Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners were found not responsible for crimes they committed by reason of mental disease or defect. Petitioners were eventually released from confinement into the community, subject to a five-year order of conditions. The New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) later requested that the supervising court extend the order of conditions. In its proposed order, OMH asked the court to include an effective-evaluation provision, which would allow the OMH to seek judicial approval of a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility if Petitioners failed to comply with the conditions of their release and refused to undergo voluntary examination. Petitioners sought writs of prohibition barred enforcement of the effective-evaluation provisions, arguing that the provisions were inconsistent with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 330.20(14)’s specific procedure for recommitment orders. The Appellate division granted the petitions, concluding that the effective-evaluation provision was barred by the recommitment provisions in section 330.20(14). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 330.20(14) does not prohibit inclusion of an effective-evaluation provision in an order of conditions. View "Allen B. v. Sproat" on Justia Law

Petitioners and other members of the East Meadow Teachers Association displayed picketing signs from their cars parked where parents were dropping their children off at Woodland Middle School. The Board of Education of the East Meadow Union Free School District (District) charged Petitioners with misconduct related to the demonstration, claiming that Petitioners created a safety risk by parking their cars so that students had to be dropped off in the middle of the street instead of at curbside. Petitioners were found guilty of misconduct. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings against them violated their right to free speech. Supreme Court denied the petitions. The Appellate Division reversed after applying the two-part balancing test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the picketing demonstration was a form of speech protected by the First Amendment; but (2) Petitioners’ interests in engaging in constitutionally protected speech in the particular manner they employed on the day in question were outweighed by the District’s interests in safeguarding students and maintaining effective operations at the middle school. View "Santer v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioners were two medical providers whose patients included individuals insured by the State’s primary health benefit plan. The State Comptroller reviewed Petitioners’ billing records as part of an audit of billing practices in the health care industry for claims paid by the State. While Petitioners conceded that the State paid eighty percent of the costs of their services, Petitioners challenged the Comptroller’s authority to audit their books. Supreme Court concluded that the Comptroller lacked constitutional authority to audit Petitioners because Petitioners were “not a political subdivision of the State.” The Appellate Division modified Supreme Court’s orders to reinstate the audits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State Constitution does not limit the Comptroller’s authority to audit, as part of its audit of State expenditures, the billing records of private companies that provide health care to beneficiaries of a State insurance program. View "Martin H. Handler, M.D., P.C. v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

This case arose out of dispute over the administration of a workers’ compensation self-insurance plan (“Plan”) administered by Herkimer County. Dozens of municipalities participated in the Plan, including the Village of Herkimer. In 2005, the County passed a resolution to terminate the plan. To ensure funding for outstanding workers’ compensation claims, the County created an Abandonment Plan that allowed municipalities to withdraw from the plan and pay a lump sum withdrawal fee. Several of the participating municipalities, including the Village, filed an action challenging the Plan and Abandonment Plan based on alleged mismanagement by the County. The County counterclaimed for breach of contract, seeking to recover the withdrawal liability. The County prevailed on summary judgment as to the liability on its counterclaim for breach of contract against the Village. After a trial on damages, the jury awarded the full amount of damages sought by the County against the Village. The Appellate Division affirmed the damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the fee for the Village’s withdrawal from the Plan reflected benefits to be paid in the future and therefore should have been discounted to its current value as of the date it was due. View "Village of Ilion v. County of Herkimer" on Justia Law

The Board of Managers of the French Oaks Condominium, a residential complex located in the Town of Amherst, commenced a Real Property Tax Law article 7 proceeding against the Town challenging the Town’s tax assessment of the development as excessive. A referee concluded that the Board established that its property was overassessed and directed the Town to amend its tax roll and remit any tax overpayments to the Board. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board did not rebut the presumption that the initial tax assessment was valid. View "Bd. of Managers of French Oaks Condo. v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) adopted amendments to regulations pertaining to the protection of endangered and threatened species. The amendments established a formal process through which individuals could obtain a permit to allow for the incidental taking of a threatened or endangered species. Before the agency implemented the regulations at issue, the Town of Riverhead and Twon of Riverhead Community Development Agency (collectively, Riverhead) challenged the amendments. Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, finding that Petitioners did not have standing. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners lacked standing based on their failure to allege an injury in fact and that Petitioners’ substantive challenges were not yet ripe. The Court of Appeals held that Petitioners could proceed with three of their procedural claims, as they alleged a sufficient injury regarding these claims, but Petitioners lacked standing with respect to the substantive causes of action, as those claims were not yet ripe. View "In re Ass'n for a Better Long Island" on Justia Law

In 2012, the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation executed a written license agreement with Chef Driven Market, LLC (CDM), which permitted CDM to operate a seasonal restaurant in the Union Square Park pavilion. Plaintiffs, Union Square Park Community Coalition, Inc. and several individuals, brought an action against the Department, its commissioner, the City, and CDM (collectively, the Department), seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief restraining the Department from altering the park pavilion to accommodate the restaurant under the public trust doctrine. The Appellate Division denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint, concluding that the seasonal restaurant did not violate the public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Department’s grant of a license to CDM to operate the restaurant in the pavilion was lawful. View "Union Square Park Cmty. Coal., Inc. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Parks & Recreation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the construction manager and owner of a building at a construction site, after a large, flat object fell and injured his hand. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a violation of N.Y. Lab. Law 241(6). Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, arguing the form that injured Plaintiff’s hand was not subject to the safety requirements of Industrial Code N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a). The Court of Appeals remitted the matter for further proceedings for a hearing on whether the object as issue was a “form” within the meaning of the Industrial Code. After a hearing, Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, concluding that the form at issue did not come within the coverage of the regulation or section 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and concluded that the Appellate Division’s order should be affirmed, holding that the language of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a) could sensibly be applied to the form that fell on Plaintiff’s hand. View "Morris v. Pavarini Constr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment when he was struck by a sheet of plywood that fell from a building under construction. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries and then filed this personal injury action. Thereafter, the insurance carrier for Plaintiff's employer filed a motion to discontinue Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff had no further causally-related disability and that he had no further need for treatment. The Workers' Compensation Board Panel (Board) affirmed. Subsequently, in this negligence action, Defendants moved for an order estopping Plaintiff from relitigating the issue of causally-related disability. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the determination of the Board was one of ultimate fact and thus did not preclude Plaintiff from litigating the issue of his ongoing disability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the issue decided in the workers' compensation proceeding was identical to that presented in this negligence action. View "Auqui v. Seven Thirty One Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

The New York City Department of Homeless Services (DHS) is the entity charged with providing temporary housing assistance to homeless men and women in the City. In 2011, DHS announced the adoption of a new eligibility procedure that required applicants to meet a need standard and to cooperate with investigations of need. The New York City Council brought a declaratory judgment action asserting that the new procedure could not be implemented because DHS failed to comply with the notice and hearing provisions in the City Administrative Procedure Act (CAPA). Supreme Court and the Appellate Court concluded that DHS violated CAPA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because DHS did not follow the notice and hearing steps necessary to formally promulgate the eligibility procedure, the provision was unenforceable until compliance was achieved. View "Council of the City of N.Y. v. Dep't of Homeless Servs. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law