Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a farmer, owned Dunaway Farm and Rehfeld Farm, both of which were located within the jurisdiction of the Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources District. Beginning in 2010, Appellant used the well on Rehfeld Farm to irrigate Dunaway Farm, which was previously not irrigated. In 2013, the District ordered Appellant to cease and desist irrigating Dunaway Farm because the District’s rules prohibited use of ground water for new irrigated acres within the District’s management area without a variance. Appellant appealed using the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and also filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of several of the District’s rules related to irrigation. The district court affirmed the District’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) on the APA appeal, there were no errors in the district court’s judicial review of the District’s order; and (2) because the District’s rules are constitutional, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment. View "Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn Natural Res. Dist." on Justia Law

Appellant sustained injuries in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Appellant filed a petition in the workers’ compensation court seeking temporary and permanent disability benefits. The compensation court awarded Appellant temporary total disability benefits for the period from August 10, 2010 to December 8, 2010 and permanent total disability benefits starting May 2, 2014. The court declined to award Appellant future medical expenses, penalties, attorney fees, or interest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the compensation court (1) did not commit reversible error in excluding the deposition of a doctor that had been taken in connection with a separate negligence action; (2) did not err when it did not award future medical expenses; but (3) erred in denying temporary total disability benefits for the period from December 9, 2010 through May 1, 2014 without providing an explanation which formed the basis for its ruling. Remanded. View "Tchikobava v. Albatross Express, LLC" on Justia Law

Lionel Simeus filed a complaint against RGR Company LLC with the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights for housing discrimination in violation of section 11.06.020(b) of the Lincoln Municipal Code and 42 U.S.C. 3604(b) of the federal Fair Housing Act. The Commission determined that RGR discriminated against Simeus on the basis of race and national origin and, on behalf of Simeus, filed a charge of discrimination against RGR. After a hearing, the Commission found in favor of Simeus. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that RGR’s proffered reasons for its negative treatment of Simeus were a pretext for discrimination or that Simeus was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "RGR Co., LLC v. Lincoln Comm’n on Human Rights" on Justia Law

Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1502(2) imposes a requirement and specifies a consequence for its violation. In this case, a taxpayer filed a property valuation protest. The taxpayer’s protest form specified the assessed and requested valuation amounts but stated no reason for the requested change. The Lincoln County Board of Equalization dismissed the protest, citing section 77-1502(2). The taxpayer appealed to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal with prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the protest due to the taxpayer’s failure to state the reason for the protest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly dismissed the taxpayer’s protest because the protest failed to include a reason for the requested change in valuation; and (2) because the Board lacked authority to hear the taxpayer’s property valuation protest on the merits, TERC likewise lacked authority to do so. View "Village at North Platte v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, applied for reclassification of his custody level from medium custody to minimum custody. The Department of Correctional Services determined that Appellant’s classification should remain at medium custody. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition in the district court seeking judicial review of DCS’ decision. The district court sustained the DCS’ motion to dismiss, concluding that DCS’ decision regarding Defendant’s level of custody was not made in a “contested case” and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court of appeals agreed with the district court’s conclusion and dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DCS’ decision was not made in a “contested case” as defined in the APA; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the level of custody decision. View "Purdie v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Two employees of Northwest Rural Public Power District (NRPPD), a political subdivision, purchased short radio advertisements on the subject of wind energy, electricity rates, and generation duplication, which were broadcast before the November 2, 2010 general election. Michael Van Buskirk, a candidate for NRPPD’s board of directors, filed complaints with the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission (Commission), contending the radio advertisements were directed at his campaign. The Commission found that the employees had expended public funds “for the purpose of campaigning” in violation of the Nebraska Political Accountability and Disclosure Act (Act). The district court reversed, concluding that the use of NRPPD funds to purchase the advertisements did not constitute “campaigning” within the definition of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s conclusion that the employees had not violated the Act was based on an interpretation of the statute that was contrary to law. Remanded. View "Neb. Accountability & Disclosure Comm'n v. Skinner" on Justia Law

Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (NPPD) was the owner or lessee of three water appropriations to divert water from the Niobrara River for hydropower generation. In 2007, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (Department) issued closing notices to several hundred junior appropriators, including Joe McClaren Ranch, LLC and Weinreis Brothers (the junior appropriators), directing them to cease water diversions from the Niobrara in favor of NPPD’s senior appropriations. The junior appropriators challenged the Department’s administration of the Niobrara and sought to stay any future closing notices. After a second hearing on remand, the Department denied the junior appropriators’ claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department (1) erred in admitting certain evidence relating to the statutory procedure for cancellation of appropriations, but the error was harmless; (2) did not err in finding that the junior appropriators failed to prove NPPD had abandoned or statutorily forfeited its appropriations; (3) did not err in determining that it had property determined the flow demand for NPPD’s appropriations; and (4) did not err in failing to conduct a futile call analysis on the main stem of the Niobrara. View "In re 2007 Appropriations of Niobrara River Waters" on Justia Law

In December 2008, Appellee was performing his duties as an outdoor parking lot attendant when he developed frostbite. Appellee’s employer and its insurance company (Appellants) voluntarily paid for the medical treatment of Appellee’s frostbite injury and paid temporary total disability benefits through mid-2009. In September 2012, a partial amputation of the fifth metatarsal in Appellee’s right foot was performed. In January 2013, Appellee sought additional benefits for his work-related injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court awarded benefits. On appeal, Appellants argued that the Workers’ Compensation Court erred in finding that Appellee’s claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the partial amputation of Appellee’s foot was a material change in condition and substantial increase in disability that would permit Appellee to seek benefits more than two years after Appellants’ last voluntary payment. View "Lenz v. Cent. Parking Sys. of Neb., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate incarcerated at the Tecumseh State Correctional Institution (TSCI), filed a petition for declaratory judgment alleging that TSCI operational memorandums that generally limited an inmate’s access to the law library to one hour per day violated his right to access the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, finding that Appellant did not show an actual injury caused by the library time regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no material factual dispute that the law library regulations did not hinder a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious legal claim regarding Appellant’s sentences or conditions of confinement. View "Payne v. Neb. Dep't of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

For the tax year 2011, the county assessor decided to assess property taxes on parcel of land owned by Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District (Central) but leased to private parties. Central protested the tax assessment, and the Board of Equalization recommended not taxing the land. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirmed, concluding that the parcels should not be taxed because Central had already made a payment in lieu of tax pursuant to Neb. Const. art. VIII, 11 for the relevant tax year. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed TERC’s finding that Central was not subject to property taxes for tax year 2011 because it had already made a payment in lieu of tax for that year; but (2) vacated the portion of TERC’s order that could be interpreted to mean that a lessee’s property tax obligation is included in Central’s payment in lieu of tax, as the issue of a lessee’s liability was not before TERC. View "Conroy v. Keith County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law