Articles Posted in New Hampshire Supreme Court

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Plaintiff Fred Teeboom appealed a superior court order dismissing his claims for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief based upon the court’s determination that the budget spending cap in the Nashua city charter was unenforceable because it violated state law. In April 2017, by a vote of nine to six, the Nashua Board of Aldermen (board) passed an ordinance exempting the entire wastewater treatment fund from the combined annual municipal budget. Later that month, Nashua’s mayor proposed a budget for fiscal year 2018 that, consistent with the ordinance, removed the wastewater treatment fund from the spending cap calculation. In so doing, the mayor did not adjust for the fact that the 2017 combined annual municipal budget included $8.1 million of wastewater treatment funds that were not included in the proposed 2018 combined annual municipal budget. This process had the effect of allowing the mayor to allocate a significant amount of additional funds to other areas without running afoul of the spending cap. On the surface, the proposed 2018 combined annual municipal budget appeared to comply with the spending cap. The maximum allowable budget pursuant to the cap was $267,517,084, and the 2018 combined annual municipal budget was $265,598,979. Faced with a proposed 2018 combined annual municipal budget purporting to be $1,918,105 below the spending cap, the board voted, ten to five, to adopt that budget. Teeboom filed this lawsuit against the City of Nashua (City), asking the trial court to enforce the spending cap provision on the ground that the ordinance exempting the wastewater treatment fund from the combined annual municipal budget violated that provision. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the City’s spending cap was unenforceable because it did not contain an override provision. View "Teeboom v. City of Nashua" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Ron L. Beaulieu & Company appealed a superior court order affirming the New Hampshire Board of Accountancy. The Board suspended plaintiff’s license to do business in New Hampshire for three years and imposed a $5,000 fine after concluding plaintiff committed professional misconduct by failing to retain work papers and records for five years and by failing to properly conduct auditing services for Tri-County Community Action Program (TCCAP) from 2008-2011. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ron L. Beaulieu & Company v. New Hampshire Board of Accountancy" on Justia Law

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The Town of Lincoln, New Hampshire, appealed a Water Court order upholding a decision by the Department of Environmental Services (DES) ordering the town to repair the Pemigewasset River Levee. The Water Counsel determined the Town owned the levee pursuant to RSA 482:11-a(2013), and therefore was obligated to maintain and repair the levee. In support of its position, DES contends that, in the Assurance, the Town “agreed to take responsibility for the [l]evee’s ongoing maintenance and repair.”1 However, the fact that the Town undertook certain maintenance obligations in the Assurance does not mean that the additional obligations of “ownership” under RSA 482:11-a can or should be imposed upon the Town. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that the Water Council’s conclusion the Town “owned” the levee under RSA 482:11-a was dependent on flawed reasoning that Appeal of Michele, 168 N.H. 98 (2015) controlled the outcome of this case. The Supreme Court concluded the Town met its burden to show the Water Council was unreasonable. The Court did not decide the precise degree of ownership that made a person or entity an “owner” for the purposes of RSA 482:11-a, it held that the limited access easement held by the Town in this case fell short of that threshold. Because the Court’s holding on this issue was dispositive of this case, it declined to address the parties’ other arguments. View "Appeal of Town of Lincoln" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Steven Silva appealed a New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB) decision that upheld decisions of respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), to suspend and subsequently terminate the petitioner’s employment. Petitioner began working at the New Hampshire Hospital in 1999. He was terminated from employment in 2015 for violating the hospital’s sexual harassment policy. In 2016, the PAB found that the petitioner’s 2015 termination did not comply with New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Per 1002.08(d) because DHHS did not provide the petitioner, prior to termination, with all of the evidence it relied upon to justify his termination, and, consequently, he was not given an opportunity to refute the evidence that led to his dismissal. For that reason, the PAB ordered DHHS to reinstate the petitioner retroactively to the date of his termination and award him back pay and benefits. Following the PAB’s order, DHHS resumed paying the petitioner but simultaneously placed him on suspension so that it could conduct a new investigation into the same sexual harassment allegations that formed the basis for the 2015 termination. In 2017, after completing its investigation, DHHS terminated the petitioner again. The petitioner appealed his suspension as well as his 2017 termination to the PAB, arguing that the PAB’s decision overturning his prior termination prevents DHHS from terminating or suspending him for the same conduct. After a hearing on the merits, the PAB upheld the suspension and subsequent termination. On appeal, petitioner argued the statutory reinstatement requirement in the Administrative Rules precluded DHHS from terminating him a second time for the same conduct which gave rise to his 2015 termination. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that because the PAB’s decision overturning the 2015 termination was based upon DHHS’s failure to satisfy the requirements of Per 1002.08(d) prior to termination, it was not a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. Therefore Silva's argument failed and the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB's decision. View "Appeal of Steven Silva" on Justia Law

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In December 2007, Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) and TS & A Motors, LLC d/b/a Kia of Somersworth (Somersworth) entered into a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Dealer Agreement), which governed the franchise relationship between the parties. Under this agreement, Somersworth was required to employ certain parts and service personnel. In 2011 and Kia sent a series of letters notifying Somersworth of perceived staffing and training deficiencies. These letters referenced Somersworth’s failure to meet technician training requirements in 2009 and 2010, to adequately staff and train personnel in its parts and service department, and to meet the minimum number of technicians required to participate in Kia’s “Optima Hybrid Program.” During Somersworth’s tenure as a dealer, Kia employees overseeing Somersworth made note of its high employee turnover rates. The Board determined that over the course of its operations as a dealer, Somersworth violated the provision of the Dealer Agreement that required certain parts and service personnel “on an almost constant basis.” Kia management worked with Somersworth to remedy its staffing deficiencies. It sent numerous written notifications to Somersworth referencing the inadequacy of its parts and service staffing, met with Somersworth to discuss its concerns over staffing, and gave Somersworth the “benefit of the doubt” when the dealer promised to hire the appropriate number of staff members. Somerset appealed a superior court decision to affirm a New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board ruling that Kia properly terminated its franchise agreement with Somersworth. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "TS & A Motors, LLC v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust (SAE), appealed a superior court order upholding a Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) decision in favor of defendant Town of Hanover (Town), that the use of SAE’s property at 38 College Street (the property) violated the Town’s zoning ordinance. SAE built the property in the late 1920s specifically to accommodate the Dartmouth College (College) chapter of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity. Fraternity members continuously occupied the property since 1931. SAE’s use of the property as a student residence was permitted as of right from the time the Town adopted its first zoning ordinance in 1931 until the ordinance was amended in 1976. Since the 1976 amendment, the property was zoned in the “‘I’ Institution” district. Student residences were not permitted as of right, but could be permitted by special exception. In February 2016, the College revoked its official recognition of SAE after learning that the national charter of the Dartmouth chapter had been suspended. As a result, the College no longer recognized the fraternity as a college-approved housing facility or provided insurance coverage. The College then notified the Town that it no longer recognized the fraternity as a student organization. In light of the College’s derecognition, the zoning administrator informed SAE that its use of the property as a student residence was now violating the zoning ordinance because it was not operating “in conjunction with an institutional use,” and, if continued, would subject SAE to daily fines. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the ZBA on all issues addressed except that of whether SAE itself qualified as an “Institution” in its own right under the zoning ordinance. As to that issue, the Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Andrew Panaggio appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (board). Petitioner suffered a work-related injury to his lower back in 1991; a permanent impairment award was approved in 1996 and in 1997, he received a lump sum settlement. Petitioner continued to suffer ongoing pain as a result of his injury and has experienced negative side effects from taking prescribed opiates. In 2016, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services determined that Panaggio qualified as a patient in the therapeutic cannabis program, and issued him a New Hampshire cannabis registry identification card. Panaggio purchased medical marijuana and submitted his receipt to the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for reimbursement. The respondent-carrier, CNA Insurance Company, denied payment on the ground that “medical marijuana is not reasonable/necessary or causally related” to his injury. The board denied his request for reimbursement from the respondent.On appeal, Panaggio argued the board erred in its interpretation of RSA 126-X:3, III, and when it based its decision in part on the fact that possession of marijuana is illegal under federal law. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Specifically, the Court determined that because the board found that Panaggio’s use of medical marijuana was reasonable, medically necessary, and causally related to his work injury, the board erred when it determined the insurance carrier was prohibited from reimbursing Panaggio for the costs of purchasing medical marijuana. The Court determined that because the board’s order failed to sufficiently articulate the law that supported the board’s legal conclusion and failed to provide an adequate explanation of its reasoning regarding federal law, it was impossible for the Court to discern the grounds for the board’s decision sufficient for it to conduct meaningful review. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the board for a determination of these issues in the first instance. View "Appeal of Panaggio" on Justia Law

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Respondent, the biological mother of C.O. and G.L., appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the two minor children on the ground that she failed to correct the conditions that led to the circuit court’s finding that she neglected both children and abused G.L. She argued the circuit court erred in finding: (1) the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children after it terminated visits with her children; and (2) she failed to correct the conditions that led to the court’s finding of abuse and neglect because one of the circuit court’s conditions, that she accept responsibility for the underlying abuse, violated her constitutional right against self-incrimination. After review of the facts entered in the circuit court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "In re C.O.; In re G.L." on Justia Law

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The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted a petition in its original jurisdiction to determine whether the Superior Court erred in ordering the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Attorney General, defendants in litigation pending before that court, to produce to plaintiffs in the litigation, the League of Women Voters of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire Democratic Party, and various individuals, the New Hampshire Centralized Voter Registration Database established pursuant to RSA 654:45 (Supp. 2018). The Supreme Court concluded the Database was exempt from disclosure by statute, and therefore vacated the trial court’s order. View "Petition of New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs David and Katherine Dietz appealed a superior court order that upheld a zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) decision for defendant Town of Tuftonboro, which granted intervenor Sawyer Point Realty, LLC (collectively with Sawyer Point Realty Trust, its predecessor in interest, Sawyer Point), two equitable waivers related to two additions Sawyer Point constructed on its house in violation of the Town’s zoning ordinance requiring a fifty-foot setback from Lake Winnipesaukee. Sawyer Point’s house was located along the shore of Lake Winnipesaukee and within the Town’s Lakefront Residential Zoning District (District); the Dietzes owned the abutting property, also within the District. In 1999, Sawyer Point added a second floor addition over the eastern portion of the first floor of its house, aware that the existing structure was located within the setback, and that a second floor addition would also be within the setback. Prior to construction, Sawyer Point submitted a building permit application to the Town containing a rough sketch of the existing house, which also showed that the house was situated less than fifty feet from the lake. The Town’s building inspector granted the building permit, noting the addition would cause “no change in footprint.” In 2008-2009, Sawyer Point constructed a second addition to its house, again receiving permission from the Town to construct. In February 2014, Sawyer Point commissioned a survey which revealed, in regard to the 2008 Addition, more of the new structure was within the setback than had been represented to the ZBA. In December 2014, the Dietzes, after learning of this discrepancy, sought injunctive relief against Sawyer Point, claiming that Sawyer Point had built within the setback without obtaining the required approvals, and requesting that the court order the removal of the unlawful construction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err when it sustained the ZBA and declined to weigh the cumulative effect of building within the lakefront setback throughout the Town. Moreover, relying on the evidence before it, the trial court agreed with the ZBA that there was little or no public benefit to be gained by correcting the violations. Because the Dietzes have failed to show that this finding was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, the trial court's decision was upheld. View "Dietz v. Town of Tuftonboro" on Justia Law