Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1502(2) imposes a requirement and specifies a consequence for its violation. In this case, a taxpayer filed a property valuation protest. The taxpayer’s protest form specified the assessed and requested valuation amounts but stated no reason for the requested change. The Lincoln County Board of Equalization dismissed the protest, citing section 77-1502(2). The taxpayer appealed to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal with prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the protest due to the taxpayer’s failure to state the reason for the protest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly dismissed the taxpayer’s protest because the protest failed to include a reason for the requested change in valuation; and (2) because the Board lacked authority to hear the taxpayer’s property valuation protest on the merits, TERC likewise lacked authority to do so. View "Village at North Platte v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, applied for reclassification of his custody level from medium custody to minimum custody. The Department of Correctional Services determined that Appellant’s classification should remain at medium custody. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition in the district court seeking judicial review of DCS’ decision. The district court sustained the DCS’ motion to dismiss, concluding that DCS’ decision regarding Defendant’s level of custody was not made in a “contested case” and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court of appeals agreed with the district court’s conclusion and dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DCS’ decision was not made in a “contested case” as defined in the APA; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the level of custody decision. View "Purdie v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Two employees of Northwest Rural Public Power District (NRPPD), a political subdivision, purchased short radio advertisements on the subject of wind energy, electricity rates, and generation duplication, which were broadcast before the November 2, 2010 general election. Michael Van Buskirk, a candidate for NRPPD’s board of directors, filed complaints with the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission (Commission), contending the radio advertisements were directed at his campaign. The Commission found that the employees had expended public funds “for the purpose of campaigning” in violation of the Nebraska Political Accountability and Disclosure Act (Act). The district court reversed, concluding that the use of NRPPD funds to purchase the advertisements did not constitute “campaigning” within the definition of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s conclusion that the employees had not violated the Act was based on an interpretation of the statute that was contrary to law. Remanded. View "Neb. Accountability & Disclosure Comm'n v. Skinner" on Justia Law

Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (NPPD) was the owner or lessee of three water appropriations to divert water from the Niobrara River for hydropower generation. In 2007, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (Department) issued closing notices to several hundred junior appropriators, including Joe McClaren Ranch, LLC and Weinreis Brothers (the junior appropriators), directing them to cease water diversions from the Niobrara in favor of NPPD’s senior appropriations. The junior appropriators challenged the Department’s administration of the Niobrara and sought to stay any future closing notices. After a second hearing on remand, the Department denied the junior appropriators’ claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department (1) erred in admitting certain evidence relating to the statutory procedure for cancellation of appropriations, but the error was harmless; (2) did not err in finding that the junior appropriators failed to prove NPPD had abandoned or statutorily forfeited its appropriations; (3) did not err in determining that it had property determined the flow demand for NPPD’s appropriations; and (4) did not err in failing to conduct a futile call analysis on the main stem of the Niobrara. View "In re 2007 Appropriations of Niobrara River Waters" on Justia Law

In December 2008, Appellee was performing his duties as an outdoor parking lot attendant when he developed frostbite. Appellee’s employer and its insurance company (Appellants) voluntarily paid for the medical treatment of Appellee’s frostbite injury and paid temporary total disability benefits through mid-2009. In September 2012, a partial amputation of the fifth metatarsal in Appellee’s right foot was performed. In January 2013, Appellee sought additional benefits for his work-related injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court awarded benefits. On appeal, Appellants argued that the Workers’ Compensation Court erred in finding that Appellee’s claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the partial amputation of Appellee’s foot was a material change in condition and substantial increase in disability that would permit Appellee to seek benefits more than two years after Appellants’ last voluntary payment. View "Lenz v. Cent. Parking Sys. of Neb., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate incarcerated at the Tecumseh State Correctional Institution (TSCI), filed a petition for declaratory judgment alleging that TSCI operational memorandums that generally limited an inmate’s access to the law library to one hour per day violated his right to access the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, finding that Appellant did not show an actual injury caused by the library time regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no material factual dispute that the law library regulations did not hinder a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious legal claim regarding Appellant’s sentences or conditions of confinement. View "Payne v. Neb. Dep't of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

For the tax year 2011, the county assessor decided to assess property taxes on parcel of land owned by Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District (Central) but leased to private parties. Central protested the tax assessment, and the Board of Equalization recommended not taxing the land. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirmed, concluding that the parcels should not be taxed because Central had already made a payment in lieu of tax pursuant to Neb. Const. art. VIII, 11 for the relevant tax year. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed TERC’s finding that Central was not subject to property taxes for tax year 2011 because it had already made a payment in lieu of tax for that year; but (2) vacated the portion of TERC’s order that could be interpreted to mean that a lessee’s property tax obligation is included in Central’s payment in lieu of tax, as the issue of a lessee’s liability was not before TERC. View "Conroy v. Keith County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellant, an over-the-road truck driver, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that he sustained injuries in the form of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism in an accident that occurred during the course and scope of his employment. The compensation court applied a split test of causation used in heart attack cases, which requires proof of both legal and medical causation. The court then dismissed Appellant’s claim for failure to establish the medical cause prong. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s claim, holding (1) the split test was properly applied to Appellant’s injuries in this case, as deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism present the same difficulties in attributing the cause of a heart attack to a claimant’s work and are similar in origin to a heart attack; and (2) the compensation court’s finding as to causation was not clearly wrong. View "Wingfield v. Hill Bros. Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Appellant suffered injuries to both of his knees in a work-related accident. Appellant filed a request for loss of earning compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that, notwithstanding findings of permanent impairment, because no permanent physical restrictions were specifically assigned by an expert for Appellant’s left knee, the court could not perform a loss of earning capacity calculation authorized under the third paragraph of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3) and that Appellant was thus limited to scheduled member compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred as a matter of law in concluding that there must be expert opinion of permanent physical restrictions as to each injured member in order to perform a loss of earning capacity calculation under section 48-121(3). Remanded. View "Rodgers v. Neb. State Fair" on Justia Law

The City of Fremont paved on block of a street and assessed the paving costs against abutting property owners. The City relied on Nebraska’s “gap and extend” law, which permits a city to “pave any unpaved street…which intersects a paved street for a distance of not to exceed one block on either side of such paved street” to authorize the paving. Appellees, legal titleholders of property that abutted upon and was adjacent to the street, filed a petition on appeal, alleging that the levy of special assessments was invalid. The district court sustained Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City did not comport with the limitations and restrictions required by the gap and extend law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plan language of the statute authorized the paving. Remanded with direction to enter judgment in favor of the City. View "Johnson v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law