Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Eight former public-school teachers who retired from the Keene School District between 2012 and 2017 sought review of a decision by the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) Board of Trustees. They challenged the board's denial of their petitions for contribution and earnable compensation adjustment, arguing that the board erroneously found they consented to a 120-day delay in payment of early retirement stipends.The NHRS Board of Trustees had denied the petitions based on the finding that the petitioners consented to the delay in stipend payments. The board's decision was influenced by the fact that the petitioners did not file grievances or inquire with the NHRS about the delay at the time of their retirement. The board distinguished these petitioners from others who had successfully challenged the delay through grievances.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioners could not have consented to the delay because the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) did not authorize such a delay. The court noted that employees governed by a CBA cannot consent to terms that modify the agreement. The court also found that the petitioners were not at fault for the delay, as they were not informed that the delay would affect their pension calculations and had no reason to challenge the School District's policy at the time. Consequently, the court reversed the board's decision and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Petition of Retired Keene School Teachers" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a police officer for the Town of Salem, was involved in an off-duty incident over ten years ago where he drove at 62 mph in a 30 mph zone, refused to pull over for another officer, and avoided spike strips before stopping and laughing off the incident as a joke. An internal investigation found he violated the department's code of conduct for "Conduct Unbecoming an Employee." He accepted responsibility, waived hearings, and took a one-day unpaid suspension in a negotiated agreement with the Salem Police Department (SPD).Years later, following an audit, the New Hampshire Department of Justice (DOJ) requested the internal investigation report and added the plaintiff's name to the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES). The plaintiff requested removal, citing a court order that his personnel file did not contain Brady/Giglio material. The DOJ denied the request, and the plaintiff filed a complaint in superior court seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the plaintiff's conduct was "potentially exculpatory evidence" under RSA 105:13-d, and that he had received adequate due process.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiff's conduct was not "potentially exculpatory evidence" as it was not relevant to his general credibility and was stale. The court noted that the conduct was over ten years old, the plaintiff had accepted responsibility, and his criminal charges were nolle prossed and annulled. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the plaintiff's removal from the EES was warranted. View "Doe v. Salem Police Department" on Justia Law

Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases. View "Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Eight New Hampshire employers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) to hold department-level hearings. These employers had their applications for reimbursement from the Special Fund for Second Injuries denied. The employers argued that they were entitled to a hearing under RSA 281-A:43, I(a). The DOL had denied their requests for such hearings, stating that the disputes were more appropriately heard by the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB).The employers initially appealed to the CAB and requested department-level hearings from the DOL. The DOL denied these requests, leading the employers to file a petition for original jurisdiction with the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The proceedings before the CAB were stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed whether the DOL is statutorily required to grant a request for a department-level hearing when an employer’s request for reimbursement from the Fund is denied. The court held that RSA 281-A:43, I(a) grants employers the right to a department-level hearing before an authorized representative of the commissioner when they have been denied reimbursement from the Fund. The court found that the statute's language supports the employers' right to such a hearing and that this interpretation aligns with the statutory scheme's purpose of encouraging employers to hire or retain employees with permanent impairments. Consequently, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, compelling the DOL to hold the requested hearings. View "Petition of City of Manchester" on Justia Law

The case involves the Union Leader Corporation (Union Leader) and the New Hampshire Department of Safety (Department). Union Leader sought to compel the Department to disclose records under the Right-to-Know Law, specifically records related to the response by New Hampshire State Police to the Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC) on October 7 and 8, 2022. The Department refused to disclose the records, arguing that they were confidential law enforcement investigative records pertaining to juvenile delinquency.The Superior Court dismissed Union Leader's suit, siding with the Department. The court found that the requested records contained facts that underlie the basis for juvenile delinquency proceedings. Therefore, based on a previous decision in Petition of State of New Hampshire (Disclosure of Juvenile Records), the court concluded that the release of the records Union Leader requested was prohibited.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case. The Supreme Court found that the term "court records" in RSA 169-B:35 should not be read so expansively as to shield a broad category of otherwise public records from a request made pursuant to the Right to Know Law, even if that record is related to alleged unlawful conduct by unidentified minors. The court concluded that it is conceivable that information in the Department’s possession could answer Union Leader's questions without interfering with the rehabilitation of the minors against whom juvenile petitions were filed. It is also conceivable that responsive records could be redacted so as to ensure that their disclosure neither conflicts with nor compromises the rehabilitative purpose of RSA chapter 169-B. The case was remanded for the lower court to make those determinations. View "Union Leader Corp. v. N.H. Dep't of Safety" on Justia Law

The appellant, A.G., was arraigned on four juvenile delinquency petitions for attempted robbery, attempted first degree assault, reckless conduct, and falsifying physical evidence when he was 17 years old. The Circuit Court found probable cause and determined that A.G. met the standard for secure detention, placing him at the Youth Detention Services Unit (YDSU). The State later filed a petition to certify A.G. as an adult and transfer the case to superior court, which remains pending. As A.G. was about to turn 18, a hearing was held to address his placement. The court ruled that A.G. would be transferred to the Hillsborough County House of Corrections (HOC) upon his eighteenth birthday.A.G. appealed this decision, arguing that the circuit court lacks authority to order his detention at the HOC. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed, stating that the circuit court is a court of limited jurisdiction with powers conferred upon it by statute. The court found no statutory authority for the circuit court to detain A.G. at the HOC, as he has neither been adjudicated delinquent nor certified as an adult.The State argued that the circuit court could continue A.G.’s detention at YDSU, even after his eighteenth birthday, while awaiting action on the petition to certify him as an adult. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the term "minor" in the relevant statute continues to apply to A.G. after his eighteenth birthday. The court reversed the trial court’s order transferring A.G. to the HOC and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

The case involves four police officers, Robert Bellenoit, Richard Brown, Gregory Ditullio, and Jacob Tyler, who were employed by the City of Manchester. Each officer was a member of a collective bargaining unit and was hired before 2008. Between 2015 and 2018, each officer was injured during their employment and filed a workers' compensation claim with the City. While these claims were being resolved, the City paid each officer accrued sick leave benefits. Once the officers were deemed eligible for workers' compensation benefits, they received payments from the City equivalent to the sick leave benefits they had previously received.In 2019, the City demanded that each officer repay the sick leave benefits they had received while their eligibility for workers' compensation was pending or being appealed. The officers argued that they had a vested right to restoration of their sick leave benefits without the requirement of repayment. The Superior Court granted the City's motions for summary judgment and denied the officers' motions, ruling that the officers did not have a vested right to restoration of sick leave benefits without the requirement of repayment.The officers appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that they did not have a vested right to the restoration of sick leave credit without the requirement of repayment. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the officers did not have a vested right to the benefits provided in the pre-2008 amendment and that the post-2008 amendment applied to them. The court reasoned that the officers did not earn the benefit set forth in the pre-2008 amendment and that the post-2008 amendment became the law of the contract, governing where the collective bargaining agreement was silent. View "City of Manchester v. Bellenoit" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Charles W. Cole, was walking on a brick sidewalk in North Conway Village, a village of the Town of Conway, when he tripped and fell due to holes in the sidewalk caused by missing or broken bricks. The plaintiff alleged that the Town of Conway was aware of the sidewalk's disrepair prior to his injury and had received written notice of the damaged bricks and holes. The plaintiff filed a negligence lawsuit against the Town of Conway in superior court.The Town of Conway moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to statutory immunity as the plaintiff had failed to allege with particularity how the Town had received written notice of the sidewalk's condition. The plaintiff objected, arguing that the complaint contained sufficient particularity and that the Town was barred from claiming statutory immunity because it was insured against the risk through Primex. The trial court granted the Town's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to plead with sufficient particularity that the Town had received notice of the holes in the sidewalk, and that Primex's pooled risk management program did not constitute an insurance policy within the meaning of the relevant statute. The trial court also denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the trial court that Primex's pooled risk management program did not constitute "insurance" within the meaning of the relevant statute, and thus the Town was not barred from claiming statutory immunity. However, the court reversed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint, finding that the plaintiff's proposed amendments could potentially satisfy the particularity requirement of the statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cole v. Town of Conway" on Justia Law

Kenneth Michaud submitted a Right-to-Know request to the Town of Campton Police Department, seeking certain records pertaining to him, his address, or any member of his household. The Town denied his request, asserting that it was an attempt to circumvent the discovery process in a separate litigation between the parties. Michaud then filed a lawsuit against the Town to gain access to the requested records. The Town reiterated its justification for the denial, and the court stayed the Right-to-Know suit until the separate litigation reached a resolution. After the resolution of the other litigation, the court ordered the Town to respond to Michaud's requests. The Town provided some documents, but Michaud filed a motion to compel, claiming that not all records were produced. The court denied the motion, finding that the Town had complied with the order and that the withheld records were either already in Michaud's possession or were exempted from disclosure.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Town violated the Right-to-Know Law by categorically denying Michaud's request based on his motive and without first reviewing the records responsive to the request. The court concluded that the Town's initial response was not lawful and that the trial court erred in ruling that the Town's initial denial was lawful. The court also vacated the trial court's denial of Michaud's request for attorney’s fees and costs and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that to award attorney’s fees on remand, the trial court must find that the lawsuit was necessary to enforce compliance with the Right-to-Know Law and that the Town knew or should have known that its conduct violated the Right-to-Know Law. View "Michaud v. Town of Campton Police Department" on Justia Law

The case involves Mojalaki Holdings, LLC and GSSG New Hampshire, LLC (the plaintiffs) who appealed a decision by the City of Franklin Planning Board (the Board) that denied their site plan application to install a solar panel array on a piece of land owned by Mojalaki. The proposed solar panel array required the installation of new utility poles and the removal of mature trees to ensure sufficient sunlight. The land, which was mostly open space and was once a golf course, did not have any specific ordinance language addressing solar panel arrays. The Board, after multiple hearings and a site visit, denied the application based on concerns raised by neighbors about the project's potential impact on the scenery, property values, and previous negative experiences with other solar projects in the city.The Board's decision was upheld by the Superior Court, which agreed with the Board's first and third reasons for denial, namely that the installation of new utility poles would create an industrial look out of place in the neighborhood, and that cutting down mature trees contradicted the purpose provisions. However, the Superior Court did not uphold the Board's second basis, that the solar panel array endangered or adversely impacted the residents, due to lack of supporting facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Board could not rely solely on the purpose provisions to deny the application. The court found that the purpose provisions lacked sufficient specificity for site plan review and left the proposed project to be judged by the subjective views of the Board through ad hoc decision making. The court granted the plaintiffs a builder's remedy, allowing them to proceed with their development provided they comply with all other applicable regulations. View "Mojalaki Holdings v. City of Franklin" on Justia Law