Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondents New Hampshire Fish & Game and the New Hampshire Council on Resources and Defelopment (CORD) appealed a superior court decision that granted summary judgment to petitioners Town of Newbury and Lake Sunapee Protective Association. Petitioners challenged CORD's decision to approve Fish & Game's design of a boat launch. The trial court held that CORD lacked authority to approve the launch because it was a class III public highway, and could not approve "new highway projects." Disagreeing with the trial court's interpretation of RSA 162-C:6, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Newbury v. New Hampshire Fish & Game Dept." on Justia Law

Petitioners Town of Newbury and Lake Sunapee Protective Association appealed a Wetlands Council decision. The Council upheld a grant by the Department of Environmental Services of a shoreland impact permit to respondent New Hampshire Fish & Game for the construction of a public boat launch with associated parking on the shore of Lake Sunapee. Petitioners contended it was error to uphold the Department's decision because the Department had violated two provisions of the Comprehensive Shoreland Protection Act with an unnecessary launch contrary to state law. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Lake Sunapee Protective Association" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Danville appealed a Superior Court order abating "land use change tax" (LUCT) assessments issued to petitioners Maplevale Builders, LLC, Hoyt Real Estate Trust, and John H. and Maryann Manning, on the basis that the LUCT bills were untimely under RSA 79-A:7 (Supp. 2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2012). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred in ruling that all of the lots of the subdivision in question changed in use in 2009, when the Planning Board granted final subdivision approval. Because the trial court did not follow the caselaw in its consideration of when each lot changed in use, the Supreme Court vacated its abatement order. The parties did not ask the Court to determine on appeal when each lot changed in use or whether the exception in RSA 79-A:7, V(a) applied. Thus, the Court remanded for a redetermination of when each lot changed in use, and whether in light of the change in use date, the LUCT bills were timely. The Court concluded that the amended version of RSA 79-A:7, II(c) applied to any notice or discovery of change in use occurring on or after April 1, 2009. View "Maplevale Builders, LLC v. Town of Danville" on Justia Law

Petitioner Justin Czyzewski appealed a Superior Court ruling that denied his request for a declaration that although he was convicted of attempted sexual assault, he was not required to register as a sex offender under New Hampshire law. Although the record did not contain the details of his conviction for attempted sexual assault, the trial court noted that the petitioner "engaged in conduct in an online chat room with an undercover police detective, whom [he] believed to be a 13-year old female." The petitioner lived in Pennsylvania but, as the trial court stated, "was required to register as a sex offender [there] because he would be required to register in New Hampshire." Upon review, the Supreme Court could not " subscribe to the petitioner's statutory interpretation," and affirmed the Superior Court's ruling. View "Czyzewski v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Petitioners Thomas Morrissey, Margaret Russell, Dorothy Sears, Reginald Rogers, Barbara Sanders and others appealed a ruling of the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) Wetlands Council (Council) that affirmed the issuance by the Wetlands Bureau of a permit to respondent Town of Lynne. Petitioners argued that when issuing the wetlands permit, the Bureau and Council did not consider the total wetlands impact of the proposed project because they misinterpreted the scope of the Supreme Court's ruling in an earlier case. Agreeing that the Bureau misinterpreted the applicable statutes, and it did not consider the total wetlands impact of the proposed project, the Supreme Court vacated DES' decision and remanded the case to the Council for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Thomas Morrissey" on Justia Law

Respondent Cheryl C. appealed a circuit court order that granted a special petition to terminate her guardianship over her grandchildren Raven G. and Salem G. filed by the children's biological mother, petitioner Jessica B. Following a hearing in January 2008, at which both parents appeared and testified, the court found that respondent had established by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the temporary guardianship was in the best interests of both children because their parents, petitioner and Stacey G., engaged in domestic violence and in the illegal use of controlled drugs while the children were in their care. The court ordered that the temporary guardianship would remain in effect until petitioner and Stacey G. complied with a number of conditions to "demonstrate[] that they are responsible enough to act as parents." In May 2008, after another hearing, the court found that neither the petitioner nor Stacey G. was complying with the conditions imposed by the court. The court made the guardianship permanent and provided for supervised contact between the children and their parents at respondent's discretion. Petitioner was subsequently incarcerated for several months as a result of a criminal conviction and then released on probation. In January 2010, she filed a motion seeking appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL). A GAL was appointed, and the parties worked out an agreement allowing gradually increased contact between petitioner and the children. In February 2011, petitioner moved to terminate the guardianship, asserting that she had complied with all of the conditions set forth by the court in January 2008. Respondent objected to terminating the guardianship. Stacey G. also opposed termination, but argued that he should be given unrestricted and unsupervised time with the children. The court held a hearing; petitioner admitted that she had not complied with a January 2008 order but argued that the court should permit her to integrate the children into her life rather than continue the artificial relationship imposed by the guardianship. The GAL testified that he believed it would be in the best interests of the children to terminate the guardianship gradually. The respondent and Stacey G. took issue with the GAL's recommendation, arguing that he had limited contact with the children and was biased. The respondent's expert witness concluded that both children had been physically and sexually abused by petitioner and opined that forcing the children to spend time with their mother would be emotionally devastating for them and recommended that any such contact be supervised by a professional. Upon review of the issue of whether the guardianship should have been continued, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous burden of proof, and therefore vacated its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re guardianship of Raven G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff The Sunapee Difference, LLC appealed: (1) a superior court order that granted summary judgment to the State on Sunapee’s claims for breach of contract, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, reformation, and inverse condemnation; and (2) an order partially granting the State's motion to dismiss Sunapee's inverse condemnation claim. The State appealed the superior court's order that ruled Sunapee had standing to bring a reformation claim. The matter arose from a management proposal and lease authorized by the New Hampshire legislature with regard to a ski area at Mount Sunapee State Park. The Capital Budget Overview Committee approved the Lease; a month later, the State produced a map and property description with the metes and bounds of the leasehold area. Sunapee discovered that the northern and western leasehold boundaries described in the Lease were not coterminous with those of the state park. At some time during the lease period, Sunapee had proposed expanding the ski area to the east. Sunapee obtained options to buy privately-owned land bordering the western boundary of the state park. Because the leasehold and state park boundaries were not described as coterminous in the Lease, this land could not be used for expansion without including buffer land in the leasehold. Accordingly, Sunapee requested that the State approve inclusion of the buffer land in an amendment to the Lease. Based upon the State's assurances that it favored the western expansion plan as long as Sunapee satisfied certain conditions, Sunapee exercised the purchase options for $2.1 million. A new governor was elected during the pendency of Sunapee's expansion plans. The new governor strongly opposed Sunapee's plans for expansion. The Governor refused to bring the proposed expansion before the Executive Council. Sunapee subsequently sued the State for damages or alternatively, mandamus relief, alleging breach of contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court: (1) found that there were issues of material facts with regard to breach of contract, estoppel and inverse condemnation, and reversed the trial court with respect to those claims; (2) found that Sunapee had standing to bring the reformation claim; and (3) affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment with regard to the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sunapee Difference, LLC v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Petitioner Hannaford Brothers Company appealed a superior court order that dismissed its appeal of a Town of Bedford Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) decision for lack of standing. Petitioner owned and operated a 36,541 square foot supermarket on Route 101 in Bedford’s commercial district. Petitioner obtained planning board approval for its supermarket in November 2006, shortly after the Town of Bedford (Town) enacted a zoning ordinance amendment restricting the size of any single building in the commercial district to 40,000 square feet. Retail Management and Development, Inc. (RMD), the intervenor in this case, developed supermarkets. In November 2010, RMD filed an application with the ZBA seeking a variance to exceed the 40,000 square foot restriction in order to construct a 78,332 square foot supermarket on Route 114 in the commercial district. The location of RMD’s proposed supermarket is 3.8 miles from petitioner’s supermarket. Although petitioner objected to the variance application, the ZBA granted it. The ZBA found, among other things, that the "spirit of the ordinance" was intended to limit the size of buildings on Route 101, but not on Route 114, where RMD sought to build. The ZBA denied the petitioner's motion for rehearing, finding that the petitioner was not a "person directly affected" by its decision and, thus, lacked standing to move for rehearing. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in dismissing its appeal based upon a lack of standing. Upon review, the Court concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate that it had a "direct, definite interest in the outcome of the [ZBA’s] action," and accordingly affirmed the superior court's order. View "Hannaford Brothers Co. v. Town of Bedford" on Justia Law

Claimant William Stewart appealed a decision of the appeal tribunal, as affirmed by the appellate board of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) that denied his application for unemployment benefits. Stewart worked as the code enforcement director for the City of Laconia from March 14 to June 29, 2011. Following his termination, Stewart applied for unemployment benefits. A DES certifying officer denied the application. The officer determined that Stewart did not have annual earnings of at least $1,400 in two of four quarters of his alternate base period. Stewart appealed the decision to the tribunal. He argued that he had earnings of at least $1,400 in both the third and fourth quarters of his alternate base period. Following a hearing, the tribunal affirmed the decision denying Stewart’s claim. Stewart argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the tribunal erred in concluding that he had insufficient quarterly earnings under RSA 282-A:25 to establish a claim for benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that DES’s reliance on its decision in "Appeal of Tennis" was misplaced. View "Appeal of William Stewart" on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Bartlett Board of Selectmen appealed a superior court order that upheld a decision of the Town of Bartlett Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) finding that a sign erected by intervenor River Run Company, Inc. (River Run) was permitted under the Town's zoning ordinance. Upon review of the applicable ordinances and the superior court record, the Supreme Court found no error in the superior court's decision and affirmed. View "Town of Bartlett Board of Selectmen v. Town of Bartlett Zoning Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law