Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several insurance companies initiated a federal lawsuit against a licensed acupuncturist, three professional service corporations under his control, and two unlicensed individuals. The insurers sought a declaration that one of the corporations was not entitled to no-fault insurance reimbursement for services rendered, alleging the corporation engaged in a scheme to pay unlicensed individuals for patient referrals. The payments allegedly violated New York’s professional conduct rules but did not involve the transfer of control over the corporation to unlicensed persons.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York found that the acupuncturist and his corporations had engaged in an unlawful fee-splitting and kickback scheme, violating New York law. The court ruled that this professional misconduct rendered the corporation ineligible for no-fault reimbursement under the relevant Department of Financial Services (DFS) regulation and granted summary judgment for the insurers. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the referral fees were paid but found it unclear whether this type of professional misconduct made the provider ineligible for reimbursement under the regulation. It certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of whether such misconduct, absent ceding control to unlicensed persons, permits denial of no-fault benefits.The New York Court of Appeals held that the DFS regulation does not authorize insurers to deny no-fault reimbursement based solely on a provider’s alleged professional misconduct, such as paying for patient referrals, unless that misconduct amounts to a failure to meet a foundational licensing requirement—specifically, surrendering control of the professional practice to unlicensed individuals. The court deferred to DFS’s longstanding interpretation that only licensing violations resulting in loss of eligibility to practice, as determined by regulators, justify denial of reimbursement. The court answered the certified question in the negative. View "Government Employees Ins. Co. v Mayzenberg" on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization based in Queens purchased a 73-acre parcel in the Town of Callicoon, Sullivan County, in 2018. Although the organization originally intended to use the property as a retreat center, testimony established that its actual use involved farming vegetables on about one cleared acre for charitable distribution to low-income residents in Queens. Occasional overnight stays involved religious activities, but there was no evidence of regular organized religious services or use as a retreat center. The Town Supervisor, who lived nearby and farmed part of the property without a formal agreement, confirmed the farming use but did not observe overnight retreats.After the Town Assessor denied a religious use tax exemption for the property for the 2021 tax year, the organization filed a grievance complaint, which was denied by the Town’s Board of Assessment Review. The organization then initiated an RPTL article 7 proceeding in Supreme Court, challenging the denial. A similar process occurred for the 2022 tax year, and both proceedings were joined. Supreme Court held a nonjury trial, found all witnesses credible, credited the organization’s testimony about actual use, and granted the petitions for both tax years, concluding the property was exempt. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with one Justice dissenting.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the lower courts applied the correct legal standards: the burden to prove entitlement to exemption rests with the party seeking it, while the burden to prove a zoning violation rests with the municipality. The Court of Appeals found record support for Supreme Court’s factual findings and concluded that the Town failed to prove a zoning violation sufficient to defeat the exemption for both years. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of First United Methodist Church in Flushing v Assessor, Town of Callicoon" on Justia Law

In this case, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) submitted a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request to the New York State Office of Court Administration (OCA) after a 2021 internal memorandum discussing a recent court decision was leaked and appeared to have been widely distributed to judges. The NYCLU sought documents created by OCA that provided instructions or guidance to judges on interpreting or applying legal authorities, aiming to understand the scope of OCA’s practice in issuing such memoranda.OCA’s Records Access Officer denied the request, arguing it was overly broad and that any responsive documents were exempt from disclosure as intra-agency materials and protected by attorney-client and work-product privileges. On administrative appeal, OCA maintained these grounds. The NYCLU then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Supreme Court, New York County, partially granted the request, finding it sufficiently specific and rejecting the privilege claims. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, holding the request was overbroad and, alternatively, that the documents were exempt under attorney-client and work-product privileges. The NYCLU was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals held that the parties now agree a specific, identifiable set of documents exists that is responsive to the request and can be located by OCA. The Court further held that OCA is not entitled to a blanket attorney-client privilege exemption for all such documents without demonstrating an attorney-client relationship with all Unified Court System judges or reviewing specific documents. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings, including in camera review of any documents over which OCA continues to assert privilege. View "New York Civil Liberties Union v. State Office of Court Administration" on Justia Law

The petitioner submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) to the New York City Department of Education (DOE), seeking all emails exchanged between the DOE and a specific domain name over a period from April 2021 to August 2022. The DOE responded that the request did not "reasonably describe" the records because it could not conduct an effective search with reasonable effort, citing technical difficulties in searching its vast email database. The DOE asked the petitioner to narrow the request, but when the petitioner declined, the DOE treated the request as withdrawn.On administrative appeal, the DOE maintained that the request was not reasonably described, as its electronic searches failed to execute due to the large number of email accounts. The petitioner then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding, seeking a court order for the DOE to provide the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that the request did not meet the statutory requirement of being "reasonably described" because the DOE could not retrieve the documents through a reasonable electronic search.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the lower courts and the DOE had improperly conflated the requirement that a request "reasonably describe" the records with the separate requirement that an agency retrieve records if it can do so with reasonable effort. The Court clarified that a request is reasonably described if the agency understands what is sought and knows where to look, regardless of the effort required to retrieve it. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the matter to the DOE for a new determination under the correct legal standard, requiring separate consideration of whether the request was reasonably described and whether the records can be retrieved with reasonable effort. View "Wagner v New York City Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

In 2019, the New York Legislature enacted the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (HSTPA), expanding rent stabilization to all municipalities in the state. The City of Kingston declared a housing emergency on August 1, 2022, opting into the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA). Petitioners, a group of landlords, sought to invalidate Kingston's opt-in and two guidelines set by the Kingston New York Rent Guidelines Board (KRGB).The Supreme Court upheld Kingston's emergency declaration, finding the city's survey methodology reasonable. However, it vacated the KRGB guidelines, ruling that the fair market rent guideline required a case-by-case determination and that the rent adjustment guideline lacked statutory authority.The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order, reinstating the KRGB guidelines. It held that the emergency declaration was based on a good faith study and that the fair market rent guideline did not require a case-by-case assessment. The rent adjustment guideline was also upheld, as the ETPA allows for rent adjustments without specifying that they must be upward.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. It found that the City's 2022 survey was reasonably reliable and relevant, supporting the emergency declaration. The court also upheld the fair market rent guideline, noting that it did not have an impermissibly retroactive effect, as no refunds were issued for periods before August 1, 2020. The challenge to the rent adjustment guideline was deemed unpreserved and not properly before the court. View "Matter of Hudson Val. Prop. Owners Assn. Inc. v City of Kingston" on Justia Law

New York City is legally required to provide health insurance coverage for its retired employees. For over 50 years, the City offered a choice of health insurance plans, including Medicare supplemental plans and Medicare Advantage plans (MAPs). In 2021, to reduce costs, the City decided to discontinue most options, including the popular Senior Care plan, and enroll all retirees in a custom-designed MAP managed by Aetna Life Insurance Company. Petitioners, consisting of nine retirees and one organization, initiated this proceeding to prevent the City from eliminating their existing health insurance plans.The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners on their promissory estoppel cause of action and their claim under Administrative Code of the City of New York § 12-126 (b) (1). The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the City had made a clear and unambiguous promise to provide Medicare supplemental coverage for life and that petitioners reasonably relied on this promise.The Court of Appeals of New York reviewed the case and determined that the petitioners were not entitled to judgment on their promissory estoppel cause of action. The court found that the Summary Program Descriptions (SPDs) provided by the City did not constitute a clear and unambiguous promise of lifetime Medicare supplemental insurance coverage. The court also rejected the petitioners' alternative grounds for relief, including their claim under Administrative Code § 12-126 (b) (1) and the Moratorium Law. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings. View "Matter of Bentkowski v City of New York" on Justia Law

A group of nonpublic schools and organizations representing them challenged regulations issued by the New York State Commissioner of Education. These regulations required nonpublic schools to provide an education substantially equivalent to that of public schools. If a nonpublic school failed to meet this standard, it would no longer be considered a school providing compulsory education under New York law.The Supreme Court of New York upheld most of the regulations but invalidated the specific provisions that deemed noncompliant nonpublic schools as not fulfilling compulsory education requirements. The court found that these provisions exceeded the Commissioner’s authority. The respondents, including the Commissioner, appealed this decision.The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, ruling that the Commissioner had the authority to promulgate the challenged regulations. The court held that the regulations were within the Commissioner’s statutory authority and did not compel parents to unenroll their children from noncompliant schools or authorize school closures. One Justice dissented, arguing that the regulations exceeded the Commissioner’s authority.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The court concluded that the Commissioner lawfully promulgated the regulations, which simply enforced the statutory mandate that nonpublic schools provide substantially equivalent education. The court found that the regulations did not require parents to unenroll their children or authorize school closures but merely stated that noncompliant schools did not meet the statutory requirements for compulsory education. The court also addressed mootness issues related to recent legislative amendments but found that the challenge to the specific regulatory provisions remained a live controversy. View "Matter of Parents for Educ. & Religious Liberty in Schs. v Young" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether certain information about deceased individuals, retained and indexed by the New York State Department of Health (DOH), should be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The DOH already publishes an online database with limited information for deaths from 1957 to 1972. The petitioner, Reclaim the Records, requested disclosure of the same categories of information and any additional indexed information for deaths from all available years through 2017.The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered DOH to disclose the records, with social security numbers redacted. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the petition, concluding that the additional fields of information for deaths from 1957 to 1972, and all information from 1973 to 2017, were exempt from disclosure under Public Health Law § 4174 (1) (a) and that disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that DOH must disclose the same categories of information it already publishes online for deaths from 1957 to 1972 for all years through 2017. The court held that DOH had not shown that any exemption applies to these categories of information. However, the court also held that disclosure of a decedent's medical history, cause of death, location of interment, and whether they were buried, cremated, or made an anatomical gift would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and is therefore exempt from disclosure under FOIL. The court remitted the matter to the Supreme Court to determine whether DOH must disclose additional portions of its death indices containing other fields of information not addressed in the decision. View "Matter of Reclaim the Records v New York State Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

In 2019, New York City enacted Local Law No. 97, requiring significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from large buildings, aiming for a 40% reduction by 2030 and an 80% reduction by 2050, relative to 2005 levels. Shortly after, New York State passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act), targeting a 100% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2050, with an interim goal of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Act tasked the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) with setting statewide emissions limits and established a Climate Action Council to develop a Scoping Plan for achieving these targets.Plaintiffs, representing residential buildings subject to Local Law No. 97, filed a declaratory judgment action claiming the local law was preempted by the Climate Act. The defendants, including the City of New York and its Department of Buildings, moved to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint entirely. However, the Appellate Division modified this decision, denying the motion regarding the preemption claim and affirming the rest. The Appellate Division held that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the Climate Act did not preempt Local Law No. 97.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the Climate Act does not preempt the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The Court emphasized that the Climate Act's legislative findings and savings clause indicate an intent to allow complementary local regulations. The Court concluded that the State did not express or imply an intent to preempt local efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and thus, Local Law No. 97 is not preempted by the Climate Act. The certified question was answered in the negative, and the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. View "Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. v City of New York" on Justia Law

Adam Schulze, a retired firefighter from the City of Newburgh, was injured on the job in 2012 and classified as permanently partially disabled in 2015. He received full salary payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and workers' compensation benefits until December 2015. In 2016, Schulze was approved for performance of duty (POD) retirement, entitling him to a 50% pension and supplemental payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2).A Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) awarded Schulze workers' compensation payments for periods before and after his retirement. The City sought reimbursement from these payments for its prior payments under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and (2). The WCLJ granted reimbursement for the period before Schulze's retirement but denied it for the period after. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld this decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing Matter of Harzinski v Village of Endicott, which held that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are not "wages" under Workers' Compensation Law §§ 25 (4) (a) and 30 (2).The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that neither Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) nor § 30 (2) entitles the City to reimbursement from workers' compensation awards for payments made under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). The court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are pension supplements, not wages, and that the statutory scheme requires the City to reduce its payments by the amount of workers' compensation benefits, not to seek direct reimbursement. The court concluded that the City is not entitled to reimbursement directly from Schulze's workers' compensation award for its prior payments. View "Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept." on Justia Law