Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The question raised in this appeal was whether records of a legal clinic at a public law school were subject to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). The Rutgers Environmental Litigation Clinic represented a private group that opposed a plan to build an outlet mall. The mall's developer, Sussex Commons Associates, LLC (Sussex Commons or Sussex), sought documents from the Clinic under OPRA. The trial court concluded that the Clinic was exempt from OPRA requests, and the Appellate Division reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and held that records related to cases at public law school clinics are not subject to OPRA. "[The Court found] no evidence that the Legislature intended to apply OPRA to teaching clinics that represent private clients, or that it meant to cause harm to clinical programs at public law schools when it enacted OPRA." The Court also concluded that the common law right of access does not extend to case-related records of law school clinics.

Plaintiff Kenneth Van Dunk and his wife filed this suit in the Law Division after he suffered serious injuries in a trench collapse at a construction site workplace. Following discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment to the employer-defendants Reckson Associates Realty Corporation and James Construction Company, Inc. Based on its assessment of the totality of circumstances, the court concluded that plaintiff did not demonstrate an intentional wrong within the meaning of the Act, notwithstanding that the employer was issued a federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) "willful violation" citation as a result of the incident. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, and returned the matter to the trial court. The Supreme Court granted the Defendants' petition for certification seeking review of that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendants' conduct fell short of an intentional wrong creating a substantial certainty of bodily injury or death. Therefore the workers' compensation statutory bar against common-law tor actions precluded this suit, and the appellate court's ruling was reversed.

Plaintiff Mazdabrook Commons Homeowner's Association, Inc. manages a common-interest community in which individual owners agree to certain common rules and restrictions for the benefit of the entire group. The Rules and Regulations of the community bar signs except as provided in a "Declaration." Defendant Wasim Khan lived in a planned townhouse community managed by Mazdabrook Commons. In 2005, Defendant ran for Parsippany Town Council and posted two signs in support of his candidacy at his private residence: one inside the window of his townhouse and another inside the door. Mazdabrook notified Defendant that the signs violated the association's rules and ordered their removal. Mazdabrook's regulations banned all residential signs except "For Sale" signs. Upon review, the Supreme Court "balance[ed] the minimal interference with Mazdabrook's private property interest against [Defendant's] free speech right to post political signs on his own property" and found that the sign policy in question violated the free speech clause of the State Constitution.

The issues in this appeal were whether, pursuant to "Contey v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.," 136 N.J. 582 (1994) or N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1, an electric utility company is entitled to immunity for any negligence in its placement of a pole along a public roadway; and whether a county is entitled to immunity for any negligence on its part pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3. Early one winter morning, plaintiff John Seals was driving his pickup truck and descended a curved, snow-covered road in Washington Township that is owned and maintained by Morris County. Due to the road conditions and despite applying the brakes, plaintiff could not negotiate the curve and the vehicle struck an electric utility pole located several feet from the roadway. He alleged that the County negligently maintained a dangerous roadway condition and that the electric utility company negligently placed the pole. The trial court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court distinguished "Contey," in which the Supreme Court held that a telephone company that placed its pole in compliance with a municipal ordinance owed no duty to a motorist. The trial court reasoned that because the County did not set standards for placing electric poles, and was not statutorily required to do so, the utility is subject to a negligence standard; and although "Contey" did not impose a duty on the County to conduct a safety study, it was not shielded by the TCA because it took "no action" to regulate placement of electric poles. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of summary judgment for JCP&L and vacated the denial of summary judgment for the County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that neither "Contey" nor N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1 conferred immunity on the utility for its negligence, if any, in placing the electric pole. If a governmental entity directs a utility where to place a pole (as in "Contey") the utility is immune from liability. When there is no governmental dictate, ordinary negligence standards apply. A utility will be liable if it places or maintains an electric pole where there is an unreasonable and unnecessary danger to travelers upon the highway. Whether the County is entitled to TCA immunity was remanded for further proceedings.

This dispute arose in the context of a large construction project known as the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System. Plaintiff Twenty-First Century Rail Corporation served as the prime contractor for the Project. In January 2002, Twenty-First Century, acting through its contracting affiliate, Washington Group, entered into a contract with Frontier-Kemper/Shea/Bemo, Joint Venture (FKSB). Pursuant to that contract, FKSB was responsible for construction of “the civil, electrical, mechanical and emergency system portions of the tunnel, station, plaza, and elevators” for the (N30) Project. In 2004, FKSB retained Bruce Meller and his law firm, Peckar & Abramson, in connection with the work that FKSB was performing on the N30 Project. In particular, Richard Raab, who was an officer of FKSB and who served as its representative, first telephoned Meller in February 2004 and arranged to meet with him at the Peckar & Abramson offices. Raab signed a retainer agreement on behalf of FKSB, pursuant to which the lawyers were asked to provide FKSB with certain legal advice. The law firm provided its opinion on the issues about which it had been consulted in the form of a letter. A year later, Meller received a phone call from Paul Killian, Esquire. Killian told Meller that he was representing FKSB and wanted Meller’s impressions of Washington Group because FKSB was considering whether to enter into an agreement with it. Thereafter, the lawsuit at issue in this appeal was filed. Twenty-First Century, for which Washington Group was the contracting affiliate, and FKSB alleged that PB Americas was responsible for the N30 Project delays and the resulting costs due to defective project designs and slow responses to requests for corrections. Meller’s law firm, Peckar & Abramson, represented PB Americas. PKSB filed a motion to disqualify Peckar & Abramson based on the prior representation. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that many of the documents that would have been provided to the law firm for its use in preparing the opinion letter were publicly available, the representation there was insignificant and immaterial, and the matters were not substantially related. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that disqualification of the attorney for PB Americas was warranted in this case because details relating to the construction project, the relationship among the parties, and the attorney’s prior representation of an adverse party, FKSB, demonstrate that the subsequent representation was prohibited by RPC 1.9(a).

In 2007, the Legislature passed a series of reform measures designed to lower property taxes. Among other issues, the reforms attempted to address the problem of excessive benefits for high-level school administrators. The following year, the Commissioner of Education issued various regulations to implement the new laws. The regulations limited certain benefits in new contracts for high-level administrators, and also capped payments for accumulated unused sick leave. In 2008, Plaintiffs-Respondents the New Jersey Association of School Administrators, Dr. Terry Van Zoeren, Dr. Simon Bosco, Joseph Abate, Jr., and John Golden filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the use of the regulations, as well as other provisions in N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-3.1(e) on federal constitutional and state law grounds. The court denied the application for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the lawsuit. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine known as "Burford" abstention, to allow the state courts the opportunity to determine important questions of state law. The Appellate Division held that the challenged regulations impermissibly reduced the compensation of tenured assistant superintendents, in violation of the tenure statute, and improperly deprived certain administrators of vested rights. The Appellate Division also concluded that the challenge to the sick leave cap was partially mooted by a newly enacted law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature had the authority to modify terms and conditions for future contracts for public employment in a manner that did not raise constitutional concerns. Furthermore, the Legislature properly exercised its power when it directed the Commissioner to issue regulations for new contracts for superintendents and assistant superintendents. The regulations that followed were consistent with their respective enabling statutes and advanced the Legislature's goals. They also protected benefits that employees had already accumulated. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division.

At the time of the attack, Anthony Andrews, who was temporarily living with his sister in an apartment across the hall, called 9-1-1. The call was routed to a State Police Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP). When the operator answered, Andrews reported that he "heard somebody screaming next door, inside this building" at "227 Wegman." The call was transferred to Jersey City’s PSAP, where the operator there asked for a location. Andrews responded, "185 Wegman." He stated: "I hear some screamin'" and "I don’t know what’s going on next door." The Jersey City operator prepared a narrative of the call which included the wrong address. The operator never asked Andrews what he meant by "next door" and so she mistakenly wrote "the house next door" rather than an apartment. Officers were dispatched to "Check 185 Wegman Parkway." Officers found the building at 185 Wegman unoccupied and left. Approximately twenty-two hours later, Andrews called 9-1-1 again. The operator who answered interrupted Andrews and asked if he had "a life threatening emergency that’s going on right now," and he replied, "No . . . it happened last night." A wrongful death and survival action was filed by both Plaintiff Paris Wilson through a guardian ad litem, his aunt Sonya Manzano, and by Plaintiff D Artagnan Manzano, individually and as Administrator of the Estates of his children DeQuan and Dartagnania. Plaintiffs claim that the two 9-1-1 operators were derelict in their duties and that their negligence, gross negligence, or wanton and willful disregard for the safety of others caused pain and suffering to all three children and led to the deaths of DeQuan and Dartagnania. The trial court dismissed the claims against defendants, finding that they were protected by statutes including the 9-1-1 immunity act, N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10, and that there was insufficient evidence of wanton and willful conduct needed to vault the immunity statute. The Appellate Division reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10 provides immunity to 9-1-1 operators and their public-entity employers for negligence in delivering 9-1-1 services, including the mishandling of emergency calls. Because the statute does not protect conduct that constitutes wanton and willful disregard for safety, the Court remanded the case to resolve that issue.

Plaintiff American Dream at Marlboro, L.L.C., is the successor in interest to Beacon Road Associates, L.L.C., an entity that served as the residential developer of a series of lots. In 1994 and 1995, Plaintiff’s predecessor sought the approval of the Marlboro Township Planning Board for "Beacon Woods I." In 1995, the Planning Board granted preliminary major subdivision approval specifically conditioned on the inclusion of a restriction in the deed for a "flag lot" that would preclude its further subdivision. In 1999, Defendant Patricia Cleary entered into a contract with Plaintiff to purchase one of the properties in the originally-approved development. Defendant's lot backed onto the flag lot. The Planning Board approved Plaintiff's application for a new subdivision. The resolution made no reference to the deed restriction. Plaintiff closed on the purchase of the additional land and vacated the easement that had provided that parcel with separate access to a nearby road. In 2002, when Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell the new subdivision to another developer, Plaintiff realized that it failed to reserve the easement that it needed to cross Defendant's property. When negotiations to secure Defendant's consent to the easement failed, Plaintiff redesigned the roadway so as to obviate the need the easement. In 2006, Plaintiff returned to the Planning Board and requested that it act on its 2003 application for an amendment to the subdivision approval, but the Board rejected it, noting that prior approvals had expired. In April 2003, Plaintiff filed suit for a declaration that its 2003 application had been approved by default. Defendant as intervenor, filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the flag lot was prohibited from being subdivided because of the earlier-imposed deed restriction, along with an order directing Plaintiff to record the deed restriction. The trial court concluded that the Planning Board could not approve the amended application because it lacked jurisdiction to eliminate the deed restriction. The court therefore entered an order declaring that all of the prior approvals for the subdivision were void, and it permitted Plaintiff to amend its complaint to eliminate the deed restriction based on changed circumstances. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification, and after review concluded the trial court misapplied the governing standards for considering the application to eliminate the restriction based on changed circumstances.

The issue on appeal in this case arose from the November 8, 2011 election of Gabriela Mosquera to the fourth Legislative district of the General Assembly. Shelley Lovett, who received the next highest number of votes, challenged the election alleging that Mosquera was ineligible because she failed to meet the one-year durational residency requirement set forth in Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution. Complicating the matter was the decision and accompanying order in "Robertson v. Bartels," (150 F. Supp.2d 691 (D.N.J. 2001)), wherein a federal trial court had concluded that the durational residency requirement of the State Constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and had enjoined the New Jersey Attorney General and Secretary of State from enforcing the provision’s one-year durational residency requirement for eligibility for General Assembly office. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that The New Jersey Constitution's durational residency requirement for members of the General Assembly does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; this decision was not a new ruling and the Court therefore declined to limit its judgment to prospective application. Because Mosquera was the incumbent at the time of the vacancy, the Democratic Party, with which Mosquera was affiliated at the time of the election, could select an interim successor for the vacant seat. Further, in construing the vacancy-filling provisions the Court recognized that Mosquera would meet eligibility requirements for appointment as interim successor, if she were selected by her party.

Plaintiff May Walker alleged that Defendant Carmelo Guiffre violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). After finding that Defendant violated the CFA and TCCWNA, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a fee award. The trial court fixed the lodestar amount and applied a forty-five percent contingency enhancement. The Appellate Division found that the trial court's analysis of the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorneys' hourly rate, based only on the judge's personal experience, did not satisfy the analysis found in "Rendine v. Pantzer" (141 N.J. 292 (1995)). In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the "Rendine" framework had been altered by the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Perdue v. Kenny A. (130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010)). The Court concluded that the mechanism for awarding attorneys' fees (including contingency enhancements) as adopted in "Rendine" remain in full force and effect as the governing principles for awards made pursuant to New Jersey fee-shifting statutes.