Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose when petitioner, a tenured assistance principal in the City's public school system, approached a principal at a middle school in the district to request favorable treatment for petitioner's son, a teacher at the middle school. Petitioner subsequently commenced a CPLR 78 proceeding, seeking to prohibit the Board and the City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) from proceeding with petitioner's scheduled administrative trial. The court held that the Board was authorized to enforce the Conflicts of Interest Law, NY City Charter 2600-2607, against a public servant who was subject to discipline under section 3020 and 3020-a of the Education Law. As a result, the lower courts improperly prohibited the Board and OATH from proceeding with the administrative trial against petitioner.

This case involved a longstanding dispute over who bore the burden of paying the educational costs for the children of St. Basil, a child car institution located within the boundaries of the school district and housed primarily Greek Orthodox children whose parents were unable to care for them due to certain circumstances. The court concluded that the Education Law specified that children living in such institutions were not deemed residents of the school district in which the institution was located purely by reason of their presence in the institution; the issuance of a license to operate a child care institution did not change the residence of the children living there; and there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended the local school district to bear the entire financial burden for those children living in a child care institution. Therefore, the court held that a school district was not obligated to provide a tuition-free education to those children determined to be nonresidents of the school district.

This appeal involved litigation that arose from the 1993 terrorist bombing incident in the parking garage of the World Trade Center complex (WTC). At issue was whether the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) was performing a governmental or proprietary function in its provision of security at the premises. And if the Port Authority was engaged in such a governmental function, whether it exercised discretion in its security decision-making to entitle it to the common-law defense of governmental immunity. The court held that, pursuant to the court's precedents, the provision of security for the benefit of a greater populace involved the allocation of police resources and constituted the performance of a governmental function. The court also held that the governmental immunity doctrine required it to find that the Port Authority was insulated from tortious liability where the court afforded deference to the exercise of discretion by the officials of municipalities and governmental entities.

Plaintiffs commenced this hybrid declaratory judgment action/article 78 proceeding, seeking a declaration that the implementation of Local Law No. 3-2011 in relation to the November 8, 2011 general election was null and void for lack of compliance with the Nassau County Charter. At issue was whether the metes and bounds descriptions in Local Law No. 3-2011 applied to the 2011 general election or whether they were the first part of a three-step process to take effect in 2013. The court held that Supreme Court properly declared that Local Law No. 3-2011 was in accord with Nassau County Charter 112, but that its implementation was null and void in connection with the November 8, 2011 general election for lack of compliance with Nassau County Charter 113 and 114. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, without costs, and the order and judgment of Supreme Court reinstated.

Petitioners, 23 transportation vendors, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to prevent the Department of Education ("DOE") from implementing allegedly illegal bid solicitations related to a school transportation contract. At issue was whether certain specifications in the bid solicitations of the DOE comported with the public bidding laws. The court held that the "Employee Protection Provisions" ("EPPs") contained in the solicitation were subject to heightened scrutiny and held that the DOE had not proven that the EPPs were designed to save the public money, encourage robust competition, or prevent favoritism. The court, however, applied the rational basis review to the remaining disputed bid specifications and held that the DOE's actions regarding pricing of school transportation and discounted payment arrangements were rational business judgments that lie within the DOE's discretion.

Plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against defendant after she slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot owned and maintained by defendant. The appellate court held that defendant met its burden of demonstrating that it had not received written notice and that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing either exception to the written notice requirement. The appellate court also certified to the court the question of whether its decision and order was properly made. The court agreed with the appellate court and held that defendant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to correct any defect before being required to respond to any claim of negligence with respect thereto where the parking lot owned and maintained by defendant was accessible to the general public for vehicular travel. Accordingly, the order of the appellate division was affirmed, with costs, and the certified question was not answered upon the ground that it was unnecessary.

Respondent, a designee of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, petitioned for an order under Mental Health Hygiene Law 9.60 requiring assisted outpatient treatment ("AOT") for Miguel M. At issue was whether the Privacy Rule adopted by the federal government pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2, prohibited respondent from disclosing, at the petition hearing, records from two hospitals related to three occasions on which Miguel was hospitalized. The court held that the Privacy Rule prohibited the disclosure of a patient's medical records to a state agency that requested them for use in a proceeding to compel the patient to accept mental health treatment where the patient had neither authorized the disclosure nor received notice of the agency's request for the records. Accordingly, the medical records at issue were not admissible in a proceeding to compel AOT.

The Duchess County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed neglect petitions pursuant to Family Court article 10 against respondents, a mother and a father, alleging that father neglected his children because he was an "untreated" sex offender whose crimes involved victims between 13 and 15 years-old and mother allegedly failed to protect the children from father. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondents' children were neglected pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act. The court affirmed the Appellate Division and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove neglect where DSS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that father posed an imminent danger to his children and therefore, DSS necessarily failed to prove that mother neglected the children by allowing father to return home.

Petitioner, a New York City police officer, retired in 2004 and was awarded disability benefits. In the following years, the police department received information indicating that petitioner was not disabled; that he made false representations to the Police Pension Fund ("Fund"); and that he had ingested cocaine, thus becoming ineligible to return to duty. At issue was whether the city should continue to pay petitioner a pension. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's order annulling the termination of petitioner's pension benefits and held that the benefits can only be terminated by the trustee of the Fund, who has not taken necessary action.