Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Kelly Hagenbuch challenged the termination of her food stamp benefits by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (department). The department terminated the benefits because it found that her income exceeded the maximum amount permitted by the program. In calculating petitioner’s income, the department included distributions from an irrevocable trust, of which petitioner was the sole beneficiary, that had been made by the trustee to third parties. These distributions included payments for trust expenses and for legal fees that the petitioner had incurred to obtain public benefits. This case presented an issue of first impression in New Hampshire: whether a distribution made by the trustee of an irrevocable trust to third parties counted as income to the trust beneficiary for the purpose of determining food stamp benefits. The narrow question before the New Hampshire Supreme Court was whether the trust distributions were “owed” to the petitioner. The Court did not decide the validity of the premise underlying the department’s argument—that because the money used to establish the Trust was derived from the settlement of the petitioner’s personal injury lawsuit, the Trust was established with the petitioner’s “own funds.” Even assuming that the premise was correct, the Court concluded that the vendor payment exclusion applied to the trust distributions because the regulations do not recognize the distinction that the department attempts to draw regarding trusts originally funded by the household. In this case, given that the distributions made by the trustee to third parties were not owed to the petitioner—and therefore, were excluded vendor payments—the department should have excluded the trust distributions from the petitioner’s income. Accordingly, the Court reversed the presiding officer’s decision that the department properly counted the trust distributions as income. View "Petition of Kelly Hagenbuch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Reid appealed a superior court decision that denied his petition under the Right-to-Know Law, to compel defendant, New Hampshire Attorney General Joseph Foster, to produce unredacted records of the Attorney General’s investigation into alleged wrongdoing by former Rockingham County Attorney James Reams. On appeal, plaintiff argued: (1) the trial court’s ruling violated Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution; (2) that the trial court erred in determining that the investigative records at issue were “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices,” because the attorney general’s investigation cannot be considered “internal”; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the attorney general’s investigation of Reams was “conducted jointly with Rockingham County.” “Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary,” the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed plaintiff’s second argument, which raised an issue of statutory interpretation. In it, plaintiff argued that the trial court erroneously “applied a subject matter exemption contrary to the plain language of RSA 91-A:5[,] IV.” Fundamentally, plaintiff’s argument was that records of the defendant’s investigation of Reams did not “pertain[] to internal personnel practices,” because “[t]he Attorney General is simply not the County Attorney’s employer.” The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff’s statutory interpretation and, therefore, vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reid v. New Hampshire Attorney General" on Justia Law

The City of Rochester’s Department of Public Works owned and operated the Rochester Water System, which provided water to residents of the City. The City operated three water storage tanks, one of which is the Rochester Hill Water Storage Tank (the Tank). Whitman & Howard n/k/a AECOM Technical Services, Inc. (AECOM) designed the Tank and oversaw its construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron n/k/a CB&I, Inc. (CB&I). CB&I completed the Tank in 1985, and it was placed into service that same year. In June 2009, the City contracted defendant Marcel A. Payeur, Inc. (Payeur) to service the Tank by recoating the Tank’s interior and exterior, installing a mixer, and modifying the Tank to accommodate the mixer. Defendant Wright-Pierce performed the engineering and design work for the modification project. Payeur substantially completed the modification, under Wright-Pierce’s supervision, in November 2009. In December 2011, the Tank developed a leak. The City had to evacuate nearby residents, drain the Tank, and remove it from service. The City inspected the Tank and discovered that Payeur had failed to properly construct the modifications in accordance with Wright-Pierce’s design. The City filed suit against Payeur in November 2012, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and unjust enrichment. In April 2014, the City named CB&I, AECOM, and Wright-Pierce as additional defendants. The City’s amended complaint alleged that Wright-Pierce had failed to properly supervise Payeur’s 2009 modification work; it also alleged that, in 1985, CB&I had failed to properly construct the Tank in accordance with AECOM’s design, and AECOM had failed to adequately monitor CB&I. CB&I and AECOM moved to dismiss the City’s claims against them, arguing that the claims were time-barred. The superior court dismissed the City’s claims against CB&I and AECOM pursuant to a six year statute of limitations in effect when CB&I and AECOM substantially completed their contract with the City. The City appealed, arguing the superior court erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of “nullum tempus occurrit regi (“time does not run against the king”). Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Katherine Streeter appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (board) order denying her request for attorney’s fees under New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(4). In 2013, Streeter injured her left shoulder at work. She notified her employer and the employer filed a First Report of Injury with its insurance carrier the next day. Streeter would ultimately be diagnosed with tendonitis and referred for physical therapy. She received a steroid injection and was unable to work for two weeks, during which time the employer’s insurance carrier paid indemnity benefits. Streeter was awarded “payment of her medical treatment associated with this case, including, but not limited to, her surgery and physical therapy treatment . . . [and] indemnity benefits at the temporary total disability rate” from May through August 2014. Streeter’s attorney was awarded 20% of the retroactive indemnity award, pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(1). Thereafter, her attorney requested additional fees. The hearing officer denied the request, finding that Streeter’s attorney was entitled only to 20% of the retroactive award and, thus, her “request for legal fees relative to the award of medical benefits [was] inappropriate under these circumstances.” On appeal, Streeter argued that “by paying benefits voluntarily after 21 days after notification of the claim,” the employer’s insurance carrier made a “de facto” determination pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 506.02 that her injury was compensable. After review, the Supreme Court determined that Streeter’s attorney was entitled only to “20% of the retroactive indemnity benefits payable out of the benefit received.” N.H. Admin. Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(1). View "Appeal of Katherine Streeter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, The Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese in New Hampshire, A Corporation Sole, d/b/a St. George’s Episcopal Church (Church), appealed a superior court order denying its summary judgment motion and granting that of the defendant, Town of Durham (Town), based upon a finding that 24 spaces in the Church’s parking lot that are leased to University of New Hampshire (UNH) students were taxable. Until 2013, the Church received a religious tax exemption under RSA 72:23, III for its entire parking lot. In early 2013, the Town learned that the Church leased spaces to UNH students. At that time, the Town believed students leased 30 of the 37 parking spaces. Accordingly, after determining that the leased parking spaces were no longer exempt from taxation, the Town issued the Church a tax bill. After review of the Church’s arguments on appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the Church did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the leased spaces were exempt. The Court affirmed the superior court order. View "Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese in New Hampshire v. Town of Durham" on Justia Law

Respondent, mother of a minor child, appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the child. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the petition brought by the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), to terminate her parental rights while the direct appeal of her underlying criminal conviction was pending; and (2) finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the consequences of interpreting the termination statute to permit termination of the parent-child relationship while an appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction was pending was “troubling.” The lack of finality of a conviction that was being appealed raised the question whether DCYF satisfied the heightened requirement of proving the grounds for termination beyond a reasonable doubt. “Taking into consideration the interests of both parents and children that are at stake in termination proceedings, and the heightened standards we apply to such proceedings, we concluded that the legislature intended the terms ‘convicted’ and ‘conviction’ as used in RSA 169-C:24-a, I, and RSA 170-C:5, VI and VII, to mean an affirmance of guilt following a direct appeal as of right to [the Supreme Court] that raises an issue of innocence or guilt.” Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it terminated the mother’s parental rights while her direct appeal of the conviction that formed the statutory ground for the termination was pending. View "In re S.T." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Weaver (individually and as administrator of the estate of his wife, Marceline Weaver) and James Sousa, appealed superior court decisions granting summary judgment in favor of defendants the Town of Pelham (Town), Pelham Police Chief Joseph Roark, Pelham Police Officer Derek Gioia (collectively, the Pelham defendants), and Woody’s Auto Repair & Towing, Inc. This case stemmed from an automobile accident allegedly caused by Randall Stewart, the owner and driver of a vehicle that collided with plaintiffs. With respect to the Pelham defendants, the superior court concluded they were not immune from suit under RSA chapter 507-B (2010) or under the common law, they were entitled to summary judgment because of the lack of evidence that they proximately caused the motor vehicle collision that resulted in the plaintiffs’ injuries. After review of that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence that the Pelham defendants proximately caused the accident. Accordingly, the Court did not address the Pelham defendants’ cross-appeal on immunity. With regard to Woody's, the superior court granted summary judgment, concluding that: (1) because Stewart’s vehicle had been towed the night before the collision pursuant to RSA 262:32 (2014), rather than impounded pursuant to RSA 262:40 (2014), Woody’s was not required to obtain authorization from the police or a court prior to releasing the vehicle the next day to its owner; (2) Woody’s could not be liable for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle because of the lack of evidence that a Woody’s employee knew, or should have known, that the owner was impaired when he picked up his vehicle from impound; and (3) given the absence of evidence demonstrating that Woody’s breached a duty owed to plaintiffs, it was not liable for negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment too. View "Weaver v. Stewart" on Justia Law

In 2011, the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (department) determined that, while receiving unemployment benefits in 2010, petitioner Annelie Mullen had “knowingly failed to report [her] work and earnings” and, thus, the department had overpaid her benefits. As a result, the department informed petitioner that she was required to repay the overpaid benefits. petitioner appealed the department’s determination to the tribunal, which upheld the determination. Petitioner then requested that the commissioner reopen the record before the tribunal. The commissioner granted her request and ordered the tribunal to conduct a de novo hearing. In January 2012, the tribunal found that the petitioner was overpaid benefits in 2010, but that she was “without fault in creating the overpayment.” As a result, the tribunal determined that petitioner was not required to repay the state unemployment benefits. In March, the commissioner, on her own initiative, informed the parties that she was again reopening the record before the tribunal because she believed that the tribunal had mistakenly excluded the testimony of a particular witness. Petitioner appealed this second re-opening, arguing it deprived her of due process. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal. Subsequently, the tribunal held a third de novo hearing. In April 2014, the tribunal issued a decision upholding the initial determination that petitioner was overpaid benefits and requiring the petitioner to repay them. Petitioner appealed to the board, but the board declined to accept jurisdiction because the petitioner had not first requested that the commissioner reopen the tribunal decision. petitioner then requested that the commissioner reopen the case, reverse the tribunal’s April 2014 decision, and reinstate the January 2012 decision in her favor. Pending a decision on her request, the petitioner also appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error in the tribunal's 2014 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Annelie Mullen" on Justia Law

Appellants N.C. and Alethea Young, Ph.D., appealed superior court orders denying Dr. Young’s motion to quash a subpoena for N.C.’s psychological records issued by appellee, the New Hampshire Board of Psychologists (Board), and dismissing N.C.’s petition for a declaratory judgment to prevent the Board from obtaining the records. N.C. has been a patient of Young for many years, attending at least two therapy sessions per week since the age of two. In August 2013, when N.C. was still a minor, she informed Young that her father, S.C., had physically and emotionally abused her. According to Young, throughout her treatment of N.C., she witnessed what she described as S.C.’s aggressive and humiliating treatment of his daughter, both in public as well as in therapy sessions. In September, S.C. filed a written complaint against Young with the Board. The complaint alleged that Young had breached her professional obligations by: (1) becoming personally over-involved with N.C., thus sacrificing her objectivity; (2) providing counseling to both S.C. and his daughter, thus creating an insurmountable conflict of interest; (3) violating RSA 169-C:29 (2014) by failing to timely report suspected abuse of a child to DCYF; (4) violating RSA 633:1, I-a (2007) and 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) by detaining and concealing N.C., who was a minor at the time, from S.C. when she drove N.C. to Vermont without S.C.’s knowledge or consent; and (5) failing to respect S.C.’s wishes that she no longer treat his daughter. On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court erred in enforcing the subpoena because the Board failed to establish that it had just cause to issue the subpoena. Appellants also contended that, even if just cause existed to issue the subpoena, once they objected, the subpoena could not be enforced by the court because the Board failed to sustain what, in their view, was the additional burden necessary to pierce the patient’s privilege by showing that there was a reasonable probability the records were relevant and material and that the Board had an essential need for them. Furthermore, appellants argued that, even if the Board met the burden necessary to pierce the privilege, the court erred in not conducting an in camera review of the records before ordering compliance with the subpoena in order to limit the scope of disclosure. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with appellants that the statute required a court order to obtain a patient’s records when there was an objection to compliance with a subpoena based upon a claim of privilege. However, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that, under the circumstances of this case, the privilege must yield to the Board’s proper exercise of its regulatory responsibilities with regard to its licensee, Dr. Young. View "N.C. v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Boyle, as trustee of the 150 Greenleaf Avenue Realty Trust, appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Transportation Appeals Board (TAB) affirming the denial of his application for a permit to construct a driveway onto a state highway. The TAB based its decision upon sections 7(a) and 7(e) of the New Hampshire Department of Transportation’s (DOT) “Policy for the Permitting of Driveways and Other Accesses to the State Highway System.” Although the TAB concluded that petitioner’s proposed driveway would adequately protect the safety of the traveling public, because it also determined that there was sufficient support for the hearings examiner’s conclusion that the proposed driveway would cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public, it upheld the hearings examiner’s denial of the petitioner’s permit application. On appeal, petitioner challenged the finding of an unreasonable hazard, arguing that it was impossible for a driveway to adequately protect the safety of the traveling public and simultaneously cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public. Thus, petitioner argued that the TAB erred in denying his permit application. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, and, therefore, reversed. View "Appeal of Boyle" on Justia Law