Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Tradz, LLC, appealed a New Hampshire Department of Safety, Bureau of Hearings (bureau) decision affirming the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) decision to deny petitioner’s applications for title to ten motor vehicles. Petitioner argued the bureau erred by concluding that New Hampshire’s abandoned vehicle statute, RSA 262:40-a (2014), did not provide a basis for it to obtain title to the vehicles. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Tradz, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Bisceglia appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants' the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (collectively the State). The court ruled that the State was immune from liability for plaintiff’s negligence claim under New Hampshire’s recreational use statute. Plaintiff and her family visited a historic lighthouse situated on land in New Castle, which was owned by the United States. That federal land was adjacent to Fort Constitution, which was owned and operated by the State. While plaintiff was standing on the federal land next to the outer wall of Fort Constitution, a portion of the wall fell on top of her, causing her substantial injuries. The trial court determined that because the State “held Fort Constitution out to the public at no charge” and the wall “was maintained as part of the historic site for the use and enjoyment of the public,” RSA 508:14, I, shielded the State from liability, “regardless of whether Plaintiff was physically on [the State’s] property at the time of the injury.” The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding it was undisputed that plaintiff did not use the State’s land; the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment based on RSA 508:14, I. View "Bisceglia v. New Hampshire Secretary of State & al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Dianna Rudder appealed a superior court order upholding the administrative suspension of her driver’s license by the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Petitioner’s suspension was upheld on grounds that she was “in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the ways of this state” while intoxicated. She argued the trial court should have overturned the suspension of her license because the hearing examiner erred when he applied the definition of “way” contained in RSA 259:125, II (2014). Petitioner was sitting in her vehicle, parked with the engine running in a private church parking lot. A police officer observed petitioner exit the vehicle, retrieve a bottle of alcohol from the trunk, and return to the driver’s seat. The officer approached petitioner, who informed him that she was sober when she arrived at the church and that, before leaving, she intended to wait until she was sober or call for a ride. The officer administered a field sobriety test, which petitioner failed. The officer arrested the petitioner for driving under the influence. On appeal, petitioner argued that the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe petitioner was in control of a vehicle “upon the ways of this state:” the church parking lot where she was arrested was not a “way” within the meaning of the statute. To this the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed and reversed judgment. View "Rudder v. Director, New Hampshire Div. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff B&C Management (B&C) appealed a superior court order ruling that 911 audio recordings were exempt from disclosure under the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law, and denying its request for equitable discovery of a 911 audio recording in the possession of defendant New Hampshire Division of Emergency Services and Communications (the Division). On June 16, 2019, a 911 call was placed to the Division, reporting that a guest was injured in a trip-and-fall incident at B&C’s Fireside Inn in Nashua. Subsequently, the guest’s attorney sent a letter to B&C indicating an intent to investigate the fall. This letter did not demand a sum for settlement, and the guest had not filed a lawsuit. B&C submitted a request to the Division under the Right-to-Know Law for the audio recording of the 911 call. The Division denied this request. Then, B&C filed an action in the superior court seeking to compel the release of the 911 audio recording pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law, or, in the alternative, pursuant to the court’s equitable powers. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied B&C’s requests. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded B&C did not demonstrate the trial court erred by ruling that it was not entitled to the 911 recording under the Right-to-Know Law. Further, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court that B&C failed to show why the trial court should have granted its request for equitable discovery. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "B&C Management v. New Hampshire Division of Emergency Services" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court arose from the New Hampshire Division of State Police's decision to terminate State Trooper Thomas Owens after an internal investigation. The Trooper appealed his termination to the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB), which reinstated him. The Division appealed, arguing that the PAB’s reinstatement of the Trooper was unjust and unreasonable because he was no longer qualified to be a state trooper. It also argued that the PAB erred as a matter of law when it reinstated the employee in contravention of public policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law

Respondent, C.R. (ward) appealed a circuit court order appointing a guardian over her person, arguing that petitioner New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was incapacitated. She also argued the trial court’s findings of incapacity exceeded the scope of the pleadings and evidence at trial, thereby depriving her of notice and an opportunity to be heard. The ward suffered from schizoaffective disorder, and, in November 2020, was involuntarily admitted to NHH for a two-year period. NHH obtained emergency treatment authorization to provide the ward with psychiatric medication without her consent, and although her condition improved, the medication caused side effects that required a reduction in dosage. The ward declined to take any medication to treat the side effects or any alternative medication that would not cause the side effects. The emergency treatment authorization expired on January 4, 2021. In the two weeks before the February 2021 guardianship proceeding, the ward started exhibiting worsening thoughts that people were trying to target her, and her mood fluctuated more, spurring concerns that the current medication was insufficient. NHH filed the guardianship petition at issue here, alleging that, the guardianship was necessary. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the trial court to have found the ward “is likely to suffer substantial harm due to an inability to provide for [her] personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care or safety or an inability to manage . . . her property or financial affairs.” Further, the Court found there was support in the record for the trial court's finding that guardianship was the least restrictive intervention for the ward. The Court found that the guardianship petition informed the ward the trial court could “impose additional orders as a result of the hearing,” but it did not inform her that NHH was asking the court to find her incapable of exercising her rights to marry or divorce, make a will or waive a will’s provisions, hold or obtain a motor vehicle operator’s license, initiate/defend/settle lawsuits, or make decisions concerning educational matters or training. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the ward did not receive the notice contemplated by RSA 464-A:5, I, as to those rights. Therefore, the Court vacated the guardianship order to the extent that it deprived her of those rights. The Court otherwise affirmed the order appointing a guardian over the person of the ward and remanded. View "In re Guardianship of C.R." on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) appealed a circuit court order that dismissed a neglect petition brought against the respondent. DCYF argued the circuit court erred by: (1) relying upon criminal definitions of sexual assault and grooming; and (2) disregarding conduct that the child did not personally observe. Further, DCYF argued the evidence compelled a finding of neglect by the circuit court. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the circuit court committed legal error by basing its neglect determination, in part, upon whether the respondent’s conduct was criminal. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded. In addition, because the issue was likely to arise on remand, the Court clarified that RSA chapter 169-C did not require that a child personally observe conduct in order for a court to consider that conduct when determining neglect. View "In re C.C." on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Chenard appealed a superior court ruling that he operated or maintained a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114. Plaintiff Town of Lincoln (town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for costs and attorney’s fees. Defendant owned the property at issue, consisting of four lots located in the town's "General Use" zoning district, which allowed junk yards only by special exception. The properties contained “large amounts of personal belongings” stored “both outdoors and in a number of sheds, which are generally in a dilapidated condition.” During its view of the properties, the court observed “old or used scrap metal including numerous machine or automotive parts, tires, wheels, cables and wiring, woodstoves, snowplows, construction debris, steel drums, plastic barrels, and other detritus.” In addition, the court observed “several automobiles that did not appear to be in working order, as well as old snowmobiles, lawnmowers, and ATVs, an old boat, and two semi-trailers.” All of the materials stored on defendant’s properties belonged to him and were stored there for his personal use. Defendant did not have a license to operate a junk yard business, nor did he have a special exception from the town. The superior court ultimately ordered defendant to end his violation of RSA 236:114 and abate the nuisance by a certain date and, if he failed to do so, authorized the town to impose a civil penalty of up to $50 per day for every day the nuisance continued and until such time as the nuisance was abated to the town’s satisfaction. The trial court denied the town’s request for costs and attorney’s fees. Finding that the trial court did not err in finding that provisions of RSA 236:111-:129 applied to defendant’s properties, and that defendant was operating or maintaining a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114, and that the town was not entitled to attorney's fees, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Lincoln v. Joseph Chenard" on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Berlin (City) appealed a New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) order determining that the City over-assessed respondent Public Service Company of New Hampshire d/b/a Eversource Energy (PSNH), for tax year 2017. The City challenged the BTLA’s decision to apply the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) 2017 median equalization ratio to determine the proportionality of the City’s assessment of PSNH’s J. Brodie Smith hydroelectric facility (Smith Hydro). It argued the 2016 median equalization ratio — the most recent DRA ratio available at the time the City prepared the 2017 tax assessment — should have applied. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed, it reversed and remanded. View "Appeal of City of Berlin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (ACLU) and the Concord Monitor, appealed a superior court order which ruled that portions of a contract between an equipment vendor and defendant City of Concord, for the purchase of “covert communications equipment,” were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. Plaintiffs argued the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that redacted portions of the contract were exempt from disclosure, and that the trial court erred when it held an ex parte in camera hearing, during which the City presented evidence supporting exemption. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err when it conducted the hearing, and that it properly determined that most of the redacted information was exempt from disclosure. However, the Court also concluded that it erred by not disclosing one provision of the agreement. That provision was ordered disclosed on remand. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire & a. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law