Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Automotive United Trades Organization brought suit against Washington State and its officials, challenging the constitutionality of disbursements the State gives to Indian tribes under fuel tax compacts. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to join indispensable parties, namely the Indian tribes party to the agreements, under CR 19. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the tribes were not indispensable parties under CR 19(b). Although the tribes are necessary parties under CR 19(a) whose joinder was not feasible due to tribal sovereign immunity, equitable considerations allowed this action to proceed in their absence. View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Paulette Kaleikini is a native Hawaiian who engages in traditional and customary practices, including the protection of native Hawaiian burial remains. Kaleikini brought suit against the City and County of Honolulu and the State of Hawai'i, challenging the approval of the Honolulu High-Capacity Transit Corridor Project. Kaleikini argued that the rail project should be enjoined until an archaeological inventory survey, which identifies and documents archaeological historic properties and burial sites in the project area, is completed for all four phases of the project. The City moved to dismiss Kaleikini’s complaint and/or for summary judgment, and the State joined in the motion. The City acknowledged that an archaeological inventory survey was required for each phase of the rail project. The City and State contended that as long as an archeological inventory survey had been completed for a particular phase, construction could begin on that part of the project even if the surveys for the other phases had not yet been completed. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the City and State on all of Kaleikini’s claims. Kaleikini appealed the circuit court’s final judgment in favor of the City and the State. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the City and State failed to comply with State law pertaining to the surveys and its implementing rules when it concurred in the rail project prior to the completion of the required archaeological inventory survey for the entire project. The City similarly failed to comply with State law and its implementing rules by granting a special management area permit for the rail project and by commencing construction prior to the completion of the historic preservation review process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment on Counts 1 through 4 of Kaleikini’s complaint and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings on those counts. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all other respects. View "Kalekini v. Yoshioka" on Justia Law

Several Alaskan native villages (Villages) claimed they possessed non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) in the Gulf of Alaska. The Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations limiting access to the halibut and sablefish fisheries. The Villages claimed that the regulations failed to account for the Villages' non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights, without Congress's consent in violation of the federal common law and the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. The district court dismissed their complaint. The Supreme Court remanded to the district court for the purpose of determining what aboriginal rights, if any, the Villages had on the OCS. The district court held that the Villages had no nonexclusive right to hunt and fish in the OCS. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the uncontested factual findings of the district court, the court did not err in concluding that the Villages failed to establish an entitlement to non-exclusive aboriginal rights on the OCS; and (2) because the Villages had not established aboriginal rights on the OCS, the Court had no occasion to consider whether there was a conflict with the federal paramountcy doctrine or whether the Secretary's actions violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act.

Petitioner Tina Marie Somerlott appealed a district court's dismissal of her claims against Cherokee Nation Distributors, Inc and CND, LLC ("CND") for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioner brought federal employment discrimination claims against CND, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. After allowing discovery by both parties, the district court concluded CND was immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and, therefore, dismissed Petitioner's complaint in its entirety. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the court's reasoning and affirmed its decision.

Petitioner Frances Leon Harvey's appeal before the Tenth Circuit stemmed from a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")lawsuit that he brought against the United States government for complications arising from an injury to his hand. Petitioner claimed that government employees injured him by: (1) misdiagnosing and delaying treatment of his hand fracture; and (2) performing negligent surgery on his hand. He argued that the district court erred in holding the misdiagnosis/delay-in treatment claim to be time-barred and in granting summary judgment on the negligent surgery claim for failure to produce expert evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner argued because Navajo law was the substantive law of this case, the district court failed to follow Navajo law when it dismissed his negligent surgery claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Petitioner's motion for default judgment. Although the Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the misdiagnosis claim was time-barred, the Court concluded that Petitioner's failure to provide expert evidence doomed both his misdiagnosis and surgical malpractice claims. Finally, although the parties disagreed about whether Arizona law or Navajo law applied, the Court did not reach the issue because the outcome would have been the same under both.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants in this case challenged the Federal Highway Administration's selection of a route for the proposed South Lawrence Trafficway project in the city of Lawrence, Kansas. Appellants claimed two aspects of the Highway Administration's decision rendered it arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Appellants claimed the environmental impact statement supporting the decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act and Department of Transportation noise analysis regulations. Furthermore, Appellants claimed the Highway Administration's analysis under the section of the Department of Transportation Act that protects historic sites, including property associated with Haskell Indian Nations University, improperly concluded there was no "feasible and prudent alternative" to the selected route. Finding "no fatal flaws" in the environmental impact statement or the prudence analysis, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Furry, as personal representative of the estate of his daughter Tatiana Furry, appealed a district court’s order granting the Miccosukee Tribe’s motion to dismiss his complaint. He complained that the Miccosukee Tribe violated 18 U.S.C. 1161 and Florida’s dram shop law by knowingly serving excessive amounts of alcohol to his daughter, who then got in her car, drove off while intoxicated, and ended up in a fatal head-on collision with another vehicle on a highway just outside Miami. The Miccosukee Tribe moved to dismiss the complaint on the jurisdictional ground that it was immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. In its order granting the tribe's motion to dismiss, the district court determined that tribal sovereign immunity barred it from entertaining the suit. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit agreed: "The Supreme Court has made clear that a suit against an Indian tribe is barred unless the tribe has clearly waived its immunity or Congress has expressly and unequivocally abrogated that immunity. [Plaintiff argued] that both of these exceptions have been met here, but these arguments are ultimately without merit."

An employee of a tribal enterprise sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court. Petitioner John A. Waltrip fell on a patch of ice while working as a surveillance supervisor at a casino and injured primarily his right shoulder. Petitioner initially obtained treatment from his personal physician but Tribal First, the employer Osage Million Dollar Elm Casino's claim administrator, sent him to an orthopedic specialist who recommended surgery in 2009. Petitioner filed a claim in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court on July 17, 2009, seeking medical treatment and temporary total disability. The Casino and Insurer Hudson Insurance Company asserted that court lacked jurisdiction based on the tribe's sovereign immunity. A hearing was held solely on the jurisdictional issue; the Workers' Compensation Court denied jurisdiction and dismissed the claim holding that the tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity and that the provisions of the tribe's workers' compensation policy did not subject the insurance company to liability for claims in state court. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari review. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity and was not therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court; and (2) the workers' compensation insurer did not enjoy the tribe's immunity and was estopped to deny coverage under a policy for which it accepted premiums computed in part on the employee's earnings.

M.A.S. (Father) appealed the termination of his parental rights to P.S.E. At the time P.S.E. was removed from Mother’s care, Father lived in California and did not know he had a child in South Dakota. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to these proceedings because P.S.E. was an enrolled member of the Fort Peck Sioux Tribe. Father argued on appeal that the Department of Social Services (DSS) did not make active efforts to reunite the Indian family and that any efforts made were successful. Because the evidence presented shows that DSS provided active and reasonable, though abbreviated, efforts to place P.S.E. with Father, and those efforts were unsuccessful, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Turner, a member of the Kiowa Tribe, was charged by Oklahoma state authorities with instituting or encouraging cockfighting. The state court rejected his argument that the crime took place in Indian Country. While state prosecution was ongoing, Plaintiff requested that the Court of Indian Offenses for the Kiowa Tribe enjoin the state proceeding. That court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff was subsequently convicted in state court. Plaintiff then sued the judges of the Court of Indian Offenses in federal district court. The district court denied relief, concluding that the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity as tribal officials. After its review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing because he could not establish redressability. Given the procedural posture of this case, it was unclear what, if any, action the district court could have taken to undermine Plaintiff's conviction.