Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

"Jade" is the biological daughter of Roy and Sheila. Jade is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Between 1998 and 2007, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) received at least 12 reports of drug abuse and child neglect in the family. Before Jade's birth in September 2004, the couple's older children were transferred to OCS custody for two years. Roy and Sheila attempted to complete drug treatment programs but were unsuccessful. Sheila relapsed while pregnant with Jade; her discharge report from the treatment program indicated she tested positive for cocaine in August 2005 and stopped attending treatment sessions or contacting drug counselors in October 2005. Roy was discharged for positive drug tests and missing treatment. Since being taken into OCS custody in July 2008, Jade has lived in five separate placements. In its termination order, the superior court found that termination of parental rights was in Jade's best interests and that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Roy contested three of the superior court's findings: that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family; that termination was in Jade's best interests; and that good cause existed to deviate from the ICWA placement preferences. Sheila did not appeal the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the superior court's conclusions with regard to OCS's efforts to keep the family together, and that it was in Jade's best interests to terminate Roy's parental rights.

Petitioner requested that the Secretary of the Interior take into trust on its behalf a tract of land known as the Bradley Property, which petitioner intended to use "for gaming purposes." The Secretary took title to the property and respondent subsequently filed suit under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., asserting that the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 465, did not authorize the Secretary to acquire the property because petitioner was not a federally recognized tribe when the IRA was enacted in 1934. At issue was whether the United States had sovereign immunity from the suit by virtue of the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 86 Stat. 1176, and whether respondent had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary's acquisition. The Court held that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity from respondent's action under the QTA. The Court also held that respondent had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary's acquisition where respondent's interests came within section 465's regulatory ambit.

A father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). He challenged the superior court's findings that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his Indian family, arguing that OCS failed to investigate placement with his extended family members and did not provide him with adequate visitation and remedial services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCS made active efforts, and accordingly affirmed OCS's decision.

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.

The 1868 Laramie Treaty, between tribes of Sioux Indians and the United States, included provisions that: “If bad men among the whites, or among other people subject to the authority of the United States, shall commit any wrong upon the person or property of the Indians, the United States will, upon proof ... proceed at once to cause the offender to be arrested and punished ... and also reimburse the injured person....”´and “If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depredation upon ...anyone ... subject to the authority of the United States ... the Indians ... will ... deliver up the wrong-doer ... the person injured shall be reimbursed ... from the annuities or other moneys due.” In 2008, two members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe were killed on the Pine Ridge Reservation by a non-Sioux, who was driving while intoxicated. The Claims Court dismissed a claim for reimbursement under the treaties. The Federal Circuit vacated. The “bad men” provisions are not limited to persons acting for or on behalf of the U.S.

The Muscogee (Creek) Nation (MCN) sued the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC), three commissioners and the Oklahoma Attorney General (collectively, State), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on numerous claims challenging three Oklahoma statutes that tax and regulate the sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products as a violative of federal law and tribal sovereignty. The OTC and the Attorney General brought motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed MCN's claims against all Defendant's based on the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or alternatively, for failing to state a claim under Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude MCN's suit, but that in its complaint, the Nation failed to state a claim.

Six tribal councils, joined by two other associations, filed an action against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (BBAP, the Plan) was unlawful. DNR’s motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) was denied and the superior court held that: (1) the BBAP is a regulation that must be promulgated under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) does not bar the Tribes’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) did not bar the Tribe's claims and the that BBAP is not a regulation.

The State challenged the Secretary's decision to accept four parcels of land within the geographic boundaries of the State into trust for the benefit of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation, a federally recognized Indian tribe. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary and the State appealed. The court held that, because the State lacked standing to bring a constitutional due process claim and did not raise any additional arguments on appeal, the State was not entitled to relief. The court dismissed and did not reach the merits.

The Tribes share an interest in a Wyoming Reservation. Consolidated suits, filed in 1979, claimed that the government breached fiduciary and statutory duties by mismanaging the Reservation's natural resources and income derived from exploitation of those resources. The Court of Federal Claims divided the suit into phases. One addressed sand and gravel and has been settled. The other two phases were devoted to oil and gas issues. An issue concerning the Government's failure to collect royalties after October, 1973 has been resolved. The final phase concerned pre-1973 oil and gas royalty collection and a series of discrete oil-and-gas issues. In 2007, the court granted the government judgment on the pleadings, finding that the claim was not filed within six years of the date on which it first accrued. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the claim asserted a continuing trespass, so that the Tribes can seek damages for trespasses which occurred within six years of the filing of this suit and all trespasses that occurred after the filing of this suit. The Tribes must establish that the government had a duty to eject trespassers from the parcels.

Defendant-Appellant Kerry Raina Bryant appealed her conviction for theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Choctaw Indian lands. She entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. She was sentenced to a two-year probation, and ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that the statute under which she was charged (18 U.S.C. 1168) did not apply to her because she was not a casino employee, and that 18 U.S.C. 2 did not apply because it punishes illegal acts against the "United States," and the Choctaw tribe is "not the United States." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Defendant committed her crime with her sister, who was a casino employee, and the applicable statute declares Defendant a "principal" for aiding and abetting theft by a casino employee. Furthermore, the Court found Defendant's crime was against a "a gaming establishment licensed by the National Indian Gaming Association that sits on territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Plainly, there was a crime against the United States." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.