Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA), appealed a Superior Court ruling. Money distributions from the Lyme Timber Company (Lyme) paid to limited partners that lived in New Hampshire were not considered taxable income under the state tax code. The court reasoned that the Lyme partners' interests were not "transferable shares" within the meaning of the tax code, and therefore not taxable. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the DRA argued that the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the tax regulations, and failed to consider portions of the Lyme partnership agreement. In its review, the Supreme Court engaged in defining the pertinent terms of the tax code and the Lyme partnership agreement. The Court concluded that the trial court did misinterpret many of the pertinent terms that were the basis of this appeal. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioners Matthew Kennedy and the Hinsdale Federation of Teachers appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) that denied their unfair labor practice claims against Respondent, the Hinsdale School District (District). Mr. Kennedy was a music teacher for about ten years and a member of the teachers' union. The District and Union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that contained a grievance procedure that provided for binding arbitration. The only matters excluded from the grievance procedure were management prerogatives and teacher non-renewals. Citing a lack of student participation, the District notified Mr. Kennedy that it would not renew his contract. Before the 2009-2010 school year, the District eliminated the Hinsdale band program and entered into an agreement with Brattleboro High School where interested students from Hinsdale could participate in Brattleboro's music offerings. Petitioners filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the PELRB alleging multiple violations of the CBA. The PELRB dismissed Petitioners' claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioners argued that the District illegally outsourced its band program to Brattleboro, and challenged the District's reasons for its "reduction-in-force" claim. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the PELRB's decision was erroneous or that it was unjust or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PELRB's decision to dismiss Petitioners' complaint.

Respondent Judith McGann was terminated as superintendent of Petitioner School Administrative Unit #44 (SAU). During the evidentiary portion of the SAU Board's termination hearing, SAU called an expert witness. Ms. McGann requested access to the expert's file. The moderator of the hearing denied Ms. McGann's request. Following the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Ms. McGann. On appeal to the Board of Education, Ms. McGann argued that the SAU violated her due process rights by denying her access to the expert's records. The Board ordered SAU to produce the expert's work file, and recommended that the SAU's decision be vacated and remanded for a new hearing. The SAU sought review of the State Board of Education's decision ordering it to produce the expert's file. The Supreme Court noted that due process requirements for binding administrative procedures are quite different from those binding judicial procedures. The Court did not find that the SAU Board violated Ms. McGann's constitutional due process rights in the course of the termination hearing. The Court found that the Board gave Ms. McGann "extensive opportunity" to meaningfully cross-examine the expert despite not having his file. The Court dismissed Ms. McGann's appeal, reversed the Board's order to produce the expert's file, and affirmed the SAU's decision to terminate Ms. McGann's employment as superintendent.

Petitioners Daniel and Lisa B. appealed the decision of the New Hampshire State Board of Education (Board) that upheld a thirty-four day suspension imposed on their daughter Keelin B. Keelin opened an email account under another studentâs name, and then sent sexually suggestive, lewd and threatening email messages to the principal of her school and one teacher. When the deception was discovered, the Board âsentencedâ Keelin to a thirty-four day suspension. Keelinâs parents appealed to the School Board, but the Board upheld the suspension. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Keelinâs âsentenceâ exceeded the Boardâs maximum allowable suspension under these kinds of circumstances. The Court reduced Keelinâs suspension to twenty days, but affirmed the Boardâs decision in all other respects.

In September, 2009, counsel for the Hampton Police Association wrote to the Town of Hamptonâs Manager requesting copies of invoices from all attorneys who gave advice to or otherwise represented the Town in a grievance and arbitration matter. The Association sought the invoices under the state âRight-to-Knowâ law. The next day, the Town Manager advised the Association that invoices from its attorneys contained confidential detailed billing narratives that were privileged information, and not subject to the Right-to-Know law. Understanding this, the Association replied to the Town Manager, suggesting the Town hand over the invoices with all the privileged information redacted. The Association sought information relating to the amounts of money the Town spent on counsel, not the information in the narratives. The Town still refused to produce the invoices, and the Association took the Town to court. Town counsel provided the trial court with the invoices for an in camera review. The court ordered the release of the invoices, and ordered the Town to make the copies. The Town objected to all the âextra work,â and the trial court amended its order to require the Town and its outside counsel to compile a list of the invoices with the general subject matter of the matters billed, and the total prices paid. The Town maintained that discussing the narratives even in a general sense, still constituted privileged information. The court denied the Town any relief from compiling the list, and the Town appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it required the Town to create an entirely new document to provide the Association with the information it sought. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings, ordering that the Town should produce the invoices with privileged information redacted.

Petitioners ATV Watch and Andrew Walters brought suit against Respondent New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) seeking the disclosure of agency documents under the stateâs âRight-to-Knowâ act. Walters is the director of ATV Watch. He wrote to the commissioner of the DOT regarding a recent inquiry related to the Federal Highway Administration, asking for clarification on the federal law that governed use of rails trails within the state. The DOT responded that it would keep Walters informed of any new developments from the talks the state had with the federal government. Walters sent the DOT an email in April, 2007, asking again for information on use of the trails. In November, the DOT responded to another email request from Walters, indicating that there was no new information. On November 21, Walters sent an email to the DOT criticizing the Department for being unresponsive to his requests, and alleging that the Department was withholding documents. The Department responded that it had complied with state law by responding to Waltersâ requests. Petitioners filed suit in January, 2008, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, fees, costs and sanctions for what it felt was the DOTs withholding documents. At the hearing, the DOT indicated it had given Walters all records it could, with the exception of certain documents redacted or withheld on the basis of a privilege or exemption. Following the hearing, the DOT provided the court under seal the unredacted copies of the withheld documents, along with an index of those materials for the courtâs review. The court issued its order on the merits, finding that most of the documents were properly redacted or withheld as privileged. The court denied the Petitionersâ motion for reconsideration. Interpreting New Hampshireâs âRight-To-Knowâ law, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtâs ruling. The Court found from the record that Petitioners lacked sufficient reasons to overcome the asserted privileged documents, and therefore were not entitled to the relief they sought.

Petitioner 1808 Corporation appeals the decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) which denied it expanded use of its building under a âspecial exception.â Petitioner owns a lot in New Ipswich on which there are two structures: a one-story building and a two-story building of office and storage space. In 1998, Petitioner requested a special exception to the Townâs zoning ordinance to allow an office building in an area zoned as âVillage District II.â At a May, 1998 meeting, the ZBA granted the special exception. In January, 2008, Petitioner applied to the ZBA for a site plan review. Petitioner wanted to use the two-story building under the special exception as all-office space, testifying that the storage area was no longer needed. At a May, 2009 hearing, the ZBA voted to defer a ruling on Petitionerâs site plan for âno more than 180 daysâ while Petitioner sought ZBA approvals. Petitioner appealed this decision, challenging the need for another ZBA approval. After a public hearing, the ZBA denied Petitionerâs request. Petitioner appealed the ZBAâs denial to the trial court; the trial court upheld the ZBAâs decision. In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argues that it did not need additional ZBA approvals since its storage space was within the scope of the 1998 special exception. The Court found that the record submitted for its review supported the ZBAâs determination. The Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision and upheld the determinations of the ZBA requiring Petitioner to seek additional approvals before proceeding with its plan to expand its office space.