Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Town of Conway (Town) appealed a superior court order granting defendant Scott Kudrick's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court ruled that the Conway Zoning Ordinance (2013) (hereinafter, “CZO”) permitted a non-owner-occupied short-term rental (STR) in the Town’s residential districts because such use of a property fell within the CZO’s definition of a “residential/dwelling unit.” The Town argued that the court erroneously interpreted the CZO to allow non-owner-occupied STRs in residential districts. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly interpreted the CZO and held that the CZO permitted non-owner-occupied STRs in the Town’s residential districts. View "Town of Conway v. Kudrick" on Justia Law

Appellants (father and mother) challenged multiple circuit court orders finding both parents neglected their children and ordering the children's removal from their home. Appellants were the parents of B.R., S.R., and J.R. Both parents had a significant history with the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), including reports alleging one or both parents were manufacturing or selling methamphetamines in the home with the children present. In March 2021, based on criminal allegations against mother (relating to her purchase and use of methamphetamine), DCYF filed a motion for ex parte removal of the children from the home. The trial court granted the motion and found that mother’s continued involvement in drug trafficking beginning in 2015, and her risk-taking behavior related thereto, “demonstrate that the children’s health or life are in imminent danger if they are allowed to remain in the parents’ home.” The court awarded DCYF protective supervision of the children. In May 2022, following a dispositional hearing, the court found that return of the children to their home would be contrary to their welfare because neither parent had corrected the behavior that led to the children’s initial removal. Father and mother each appealed separately. The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted the two appeals and consolidated them. Parents argued both findings were unsupported by the evidence. Father also argued that the court’s orders failed to provide specific written findings as required by RSA 169-C:6-b, III (2022). After review of the circuit court orders, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "In re J.R.; In re S.R.; In re B.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC, JHM HIX Keene, LLC, VIDHI Hospitality, LLC, NAKSH Hospitality, LLC, 298 Queen City Hotel, LLC, ANSHI Hospitality, LLC, 700 Elm, LLC, Bedford-Carnevale, LLC, and Carnevale Holdings, LLC, owned commercial real estate on which they operated hotels, some of which offered restaurant services along with banquet or function facilities. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “natural disaster” and that their buildings were “damaged” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. Plaintiffs sought relief from the New Hampshire municipalities involved: the Cities of Laconia, Keene, and Manchester, and the Town of Bedford. After denial of their applications, they appealed to the superior court in the applicable county. Observing that there were thirteen separate lawsuits pending in six counties, they then filed an assented-to motion for interlocutory transfer without ruling and motion to consolidate to allow the coordinated transfer of the common questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In this interlocutory transfer without ruling, the Supreme Court was asked to determine: (1) whether, for purposes of RSA 76:21, the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a “natural disaster”; and (2) if so, whether the buildings owned by the plaintiffs were “damaged” by COVID-19 such that they were “not able to be used for [their] intended use” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. The Court answered the second question in the negative. View "Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC v. City of Laconia; et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), petitioned under the New Hampshire Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking review of a superior court order denying DCYF’s motion to dismiss a complaint brought against it. In 2019, Respondent filed a complaint as parent and next friend of his children, M.M. and J.M., asserting various claims against both DCYF and the Court Appointed Special Advocates of New Hampshire (CASA). DCYF and CASA moved to dismiss the complaint, with DCYF arguing, inter alia, that the claims were time-barred by RSA 541-B:14, IV. Respondent objected, asserting that RSA 508:8 (2010) tolled the period of limitations in RSA 541-B:14, IV. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the claims against CASA as precluded by quasi-judicial immunity, but denied the motion to dismiss the claims against DCYF. In its order, the trial court reasoned that RSA 508:8 operated as a tolling provision and that failing to read the tolling provision into the statute of limitations in RSA 541-B:14, IV would lead to “an absurd, unfair, and unjust result.” In its petition to the Supreme Court, DCYF asked the Court to determine that RSA 508:8 did not apply to claims brought under RSA chapter 541-B. The Supreme Court concurred with Respondent, holding that RSA 508:8 had to be read into RSA 541-B:14, IV in order to comport with the equal protection guarantees afforded to the citizenry under Part I, Articles 2 and 12 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law

Respondent-Mother appealed a circuit court order finding that her children were abused and neglected. Petitioner New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed six abuse and neglect petitions alleging Mother's biological children, J.S. and J.P.S. were born prematurely due to exposure to drugs taken during Mother's pregnancy. J.P.S. was born on October 7, 2021, at Mother and Father’s home. Approximately three days after his birth, J.P.S. began showing signs of distress. Father brought J.P.S. to Catholic Medical Center (CMC) under the so-called “safe haven law,” and stated that the child’s mother was, or was believed to be, an intravenous drug user. Because J.P.S’s needs were so extensive, he was transported to Boston Children’s Hospital (BCH). After three days at BCH, J.P.S. returned to CMC, where he was still being treated at the time of the adjudicatory hearing. He was diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS). The circuit court entered findings of “true” with respect to four petitions alleging neglect of J.S. and J.P.S. by Mother and Father. The two remaining petitions alleged abuse of J.P.S. by Father and Mother, respectively, through injuries sustained by J.P.S. after birth, caused by Mother’s prenatal narcotics use. The court entered findings of “not true” with respect to Father and “true” with respect to Mother. Mother appealed, challenging the finding of abuse of J.P.S. and the findings of neglect of both J.P.S. and J.S., and raising other alleged errors. The only question briefed by Mother, however, relates to the finding of abuse of J.P.S. Accordingly, we deem all other issues raised in Mother’s notice of appeal waived. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error in the circuit court's judgment and affirmed. View "In re J.P.S.; In re J.S." on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) appealed a circuit court order dismissing its neglect petitions against respondent, mother of H.B. and G.B. (Mother). DCYF argued the trial court erred when it dismissed the petitions because DCYF did not meet its burden of proving that any deprivation of parental care or control, subsistence, or education identified in RSA 169-C:3, XIX(b) was “not due primarily to the lack of financial means” of the parents. RSA 169-C:3, XIX(b) (2022). To this, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred, vacated the decision, and remanded for further proceedings on whether H.B. and G.B. were neglected. View "In re H.B.; In re G.B." on Justia Law

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, G.F., on the ground that he failed to correct, within twelve months, the conditions that led to the court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C (2022) that G.F. was neglected by G.F.’s mother. In January 2020, father did not attend mother’s adjudicatory or dispositional hearings. Mother entered into a consent agreement acknowledging that neglect occurred due to her drug use. At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court adopted a case plan and dispositional orders, which also applied to father. Father was not served with these documents. At the three-month review hearing, father's counsel received the case plan, dispositional orders and related discovery. Two days after the six-month review hearing, father was arrested for felony second degree assault and other domestic violence charges involving his then girlfriend and her minor child. He pled guilty to at least two of the charges. In September 2020, a nine-month review hearing was held. In January 2021, the trial court held the first permanency hearing in the neglect case while father was incarcerated. The trial court found father was not in compliance with dispositional orders. The trial court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and specified that “DCYF is no longer required to provide reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification between [G.F.] and mother [and] father, but shall make reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan.” In September 2021, the circuit court held a second permanency hearing; again the court found father was not in compliance with the dispositional orders and concluded G.F. could not be safely returned to his care. DCYF filed a new petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in October 2021. In December 2021, the father was released from incarceration. In February 2022, the circuit court granted DCYF’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. Assuming without deciding that, during the nine months in which DCYF was ordered by the court to make reasonable efforts to reunify G.F. with his father, those efforts were reasonable, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that DCYF failed to meet its burden because the court did not order DCYF to make such efforts for the remaining three months. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights over G.F. View "In re G.F." on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Amherst (Town) appealed Housing Appeals Board (HAB) orders vacating the denial by the Town’s planning board (Board) of subdivision and site plan approval sought by the respondents, Migrela Realty Trust II and GAM Realty Trust (collectively, Applicant). In November 2020, Applicant filed a subdivision/site plan approval application with the Board for 54 age-restricted and unrestricted housing units. Applicant previously had been granted a conditional use permit (CUP) for “an increased project density” of up to 54 units under the Town’s since-repealed Integrated Innovative Housing Ordinance (IIHO). During the review process with respect to the subdivision/site plan application, the project’s density was reduced from 54 to 49 units. The composition of age-restricted and unrestricted units was also modified, with the final plan designating 14 units as age-restricted, 65-and-older units and the remaining 35 units as unrestricted. In April 2021, the Board denied the site plan because: (1) the Board perceived conflicts between the proposed project and federal law; and (2) “the proposed design does not protect and preserve the rural aesthetic the Town has consistently valued, as is required by Section 4.16A of the Zoning Ordinance.” Finding no reversible error in the HAB's orders, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Applicant. View "Appeal of Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire petitioned for original jurisdiction to the New Hampshire Supreme Court to challenge a circuit court order that granted respondent’s motion to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition. The trial court ruled that the State failed to comply with RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) (2022) because no “manifestation review” had occurred prior to the filing of the delinquency petition. The Supreme Count found the term “manifestation review,” in the context of a juvenile delinquency petition resulting from conduct in a school setting by a student with a disability, referred to a process whereby a school, the student’s parents, and other parties review the student’s individualized education plan (IEP) and other relevant information to determine whether the alleged misconduct stemmed from the student’s disability or the school’s failure to implement the student’s IEP. The Court affirmed and held that whenever a delinquency petition is to be filed pursuant to RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) and the legally liable school district has determined that the child is a child with a disability according to RSA 186-C:2, I, then a manifestation review must be performed prior to the filing of the delinquency petition. "Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our construction of RSA 169-B:6, IV, it is free, within constitutional limits, to amend the statute accordingly." View "Petition of State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Cassandra Caron, Brandon Deane, Alison Petrowski, and Aaron Shelton, appealed a superior court order denying their request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief and dismissing their complaint. Plaintiffs sought, pursuant to RSA 282-A:127 (2010), to require defendants, the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (NHES) and its Commissioner, to reinstate Pandemic Unemployment Assistance available under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. On appeal, they argued the court erred when it construed RSA 282-A:127 as imposing no obligation on defendants to secure Pandemic Unemployment Assistance for New Hampshire citizens and, therefore, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s interpretation of RSA 282-A:127, the judgment was affirm. View "Caron et al. v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, et al." on Justia Law