Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a chief municipal court judge whose son became a member of the police department in the same municipality could hear cases involving that police department. The Supreme Court held that, "consistent with the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a municipal court judge whose child becomes a police officer in the same municipality may not hear any cases involving that police department. The judge also may not supervise other judges who hear those cases." View "In the Matter of Advisory Letter No. 7-11 of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Extrajudicial Activities" on Justia Law

The taxpayer, Bocceli, LLC, is the taxpaying sublessee of a commercial property owned by Penns Grove Associates in the Township of Carney's Point. The Township's tax assessment list incorrectly listed Prime Accounting Department as the owner. In 2007, the Township wrote to Prime Accounting requesting updated income and expense information for purposes of assessing the value of the property. Prime Management's interest in the property transferred to a new lessee, WIH Hotels, Inc. That inquiry eventually reached WIH, which submitted a late response and paid taxes for 2007. WIH entered into a sublease with Bocceli, which became responsible for property tax payments. In 2008, the managing member of Bocceli visited the tax collector's office, made a tax payment, and requested that the tax assessment list be changed to designate "Bocceli, LLC" as the owner and that notices be sent to the property. According to the Township, the clerk advised the managing member that a deed needed to be presented to the assessor's office to change the list. No deed was presented, and Prime Accounting remained on the list. The tax assessor sent the annual request to Prime Accounting. When it was returned undelivered, the Township reviewed its records and discovered that WIH had responded to the prior year's request. It sent another request to WIH, which did not forward it to Bocceli. Later that year, the tax collector advised the tax assessor of the address that the managing member had provided, but it continued to list Prime Accounting as the owner. In early 2009, the assessor notified Bocceli of the annual tax assessment. Thus, at that time, the assessor was aware of Bocceli's responsibility to pay property taxes and used Bocceli's mailing address to serve the notice of assessment that prompted this tax appeal. The tax assessment list continued to designate Prime Accounting as the entity responsible to pay the taxes. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a tax appeal complaint timely filed, but one which did not name the aggrieved taxpayer as the plaintiff, should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that Bocceli's misdesignation of the plaintiff did not deprive the tax court of subject matter jurisdiction. "The defect in the complaint did not prejudice the Township and [could] be corrected by an amended complaint that relate[d] back to the filing of the original complaint." View "PrimeAccounting Department v. Township of Carney's Point" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Valeria Headen worked on a full-time ten-month basis as a food service worker for defendant Jersey City Board of Education (Board). She filed a complaint against the Board in 2009 alleging that because the District is governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Act (Act), she and potential class members were entitled to vacation leave under its provisions. Those provisions grant vacation leave to full-time "political subdivision employees" based on years of service, and they direct that a proportionate amount of leave be provided for part-time employees. Plaintiff's terms and conditions of employment were governed by a collectively negotiated agreement (CNA). Under the CNA, Headen and her fellow ten-month employee class members were classified as salaried employees. After discovery was completed, Headen filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the Board filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Board's motion and denied Headen's motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that provisions of the Act (N.J.S.A. 11A:6-3) did not apply to full-time ten-month school district employees. It reasoned that the term "political subdivision" in the vacation leave provision did not include school districts, and it concluded that laws addressing vacation leave in Title 18, suggested that the Legislature did not intend for Title 11A, Chapter 6 to apply to school district employees. Upon review on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act's paid vacation leave provisions applied to career service, non-teaching staff employees of school districts that have opted to be part of the civil service system, including ten-month employees such as plaintiff Valeria Headen. "Because the Act and its implementing regulations establish a floor for the amount of leave to be provided to such employees and a collectively negotiated agreement provided Headen with more than the minimum paid vacation leave to which she was entitled under the Act, her claims were properly dismissed." View "Headen v. Jersey City Board of Education" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the nature of the nexus that must be proven by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) under the Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act or Act) against Sue’s Clothes Hanger (Sue’s), the only direct defendant that remained in the case, for costs expended in the investigation and remediation of contaminated groundwater that tainted private wells in Bound Brook. The trial court dismissed the Spill Act claim, concluding that even if the building where Sue’s was located is a contamination source, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Sue’s discharged PCE that contaminated the groundwater. The court found: the groundwater and soil contamination preceded Sue’s dry cleaning operation; there was no evidence that the drip from Sue’s continued or the pavement below showed signs of contamination; the DEP took no other action regarding the drip, suggesting it was not considered to be significant; there is no evidence that PCE in the groundwater or soil came from Sue’s rather than from others who had conducted dry cleaning operations in the building; and because there are alternative sources of contamination from the building and Zaccardi’s, the DEP had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Sue’s contributed to the groundwater contamination. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division in holding that in order to obtain damages under the Spill Act, the DEP must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, a reasonable connection between the discharge, the discharger, and the contamination at the damaged site. The proofs failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the groundwater contamination and Sue’s discharge during its operation. View "New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Dimant" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether a plaintiff, who was removed from public employment after positing a claim of employer retaliation in a civil service disciplinary proceeding, should have been barred from seeking to circumvent that discipline through a subsequent Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) action also alleging retaliation. Plaintiff was terminated from his position following two close-in-time proceedings involving separate disciplinary matters before the Civil Service Commission (Commission). The first resulted in a demotion and the imposition of a sixty-day suspension. The second proceeding involved a distinct set of charges relating to plaintiff's abuse of sick leave. Following full discovery practice before the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) and the commencement of an evidential proceeding in the second matter, the employer moved for partial summary decision, which was granted by the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found it significant that despite plaintiff's defensive theme of employer retaliation, he did not provide support for that claim in his response to the employer's motion seeking partial summary judgment, and plaintiff's termination, for sick-leave misuse. "This matter raises significant and practical concerns about the intersection of administrative disciplinary proceedings and the important protection provided to whistle-blowing employees through CEPA. Although this matter does not present a textbook record for transparent application of the elements required for application of collateral estoppel, [the Supreme Court was] persuaded that preclusion should apply to plaintiff's subsequently filed retaliation claims against his former employer." The Court reversed the appellate court and held that under the facts of this case, plaintiff's CEPA action was barred. View "Winters v. No. Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Pension and Health Care Benefits Act (Chapter 78) was enacted into law, a law that applied to all public employees, including Supreme Court justices and Superior Court judges then in service. Article VI, Section 6, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that justices and judges "shall receive for their services such salaries as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during the term of their appointment" (the No-Diminution Clause). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Chapter 78 violated the New Jersey Constitution by diminishing the salaries of justices and judges during the terms of their appointments. Upon review, the Court concluded that it did. "Whatever good motives the Legislature might have, the Framers' message is simple and clear. Diminishing judicial salaries during a jurist's term of appointment is forbidden by the Constitution." View "DePascale v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered the extent to which the Board of Governors of Rutgers, the State University (University) complied with the requirements of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), and if its compliance was deficient, the extent to which plaintiff was entitled to a judicial remedy. Plaintiff Francis McGovern is an alumnus of the University who attended regularly the meetings of the University's Board of Governors. Concerned at what he perceived to be a persistent disregard on the part of the Board for OPMA's mandates, he filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs. The trial court ultimately granted defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint. Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. View "McGovern, Jr. v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Defendant F.M. (Fernanda) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her now five-year-old daughter, Quinn, and four-year-old son, Troy, Jr. Both children were born of a relationship between Fernanda and T.J. (Troy). The family court found that Troy had committed an act of domestic violence against Fernanda, had an intractable drug-addiction problem, and suffered from mental illness that induced delusional thoughts that he was God. On this basis, the court considered Troy a danger to the physical well-being of the children. The termination of Fernanda's parental rights was premised on the court's findings that she was incapable and unwilling to protect her children from the dangers presented by Troy. The court barred Troy from having unsupervised contact with Quinn, the only child born of their relationship at the time. In violation of court orders and earlier consent agreements with the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), Fernanda allowed Troy to have access to Quinn in her home. Fernanda's inability to shield Quinn from her father led to the child's removal from the home and later to the removal of Troy, Jr. after his birth. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Fernanda never raised any objection to "care or custody" before the family court, she was barred from doing so on appeal based on laches. Furthermore, the Court upheld the family court's determination to terminate Fernanda's parental rights, deferring to the lower court's findings as adequately supported by the record. View "New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. F.M." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned the validity of Chapter 37 of the Laws of 2009, "Kyleigh’s Law." Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that Chapter 37 is preempted by the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act; violates equal protection; and constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel found that the decal requirement was not preempted by the federal statute because disclosure of a person's age group is not "personal information" under the Act; that the decal requirement does not violate equal protection because it is a rational and suitable means of furthering a legitimate and appropriate government interest; and that the decal requirement does not give rise to an unreasonable search and seizure because a driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her age group and an officer's examination of the decal is not a "search." Upon review, the Supreme Court substantially affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that Chapter 37 is not preempted by federal law, does not violate equal protection, and does not give rise to an unconstitutional search and seizure. View "Trautmann v. Christie" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Court determined whether N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provided immunity to the Plainfield Rescue Squad as an entity, regardless of any negligent delay in transporting a gunshot victim to a hospital. According to the report of the Plaintiff's expert, the Rescue Squad members "wasted over 30 minutes" performing ineffective CPR, depriving the decedent of "any chance of surviving his injury." The decedent needed an immediate transport to the nearby emergency room, where a surgical trauma team could have opened his chest and taken him to the operating room for surgical repair. Had the decedent been transported promptly, he would have had a twenty to thirty percent chance of surviving. The expert concluded that the Squad members engaged in "significant deviations" from usual standards of practice that were significant contributing factors to the decedent's death. Plaintiffs filed a wrongful-death/survival action against the Plainfield Rescue Squad and others. Ultimately, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. With respect to the Rescue Squad, the trial court found immunity under both N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 and another statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, determining that only N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 shielded the Squad from civil liability. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed: "[a]lthough N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provides immunity to 'officers and members' of a rescue squad for civil damages in rendering 'intermediate life support services in good faith,' the plain language of the statute does not provide immunity to a rescue squad as an entity. Thus, Plainfield Rescue Squad is subject to a civil suit for negligence based on the facts alleged by plaintiffs."