claims related to increased vessel traffic by not raising them during the notice-and-comment period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its environmental impacts analysis, including its assessment of cumulative impacts and climate change. The court found that the Corps's EA was sufficient and that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required. The court also agreed that plaintiffs had forfeited arguments related to increased vessel traffic. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Indigenous Peoples v. U.S. Army" on Justia Law