Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After the Secretary denied Sandy Lake's request to hold an election so that Sandy Lake's members could vote on a proposed constitution, Sandy Lake filed suit seeking an order directing the Secretary to call an election. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Sandy Lake's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Sandy Lake then filed a second lawsuit without appealing the first lawsuit or exhausting its administrative remedies and subsequently appealed the adverse summary judgment on its claims alleged in the second lawsuit. The court affirmed the district court's original determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that issue preclusion barred the court from reaching the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the case, modifying it to be without prejudice. View "Sandy Lake Band v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

The Tribe sought to set aside a decision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) directing the Tribe to place the names of certain disenrolled individuals back on its membership roll. The BIA issued its decision pursuant to regulations providing for administrative review of adverse tribal enrollment actions where, as the BIA believed in this case, a tribe had authorized such review. The court concluded that the Tribe's governing documents did not grant the authority to the BIA to review appeals from disenrollment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Cahto Tribe v. Dutschke" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed a complaint regarding the government's management of the Central and Southern Florida Project for Flood Control in the Everglades. The gist of the four-count complaint the Tribe filed was that the project diverted excessive flood waters over tribal lands. The district court dismissed three of the complaint's counts for failure to state a claim for relief and the fourth on summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Count I because the complaint contained nothing to support Count I's allegation that the Corps had an obligation to protect and not interfere with the Tribe's rights; the district court properly dismissed Count II because it contained no allegation of the process the Tribe claimed was due, much less that it was inadequate; the district court properly dismissed Count III because it failed for the same reasons the court found Count I insufficient to state a claim; and the district court properly dismissed Count IV because its allegations were vague and ambiguous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of FL v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Agreeing with the Board, the district court ruled that Quantum's 1996 Management Agreement with the Pueblo was null and void for lack of approval by the Secretary as required by 25 U.S.C. 81, and that it was incapable of being validated by the 2000 amendment to section 81, the application of which would be impermissibly retroactive. Applying Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the court concluded that Congress made no clear statement that it intended the 2000 amendment to apply retroactively. The court also concluded that, because the 1996 Agreement required Secretarial approval that was never obtained and the parties agreed that the Agreement would be valid without Secretarial approval under section 81 as amended, the application of the new law would give life to a null and void agreement, thereby attaching new legal consequences to it. Although the Pueblo may have voluntarily undertaken the stated duties and liabilities under the Agreement, such an agreement was null and void without Secretarial approval before 2000. Since the Secretary never approved the Agreement, any legislative validation of the duties or liabilities attached to it was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Quantum Entertainment Ltd. v. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

While driving his vehicle within the boundaries of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation's (Nation) reservation, Appellant, an enrolled member of the nation, was arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) subsequently suspended Appellant's Kansas driver's license based on Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567a, which prohibits any person less than twenty-one years of age from operating a vehicle in the state with a blood alcohol content of .02 or greater. Upon judicial review of the suspension order, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of KDR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over any civil matter arising from the incident, and the KDR acted outside the scope of its authority in this case. Remanded with directions to order the reinstatement of Appellant's driver's license. View "Rodewald v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the adjudication of water rights in the Yakima River Basin. The parties brought various challenges to the conditional final order of the trial court determining their water rights. The Court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court for direct appeal. Upon review, the Court reversed the trial court's decision concerning the quantification of irrigable land on the Yakama reservation, and reversed the trial court's determinations regarding the Nation's right to store water. The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusions regarding the rights of nontribal claimants to excess water, but reversed the application of the "future development excuse" under RCW 90.14.140(2)(c) for nonuse of a water right. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of several individual water rights claims. View "In re Rights to Waters of Yakima River Drainage Basin (Acquavella)" on Justia Law

The Muwekma petitioned the court to order Interior to recognize it as an Indian tribe. The court agreed with the district court that Interior's Supplemental Explanation adequately explained why Muwekma was not similarly situated to the Ione Band of Miwok or the Lower Lake Rancheria of California and, accordingly, Muwekma's equal protection claim failed; Muwekma's termination claim, although not barred by the statute of limitations, failed on the merits because Interior did not terminate Muwekma's recognition; because Muwekma had no cognizable property interest, its claim under 5 U.S.C. 554(d) failed; and Interior's Final Determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Interior. View "Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Amanda Addison and Melody St. Clair were tried for embezzling or converting funds from Northern Arapahoe Tribe’s Department of Social Services (DSS). On the third day of trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial as to St. Clair only and excluded her from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial. Addison was convicted. She appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the exclusion of St. Clair violated Addison’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; and, (2) the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate criminal intent. Because the district court had a substantial reason for excluding St. Clair, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The evidence was sufficient to prove her knowing and intentional taking of DSS funds. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Addison" on Justia Law

Appellant Fredrick Williams appealed the superior court's decision affirming the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's ruling that a house was not exempt from Ketchikan Gateway Borough taxation. In 2002 Williams received a grant to rebuild his house from the Bureau of Indian Affairs Housing Improvement Program. Because Williams has owned the home for ten years, the repayment amount annually decreased by ten percent of the original amount, resulting in no repayment for a transfer occurring 20 years or more after Williams received the grant. Williams executed a deed of trust securing the federal government's right to repayment under the grant. Williams claimed that under the grant and the deed of trust, "[t]he federal government own[ed] . . . the $115,000 it took to build the home," and that Williams was therefore exempt from paying property taxes on it. On appeal, the superior court rejected this argument, upholding the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's view that the deed of trust securing the grant did not divest Williams of the ownership interest in his real property. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusion and affirmed and adopted its decision. View "Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

A group of Freedmen, former Cherokee slaves and their descendants, sued in district court claiming that the Cherokee Nation had violated the 1866 Treaty that guaranteed the Freedmen all the rights of native Cherokees. To avoid the sovereign immunity bar, the Freedmen sued not only the Cherokee Nation itself but also the relevant executive official, the Principal Chief, in his official capacity. Applying the precedents that permitted suits against government officials in their official capacities, the court concluded that this suit could proceed against the Principal Chief in his official capacity, without the Cherokee Nation itself as a party. The Cherokee Nation and the Principal Chief in his official capacity were one and the same in the Ex Parte Young suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. As a result, the Principal Chief could adequately represent the Cherokee Nation in this suit, meaning that the Cherokee Nation itself was not a required party for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vann, et al v. DOI, et al" on Justia Law