Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners provide protection and advocacy services to individuals with developmental disabilities. After receiving a complaint regarding the discharge practices of respondent, petitioners requested access to the clinical records of all individuals residing at two respondent facilities to investigate whether they were being denied the opportunity to live in less restrictive settings. Relying on Mental Hygiene Law 45.09(b) and 33.13(c)(4), petitioners asserted that they were entitled to unrestricted access to the clinical records. Answering a certified question, the court concluded that section 45.09(b) and section 33.13(c)(4) must be read in accord with federal law and that actively-involved family members could possess sufficient decision-making authority to qualify as legal representatives under the pertinent regime. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, and the case remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion and, as so modified, affirmed.

Plaintiff commenced this CPLR 78 proceeding to compel the District Attorney and the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law 84, et seq., to comply with his records requests regarding Avrohom Mondrowitz. Mondrowitz was convicted of multiple counts of sexual abuse involving young boys in 1984 and fled from the United States to Isreal. Plaintiff, an attorney and author, became interested in the case and made requests for information under FOIL. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's conclusion that the District Attorney had established that the materials requested by plaintiff were covered in their entirety by section 87(2)(3)(i) because it was related to an ongoing prosecution.

The Town commenced this proceeding to challenge the DEC's denial of portions of its request for information under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law 87[2][g]. Specifically, the Town, a municipality that obtained its drinking water from the Hudson River, sought information relating to the Hudson River dredging project and the availability of alternative water supplies for local residents. The DEC denied access to certain records exchanged with the EPA by invoking the FOIL exception for inter-agency or intra-agency materials. The court agreed with the Town that this exemption was not applicable under the circumstances presented and therefore modified the determinations.

Under Real Property Tax Law 523-b, the State Legislature authorized Nassau County to establish the Nassau County Assessment Review Commission (ARC) for the purpose of "reviewing and correcting all assessments of real property." At issue was whether the Nassau County Executive had the authority to terminate the commissioners of the ARC in the absence of cause, prior to the expiration of their fixed, statutory terms. The court found that RPLT 523-b and Nassau County Charter 203 were not incompatible and read them together to accomplish the clear legislative intent to protect the ARC from political influence. The court also concluded that the commissioners were not essentially at-will employees, subject to termination for any reason whatsoever. The court held that the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by granting judgment declaring that in the absence of cause, the County Executive did not have authority to remove the commissioners prior to the expiration of their statutory terms, and remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

RECAP, a tax-exempt charitable organization and owner of properties in the City of Middletown, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the City, challenging the legally of the City's tax assessments. In this appeal, the court was asked to determine the statute of limitations governing a taxpayer's claim against a school district for money had and received arising from an erroneous assessment of school taxes and when such claim accrued. The court held that Education Law 3813 (2-b)'s one-year statute of limitations applied and that the claim for money had and received accrued when the taxes were paid. Therefore, the court concluded that RECAP's cause of action for money had and received accrued when it paid the taxes. Even assuming RECAP's last payment was made "under protest" in October 2007, as RECAP claimed, RECAP did not commence this action until April 2009, outside the one-year statute of limitations, rendering RECAP's claim time-barred. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

This case arose when petitioner, owner of a residential apartment building, passed along the costs of a "major capital improvement" (MCI) to its tenants by filing an application with the DHCR once the work was completed. At issue was whether the DHCR was authorized to grant a MCI rent increase while at the same time permanently exempting particular apartments from the obligation to pay additional rent when circumstances warranted. The court held that DHCR had been granted such authority and, on this record, it was not arbitrary or capricious for DHCR to permanently exempt five apartments.

This case arose when petitioner, a tenured assistance principal in the City's public school system, approached a principal at a middle school in the district to request favorable treatment for petitioner's son, a teacher at the middle school. Petitioner subsequently commenced a CPLR 78 proceeding, seeking to prohibit the Board and the City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) from proceeding with petitioner's scheduled administrative trial. The court held that the Board was authorized to enforce the Conflicts of Interest Law, NY City Charter 2600-2607, against a public servant who was subject to discipline under section 3020 and 3020-a of the Education Law. As a result, the lower courts improperly prohibited the Board and OATH from proceeding with the administrative trial against petitioner.

This case involved a longstanding dispute over who bore the burden of paying the educational costs for the children of St. Basil, a child car institution located within the boundaries of the school district and housed primarily Greek Orthodox children whose parents were unable to care for them due to certain circumstances. The court concluded that the Education Law specified that children living in such institutions were not deemed residents of the school district in which the institution was located purely by reason of their presence in the institution; the issuance of a license to operate a child care institution did not change the residence of the children living there; and there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended the local school district to bear the entire financial burden for those children living in a child care institution. Therefore, the court held that a school district was not obligated to provide a tuition-free education to those children determined to be nonresidents of the school district.

This appeal involved litigation that arose from the 1993 terrorist bombing incident in the parking garage of the World Trade Center complex (WTC). At issue was whether the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) was performing a governmental or proprietary function in its provision of security at the premises. And if the Port Authority was engaged in such a governmental function, whether it exercised discretion in its security decision-making to entitle it to the common-law defense of governmental immunity. The court held that, pursuant to the court's precedents, the provision of security for the benefit of a greater populace involved the allocation of police resources and constituted the performance of a governmental function. The court also held that the governmental immunity doctrine required it to find that the Port Authority was insulated from tortious liability where the court afforded deference to the exercise of discretion by the officials of municipalities and governmental entities.

Plaintiffs commenced this hybrid declaratory judgment action/article 78 proceeding, seeking a declaration that the implementation of Local Law No. 3-2011 in relation to the November 8, 2011 general election was null and void for lack of compliance with the Nassau County Charter. At issue was whether the metes and bounds descriptions in Local Law No. 3-2011 applied to the 2011 general election or whether they were the first part of a three-step process to take effect in 2013. The court held that Supreme Court properly declared that Local Law No. 3-2011 was in accord with Nassau County Charter 112, but that its implementation was null and void in connection with the November 8, 2011 general election for lack of compliance with Nassau County Charter 113 and 114. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, without costs, and the order and judgment of Supreme Court reinstated.