Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, the finance officer for the Standing Rock Housing Authority of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, pleaded guilty to theft concerning programs receiving federal funds and was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 120 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court committed procedural error when it departed upwards from the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range, U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, and when it considered ethnicity and other improper factors during sentencing. Also at issue was whether the sentencing was substantively unreasonable. The court held that the district court did not engage in impermissible double counting by departing upwards to criminal history category IV where the district court discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of appellant, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between similar defendants, and the need to provide restitution for the victims. The court also held that the sentence was substantively reasonable where any comments regarding race or national origin were not offered as an explanation for imposing sentence but reflected the district court's disagreement with appellant's counsel that the Guidelines were "fair" and that a Guidelines sentence of 70 to 87 months imprisonment was appropriate as a matter of law; where the district court's statements expressed its frustration about its inability to order restitution for an amount closer to the total loss of money rather than a comment on appellant's socio-economic status; and where the district court did not use appellant's lack of an addiction to justify the sentence, but rather to describe his state of mind as he carried out the embezzlement scheme.

This case stems from Plaintiff Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C.'s (Crowe) legal representation of the Thlopthlocco in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation District Court in 2007. Nathan Anderson, a member of the Thlopthlocco Nation attempted a coup d'etat by declaring himself the only valid leader and purported to appoint a new government. While the "coup" proceeded through the tribal courts, the matter of paying the legal bill for Crowe's representation came up. With the "official" government in dispute, and tribal business halted from an injunction issued until the case was resolved, Mr. Anderson argued that his legal fees should be paid from the tribal treasury. The tribal district court dismissed his claim, reasoning that until the litigation was resolved, no one knew who had authority to spend Thlopthlocco funds. The court then ordered that any attorney fees paid from the tribe's treasury be refunded. Instead of complying with the order, Crowe filed suit with the federal district court, seeking to enjoin the tribal court from ordering a return of the legal fees. The federal court ruled in favor of Crowe, and the tribal judge, Defendant Judge Gregory Stidam, appealed. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Judge Stidham argued the case should have been dismissed because he was entitled to sovereign and judicial immunity. The Tenth Circuit found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction against Judge Stidham's order. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Pursuant to the Indian Self-determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), the United States enters into contracts with Indian tribes and tribal organizations for âthe planning, conduct and administration of programs or services which are otherwise provided to Indian tribes and their members pursuant to Federal law.â These agreements (Contract Support Cost contracts, or CSCs) include costs which are used for the running of essential tribal services, such as law enforcement, economic development and natural resource management. Congress mandated all CSCs be provided with full funding, but then failed to appropriate funds sufficient to pay all CSCs. Instead Congress capped appropriations at a level well below the sum total of CSCs. Several tribes sued seeking to collect the promised-but-unappropriated CSC money. The government argued that the phrase âsubject to the availability of appropriationsâ relieves it of the obligation to pay if the Congress doesnât appropriate the funds. The tribes argued that only Congressional funding decisionsânot the discretionary allocation decisions made by the Department of the Interiorâcan render an appropriation âunavailable.â The Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffsâ interpretation is âreasonable,â and it reversed the district courtâs grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Seneca Nation of Indians ("Seneca Nation"), Unkechauge Indian Nation ("Unkechauge Nation"), St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("Mohawk Tribe"), Cayuga Indian Nation of New York ("Cayuga Nation"), and Oneida Nation of New York ("Oneida Nation") (collectively, "plaintiffs") sought to enjoin amendments to New York's tax law which were designed to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-member purchasers. At issue was whether New York's amended tax law interfered with plaintiffs' tribal sovereignty and violated their immunity from state taxation. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the precollection scheme impermissibly imposed a direct tax on tribal retailers, or alternatively, imposed an undue and unnecessary economic burden on tribal retailers; and that the coupon and prior approval systems interfered with their rights of self-government and rights to purchase cigarettes free from state taxation. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting the Oneida Nation's motion for preliminary injunction and correctly rejected the Seneca Nation's, Cayuga Nation's, Unkechauge Nation's, and Mohawk Tribe's motions for preliminary injunctions.

The Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians ("Buena Vista") entered into a compact with California to engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") for approval of the compact. Amador County, in which Buena Vista's land was located, challenged the Secretary's "no-action" approval claiming that the land at issue failed to qualify as "Indian land." At issue was whether Amador County lacked constitutional standing to maintain the suit and whether a compact, that was deemed approved where he failed to act within the 45 day limit, was reviewable. The court held that Amador County had standing where its allegations were more than sufficient to establish concrete and particularized harm and where Amador County could easily satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. The court also held that where, as here, a plaintiff alleged that a compact violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C), and required the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), precluded judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval. Accordingly, the court remanded to give the district court the opportunity to assess the merits of the suit.

Appellant, an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, pled guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian Country in violation of 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3) and 1153 and was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment followed by 3 years supervised release. At issue was whether the government failed to establish compliance with Articles I and V of the Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 635, between the United States and different Tribes of Sioux Indians which deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over his case. The court affirmed the judgment and held that even if Articles I and V of the treaty could reasonably be construed as establishing a jurisdictional requirement at the time the treaty was executed, Congress's subsequent grant of citizenship to the Indians makes them subject to all restrictions to which any citizen was subject and was evidence of clear indication to abrogate any contrary treat provisions.

Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court against federal officials who managed tribal assets held in trust by the Federal Government alleging violations of fiduciary duty and requesting equitable relief. The next day after filing the suit, respondent filed this action against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims ("CFC") alleging almost identical violations and requesting money damages. At issue was whether a common factual basis like the one apparent in respondent's suits sufficed to bar jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Court held that two suits were for or in respect to the same claim, precluding CFC jurisdiction, if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit. The Court also held that the substantial overlap in operative facts between respondent's District Court and CFC suits precluded jurisdiction in the CFC where both actions alleged that the United States held the same assets in trust for respondent's benefit and they describe almost identical breaches of fiduciary duties.