Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A town and county squabbled in and out of court for five years over whether the county's department of human resources was required to provide the town with documentation of an employee's fitness to resume work before the town reinstated him to his position under N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 71. On the employee's second visit to the appellate division, the court concluded that section 71 did not require the department to provide the town with medical certification or an underlying medical report. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a civil service commission or department directs a municipal employer to reinstate an employee pursuant to a medical officer's determination of fitness under section 71, the municipal employer must immediately reinstate the employee, and a challenge to such a determination must take the form of a N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding. View "Lazzari v. Town of Eastchester" on Justia Law

East Midtown Plaza Housing Company, a limited-profit housing company organized under the Mitchell-Lama Law, sought to withdraw from the Mitchell-Lama program and become a private cooperative apartment complex. A vote was taken on a revised privatization plan, and the proposal would have been approved if the votes were tallied using a one-vote-per-share rule, but not if counted under a one-vote-per-household formula as directed by the certificate of incorporation and City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD). Following the vote, East Midtown filed a proposed second amendment stating that the plan had been adopted by the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the outstanding shares of East Midtown. The Attorney General refused to accept the amendment. East Midtown responded by commencing this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Attorney General to accept the second amendment declaring the plan effective and to direct HPD to recognize that the plan achieved the necessary two-thirds shareholder vote. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the courts below correctly held that the vote should be calculated using the one-vote-per-apartment formula, and therefore, the necessary two-thirds approval was not met. View "E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v. Cuomo " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a credit union, commenced this declaratory judgment action against Defendants, the state department of taxation and finance, its commissioner, and the state. The credit union asserted it was not required to pay the mortgage recording tax (MRT) on mortgage obligations issued to members because (1) the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) exempts federal credit unions and their property from state taxation, and (2) as instrumentalities of the United States, federal credit unions are immune from state taxation under the Supremacy Clause. Supreme court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, based on principles of statutory interpretation and the legislative history of the FCUA, federal credit unions are not exempt from the state's MRT. View "Hudson Valley Fed. Credit Union v. Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Court of Appeals considered whether a written letter from the assistant commissioner of the fire department of the city of New York to Petitioner firefighter advising him that he violated the department's code of conduct and equal employment (EEO) policy may be made part of Petitioner's permanent EEO file without affording him an opportunity for a hearing. The supreme court annulled the department's determination that Petitioner made racially offensive remarks and expunged the letter from Petitioner's EEO file. The appellate division affirmed, concluding that the department did not comport with the requirements of due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the department denied Petitioner his right to due process by placing the letter in his file without conducting a hearing, and thus the letter was properly expunged from Petitioner's permanent EEO file. View "D'Angelo v. Scoppetta" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a rezoning proposal for Sunset Park, a predominantly residential neighborhood in Brooklyn. Following public hearings, the Department of City Planning (DCP), the lead agency here, prepared an environmental assessment statement (EAS) and issued a negative declaration, concluding that the proposed rezoning would not have an adverse impact on the environment. Petitioners sought to annul the negative declaration on the ground that DCP's environmental review of the proposed rezoning was not in compliance with the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act and the City Environmental Quality Review rules. Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that DCP neither abused its discretion nor was arbitrary or capricious when it issued its negative declaration because in its EAS the DCP identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination.

This case arose when a mid-twentieth century historian sought disclosure of unredacted transcripts of interviews from a New York City Board of Education investigation, under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law 87 and 89, with people who were promised confidentiality and asked to provide the names of those who had been in the Communist Party with them. The court concluded that petitioner's constitutional arguments lacked substance and therefore dismissed the appeal as of right. The court granted the motion for permission to appeal, and modified the Appellate Division order, permitting the City to redact only names and other identifying details related to informants who were promised confidentiality.

Plaintiff, an employee of the New York City Fire Department, applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from the city. Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the city and its Parks and Recreation Department, alleging both common law negligence and a cause of action under General Municipal Law 205-a. The city moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, arguing that plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits barred his lawsuit. The court concluded that it was not the intent of the Legislature to allow recipients of workers' compensation benefits to sue their employers in tort under section 205-a. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Commission is constitutionally charged with the oversight of all correctional facilities in the state. At issue was the enforceability of a subpoena deuces tecum issued by the Commission commanding Elmhurst, a health care facility operated by HHC, to produce its records respecting its care and treatment of a specified individual, who, at the time of his pre-mortem hospitalization at the Elmhurst facility, was a correctional inmate in the custody of the city. In the proceedings resulting in this appeal, the Commission's subpoena was quashed upon the ground that it sought material shielded from disclosure by the physician-patient privilege. The court held that this was error that the records sought were not properly withheld from the Commission by reason of the asserted privilege and that the subpoena should be enforced.

This case arose when plaintiff worked as a collision shop technician and suffered several injuries on the job. Workers' Compensation Law 15(6) provided that compensation for any disability, partial or total, shall not exceed a fixed maximum per week. At issue was whether the application of the cap when an employee has received several awards for different injuries, at least one of which was a so-called "schedule loss of use" award being paid periodically pursuant to the pre-2009 version of Workers' Compensation Law 25. The court held that in such cases an employee's total weekly payment could not exceed the cap. The schedule award was not nullified by the other awards, but must be deferred until the time comes when the cap would not be exceeded. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings.

This case arose when claimant was working as a phlebotomist for New York Neurologic Associates when a computer monitor fell off a shelf and struck her upper back. At issue was whether the Worker's Compensation Board must infer, from the finding that a claimant withdrew from her employment due to an accident at her work place, that her post-accident loss of wages was attributable to physical limitations caused by the accident. The court held that the Board was not required to draw that inference. The Board could, but need not, infer that the claimant could not find a suitable job because of her disability. The court could not weigh the evidence or reject the Board's choice simply because a contrary determination would have been reasonable. Here, the evidence concerning the types of work that claimant had attempted to find and her lack of success in those endeavors, together with the absence of evidence of attempts to find less physically taxing work, constituted relevant proof adequately supporting the Board's determination. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the decision of the Board reinstated.