Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an employee of the New York City Fire Department, applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from the city. Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the city and its Parks and Recreation Department, alleging both common law negligence and a cause of action under General Municipal Law 205-a. The city moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, arguing that plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits barred his lawsuit. The court concluded that it was not the intent of the Legislature to allow recipients of workers' compensation benefits to sue their employers in tort under section 205-a. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Commission is constitutionally charged with the oversight of all correctional facilities in the state. At issue was the enforceability of a subpoena deuces tecum issued by the Commission commanding Elmhurst, a health care facility operated by HHC, to produce its records respecting its care and treatment of a specified individual, who, at the time of his pre-mortem hospitalization at the Elmhurst facility, was a correctional inmate in the custody of the city. In the proceedings resulting in this appeal, the Commission's subpoena was quashed upon the ground that it sought material shielded from disclosure by the physician-patient privilege. The court held that this was error that the records sought were not properly withheld from the Commission by reason of the asserted privilege and that the subpoena should be enforced.

This case arose when plaintiff worked as a collision shop technician and suffered several injuries on the job. Workers' Compensation Law 15(6) provided that compensation for any disability, partial or total, shall not exceed a fixed maximum per week. At issue was whether the application of the cap when an employee has received several awards for different injuries, at least one of which was a so-called "schedule loss of use" award being paid periodically pursuant to the pre-2009 version of Workers' Compensation Law 25. The court held that in such cases an employee's total weekly payment could not exceed the cap. The schedule award was not nullified by the other awards, but must be deferred until the time comes when the cap would not be exceeded. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings.

This case arose when claimant was working as a phlebotomist for New York Neurologic Associates when a computer monitor fell off a shelf and struck her upper back. At issue was whether the Worker's Compensation Board must infer, from the finding that a claimant withdrew from her employment due to an accident at her work place, that her post-accident loss of wages was attributable to physical limitations caused by the accident. The court held that the Board was not required to draw that inference. The Board could, but need not, infer that the claimant could not find a suitable job because of her disability. The court could not weigh the evidence or reject the Board's choice simply because a contrary determination would have been reasonable. Here, the evidence concerning the types of work that claimant had attempted to find and her lack of success in those endeavors, together with the absence of evidence of attempts to find less physically taxing work, constituted relevant proof adequately supporting the Board's determination. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the decision of the Board reinstated.

Petitioners provide protection and advocacy services to individuals with developmental disabilities. After receiving a complaint regarding the discharge practices of respondent, petitioners requested access to the clinical records of all individuals residing at two respondent facilities to investigate whether they were being denied the opportunity to live in less restrictive settings. Relying on Mental Hygiene Law 45.09(b) and 33.13(c)(4), petitioners asserted that they were entitled to unrestricted access to the clinical records. Answering a certified question, the court concluded that section 45.09(b) and section 33.13(c)(4) must be read in accord with federal law and that actively-involved family members could possess sufficient decision-making authority to qualify as legal representatives under the pertinent regime. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, and the case remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion and, as so modified, affirmed.

Plaintiff commenced this CPLR 78 proceeding to compel the District Attorney and the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law 84, et seq., to comply with his records requests regarding Avrohom Mondrowitz. Mondrowitz was convicted of multiple counts of sexual abuse involving young boys in 1984 and fled from the United States to Isreal. Plaintiff, an attorney and author, became interested in the case and made requests for information under FOIL. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's conclusion that the District Attorney had established that the materials requested by plaintiff were covered in their entirety by section 87(2)(3)(i) because it was related to an ongoing prosecution.

The Town commenced this proceeding to challenge the DEC's denial of portions of its request for information under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law 87[2][g]. Specifically, the Town, a municipality that obtained its drinking water from the Hudson River, sought information relating to the Hudson River dredging project and the availability of alternative water supplies for local residents. The DEC denied access to certain records exchanged with the EPA by invoking the FOIL exception for inter-agency or intra-agency materials. The court agreed with the Town that this exemption was not applicable under the circumstances presented and therefore modified the determinations.

Under Real Property Tax Law 523-b, the State Legislature authorized Nassau County to establish the Nassau County Assessment Review Commission (ARC) for the purpose of "reviewing and correcting all assessments of real property." At issue was whether the Nassau County Executive had the authority to terminate the commissioners of the ARC in the absence of cause, prior to the expiration of their fixed, statutory terms. The court found that RPLT 523-b and Nassau County Charter 203 were not incompatible and read them together to accomplish the clear legislative intent to protect the ARC from political influence. The court also concluded that the commissioners were not essentially at-will employees, subject to termination for any reason whatsoever. The court held that the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by granting judgment declaring that in the absence of cause, the County Executive did not have authority to remove the commissioners prior to the expiration of their statutory terms, and remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

RECAP, a tax-exempt charitable organization and owner of properties in the City of Middletown, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the City, challenging the legally of the City's tax assessments. In this appeal, the court was asked to determine the statute of limitations governing a taxpayer's claim against a school district for money had and received arising from an erroneous assessment of school taxes and when such claim accrued. The court held that Education Law 3813 (2-b)'s one-year statute of limitations applied and that the claim for money had and received accrued when the taxes were paid. Therefore, the court concluded that RECAP's cause of action for money had and received accrued when it paid the taxes. Even assuming RECAP's last payment was made "under protest" in October 2007, as RECAP claimed, RECAP did not commence this action until April 2009, outside the one-year statute of limitations, rendering RECAP's claim time-barred. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

This case arose when petitioner, owner of a residential apartment building, passed along the costs of a "major capital improvement" (MCI) to its tenants by filing an application with the DHCR once the work was completed. At issue was whether the DHCR was authorized to grant a MCI rent increase while at the same time permanently exempting particular apartments from the obligation to pay additional rent when circumstances warranted. The court held that DHCR had been granted such authority and, on this record, it was not arbitrary or capricious for DHCR to permanently exempt five apartments.