Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After Joel Woodward was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) a second time, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) issued an order revoking Woodward’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life. Woodward did not appeal from the lifetime revocation. Woodward later filed motions asking the sentencing court to set aside both DUI convictions pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2264. The sentencing court set aside both DUI convictions. Woodward’s attorney subsequently wrote a letter to the director of the DMV asking that Woodward’s CDL be reinstated or that he be deemed eligible to reapply for a CDL. The director denied the request in a letter. Woodward filed an appeal pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-4,105. The district court dismissed Woodward’s petition on several ground, including that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the director’s letter did not constitute a “final decision or order.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the letter from which Woodward appealed was not a “final decision or order” of the director or the DMV under section 60-4,105. View "Woodward v. Lahm" on Justia Law

After Douglas County Youth Center terminated Daniel Archie’s employment, Archie brought an administrative appeal. The Douglas County Civil Service Commission reversed the termination and ordered that Archie be reinstated. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed the decisions of the district court and the Commission and ordered that the termination of Archie’s employment be reimposed, concluding that the district court’s order was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by sufficient, relevant evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sufficient, relevant evidence supported the Commission’s decision and that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Douglas County v. Archie" on Justia Law

Two taxpayers sold their capital stock of a corporation and structured the transaction to comply with the terms of a definitional statute in order to qualify for a special capital gains election. The Nebraska Department of Revenue disallowed the taxpayers’ special capital gains election. The taxpayers filed a petition for redetermination, and the Tax Commissioner denied the petition. The district court affirmed. The taxpayers appealed, asserting that the district court erred in applying the “economic substance” and “sham transaction” doctrines in determining whether they were entitled to the special capital gains election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the economic substance doctrine and the sham transaction doctrines did not provide a basis to disallow the taxpayers’ election. Remanded. View "Stewart v. Nebraska Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, sent his typewriter out of the prison for repairs, but the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services refused to return the typewriter to him. After unsuccessfully filing a grievance with the Department, Appellant filed a petition for review before the district court seeking review under the Administrative Procedure Act and a declaratory judgment. The district court ultimately dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that the court did not err in sustaining the Department’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s claim. View "Jacob v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

The City of Springfield filed suit against the City of Papillion, and Sarpy County, seeking to enjoin Papillion from annexing land which had been indicated as Springfield’s area of future growth in a map adopted by the County in 1995. The district court for Sarpy County found that Springfield lacked standing; Springfield appealed. After review, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that Springfield asserted an infringement of its statutory governmental functions and rights under the County Industrial Sewer Construction Act. That infringement was sufficient to grant standing. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Springfield v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

Appellant, a farmer, owned Dunaway Farm and Rehfeld Farm, both of which were located within the jurisdiction of the Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources District. Beginning in 2010, Appellant used the well on Rehfeld Farm to irrigate Dunaway Farm, which was previously not irrigated. In 2013, the District ordered Appellant to cease and desist irrigating Dunaway Farm because the District’s rules prohibited use of ground water for new irrigated acres within the District’s management area without a variance. Appellant appealed using the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and also filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of several of the District’s rules related to irrigation. The district court affirmed the District’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) on the APA appeal, there were no errors in the district court’s judicial review of the District’s order; and (2) because the District’s rules are constitutional, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment. View "Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn Natural Res. Dist." on Justia Law

Appellant sustained injuries in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Appellant filed a petition in the workers’ compensation court seeking temporary and permanent disability benefits. The compensation court awarded Appellant temporary total disability benefits for the period from August 10, 2010 to December 8, 2010 and permanent total disability benefits starting May 2, 2014. The court declined to award Appellant future medical expenses, penalties, attorney fees, or interest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the compensation court (1) did not commit reversible error in excluding the deposition of a doctor that had been taken in connection with a separate negligence action; (2) did not err when it did not award future medical expenses; but (3) erred in denying temporary total disability benefits for the period from December 9, 2010 through May 1, 2014 without providing an explanation which formed the basis for its ruling. Remanded. View "Tchikobava v. Albatross Express, LLC" on Justia Law

Lionel Simeus filed a complaint against RGR Company LLC with the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights for housing discrimination in violation of section 11.06.020(b) of the Lincoln Municipal Code and 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) of the federal Fair Housing Act. The Commission determined that RGR discriminated against Simeus on the basis of race and national origin and, on behalf of Simeus, filed a charge of discrimination against RGR. After a hearing, the Commission found in favor of Simeus. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that RGR’s proffered reasons for its negative treatment of Simeus were a pretext for discrimination or that Simeus was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "RGR Co., LLC v. Lincoln Comm’n on Human Rights" on Justia Law

Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1502(2) imposes a requirement and specifies a consequence for its violation. In this case, a taxpayer filed a property valuation protest. The taxpayer’s protest form specified the assessed and requested valuation amounts but stated no reason for the requested change. The Lincoln County Board of Equalization dismissed the protest, citing section 77-1502(2). The taxpayer appealed to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal with prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the protest due to the taxpayer’s failure to state the reason for the protest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly dismissed the taxpayer’s protest because the protest failed to include a reason for the requested change in valuation; and (2) because the Board lacked authority to hear the taxpayer’s property valuation protest on the merits, TERC likewise lacked authority to do so. View "Village at North Platte v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, applied for reclassification of his custody level from medium custody to minimum custody. The Department of Correctional Services determined that Appellant’s classification should remain at medium custody. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition in the district court seeking judicial review of DCS’ decision. The district court sustained the DCS’ motion to dismiss, concluding that DCS’ decision regarding Defendant’s level of custody was not made in a “contested case” and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court of appeals agreed with the district court’s conclusion and dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DCS’ decision was not made in a “contested case” as defined in the APA; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the level of custody decision. View "Purdie v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law