Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that warrantless inspections authorized by New York regulations adopting a rule promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) requiring the installation of electronic logging devices (ELD) in commercial motor vehicles fell within the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.The FMCSA promgulated the rules at issue in 2015, and the rules were permanently incorporated into New York law in 2019. Petitioner commenced this combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging New York's adoption of the rule. Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that the searches authorized by the rule were valid under the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the lower courts properly determined that the ELD rule is constitutional; but (2) Supreme Court should have declared the rights of the parties rather than dismissing the complaint. View "Owner Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division concluding that the underlying challenge to Local Law No. 9-2014 was not time barred by either a four-month or a six-year statute of limitations, holding that there was no error.Local Law No. 9-2014 was adopted by the Town Board of the Town of Clarkstown in 2014 and purportedly set an eight-year term limit for all Clarkstown elected officials and required a supermajority vote of the Town Board to repeal. Appellees brought this action seeking a determination that the law was invalid because it was not subjected to a referendum of the Town's voters. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds. The appellate division declined to dismiss the actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed in each case, holding that, under the circumstances, the actions were not time barred. View "Hoehmann v. Town of Clarkstown" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that Taxi and Limousine Commission and New York City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and engaged in deceptive business practices under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.Plaintiffs, entities that purchased government licenses to operate taxis at an auction, brought this action alleging that Defendants (1) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to enforce certain licensing requirements against smartphone applicate-based competitors such as Uber Technologies, Inc. and Lyft, Inc.; and (2) engaged in deceptive business practices in their promotion of the auction. Supreme Court granted in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed in part and concluded that both claims should be dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not adequately plead a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to plead the type of conduct covered by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349. View "Singh v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Civil Service's (DCS) unilateral implementation of application fees for promotional and transitional civil service exams was not a term and condition of employment, as defined in N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 201(4), and therefore, the State had no obligation to negotiate those fees under the Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 200 et seq.The State offers the subject exams to provide qualified State employees an opportunity to seek other public employment. For at least ten years, DCS waived the application fees for employees represented by Respondents to take the exams. In 2009, DCS began assessing fees for the exams but did not collectively bargain with Respondents regarding the imposition of the fees prior to taking the action at issue. Respondents filed improper practices charges with the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging that by unilaterally imposing the fees the State violated Civil Service Law 209-a(1). PERB determined that the subject was mandatorily negotiable and that the State's past practice of not charging such fees was enforceable. The Appellate Division dismissed the State's ensuing petition seeking to annul PERB's determinations. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that PERB's determination conflicted with Civil Service Law 201(4) and this Court's precedent. View "State v. New York State Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Department Environmental Conservation (DEC) may process renewal and modification applications when those applications seek to mine land that falls within the scope of an undisputed prior nonconforming use, thus modifying the judgment of the courts below and the DEC and remitting for further proceedings.At issue was whether the DEC was barred from processing applications, including applications for renewal and modification permits, for permits to mine in covered counties when "local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining uses within the area proposed to be mined" see New York Environmental Conservation Law 23-2703(3). Petitioners here sought to annul a modified permit granted to Respondent, the owner and operator of a sand and gravel mine. The applications at issue implicated some prior nonconforming uses that were undisputed and others that were disputed but not resolved. Supreme Court denied the petition, and the appellate division modified and affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed as modified, holding that because prior nonconforming use was not taken into account by either DEC or the courts below, remand to the DEC was required for further proceedings. View "Matter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dep't of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the two-hour rule in N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1194(2)(a)(1) authorizing a chemical test to be taken from a motorist based upon deemed consent is not applicable to a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) license revocation hearing held pursuant to N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1194(2)(c) after a motorist's refusal to submit to a chemical test.Petitioner was arrested for driving while intoxicated and refused to submit to a chemical test. An administrative law judge revoked Petitioner's driver's license, and the DMV appeals board affirmed. Petitioner then commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding seeking to annul the DMV's determination. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that Petitioner's refusal to submit to the chemical test was properly used in the administrative license revocation hearing, even thought the refusal occurred more than two hours after the arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DMV's determination was not irrational or affected by an error of law. View "Endara-Caicedo v. Vehicles" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York (BSA) interpreting the definition of open space within the meaning of the New York City Zoning Resolution to encompass rooftop gardens accessible to a single building's residents as long as the residents of each building on the zoning lot receive at least a proportionate share of open space, holding that the BSA's determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.Plaintiff commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding asserting that BSA's interpretation of open space had no legal basis under the Zoning Resolution. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that the definition of open space unambiguously required that open space be accessible to the residents of every building on a zoning lot. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BSA's application of the definition of open space to multi-owner zoning lots was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. View "Peyton v. New York City Board of Standards & Appeals" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the condition restricting entry upon school grounds on certain offenders is mandatory only for parolees who have been designated a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and are serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).Although Petitioner's conviction did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the statute, the Board of Parole determined that, because of his level three sex offender designation, Petitioner was nevertheless subject to the mandatory condition restricting entry upon school grounds. The Appellate Division granted Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus to the extent of annulling that part of the Board's determination that found Petitioner subject to the mandatory school grounds restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding than an offender must be serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and be a level three sex offender in order for the mandatory condition to apply. View "People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in these two criminal cases, there was no constitutional violation in the practice of temporarily confining level three sex offenders in correctional facilities, after the time they would otherwise be released to parole or postrelease supervision (PRS), while they remain on a waiting list for accommodation at a shelter compliant with N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified. At issue was whether the Federal Constitution allows DOCCS to place a SARA-restricted sex offender in an RTF or other correctional facility while awaiting SARA-compliant housing. The Court of Appeals held that the practice is constitutional. View "People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified.Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45(3), the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from an underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of an residential treatment facility (RTF). N.Y. Correct. Law 73(10) authorizes the DOCCS to use any RTF as a residence for persons who are on community supervision, which includes those on PRS. The Court of Appeals held that Correction Law 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the SARA, N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), after the six-month period specified in Penal Law 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. View "People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law