Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees, three Nebraska non-profit organizations and a resident taxpayer, brought an action against the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission and its director, seeking a declaration that the Commissioner's regulations were illegal and void because the Commission had exceeded its authority under the Nebraska Liquor Control Act by classifying flavored malt beverages as beer rather than spirits, which were taxed at a much higher rate under the Act. The district court concluded (1) Appellees had standing to challenge the Commission's regulation, and (2) the flavored malt beverages were spirits under the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court correctly concluded that the taxpayer had taxpayer standing to assert this claim, and therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the nonprofits also had standing; and (2) the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by classifying and taxing flavored malt beverages as beer, as the Act unambiguously required flavored malt beverages to be classified as spirits.

During the November 2008 election season, parties Senate Majority Fund, LLC (SMF) and Colorado Leadership Fund (CLF) were registered with the I.R.S. as so-called "527" tax-exempt political organizations. In the run-up to the November 2008 election, SMF distributed eight printed political ads and one television ad and CLF distributed eight printed ads that were the subject of this dispute. None of the seventeen ads contained words or phrases that specifically directed the viewer to "vote for," "elect," "support," "vote against," "defeat," or "reject." Similarly, none of the ads included the phrase "[candidate] for [office]." The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of this case by an administrative law judge (ALJ) for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At issue is the meaning of "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate," as that phrase is used within the definition of "expenditure" in article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution, the Campaign and Political Finance provision. The parties contended that "express advocacy" encompassed only those advertisements that explicitly exhort the viewer, listener, or reader to vote for or against a candidate in an upcoming election. This included the use of so-called "magic words," as set forth in "Buckley v. Valeo," (424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)), as well as substantially similar synonyms of those words. Appellant Colorado Ethics Watch (Ethics Watch) argued that the category of advertisements that "expressly advocate" is more expansive and encompasses any advertisement that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The court of appeals rejected Ethics Watch's argument and held that, given the settled definition of express advocacy at the time that article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution was adopted, the category of advertisements that constitute express advocacy was intentionally limited to include only those ads that use the magic words or those that explicitly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate. After reviewing article XXVIII and the legal context in which it was adopted as a citizen's initiative in 2002 (known as Amendment 27), the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that "expenditure" was intentionally and narrowly defined in article XXVIII to include only "express advocacy," so that it covers only those communications that explicitly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate in an upcoming election. The Court affirmed the appellate court and remanded the case to the court of appeals to return to the ALJ to enter judgment consistent with the Court's opinion.

RECAP, a tax-exempt charitable organization and owner of properties in the City of Middletown, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the City, challenging the legally of the City's tax assessments. In this appeal, the court was asked to determine the statute of limitations governing a taxpayer's claim against a school district for money had and received arising from an erroneous assessment of school taxes and when such claim accrued. The court held that Education Law 3813 (2-b)'s one-year statute of limitations applied and that the claim for money had and received accrued when the taxes were paid. Therefore, the court concluded that RECAP's cause of action for money had and received accrued when it paid the taxes. Even assuming RECAP's last payment was made "under protest" in October 2007, as RECAP claimed, RECAP did not commence this action until April 2009, outside the one-year statute of limitations, rendering RECAP's claim time-barred. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Decedent was treated at a non-profit clinic, by volunteer physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services deemed those physicians to be Public Health Service employees (Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(o)), immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680. A suit against the U.S. was the exclusive remedy for alleged malpractice at the clinic. Decedent also treated at a facility where physicians did not enjoy those protections. Her estate sued the U.S., the clinic, the other facility, the doctors at that facility, and their physicians' group. The district court granted summary judgment for the clinic, predicated on immunity under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (NJCIA), and ultimately dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, except for remanding with respect to the physicians' group. The trial court properly held that the U.S. was immune from suit under the NJCIA, which provides that a similarly-placed private employer would be entitled to the defense. The court properly held that the treatment provided constituted emergency medicine, so that N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-41 applied and one of plaintiff's experts was not qualified to testify. The court erred in not considering treatment by a physicians' assistant in considering claims against her employer, the physicians' group.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a part of the United States Department of Treasury, froze the assets of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Oregon (AHIF-Oregon), a non-profit organization, and designated AHIF-Oregon as a "specially designated global terrorist" pursuant to Executive Order No. 13,224. AHIF-Oregon eventually filed an action asserting that the OFAC violated a variety of its statutory and constitutional rights. The Multicultural Association of Southern Oregon, which the government had not accused of supporting terrorism, challenged certain laws that barred it from providing services to designated entities such as the AHIF-Oregon. With the exception of one claim not at issue on appeal, the district court granted summary judgment to OFAC. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that substantial evidence supported OFAC's redesignation of AHIF-Oregon as a specially designated global terrorist, and the court affirmed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's due process claims. The court reversed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's Fourth Amendment claim and remanded for the district to determine what judicial relief, if any, was available. Finally, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' First Amendment claim.

King County sought ways to provide legal defense services to indigent criminal defendants. The County settled on a system of using nonprofit corporations to provide services funded through and monitored by the County's Office of the Public Defender (OPD). Over time, the County took steps to improve and make these nonprofit organizations more accountable to the County. In so doing, it asserted more control over the groups that provided defender services. Respondents are employees of the defender organizations who sued the County for state employee benefits. They argued the County's funding and control over their "independent" organizations essentially made them state employees for the purposes of participating in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Applying the pertinent statues and common law principles, the Supreme Court agreed that employees of the defender organizations are "employees" under state law, and, as such, are entitled to be enrolled in the PERS.

Appellants, nonprofit environmental organizations, appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered by the district court in an action against the EPA under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., challenging the EPA Administrator's failure to take action to prevent the construction of three proposed pollution-emitting facilities in Kentucky. The court held that the validity of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits issued under the noncompliant State Implementation Plan (SIP), and the possible invalidity of the amended SIP, sufficiently raised a current controversy to save the litigation from mootness. The court also held that the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not provide a cause of action to review the EPA Administrator's failure to act under section 7477 of the CAA because her decision was an agency action "committed to agency discretion by law." Therefore, the EPA Administrator's decision was discretionary and not justiciable and thus, appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Although the district court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court affirmed the district court's action because dismissal would otherwise have been proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Appellants, three Minnesota corporations seeking to advance their respective social and commercial interests, filed suit to enjoin Minnesota election laws on independent expenditures and corporate contributions to candidates and political parties and moved for a preliminary injunction. At issue was whether the district court erred in failing to grant a preliminary injunction because appellants failed to show a likelihood of success. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for an injunction where appellants were unlikely to prevail on the issue of whether Minnesota functionally retained a ban on corporate independent expenditures; appellants were unlikely to prevail on their claim of improper tailoring; and appellants were unlikely to prevail on the direct-contribution issue or the independent-expenditure issue.

The Polm Family Foundation ("Foundation") filed a suit in district court for a declaratory judgment that it was exempt from federal income taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). At issue was whether the Foundation qualified as a public charity under section 509(a)(3) of the IRC. The court held that, in light of the broad purposes mentioned in the Foundation's articles of incorporation, the court agreed with the government that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the Foundation would receive oversight from a readily identifiable class of publicly supported organizations. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Foundation did not qualify as a public charity under section 509(a)(3).