Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant suffered an injury while working for Employer in Nebraska. After a trial, Appellant was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Three years later, Employer petitioned to discontinue the TTD benefits. Meanwhile, Appellant moved to Mexico. The compensation court terminated Employer’s obligation to pay TTD benefits but declined Appellant’s claim for permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity, finding that Appellant had failed to prove loss of earning capacity in his new community in Mexico. The Supreme Court remanded the case to permit Appellant to establish loss of earning capacity using the Nebraska community where the injury occurred. On remand, the compensation court found that Appellant suffered a forty-five-percent loss of earning capacity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred in failing to weigh all the evidence in making its factual findings, specifically in regard to the court’s findings that the opinions of a vocational rehabilitation counselor regarding Appellant’s loss of earning capacity were not rebutted. Remanded. View "Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions" on Justia Law

Appellee injured his back while working for Appellant. The original workers’ compensation judge found that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled. On appeal, a three-judge review panel concluded it could not tell whether the judge had considered the presumption of correctness afforded to a vocational rehabilitation specialist’s opinion of Appellee’s disability and remanded the cause. The court of appeals affirmed. On remand, the case was assigned to a new trial judge, who ruled that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding that Appellee had rebutted the presumption afforded to the specialist’s opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that new judge’s ruling on the issues without a new evidentiary hearing violated Appellee’s right to due process because the witnesses’ credibility was relevant to the issues presented at trial. View "Liljestrand v. Dell Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 2008 Appellant was convicted of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child, a Class I misdemeanor. In 2011, Appellant applied for a permit to carry a concealed handgun.The Nebraska State Patrol denied Appellant’s application pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 69-2433(5), which provides that a permit will be denied an applicant convicted a “misdemeanor crime of violence” within the ten years preceding the date of application. On appeal, Appellant contended that his conviction for attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 69-2433(5). The district court affirmed the State Patrol’s denial of Appellant’s application for a concealed handgun permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court and State Patrol did not err in finding that Appellant’s conviction of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was a crime of violence under section 69-2433(5) and disqualified him from receiving a concealed handgun permit. View "Underwood v. Neb. State Patrol" on Justia Law

Appellant sustained a compensable injury while working for Employer. The workers’ compensation court awarded benefits. Appellant later filed a second petition to modify, alleging that her injury had materially and substantially worsened, necessitating a modification of the award. The workers’ compensation court found that a modification was not warranted and that, in the alternative, Employer could not be ordered to pay more even if Appellant had established that she was entitled to modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation court did not err in concluding that Appellant did not prove a material and substantial change for the worse in her condition warranting a modification of the award. View "Rader v. Speer Auto" on Justia Law

Employee was severely injured when he fell off a flatbed truck driven by the location manager for Employer’s facility after a customer appreciation supper. Employee filed for workers’ compensation benefits. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court concluded that Employee was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The court reserved the issue of benefits for a later determination, and Employer appealed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court’s order was final. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that Employer did not appeal from a final order because the trial court had not yet determined benefits. Remanded. View "Jacobitz v. Aurora Coop." on Justia Law

Robert Sivick was appointed the county attorney for Howard County. Sivick was unsuccessful in his bid to be elected the county attorney for the next term of office and subsequently filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the State. The Nebraska Department of Labor determined that Sivick was ineligible for benefits because his wages were not for covered "employment." The Nebraska Appeal Tribnual reversed, concluding that because the majority of Sivick's duties were not spent in policymaking or advisory capacities, because Sivick was not an elected official, and because there was no statutory designation of his position being a major advisory position, Sivick's earnings were covered wages for the purposes of unemployment insurance benefits. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the position of county attorney is one that has been designated a "major nontenured policymaking or advisory position" under Nebraska law, and therefore, the services Sivick performed in his position were monetarily ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because his wages were not for covered "employment." View "Lang v. Howard County" on Justia Law

The Harold Warp Pioneer Village Foundation (Foundation) owned and operated a museum, motel, and campground. The motel and campground were primarily used by museum visitors. The museum, motel, and campground were all granted property tax exemptions for many years, but in 2011, state tax officials challenged the exemptions granted to the motel and campground. The Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission determined that because the motel and campground were not used exclusively for educational purposes, neither was entitled to tax exemptions under Nebraska law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motel and campground were beneficial to the museum and reasonably necessary to further its educational mission, and were therefore entitled to property tax exemptions. View "Harold Warp Pioneer Village Found. v. Ewald" on Justia Law

Mike and Becky Carey applied for a building permit for an interior renovation of an apartment building. A municipal building inspector denied the application because the construction documents were not prepared by a registered design professional. The city's appeals board denied the Careys' appeal. The district court overruled the appeals board and ordered that the Careys be issued a building permit without the requirement that they retain a licensed architect, concluding (1) the appeals board did not act within its jurisdiction, and (2) the renovation fell into one of the exemptions to the Engineers and Architects Regulation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appeals board acted within its jurisdiction and that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the proposed renovation failed to qualify for statutory and regulatory exemptions to the Act. View "Carey v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant purchased the assets of an indoor football team owned by Omaha Beef, LLC. In 2008, Appellant applied for workers' compensation insurance under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Plan, arguing that it was entitled to a certain experience modifier (XMod), which is used when calculating the premium owed, because it was a new entity with no claims experience. The National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. determined that Appellant was a successor entity to Omaha Beef, and thus, the various XMods assigned to Omaha Beef for the relevant time periods must be transferred to Appellant. The director of the Department of Insurance affirmed. The district court affirmed, reasoning that Appellant was a successor to Omaha Beef and that the change in ownership resulted in the transfer of the workers' compensation rating for Omaha Beef to Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Appellant had the burden of proof to show there was no "change in ownership"; and (2) a "change in ownership" existed such that the XMod of Omaha Beef should be transferred to Appellant. View "Gridiron Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union Local 226 (Local 226) was the certified exclusive bargaining agent for three bargaining groups of the Douglas County School District 001 (District). Following the implementation of the District's new vacation accrual policy, Local 226 filed petitions with the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that the District had engaged in a prohibited practice of bad-faith bargaining under the Industrial Relations Act by failing to negotiate regarding the vacation accrual policy and that the unilateral action constituted a change in the terms and conditions of employment with respect to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The CIR found that the District had not engaged in a prohibited practice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District unilaterally changed its vacation accrual policy but presented Local 226 with opportunities to give input on the policy changes and request negotiations before implementation of the changes, and because Local 226 failed to take advantage of those opportunities it waived its right to negotiate on the matter of vacation accrual. View "Serv. Employees Int'l Union (AFL-CIO) Local 226 v. Douglas County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law